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The present book on Tang Junyi attempts to make his work accessible for con-
temporary philosophy and intellectual history. Although I have interpreted 
Tang’s works as an intellectual historian, I endeavor here to do more than think 
about him. I also think with Tang and, consequently, at times go beyond him.
It is admittedly not the case that all of Tang’s oeuvre equally deserves con-
temporary philosophy’s undivided attention. Indeed, some parts are best left 
to intellectual historians. Their examination can deepen our historical under-
standing of modern Confucianism, without necessarily having immediate rel-
evance for current discussions in international philosophy or political theory. 
Other parts, however, undoubtedly offer stimulating insights with respect to 
ongoing discourses, for example on modernity, in these disciplines.
The scope of the subject matter covered by Tang’s philosophy is vast. Readers 
can thus follow their own interests by perusing specific chapters. For those 
with little interest in political ideas and historical thinking, Chapters 8 to 12 
are of secondary importance. As regards the first three chapters, and Chapters 
5 and 6, they offer an examination of the historical and intellectual contexts of 
Tang’s Confucianism, as well as an analysis of the civil-theological framework, 
which is crucial for understanding his philosophical undertaking. Chapter 7 
should also be of interest for those readers who do not normally study politi-
cal philosophy. It shows how profoundly Tang’s thought differs from common, 
often uninspiring interpretations of Confucianism and its idea of man. In the 
same vein, Chapter 4 is meant to correct the impression that Confucians of 
the 20th century mostly contented themselves with defending “Chinese cul-
ture” and fighting cultural battles against Western influence. The fact that Tang 
was more concerned with general problems of modern life and exile is one of 
the reasons why his work rewards careful study.
Finally, it is not my aim to reconstruct Tang Junyi’s philosophy as a closed 
system free from inner contradictions. This would inevitably lead to ommis-
sions and misrepresentations of certain parts of his work. Nor do I wish to 
present a hermetic exegesis of his writings that would have little more to offer 
than a straightforward reading of his texts.
Research on the present work began more than fifteen years ago. Some 
parts have been published, in earlier versions, as articles in journals and col-
lective volumes. Chapter 4 is based on my “The Exilic Prism of Modernity: New 
Perspectives on the Post-War Philosophy of Tang Junyi;” Chapters 7 and 8 con-
tain some revised passages from “Tang Junyi, Max Weber und die Mächte des 
Dämonischen. Zum Politikverständnis eines modernen Konfuzianers,” and 
viii preface and acknowledgments
“Tang Junyi und die konfuzianische Erneuerung des chinesischen Staates;” 
Chapter 9 entails revised passages of “ ‘Confucian Democracy’ and its Confucian 
Critics: Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi on the Limits of Confucianism;” Chapters 
11 and 12 contain parts of “The Challenge of Totalitarianism: Lessons from Tang 
Junyi’s Political Philosophy.”
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CHAPTER 1
Tang Junyi’s Intellectual Endeavor
 A Journey into a Broken World
Tang Junyi conveyed a vivid impression of the huge distance between the 
Sichuan of his youth and the modernizing Hong Kong of the late 1960s in an 
interview that he gave to a student journal two decades after his emigration 
to Hong Kong in 1949. He revealed that his interest had been piqued by the 
American hippie movement after watching a documentary about Woodstock 
in a movie theater in Hong Kong. His comments are particularly illuminating 
not only because they highlight his extensive intellectual journey, but also his 
liberal mindset. For instance, he indicated his fascination with the fact that the 
hippies practiced a passive form of social protest, albeit without a clear objec-
tive. While he sympathized with the hippies, he critically observed that they 
had no adequate form of expressing their opinions or their longing for individ-
uality. They also had no real idea of how to proceed. At most, they seemed only 
able to engage in a form of protest that was specifically linked to their clothing 
and hair style. Tang believed that they ultimately did not know how to posi-
tively change the external world and thus resorted to transforming their own 
internal realities—their feelings—through another form of protest, namely, 
by taking drugs. While he was convinced that hippies lacked “inner peace” and 
individual strength, he also recognized that their music appealed to audiences 
despite its sense of despair and restlessness. What is more, even though he dis-
closed his conservative sexual morality in diagnosing an “indulgence in sexual 
life” in Europe and America (believing it to be a sign of the “degeneration of 
Western culture”1), he still refrained from condemning the hippie movement 
altogether.2
Woodstock might seem far removed for a Chinese philosopher who was born 
in suburban Southwestern Sichuan on January 17, 1909, four days before the 
reign of the second to last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, the  Guangxu-Emperor, 
1   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 325 (interview in the Mingbao 明報 from 
1974).
2   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 385, 393–394. The interview was 
published on August 7, 1970 in Zhongguo Xuesheng Zhoubao, No. 42.
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had officially ended.3 At that time, the Chinese state was rapidly disintegrating 
and many parts of the country were caught in the grip of tumultuous political, 
social, and intellectual change. Tang not only lived through these events and 
the upheavals of the following decades, but he felt compelled to make sense 
of them. His philosophical oeuvre, which reflects this endeavor, is marked by 
many achievements and failures, along with some surprises. Tang was one of 
modern China’s most prolific thinkers. He relentlessly produced his lifework, 
which spans a remarkable range of intellectual concerns, over the course of 
half a century.4 His life indeed seems to be characterized by a persistent effort 
to keep pace intellectually with an age of unprecedented cataclysms and recur-
rent political and social turmoil in China and the world.
Tang’s statements about the hippie movement are also remarkable 
because they reveal his open-mindedness toward social phenomena that 
must have been unsettling to a tradition-conscious thinker. Tang himself 
would have referred to his intellectual and personal attitude as “humanistic,” 
but it might also be called “liberal.” Liu Shu-hsien aptly sums up this attitude 
when he writes that “[f]or Tang everyone has to find the best for himself in 
the context given.”5 This liberal mindset was certainly prone to ambiguity, for 
while Tang upheld a culturally conservative world view, he was also convinced 
that a rigid insistence on traditional orders of political and moral values was 
untenable for modernizing societies. As a result, his reflection on modernity 
was largely free from schematic distinctions between (Chinese) tradition and 
(Western) modernity.
Tang maintained his liberal outlook in the face of hostile political tenden-
cies and historical turmoil. The most severe disruption in his life came in 
1949, when he left the Chinese Mainland for good. At the time he immigrated 
to Hong Kong, his life had probably not been in immediate danger, nor did 
Chinese communism likely pose a personal threat to him. Indeed, he had 
never publicly criticized the communists before his years in exile.6 This would 
3   For a brief biographical summary of Tang’s life, see the Biographical Survey at the end of this 
book. A major source for Tang’s biography, apart from Tang’s diaries, is Tang Duanzheng’s 
Chronicle of the life and work of Tang Junyi, see Tang, Nianpu; see also Tang Duanzheng’s Tang 
Junyi zhuanlüe.
4   In Tang’s thirty volumes of collected writings there are over 450 publications, including 20 
books; an index of these works can be found in Tang, Zhushu nianbiao, pp. 3–71; cf. also Feng, 
Tang Junyi xiansheng jinian ji, pp. 29–117.
5   Liu, Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy, p. 103.
6   Tang, Tang Junyi zhuanlüe, p. 50. Perhaps it was due to Tang’s reticence that Liang Shuming 
decided to write him a letter in December 1951 suggesting that Tang return to the Mainland. 
Li Yuandeng 李源澄 and Qian Ziyuan 錢子原 also wrote letters to the same effect. In a letter 
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change almost immediately after his arrival in Hong Kong. In the context of the 
Cold War period, he began to equate communist rule on the Chinese Mainland 
with totalitarianism, which, for him, was inextricably linked to modernity 
(see Chap. 12). Other aspects of modernity appeared on Tang’s philosophical 
agenda as well which were no less threatening to him. His reflection on the 
exilic experience was, above all, closely intertwined with a perceptive observa-
tion of modernity’s downsides. These included the experience of the individu-
al’s cultural alienation, social isolation, and intellectual marginalization. Tang 
once remarked that the contemporary situation of the exiled Chinese is char-
acterized by the fact that their “motherland has been destroyed and [their] 
home lost”7—that their hopes for their lives and educational ideals now “loom 
in the emptiness,” and they therefore “roam around” and are “carried by the 
wind.”8 In fact, Tang conceptualized the exilic experience as a sort of prism 
through which one could not only grasp the nature of modernity, but also con-
ceive of ways to cope with it. This interweaving of exile and modernity informs 
his reflection on the identity and stability of the individual self in modern soci-
ety (see Chap. 4).
At the interface between exile and modernity, Tang also pondered the 
aggressive colonization of human societies by hegemonic forms of instrumen-
tal rationality and an ensuing reification of social and cultural relations. This 
led to his diagnosis of the global unfolding of an instrumental type of modern-
ization that was posing a lethal threat to the remnants of intellectual traditions 
and established ways of life. In the wake of the communist takeover on the 
Chinese Mainland, he described this threat at times in a dramatic way, detect-
ing initial signs of a withering away of China’s humanistic culture. However, 
he insisted that a wholesale rejection of modernity was not feasible, and he 
was keenly aware of the dangerous implications of ideologies that prom-
ised fundamental solutions to the modern malaise. He also did not opt for a 
“Chinese” solution, for he knew that many emancipatory facets of political 
modernity—among them constitutional government, human rights, the rule 
of law, and democracy—had Western, not Chinese origins. The same could be 
said, by and large, of the dynamic process of industrialization and scientific- 
technological development. Significantly, Tang never subscribed to the type 
of historical speculation that predicted the emergence of a superior, predomi-
nantly “Chinese” form of  modernity. Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) had 
from January 1952, Tang reaffirmed to Liang his decision to stay in Hong Kong: Li, “Tang Junyi 
shujian xi nian xianyi bu ding,” pp. 119–120.
7   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, p. 470.
8   Ibid., p. 478.
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done this in his widely popular book Eastern and Western Cultures and Their 
Philosophies (Dong Xi wenhua ji qi zhexue) from 1921.9 On the contrary, Tang 
was convinced that modern societies were irremediably broken to the point 
where no single, comprehensive doctrine could adequately respond to their 
inherently ambiguous life-worlds.
Yet Tang was still convinced that members of modern societies needed to 
maintain, at least in some measure, an affirmative identification with cul-
tural life in order to instill meaning into their own ways of life—even if exist-
ing conditions were in turmoil and the given cultural contexts on the brink 
of disintegration. Otherwise, neither individuals nor collectivities would be 
able to uphold an authentic self-reassurance. Indeed, authenticity was one 
of Tang’s major concerns. Under the condition of an irretrievably alienating 
modernization, an effort of normative “reconstruction” was necessary since 
authenticity could no longer be understood as a historically given condition. 
Yet he disagreed with the reactionary forces that propagated a return to impe-
rial political and cultural traditions, a tendency which culminated under the 
dictatorial rule of Yuan Shikai in the mid-1910s. Tang’s stance was also critical 
toward the so-called movement for a “New Culture,” which began at around 
the same time. He was highly skeptical about the tendency of “New Culture” 
proponents to subject the modern plurality of Chinese life-worlds to totalistic 
forms of scientism. Despite these misgivings, his opposition to the movement 
remained limited to the intellectual sphere. The political goal of democracy, 
on the other hand, was not contested by the New Culture Movement or Tang’s 
modern Confucianism, nor was the basic understanding that the introduction 
of modern science to China was indispensable.
Overall, Tang’s diagnosis of Chinese modernity was bleak. This was espe-
cially true with regard to China’s prolonged failure in catching up with Western 
nation-states economically, and its inability to establish a robust demo-
cratic republic after 1911. Reflecting on China’s historical course, Tang faced 
9   While studying at Peking University from 1925 to 1927, Tang attended Liang Shuming’s lec-
tures on the eight stages of pursuing philosophy. After Liang was openly criticized by left-
ists when he delivered his public lectures, Tang, apparently sharing this criticism, stopped 
listening to Liang’s talks. What is more, Tang deemed Liang’s intuitionist philosophy too 
“subjective” and hence unreliable; see Tang, Nianpu, pp. 19, 23. Li Yufang and Zhang Yunjiang 
indicate that Tang also attended lectures by Liang Shuming on the “Eastern and Western 
Cultures and Their Philosophies,” but they do not substantiate this finding; see Li et al., “Tang 
Junyi qi fo gui ru zhi yuanyin chutan,” p. 21. According to the Nianpu, Tang had read Liang’s 
Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies in 1923; see Tang, Nianpu, p. 15.
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the uneasy reality that, except for the communist revolution of 1949, every 
other political revolution and use of military force had largely failed to pro-
duce any political and social stability. He thus drew the following fundamental 
lesson from China’s continuous failure to establish a new and stable type of 
political order: Any attempt to implement a totalistic, substantial reintegration 
of modern society would inevitably come at the cost of traditionalism, dog-
matism, authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism. What had to be acknowl-
edged instead was the insight that the justification of institutions, procedures 
and norms of collective life could no longer rest on claims to a higher, “sacred” 
truth. Tang was thus well aware of the fact that in global modernity there were 
both emancipative currents and an ever-looming tendency toward the oppo-
site, namely the totalistic reification of the human beings and their life-worlds. 
In Tang’s view, modern subjects were indeed in danger of falling victim to their 
own rebellion against the fetters of traditional societies and ideas. This para-
dox marks the point of departure for his project to reconstruct Confucianism. 
It is therefore more to the point to address this reconstruction as “modern” 
rather than simply as “new.” In fact, Tang hardly ever used the now common 
label of “new Confucianism” (xin ruxue 新儒學 / xin rujia 新儒家). The des-
ignation “modern” is also apt because Tang’s project is consistent with key 
ideas of the Western philosophical criticism of modernity raised during the 
20th century—whether in the context of philosophies of life, existentialism, 
philosophical anthropology, or political philosophy.
Tang occasionally termed his philosophical project “humanistic” (renwen 
人文) and contended that Chinese humanism would need to “expand” in the 
future to attain the position of a “world humanism.”10 The humanistic con-
cern of thinking through modernity entails, first of all, the quest for a “moral 
self,” i.e. a realization of man’s “moral nature.” Here, Tang harkened back to 
Confucian speculations about the individual’s access to the inner moral truth 
of human nature. In the 20th century, these speculations had to be critically 
reassessed under specifically modern conditions. Tang consequently elimi-
nated from his Confucian agenda the vain hope of overcoming the downsides 
of modernity by making an appeal to individuals to engage in ethical “self-
cultivation.” An uncritical belief in self-cultivation would make the individual 
highly susceptible to Weltanschauungen (world views) and political ideologies 
that proclaim the omnipotence of an ethical will in the realm of politics. Yet 
10   See e.g. Tang’s essay entitled “World humanism and Chinese humanism (Shijie ren-
wenzhuyi yu Zhongguo renwenzhuyi 世界人文主義與中國人文主義)” from 1959; 
reprinted in Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 44.
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the historical course of modernity, according to Tang, is not to be misunder-
stood as a process of inner-worldly salvation leading to the ethical realization 
of the good in human society.
Tang was equally skeptical towards reflections on modernity that simply 
adopt the “Western” perspective, no matter whether they are presented in 
the fields of social science, philosophy, or social criticism. But his skepticism 
did not prevent him from conceptualizing modernization as a globally ongo-
ing process characterized by the gradual evolution of traits typically associ-
ated with contemporary Western societies. He assumed that over the long run 
functional and institutional differentiations of spheres of action which were 
observable in Western societies would emerge on a global scale. This per-
tained, in particular, to the division of labor in industrial society, and, above all, 
to the division of spheres of law and morality. Indeed, this assumption is criti-
cal to Tang’s universalistic concept of modernity-as-modernization. It forms 
the basis for his claim that modernization will produce the political form of 
a constitutional democracy, together with an industrial society. Yet Tang did 
not ignore particular historical conditions and intellectual traditions—such as 
those in China—which could shape modernity in different parts of the world. 
On the contrary, in reconsidering China’s intellectual traditions in the broad 
sense, he fought against what he perceived to be manifestations of a “Western” 
colonial hegemony or even cultural imperialism in the spheres of education, 
science, the liberal arts, and public debate. A number of Tang’s writings from 
the exile period bear witness to his crusade, as does his affirmative, pan-Asian 
depiction of post-war Japan as a model for preserving indigenous intellectual 
and material culture under conditions of rapid modernization (see Chap. 4).
Since the early decades of the 20th century, there have been debates both 
inside and outside of China about Confucian alternatives to Western models 
of modernization. In many respects, however, the discussions have reached an 
impasse: Whereas some observers tend to depict Confucianism as a panacea 
for all kinds of political and social ills in East Asian and Western societies, oth-
ers consider it to be a mere vestige of imperial China that lacks any relevance 
for contemporary discourse on modernity. Tang Junyi’s modern Confucianism 
proposes a way to overcome this impasse by combining a critical reinterpre-
tation of Confucian thought with a careful assessment of achievements and 
failures in modern societies. Not only does an in-depth analysis of his project 
inspire a critical reexamination of key issues in contemporary Confucian dis-
course such as “Confucian democracy,” but it is also highly conducive for the 
discussion of issues that are critical to our understanding of modern China 
and Confucianism. Among these we find an ever-present concern in modern 
Tang Junyi’s Intellectual Endeavor  7
Chinese philosophy and politics, namely the question of how to conceptual-
ize the relationship between new “Western” types of political order and indig-
enous intellectual traditions. Equally significant, Tang’s philosophy yields a 
thought-provoking approach to understanding the individual’s vulnerability 
in the context of rapidly modernizing East Asian societies. What is more, by 
reflecting on exile—an experience with which he was intimately familiar and 
which marked the lives of many people worldwide in the 20th century—Tang 
presents a novel perspective on the modern malaise. Here, as well as in other 
respects, Tang’s own refusal to “Orientalize” his thinking is crucial, because it 
opens it up to broader philosophical debates.
 The Vantage Point of Modern Confucianism
To grasp the originality, but also the ambivalence of Tang’s modern 
Confucianism, discussion should not be limited to his moral reflection, reli-
gious thought, and academic philosophy.11 In the framework of Tang’s thought, 
it is indispensable to uncover the relation between moral, political, and reli-
gious concerns. Toward this end, one may discern three major stages in his 
11   For a compilation of Chinese and English research on Tang Junyi until 2008, see Chen, 
“Tang Junyi yanjiu gaikuang ji shumu wenxian suoyin.” So far, research on Tang’s philoso-
phy has focused on his metaphysical speculation about human nature and the human 
spirit’s access to the higher, transcendent realm of “Heaven.” This is somewhat surpris-
ing given the fact that, in international philosophical anthropology, the identification 
of the human being as an animal metaphysicum was by and large abandoned by the 
mid-20th century. Tang’s moral philosophy and his religious studies on the Confucian 
tradition also received considerable attention (for a monographic study see e.g. Kevin 
Shun Kai Cheng’s thesis: Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the 
Realization of Moral Life: A Comparative Study from 1995; in a Chinese version: Zheng, 
Tang Junyi yu Bate. Yi ge lunlixue de bijiao from 2002). A number of studies have been pub-
lished on Tang’s final two-volume monograph Life, Existence and the Horizons of the Mind 
(Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie); see e.g. Liang, Xinling jiu jing yu rensheng zhexue: 
Tang Junyi xiansheng “Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie” dao du (2006); Shan, Xin tong 
jiu jing: Tang Junyi zhexue de jingshen kongjian (2001); Steinbauer, Tang Junyis System der 
neun Horizonte des Geistes (2005); for a recent in-depth article on this topic, see Huang, 
“Tang Junyi de jingjie gantong lun: Yi ge changsuo lun de xiansuo” (2011). Several mono-
graphic studies on Tang that were published in Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan provide 
general surveys of his thought, with Li Du’s Tang Junyi xiansheng de zhexue from 1982 
being a pioneering study.
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philosophical lifework, which spanned a period of almost five decades.12 Prior 
to his years in exile, which began in 1949, he wrote two monographs deal-
ing with topics of moral philosophy and philosophy of life. He also published 
a considerable number of articles on Chinese philosophy, art and literature, 
Western philosophy, and contemporary political and social issues.13 In the 
second stage, from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, Tang concentrated on 
political philosophy, moral philosophy, philosophy of history, and Chinese 
humanism, while also developing the theological-metaphysical framework of 
his Confucianism.14 In addition, he addressed a wide range of issues in politics, 
society, and cultural life. Though he did not comment on contemporary issues 
as much as Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982) or Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1886–
1969), he continuously engaged in current affairs well into the 1970s by writ-
ing articles and giving interviews. The third stage can be roughly dated from 
the mid-1960s onwards until the end of Tang’s life, when he devoted most of 
his time to an extensive academic study of Chinese philosophy and a compre-
hensive metaphysical speculation about the spiritual and moral dimensions of 
human life.15
12   This division roughly corresponds to the one presented by Kevin Shun Kai Cheng, with 
the exception that I place Tang’s seminal study Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing in the second 
phase as the major work of his political philosophy. However, Cheng seems to overlook 
the importance of the middle period; see Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature 
of Ethics and the Realization of Moral Life: A Comparative Study, pp. 487–497. Tang’s own 
review of stages in his intellectual development appears to be somewhat haphazard. On 
the one hand, he applied a rationale of personal “spiritual” development; on the other, his 
evaluative criteria are more academic in nature; see ibid., pp. 500–501.
13   These two monographs are The Establishment of the Moral Self (Daode ziwo zhi jianli) and 
The Realization of Human Life (Rensheng zhi tiyan), both published in 1944. For research 
on the early phase of Tang’s work, see e.g. Fan, Tang Junyis Synthese chinesischer und westli-
cher Philosophie; Lai, Ti yong yu xin xing: dangdai xin ruxue zhexue xin lun, pp. 45–110. For 
a brief overview, see Huo, “Tang Junyi xiansheng de wenhua zhexue tixi—yi ‘Wenhua 
yishi yu daode lixing’ yi shu wei zhongxin,” pp. 97–111.
14   His major works from his middle period include the two-volume monograph Cultural 
Consciousness and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing; the manuscript was writ-
ten between 1947 and 1952; see Tang, Nianpu, pp. 67, 69, 119) and several volumes of col-
lected essays and articles: The Reconstruction of the Humanistic Spirit (Renwen jingshen 
zhi chongjian) and The Development of the Chinese Humanistic Spirit (Zhongguo renwen 
jingshen zhi fazhan) are particularly significant. At the beginning of his exile, Tang pub-
lished The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi), a 
monograph that marks the transition from the first to the second period.
15   These are the monograph series On the Sources of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue 
yuan lun) and the two-volume monograph Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie.
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It was during the middle period that Tang developed his understanding of 
modern Confucianism in terms of political thought. This effort rested on his 
conviction that the course of modernity might be influenced by those afflicted 
by it, even though modern societies appeared to organize collective life her-
metically. For Tang, there was still room for normative reflection and practi-
cal interventions in the modern world, provided that individuals were able 
to attain a thorough understanding of the process of modernity. The modern 
world, in other words, was still a political reality.
Most interpreters exclusively apply the label “philosophy” to Tang’s work, 
without addressing its framework as “theological.” However, Tang systemati-
cally developed the notions of “Confucian religiosity” to a degree that justifies 
the use of the label “theological” in this context. Some scholars actually qualify 
Tang’s “philosophy” by highlighting the religious aspects of his thought. Shun 
Kai Kevin Cheng, for example, concludes that “[t]his (i.e. Tang’s philosophy—
TF) can be considered as a fully incarnational philosophy where the decree of 
Heaven is fully incarnated within the nature of each and every human being.” It 
goes without saying that the word “theology” is used in the present study in the 
broad sense of the word. This is common nowadays in encyclopedias of theol-
ogy, with “theology” in the narrow sense denoting the monotheistic religions. 
When Tang outlined the theological framework of modern Confucianism in the 
late 1940s and 1950s, he may have felt that the term “theology” (shenxue 神學) 
was linked too closely to Christian theology. Be that as it may, he conceived 
of an inclusive concept of philosophy to absorb theological-metaphysical ele-
ments, referring to this framework variously as “philosophical,” “metaphysical,” 
or “religious.”
Tang summarized the far-reaching infusion of modern Confucianism with 
theological elements as a “philosophical faith” (zhexue de xinyang 哲學的 
信仰) (see Chap. 5). His project is therefore “modern,” not only in the sense 
of a philosophical reaction to the global impact of modernity, but also in a 
much more ambitious sense insofar as it aims to delineate a philosophical-
theological foundation of social modernity in (a future) China. To be sure, Tang 
recognized the secularized, “disenchanted” form of modernity. Nonetheless, 
he still identified modernity as the historical stage at which Confucian ideas 
of individual self-fulfillment, and hence freedom, can be realized to an 
unprecedented degree. In effect, he maintained that modern forms of collec-
tive life are to be understood as preconditions for the individual’s striving for 
self-realization. Faced with socioeconomic, political, and cultural alienation, 
individuals can, according to a Hegelian figure in Tang’s thought, overcome 
(aufheben) the antithesis between their goal of self- fulfillment and the “outer” 
forms of alienation. In order to come to terms with the modern experience of 
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alienation, they must analyze its historical formation and then discern how 
alienation and emancipation are interrelated. This very reflection is to be seen 
as an endeavor that actually befits the individual’s self-fulfillment. The latter 
does not require, if we are to follow Tang, a comprehensive remediation of 
alienation in modernity, nor should it be understood as a purely theoretical 
endeavor. Rather, Tang proposes to closely interweave normative reflection on 
the modern world and the quest for individual self-fulfillment. In this vein, 
Tang conceptualizes “inner sagehood” as the human being’s immediate real-
ization of the absolute or “Heaven” (tian 天). As Tang claims, the communion 
with “Heaven” instantaneously lifts the individual’s mind above its own limits. 
This ephemeral state of mind involves the cognitive act of “innate knowing” 
(liang zhi 良知), whereby the human mind gains intuitive access to the high-
est truth or principle. This is the broad perspective of Tang’s tenacious effort 
to reconstruct modern subjectivity on the basis of a Confucian civil theology.16 
He accordingly linked the notion of self-fulfillment with certain Confucian tra-
ditions and categorized it as a Confucian type of “religiosity” (zongjiaoxing 宗
教性) (see Chap. 5). Besides, Tang’s civil-theological understanding of “innate 
knowing” is clearly set apart from reinterpretations of “innate knowing” from 
the Republican period. He indeed refrained from harkening back to these ear-
lier reinterpretations and their critics.17
With the new conceptualization of Confucian religiosity, Tang’s civil theol-
ogy dissociates itself from the politico-religious tradition of Confucian cults in 
16   “Civil theology” will be used in the present study as a technical term for the analysis of 
Tang’s modern Confucianism. Even though he did not use the term “civil theology” to 
designate his brand of Confucianism, it is nonetheless useful for our purposes. On the 
different uses of the term as a self-referential marker and as an analytical concept in 
the Western context, see Sandoz, “The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy: Locke and 
His Predecessors,” p. 2.
17   In an article on the philosophy of Dai Zhen 戴震 (Dai Dongyuan 戴東原; 1723–1777) 
from 1927, Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) deplored the “recent” tendency in China to return 
to the philosophy of Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (Lu Xiangshan 陸象山; 1139–1192) and Wang 
Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) and their “philosophy of liang zhi.” Hu’s criticism was 
clearly leveled against Zhang Junmai and Liang Shuming; see Hu, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue, 
p. 140; on Liang Shuming’s interest in intuitionist philosophy (in Confucianism and in 
Henri Bergson’s vitalist philosophy), see Alitto, The Last Confucian. Liang Shu-ming and 
the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity, pp. 98–101. Before Hu Shi, it was Yan Fu 嚴復 (1853–
1921) who had sharply criticized Chinese intuitionist philosophy, and Lu Jiuyuan and 
Wang Yangming in particular, as an obstacle to scientific progress in China; see Kurtz, The 
Discovery of Chinese Logic, pp. 155–156. After 1949, Zhang Junmai attempted to interpret 
liang zhi in terms of philosophical rationalism; see e.g. Chang (Zhang Junmai), “Is there 
no Epistemological Background for the Chinese Philosophy of Reason?” pp. 130, 136–137.
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the late imperial period and from ill-fated attempts to install a Confucian state 
religion in early republican China. What it shares with the ideas of proponents 
of a Confucian state religion, such as Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章 (1880–1933), 
Yan Fu, or Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) who were active in the years 1912 
and 1913, is the intention to tie “Confucianism” to the normative foundations of 
the republic. Yet Tang’s notion of Confucian religiosity did not lend itself to a 
concept of republican “state religion” (guo jiao 國教) that tended to contradict 
the constitutional principle of religious freedom. It also was neither amenable 
to a religious reverence of the figure of Confucius (as in “Kong jiao” 孔教), nor, 
finally, to a dogmatism that hypostatized Confucianism as an authoritative 
religious teaching (as in “Ru jiao” 儒教).18
In fact, Tang did not assume that the truth of moral intuition (liang zhi) could 
be institutionalized, either in terms of religion or politics. He instead endorsed 
a view that highlights the religious and political elusiveness of absolute truth 
claims based on intuition. Due to this rejection of dogmatism, Tang’s civil theol-
ogy accords with the transcendental type of civil theology.19 “Transcendental” 
refers to the conviction that “secular ends can never really become sacred.”20 
The sacred, accordingly, is not considered to be substantially immanent to par-
ticular politico-religious institutions and practices. David Apter’s observation 
that “what there is of the sacred in Western secular government is the frame-
work itself”21 also pertains to Tang’s civil theology. The latter can thus be distin-
guished from the immanent type of civil theology, which “in its more archaic 
forms,” seems closely related to what David Apter calls the theocratic system.22 
Unsurprisingly, Tang rejected the idea that the government should implement 
a civil theology through direct legal means. The enforcement of the Confucian-
based civil theology by the government would have to be restricted to the insti-
tutionalization of religious tolerance. This orientation towards constitutional 
provisions for religious freedom shows that Tang’s Confucian civil theology 
concurs with liberal forms of civil or political theology. Specifically, it funda-
mentally accepts two major shifts in the history of Western political thought: 
18   For a concise overview of the different stages of controversies in China about Confucianism 
as a state religion during the first two decades of the 20th century, see: Kobayashi, “Some 
Political Aspects of the Problem of Confucian State Religion.”
19   For a definition of this type of civil theology, see Davis, “The Civil Theology of Inou 
Tetsujirô,” p. 3.
20   This is David Apter’s phrase (see his “Political Religion in the New States,” p. 67; here 
quoted from Davis, ibid.).
21   Apter, ibid., p. 76; quoted from Davis, ibid.
22   Apter, ibid.
CHAPTER 112
the emphasis on a notion of political reason, which allows room for the separa-
tion of ethics/religion and politics; and an acceptance of secularizing societies 
and the related repercussions in politics and law. Tang’s version therefore sets 
itself apart from imperial China’s civil theology23 by emphatically approving the 
introduction of modern rights and its accompanying institutions based on the 
rule of law.
The major political concern of Tang’s civil theology is therefore not to re-
sacralize the political and social institutions and customs, but to bolster the 
normative foundation of the republic’s democratic order. The aim of his civil 
theology is to foster the individual’s loyalty to the republican state and its lib-
eral constitution, while at the same time providing him or her with a new self-
image as a republican citizen. Toward this end, core concepts of the Confucian 
civil theology such as “innate knowing” and “inner sagehood” function as posi-
tive limit-concepts. They serve as a normative measuring stick and a spiritual 
vision for the modern subject in social and political life. There is, however, 
no promise of creating an ideal social life form or substantially reconciling 
the subject with the disenchanted modern world. The kind of reconciliation 
offered here requires that individuals perceive the modern forms of alienated 
social life as the necessary condition for their efforts to attain “inner sagehood.”
Consistent with this interest in the individual’s ability to cope with alien-
ation, Tang’s Confucian civil theology frames and unites his intellectual endeav-
ors in the fields of political philosophy, ethics, religious metaphysics, cultural 
philosophy, and the philosophy of history. Even though his writings in specific 
fields might be studied as isolated parts of his oeuvre, a sound understand-
ing of his project of modern Confucianism requires the close examination of 
the civil-theological axis. His modern Confucianism cannot, in other words, be 
detached from its theological underpinnings. A selective, post-metaphysical 
dissection of his work which disregards its civil-theological dimension would 
result in distortions and simplifications.
Tang’s civil theology cannot be productively compared with particular fea-
tures of Western civil theology without considering the question of how his 
civil theology relates to political philosophy. Even though he did not explicitly 
23   For an analysis of early imperial Chinese civil theology and its pre-imperial roots, see 
Weber-Schäfer, Oikumene und Imperium, pp. 17–22. Tang’s concept of civil theology 
is obviously also fundamentally different from what Max Weber had in mind when he 
described Confucianism as a civil theology which systematized and institutionalized 
political and social ethics of the Confucian elite in the context of late imperial China. 
On Weber, see Schluchter, “Einleitung,” p. 26.
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discuss this issue, Tang tried to reconnect political thought with a Confucian 
anthropological vision of human existence. It is, indeed, no exaggeration to 
say that Tang’s own political thinking finds its guiding principles in the civil-
theological limit-concepts of “innate knowing” (liang zhi) and the “sage” 
(sheng ren). His political philosophy hence relates these limit-concepts to 
political reality. Tang measures, as it were, political reality, its development, 
actions, institutional and symbolic orders, and structures against these guid-
ing principles. The civil theology thus forms the normative reference point for 
his political philosophy. In turn, the political philosophy serves the purpose of 
exploring, within the time frame of the modern world, the realization and tem-
poralization of civil-theological principles. Tang’s thoughts on such issues as 
the human will to political power, the relation of statehood and individual self-
fulfillment, the distinction of state and society, the world order of “ecumenical 
states,” the justification of democracy, the meaning and function of “humanis-
tic culture,” and civil religion in democracy, are thus closely intertwined with 
his civil-theological limit-concepts (see Chap. 5).
The range of issues covered by Tang’s political thought indicates that his 
civil theology is not to be understood solely as a reaction to the modern sub-
ject’s experience of alienation, but also as a reaction to political and religious 
violence in modern China. Tang’s outlook on China’s political history since the 
mid-19th century highlights such violent events as the rebellion of the Taiping, 
the Boxer Rebellion, the revolution of 1911, the Second Revolution that top-
pled Yuan Shikai, the rise of warlords, the Northern Expedition, the struggle 
between nationalists and communists in the 1920s and 1930s, and, of course, 
the communist victory in 1949.24 What has been said of John Locke as well as 
Hobbes and Spinoza may thus, mutatis mutandis, also be said with respect 
to Tang’ interest in civil theology, namely that “. . . his chief purposes were . . . to 
foster civic peace in the face of political and religious enthusiasm and vio-
lence.” Proponents of civil theology consequently acknowledged the “political 
necessity for a generally accepted account of the ultimate reality.”25 Whereas 
Hobbes and Spinoza sought to secure public peace through the enforcement of 
a broadly acceptable, doctrinally minimized form of religious belief, Tang, like 
Locke, viewed the idea of institutionally guaranteeing  religious tolerance as 
24   See for example Tang’s article from 1955 “The Logic of the Development of the Chinese 
Nation’s Political Consciousness in the Past One Hundred Years” reprinted in: Tang, 
Zhongguo renwen zhi jingshen fazhan, pp. 155–176.
25   Sandoz, “The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors,” p. 3.
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an integral element of civil theology.26 Civil theology itself, therefore, “was not 
a dogma; rather it marked the parameters of a conversation or debate which 
rested on the shared assumption that there was some correlation between a 
society’s religion and its government.”27
An essential distinction made by Western civil theologies concerns the pub-
lic cult and the “life of reason.” Whereas the former is a matter of faith and 
entails the representation of the “minimum dogma,” the latter pertains to the 
search for truth in philosophy and the sciences. This contrast became starker 
during the age of Enlightenment.28 Tang Junyi’s civil theology draws a similar 
distinction, even though he did not prescribe which parts of the Confucian 
rituals, if any, were to be “public” in character. Yet Tang’s delineation between 
the realms of Confucian religiosity, scientific truth-seeking, and politics corre-
sponds to their modern differentiation in functional and institutional spheres. 
The conflation of faith and knowledge was, according to Tang, to be achieved 
only in the individual’s inwardness. The public representation of Confucian 
religiosity was hence characterized by the absence of clerical institutions (see 
Chap. 10). Still, the Confucian-based civil religion was to produce a “funda-
mental consensus beyond public debate,”29 even though its symbolic repre-
sentation in the public sphere was much more subtle than in the case of its 
Christian counterparts.
As regards doctrinal aspects, there are further differences between Tang’s 
civil theology and both ancient and modern Western forms of civil  theology.30 
For one, Tang neither referred to a comprehensive theological system, nor 
26   On Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke see Ibid., p. 31.
27   Kidd, “Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America,” p. 1010; 
Sandoz traces the history of civil theology back to Plato, stating that Plato’s “analysis of 
the order of being, in relation to the true and political order as given in the Republic” 
entailed the assumption that “only after the true theology has been expounded . . . the 
truth of man can become thematic to the Republic.” See Sandoz, “The Civil Theology of 
Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors,” pp. 4–5.
28   See Sandoz, “The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors,” 
pp. 6–8; Sandoz refers in this context to the distinction between the “public system of 
divine worship” and “private worship” in the thought of Hobbes and Spinoza.
29   Ibid., p. 7.
30   Concise overviews of the conceptual development of civil theology in the Western con-
text can be found in Wacker and Manemann’s “ ‘Politische Theologie’. Eine Skizze zur 
Geschichte und aktuellen Diskussion des Begriffs,” pp. 28–65; Sandoz, “The Civil Theology 
of Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors,” pp. 2–10. In current usage, “civil 
 theology” and “political theology” have become interchangeable, especially once “politi-
cal theology” lost the negative meaning it had acquired in the 19th century.
Tang Junyi’s Intellectual Endeavor  15
 prescribed a religious faith based on divine revelation.31 What is more, when 
considering the question of how to arrange the relations between religious and 
political institutions, Tang hardly referred to extant clerical systems in China, 
such as Buddhist or Daoist churches. Nor did he contemplate a Confucian state 
cult. His Confucian civil theology, therefore, did not center on problems per-
taining to the relation between the church and the state, as was the case in the 
Western context.
Finally, Tang’s concept of civil theology differs from political theologies 
based on Christianity, Judaism or Islam, but also from China’s imperial civil 
theology, insofar as it does not serve to vindicate an existing political order. On 
the contrary, modern Confucian civil theology questions the legitimacy of the 
existing Chinese political regimes of the 20th century (both on the Mainland 
and in Taiwan). At the same time, it anticipates the future, “authentic” political 
form of Confucianism: liberal democracy. Tang consequently invests the intel-
lectual foundations of  liberal democracy with a belief that is consistent with 
Confucian religiosity:
He [who shares the Confucian faith that all human beings are natu-
rally endowed with humaneness—TF] can truly believe that everybody 
can become a Yao or Shun and that all human beings can ascend to the 
Heavenly kingdom. This is the Chinese Confucians’ great spirit of equal-
ity. (. . .) At the same time, this is also the last and only foundation of the 
comprehensive spirit of democracy as a whole. If you cannot attain this in 
[your] faith, you will certainly in the last resort be unable to truly believe 
in democracy, and one day you will not take others as [your] equal. By 
the time you wield political power, you will definitely not let those who 
are not equal to you in their personality have an equal share of political 
power. As a matter of fact, those in the early modern Western [world] 
who sincerely believed in democracy also often had this faith. In the end, 
the teachings of Jesus as well as those of early modern Western idealism 
can also share this [faith]. But those who usually discuss the theoretical 
foundation of democracy and freedom are not necessarily able to truly 
recognize that they will ultimately have to erect this faith and may be 
able to reach a high level thereafter.32
31   This is not to say that there are no systematic aspects at all in Tang’s theology which does 
include the outlines of a classification of religious doctrines; see below Chap. 5 and 10.
32   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 418–419.
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Obviously, the civil-theological outlook was not intended to evoke a passive 
attitude towards the modern world and its vicissitudes. On the contrary, the 
renewal of Confucian intellectual traditions was meant to foster an activistic 
form of inwardness in individuals which conformed to what Tang considered 
the preferable outer forms of modernity—i.e. a constitutional democracy and 
a pluralistic, industrialized society. These outer forms were to be vindicated, 
albeit not exclusively, in the language of China’s indigenous intellectual tradi-
tions (see Chap. 9).
Tang was not the only one to turn to Confucianism with such a liberal 
agenda in mind, even though his civil theology clearly stands out in terms of 
its complexity and scope. Apart from Zhang Junmai, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 
(1909–1995), and Xu Fuguan, liberal intellectuals like Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權 
(1897–1981) and Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973) also took recourse to 
Confucianism in order to foster acceptance of constitutional democracy in the 
period of civil war after 1945. Like Tang, both Xiao and Zhang did not interpret 
the concept of political freedom primarily from the “negative” perspective of 
the individual embracing his or her fundamental rights as means of a defense 
against the state. They did so from a Confucian (as well as Greek/republican) 
position that highlighted the aspect of freedom as expressed in the individu-
al’s right to participate in political life. This, in turn, would provide him or her 
with opportunities to actualize the natural dispositions, or “nature” (xing 性), 
of the human being.33 Xiao explicitly linked this interpretation of participa-
tion in political life with the teachings of Confucius.34 In a similar way, Zhang 
Dongsun discussed the notion of personal “self- attainment” (zi de 自得) from 
the Mencius in order to demonstrate that there had existed a positive concept 
of freedom in ancient China. He added that this concept indeed constituted 
one of the strong points of Confucian thought.35
This approach to a vindication of constitutional democracy in Confucian 
thought and language did not exclude criticism of extant types of Western 
democracy. The critique, however, like the description and analysis of democ-
racy, had to take a proleptic form. After all, Xiao and Zhang, as well as Tang 
after 1949, faced a Chinese reality that was unfamiliar with liberal-democratic 
institutions and values. Indeed democracy for Tang was one of the unrealized 
 
33   For Xiao’s concept, see his article “On the Freedom of Speech” (Shuo yanlun ziyou 說言論
自由) from 1940 in: Xiao, Xianzheng yu minzhu. Xiao Gongquan xiansheng quanji zhi ba, 
p. 29 and his Ziyou de lilun yu shiji, pp. 33, 59.
34   Xiao, “Kongzi zhengzhi xueshuo de xiandai yiyi,” p. 74; see also ibid., p. 69.
35   Zhang, Lixing yu minzhu, pp. 118–119, 123.
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goals of “modernization.” The objective, then, was to establish the normative 
and factual preconditions for the development of modern statehood, which 
would include constitutional government, the rule of law, and democracy. 
What was at stake, therefore, was not solely a justification of liberal democ-
racy, but equally the mobilization of intellectual resources to spur its forma-
tion. Henceforth, the Chinese should be able to describe themselves at once 
as Confucians and as the democratic authors of the laws that bind them as 
citizens. Under the condition of the state’s neutrality vis-à-vis the religious 
preferences of the citizens, China’s future political culture was to embrace a 
Confucian-based humanistic culture which could be made the object of cul-
tural patriotism. The latter would, moreover, promote commonplace attitudes 
of mutual respect for rights and religious tolerance in a Chinese democracy.
To be sure, Tang’s political thought is unmistakably marked by elitist ele-
ments. This should not be taken, however, as a contradiction within the liberal-
democratic outlook of his modern Confucianism. After all, “classical” European 
liberalism, as represented for example by John Stuart Mill, also abounded with 
elitist ideas, not all of which have disappeared in the many revisions of politi-
cal liberalism of the 20th century. It is therefore appropriate to call Tang’s posi-
tion generally “liberal,” especially given the persistent vagueness of the term 
“liberal.” Most problematic in this regard is without doubt the assessment of 
how Tang might have supported a “liberal” model for the economic order 
of modern societies. Since he neither discussed theories of capitalism or mar-
ket economy, nor devised an elaborate criticism of socialist economic models, 
his economic liberalism is much more a matter of uncertainty than his politi-
cal liberalism.
The picture is clearer with respect to the ethical dimension of his liberal 
thought. The civil-theological conception of man and the notion of an imme-
diate, non-discursive access to the highest truth constitute elements of a 
political anthropology with ethically “pluralistic” implications. The intuitive 
access to truth is only open to the individual’s subjective mind in a moment 
of immediate enlightenment. Accordingly, discursive truth claims can neither 
be justified with absolute moral certainty, nor attain uncontested political 
validity. Any deliberative or otherwise symbolically represented truth claim 
has to be seen as provisional and should be made with an awareness of its ten-
tative nature. By implication, this means that there cannot exist a human col-
lectivity that truly commands an access to absolute truth as collectivity, i.e. as 
a group that identically acts as an enlightened collective agent. Given Tang’s 
conviction that the absolute truth can only be grasped in an ephemeral intu-
ition in actu, which is non-linguistic in nature, no such truth possession can 
be objectified or permanently incorporated into ideologies or other systems 
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of thought. Neither can any political order as such be regarded as an immedi-
ate manifestation of an intuitively accessible, ultimate truth.
One of the major problems posed by the civil-theological foundation of 
Tang’s political thought is shared by many other schools, currents, and theories 
in the history of political thought—namely, the imposition that one is called 
on to believe in the notion of man and human nature as part of an underlying 
political anthropology. For the non-believer it is challenging, to say the least, 
to follow Tang when he maintains, on the one hand, that “innate knowing” 
entails a moment of sudden awareness free from any form of intersubjectivity, 
and on the other, that individual self-cultivation which is clearly dominated 
by intersubjective elements (e.g. moral practice) leads to “innate knowing.” At 
this point, Tang’s project of reconstructing Confucianism as a civil theology 
begins to break down—at least from the perspective of a political philosophy 
grounded in intersubjectivity. This does not mean, however, that it is a com-
plete failure. On the contrary, Tang’s civil theology encourages deliberation 
about central issues to political thought. This includes questions pertaining to 
the formation of political reason, the normative potential of Confucian tradi-
tions, and the secularization of pre-modern Chinese speculation in the trans-
national context of accommodating Western political ideas.
 The Watershed of 1949
Between 1934 and 1948, just five out of the considerable number of articles that 
Tang published during those years addressed political issues. They specifically 
dealt with Chinese nationalism and national consciousness and China’s national 
salvation movement. Two other articles from 1938 concerned China’s war of 
resistance against Japan.36 Tang appears to having taken very little interest in 
political issues at this time. The immediate inducement for turning his atten-
tion in this direction was the communist takeover on the Mainland. In an article 
published in 1955, he explained that prior to 1949 he had been generally confi-
dent with respect to China’s political prospects and had thus felt free to indulge 
in purely academic work, oblivious to the rising communist threat.37
After 1949, Tang was much more concerned with the fragility of individual 
subjectivity in times of revolutionary turmoil, ideological contestations, rapid 
modernization and, last but not least, exilic isolation. His Confucian philoso-
phy now took the form of an intellectual engagement that extended beyond 
36   Tang, Zhushu nianbiao, pp. 6, 9, 13–14.
37   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 7, p. 172.
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purely academic concerns. Significantly, at around the time he immigrated to 
Hong Kong and was developing his political ideas, he began to conceptualize 
his Confucian civil-theology. This endeavor was intimately linked to the events 
of 1949 and the new political constellation that emerged during that fateful 
period. Starting in the 1950s he indeed hardly addressed controversies about 
Confucian traditions or the historical reliability of Confucian scriptures from 
the Republican period. By all appearances, he was convinced that the cata-
clysmic events of 1949, the continuing process of global modernization, and 
the disruptions of the Cold War period represented challenges to the “human-
istic tradition” of Confucianism which greatly transcended those that had 
been previously raised in China. One can surmise that this was the reason why 
Tang very rarely mentioned earlier works by such prominent figures as Liang 
Shuming, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) and Zhang Junmai.
While the historical contexts of Tang’s initiation to political thought are 
fairly easy to discern, the same cannot be said regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the eventually drastic decline in his production of political writ-
ings. For reasons that remain unclear, Tang turned away from political phi-
losophy after the mid-1960s. This may have been due to the beginning of the 
so-called Cultural Revolution, with its crude anti-Confucian propaganda. 
During the 1970s, his rejection of the “Cultural Revolution” might have brought 
him somewhat closer to the anti-communist regime of the Nationalist Party 
(Guomindang; GMD) in Taiwan. Indeed, he gave an interview in 1974 that gives 
a glimpse of the enormous impact that the victory of Chinese communism and 
the subsequent events of the “Cultural Revolution” had on the intellectuals in 
exile.38 Tang further noted how strongly he reacted to film footage of the mass 
movements of the “Cultural Revolution” that was shown in movie theaters in 
Hong Kong around 1972, comparing such slogan shouting masses of people to 
the mass rallies that had taken place in Nazi Germany.39
During his years in exile, Tang’s judgments about the communist regime 
on the Mainland were consistently negative. In contrast, his attitude towards 
the regime of the GMD was much more ambivalent. This may be explained 
by the fact that, to begin with, Tang had been briefly employed by the bureau-
cracy of the GMD government during the Second World War. In 1939, he had 
accepted an offer to work as an editor on special assignment in the Ministry of 
Education in the war-time capital of Chongqing. At that time, he was assisting 
Chen Lifu 陳立夫, the Minister of Education, with a book project. Chen had 
been one of the chief theoreticians of the party’s right wing and an eminent 
38   See Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 311–333.
39   Tang, Nianpu, pp. 183–184.
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figure in the fascist-inspired “New Life Movement” instigated in 1934.40 Tang 
quit his position in the Ministry of Education after little over a year to teach 
philosophy at Central University (Zhongyang Daxue 中央大學) in October 
1940, which by then had been moved from Nanjing to Chongqing. In 1941, at 
age 32, he was listed by the Ministry of Education as being qualified for a posi-
tion as full professor.41 In the same year, he became the editor of the journal 
Ideal and Culture (Lixiang yu Wenhua 理想與文化), which headed up the gov-
ernment’s wartime effort to refute the Japanese militarist spirit and promote 
the general awareness of the superiority of China’s spiritual culture.42
During the post-war period, Tang’s view on the GMD vacillated between 
tacit acceptance, explicit praise of its success in economic and technological 
modernization, and open criticism of its post-war failure to establish a demo-
cratic government in Taiwan (see Chap. 9). His criticism culminated in an 
article from 1954 in which he called on Chiang Kai-shek to reaffirm that the 
presidency represented the whole population and step down as chairman of 
the GMD.43 Besides, looking back at the GMD’s political record prior to 1949, 
Tang criticized the GMD’s “fascism” after the dissolution of its first united front 
with the Communist Party of China (CCP) and during the war against Japan, 
when the fascist tendencies included a blind adoration for a spirit of war. He 
also condemned the fact that the GMD was still unable to attain a clear under-
standing of the (ethical) nature of the state and had thus failed to establish a 
modern nation-state.44 Moreover, he occasionally distanced himself in private 
from the regime of the GMD. For example, during a trip to Taiwan in August 
1956, he tellingly commented in a letter to his wife Xie Tingguang 謝廷光 (1916–
2000) that politics was not as progressive in Taiwan as industry, agriculture, or 
the military.45 Without doubt, Tang was neither in favor of a one-party state, nor 
did he sympathize with earlier efforts of the GMD to create mass movements.46
40   Tang, Nianpu, p. 37. According to Chen’s memoir, Tang had spent a half hour each day at 
Chen’s home to take notes; see Chang, The Storm Clouds Clear Over China: the Memoir of 
Ch’en Li-fu, 1900–1993, p. 248.
41   Tang, Nianpu, p. 46.
42   Ibid., p. 47. Tang wrote the initial editorial of the journal; among its contributors were 
Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming and Zhang Junmai.
43   See Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 257–258 (the article is 
entitled “Placing Hopes in the New Government” [Dui xin zhengfu zhi xiwang 對新政府
之希望]; Minzhu Pinglun, Vol. 5, No. 13; July 1954).
44   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 157–158.
45   Tang, Zhi Tingguang shu, p. 315 (letter from August 16, 1956).
46   Tang explicitly criticized the GMD for its mass campaigns, including the mass wedding 
ceremonies of the Republican period; see an interview from 1974 reprinted in: Tang, 
Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 329.
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Tang’s judgments about the GMD government between the 1940s and the 
1970s must be seen in relation to the major changes that resulted from 
the GMD’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949. This included the implementation of 
martial law, the thorough reorganization of the party in 1952 that solidified its 
one-party rule, and, eventually, the GMD’s gradual departure from harsh author-
itarianism during the 1960s. That said, the course of events on the Mainland 
after 1949 also seems to have profoundly influenced Tang’s attitude towards the 
regime of the GMD. In comparison to the communist efforts that were made 
to dismantle China’s cultural tradition and eliminate alleged enemies of the 
revolution, the GMD regime of the late 1960s appeared to be the lesser of two 
evils. For one, the GMD had reacted against the “Cultural Revolution” by insti-
gating a large-scale, prolonged movement for the “Revival of Chinese Culture” 
(Zhonghuo a wenhua fuxing yundong 中華文化復興運動) in 1966.47 Tang, 
however, was still far from being enthusiastic about the GMD. He declined, 
for example, an invitation to contribute an article to the Zhongyang Monthly 
(Zhongyang Yuekan) on the occasion of the GMD’s celebration of the 80th anni-
versary of the founding of Sun Yat-sen’s “Revive China Society” (Xing Zhong Hui 
興中會, 1894) in August 1974.48 Even though he explicitly recognized the GMD 
government as the government of China and annually attended the national 
day celebration of the Republic of China, he neither attended official celebra-
tions of president Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday, nor referred to Sun Yat-sen as the 
“father of the nation” (guofu 國父).49
Overall, Tang was a more outspoken critic of the GMD regime before the 
outbreak of the “Cultural Revolution” than he was afterwards. Although he 
travelled to Taiwan on two separate occasions during the 1950s and 1960s, 
meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國,50 he repeatedly 
voiced his skepticism about the GMD’s political agenda and its refusal to estab-
lish a democratic government. He thus deplored that the advances the GMD 
47   The campaign was officially launched by Chiang Kai-shek, who declared November 11, 
1966 to be the day of the “Revival of Chinese Culture”—a date that significantly coincided 
with Sun Yat-sen’s 101st birthday; see Tu, “Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong de shixian 
yu zhanwang,” p. 301.
48   Tang, Nianpu, p. 196.  .
49   Ibid., p. 196. Tang’s criticism of the indigenous Taiwanese movement (bentu 本土) in the 
mid-1970s should be seen against the backdrop of his endorsement of the Republic of 
China; see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 522–529.
50   In September 1961, while on a lecture tour in Taiwan, Tang visited the Central Party 
Committee of the GMD together with Xu Fuguan and allegedly discussed with Chiang 
Ching-kuo the idea that politics and culture should be relatively independent of each 
other; see Tang, Nianpu, p. 136. On the trips to Taiwan in 1956 and 1961 (five more trips 
followed in the 1970s), see Li, “Tang Junyi xiansheng yu Taiwan ruxue,” p. 719.
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had made towards “democratic, constitutional politics” and its democratic 
convictions were “questionable,” marking at most only a “beginning.”51 When 
reconsidering China’s political development in the 20th century in a three-
part article published in the Homeland Weekly (Zuguo Zhoukan 祖國周刊) in 
1958, he was also clear that the GMD had failed to establish true democracy 
in China.52 The GMD, for its part, leveled severe criticism against “overseas per-
sonalities” who were openly accused in a party journal in 1958 of playing into 
the hands of the Chinese communists. They were blamed for criticizing the 
political situation in Taiwan, even though they actually held anti-communist 
convictions. This criticism was openly refuted by Zhang Junmai.53 It is no exag-
geration to say that after 1949 an intellectual-political battle unfolded outside 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the interpretation and implications 
of “Free China.” Confucian intellectuals like Tang Junyi, Zhang Junmai, Mou 
Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan were unwilling to subscribe to the GMD’s definitions 
of “Free China,” Chinese nationalism, and Chinese culture. 
51   Tang, Zhongguo renwen zhi jingshen fazhan, pp. 175–177.
52   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 107–109. The article was entitled “The 
Practice of Democratic Ideals and the Consciousness of Objective Values.”
53   Zhang, Zhang Junmai yanlun ji. Yijiusijiu nian yihou, Vol. 1, pp. 123–124.
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CHAPTER 2
Critical Issues in Research on Modern 
Confucianism
 Stereotypes and Omissions
One of the reasons it is worth studying Tang’s modern Confucianism is 
because he did not fall into the culturalist trap of juxtaposing a universalis-
tic,  rationality-based Western form of modernity with an emergent, and alleg-
edly superior, Eastern one. He thus never maintained that by reconstructing 
Confucian traditions it was possible to find a cure-all for the downsides of 
modernity. In most cases, culturalist juxtapositions rely on a static conceptual-
ization of (Western) modernity that rests on makeshift analyses from the social 
sciences. Furthermore, there is often a strong normativist tendency to hyposta-
size the value orientations of individuals and groups who are afflicted by mod-
ern transformations and the presumed impact they have had on social history. 
Confucianism has been ascribed eminent importance as a cultural resource for 
the formation of such value orientations, and hence, for China’s course in the 
modern world. A culturalist outlook on the process of modernity was already 
common in the earlier critique of modernity in Western philosophies of life, 
whose representatives, above all Rudolf Eucken and Henri Bergson, had gained 
considerable influence in China in the early 20th century. Further congruities 
can be retraced to strands of European romanticism of the 19th century, which 
expressed skepticism towards scientific-technological world views. That said, it 
is possible to assert that the juxtaposition of Confucian traditions and Western 
modernity is actually a byproduct of earlier Western criticisms of modernity, 
which had been introduced to China alongside the dominant Western models 
of modernization. As a matter of fact, a considerable number of Confucian 
positions are, wittingly or not, “Westernized” in this sense.
Tang Junyi’s thought on the role of Confucianism in the contemporary 
world is not consistent with stereotypical Confucian models of modernity. He 
neither maintained that there are perennially valid ideas in Confucian politi-
cal and social thought, nor did he anachronistically insist on the unqualified 
validity of Confucian notions of rule, rituals, or self-cultivation. It is thus ironic 
that Tang’s modern Confucianism, and especially his political thought, are 
often discussed in an anachronistic way. The kind of anachronism at work here 
might be labeled an “anachronism due to topical omission.” To be precise, the 
problem is one of not addressing topics and questions that actually  constitute 
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key issues in the body of texts under examination. This neglect stems from 
a reductionist approach that interprets Tang’s writings through the lenses of 
Confucianism’s allegedly perennial concerns. Such distorted interpretations 
seek to reclaim Tang’s thought for a historical lineage of neo-Confucianism 
and, consequently, as a manifestation of “traditional” Confucianism in modern 
times. The very concerns of Tang’s philosophy that clearly distinguished him 
as a thinker of the 20th century, as compared to his Confucian predecessors, 
hence tend to be relegated to the background.
More generally, the narrowing of the discussion of contemporary 
Confucianism to such allegedly enduring Confucian concerns (e.g. the forma-
tion of the moral self, the role of rituals and hierarchies in social and political 
orders, and the transmission of authoritative scriptures) may simply accom-
modate expectations that a cultural code of “Confucian China” can be deci-
phered. In its extreme form, this produces the culturalist cliché of a Chinese 
modernity which is easier to understand than its Western counterparts due 
to its alleged Confucian identity. Anachronistic approaches based on topical 
omission bolster this reductionist culturalism and neglect issues in modern 
Confucian thought that do not coincide with the cliché of Confucianism or 
comply with the stereotypical dichotomies. This may help explain why those 
elements of Tang’s political thought which are highly critical of traditional 
Confucian ideas, or simply absent from the tradition, are readily overlooked by 
interpreters bound by commonplace views of Confucianism.
As a matter of fact, Tang’s political thought in general has only attracted 
scant attention. While such neglect may not be entirely caused by an anach-
ronism due to topical omission, it is nonetheless consistent with a reduction-
ist view of Tang’s modern Confucianism. In the Chinese-speaking world, the 
focus of research has been on Tang’s metaphysical speculation, moral philoso-
phy, religious thought and ideas on humanistic culture. Similar tendencies can 
be observed, for example, in the work being done on Tang’s long-time intel-
lectual companion Mou Zongsan.1 There is no comprehensive study on Tang’s 
1   Tang had first met with Mou in 1939; see Cai, Mou Zongsan xiansheng xue si nianpu, p. 9. 
The number of studies on Mou Zongsan’s philosophy clearly exceeds the number that has 
been done on Tang’s. What is more, there are some signs of an intellectual split among stu-
dents and followers of Mou and Tang in Hong Kong and Taiwan; for an excellent overview 
of research about modern Confucianism and the manifold attempts of Chinese scholars to 
identify intellectual schools and traditional teacher-pupil constellations with respect to 20th-
century Confucianism, see Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism” 
(on evaluations of Tang and Mou: pp. 40–41) and “The New Daotong” (on Liu Shu-hsien’s 
preference for Mou Zongsan in comparison to Tang: p. 66).
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political philosophy to date. Tellingly, in a recent collection of Confucian polit-
ical writings published in China, one finds an extensive collection of political 
texts by modern Confucian thinkers, but not a single one by Tang.2
Overall, the main body of research on Tang’s political thought is still very 
limited in terms of the quantity, topics, and analytical scope.3 The consequence 
of this precarious state is exemplified by a recent volume on contemporary 
Confucian political philosophy. It covers topics from the fields of political 
ethics to philosophy of law, but mentions Tang only in passing and without 
 reference to any of his writings on political philosophy.4 Such neglect of his 
2   See Wang (ed.). Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yanjiu.
3   Since the publication of the pioneering article by Liu Guoqiang in 1991 entitled “Tang Junyi 
de zhengzhi zhexue,” little more than a dozen articles on Tang’s political philosophy had 
been published by 2011, about half of them dealing with Tang’s concepts of democracy and 
freedom. Lau Kwok-keung’s article also deserves special mention for it offers a concise intro-
duction to other main topics of Tang’s political thought (including the concepts of state and 
power) and briefly discusses Tang’s interpretation of Locke, Hume, Bentham, Mill, Rousseau, 
Marx, and Hegel. In addition, Lau’s article discusses the relation between Tang’s political 
thought and his moral-metaphysical speculation. Last but not least, Lau draws the reader’s 
attention to Tang’s book Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, a major source for his political philoso-
phy. Thomas Metzger’s discussion of Tang’s political thought in Chap. 2 and 13 of his A Cloud 
across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories Today 
is pathbreaking in that it (re-)introduces Tang to an English readership outside the small 
circle of those who were familiar with Tang’s  philosophy—a task that Metzger had first taken 
up in his highly influential Escape from Predicament. Metzger’s conclusions are challenging 
in many respects and these will be discussed in the course of this book. Unfortunately, the 
scope of Metzger’s analysis is very restricted, for he excludes seminal texts of Tang’s politi-
cal philosophy. Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, for instance, is not discussed by Metzger at all, 
and the same holds true for some of Tang’s key texts from Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 
and Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian. It is in those texts that Tang developed his 
concepts of the will for power, evil and politics, all of which are crucial for an interpretation 
of his political thought. Zhang Xianghao provides a brief overview of Tang’s political ideas, 
including a criticism of Tang from an explicit Marxist-Leninist perspective; cf. Zhang, Tang 
Junyi sixiang yanjiu, pp. 145–168. According to Zhang’s interpretation, Tang failed to distin-
guish between the normative spheres of politics and morality. This inaccurate interpreta-
tion not only overlooks the critical import of Tang’s political philosophy, but falsely depicts 
him as a thinker still steeped in traditional Confucian political thought. As regards Tang’s 
conception of history, which is also relevant for his political thought, the recent monograph 
by Huang Zhaoqiang provides highly valuable insights; see Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang 
Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai.
4   See Angle, Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy. In his Sagehood: The Contemporary 
Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy, Angle speaks of Tang Junyi as “a good example” of 
an “antidemocratic elitist” among the “believers in sagehood,” bolstering this statement with 
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political thought is deplorable because it means an important voice is absent 
from the discussion of Chinese political thinkers of the 20th century. Tang’s 
concept of political power, his theory of state, his thoughts on the relation 
between state and civil society, his concept of politics, his analysis of totali-
tarianism, and his criticism of pre-modern Confucian political thought funda-
mentally challenge our common views on Confucian political philosophy.
There are a number of reasons for the silence that has long prevailed on 
Tang’s political thought. For one, his political ideas defy conventional assump-
tions about Confucian political thought and are thus unsettling for those 
seeking confirmation of hitherto unchallenged perceptions. This may also 
be said, incidentally, of Mou Zongsan’s political thought of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Tang’s and Mou’s depiction of the shortcomings of traditional 
Confucian political thought is one of the most insightful, if not searing, cri-
tique of Confucianism put forward in the 20th century.5
The reception of Tang’s political thought in Mainland China was limited up 
to the 1990s due to its strong anti-communist and anti-Marxist strains and the 
a reference to Metzger’s A Cloud across the Pacific. One can only guess that this misinterpreta-
tion is due to the very limited scope of the analysis of Tang’s political writings by Angle and 
Metzger; see Angle Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy, 
p. 181. Other recent studies that make limited use of Tang’s political thought include Joseph 
Chan’s Confucian Perfectionism. A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. Chan sets his 
study in a broader framework of contemporary political theory and makes suggestions for 
establishing democratic institutions based on Confucian political ideas (such as a “Second 
Chamber” in parliament which should function as a meritocratic counter-weight). David 
Elstein’s thought-provoking Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy is yet another 
example of a highly selective overview in the field. In discussing the political thought of what 
he calls “overseas new Ruism,” the author exclusively singles out Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, 
and Lee Ming-huei. There is also no mention of Tang’s political ideas in Lee Seung-hwan’s 
A Topography of Confucian Discourse. Politico-Philosophical Reflections on Confucian Discourse 
since Modernity.
5   For a discussion of Mou Zongsan’s critique of pre-modern Confucian political thought: 
Fröhlich, “ ‘Confucian Democracy’ and its Confucian Critics: Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi on 
the Limits of Confucianism,” pp. 177–183. An example of such eloquent silence is Cai Renhou. 
On the one hand, Cai draws attention to Mou Zongsan’s critique of Confucian political ideas 
for having failed to restrain arbitrary rule by emperors; on the other, Cai assumes that Mou 
favoured the “Confucian” idea of common welfare as embodied in the notion of “people as 
foundation” (min ben 民本). This conclusion is questionable, to say the least. After all, Mou 
wanted to examine why the foundations of constitutional government had not been concep-
tualized in Confucian traditions, which centered on the notion of the “people as foundation” 
(see Fröhlich, ibid.); Cai, Xin rujia yu xin shiji, pp. 45–46.
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pronounced criticism of the CCP. In democratized Taiwan, interest in mod-
ern Confucian political thought was generally quite narrow, probably in part 
due to the insistence of Confucian intellectuals on a depiction of “China” as 
a  unitary cultural nation. According to this conception, the Chinese cultural 
nation unfortunately exists for the time being in the political form of two 
nation-states on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This point of view obviously 
has little appeal to those who subscribe to the idea of a Taiwanese nation. In 
addition, even those Taiwanese and overseas proponents of a Chinese cultural 
nation who identified this notion with the Republic of China might not have 
been entirely at ease with Tang’s political thought because of his criticism of 
the GMD and its brand of cultural nationalism.
One further reason for this general silence is the excessive attention that has 
been given in recent years to a lengthy manifesto entitled A Declaration to the 
World for Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie), compiled by Tang Junyi 
and signed by Mou Zongsan, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan. First published 
in 1958 in The Democratic Review (Minzhu Pinglun 民主評論), Tang produced 
the manifesto within two weeks during an extended visit to the United States 
in June 1957. He discussed its contents either personally or in correspondence 
with Mou, Zhang, and Xu. A partial translation into Japanese was published in 
1959 in the journal Ajia Zasshi 亞細亞雜誌 and a complete English translation 
was made available in 1960 in the Taiwan-based journal Chinese Culture. Two 
condensed translations followed later.6 Conveniently, the manifesto, together 
with its English translation, seems to provide a comprehensive overview of 
modern Confucianism. Nonetheless, the reception of this text is problematic, 
for it is often not read for what it is—a manifesto that makes an appeal to its 
readers—but rather as a carefully argued philosophical text. The latter ten-
dency is no doubt partly due to its considerable length and its academic style. 
Yet, if the manifesto is read out of context, without reference to the many other 
texts written by the author in that era, it does not provide a reliable compass to 
6   See Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie. The manifesto was first published under the title “Wei 
Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan—women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji 
Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 為中國文化敬告世界人
士宣言—我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識” in: Minzhu 
Pinglun, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1.1.1958), pp. 2–21. For the Japanese version, see Ajia Zasshi 亞細亞雜誌, 
No. 25 (1959); for the full translation into English, see Chang (Zhang Junmai), “A Manifesto on 
the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture;” for partial translations into English, see Chang (Zhang 
Junmai), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, Vol. 2, pp. 1–29; Kramers, “Confucian 
Apologetics in Modern Times.” It must be noted that none of these English texts is free of 
terminological inconsistencies.
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Tang’s philosophy. A much broader analysis is therefore indispensable if one 
wants to avoid drawing inaccurate conclusions and missing important topics 
of Tang’s thought.
Discussions about the manifesto show, moreover, that the text has not under-
mined stereotypes of Confucianism that reduce the spectrum of Confucian 
political thought to such topics as the self-cultivation of political actors, rule by 
virtuous or meritorious persons, or the intimate relation between the spheres 
of the family and the state. Again, these stereotypes are prone to produce 
anachronisms by topical omission. One such anachronism is evident in the 
neglect of an issue which figured prominently in Tang’s thought: the nature 
and impact of totalitarianism on the contemporary world and its implica-
tions for constitutional democracies. Even though this issue is clearly linked 
to events and developments that dominated international political thought 
in the mid-20th century and was hence prevalent during a period in which 
projects of modern Confucianism evolved, the considerations of Tang Junyi, 
but also, for example, of Zhang Junmai or Xu Fuguan on totalitarianism have 
gone largely unnoticed to this day. This neglect has repercussions on recent 
research on “Confucian democracy.” The latter is generally still preoccupied 
by normativist attempts to link up pre-modern Chinese Confucianism with 
contemporary theories of democracy or general reflections about democratic 
societies. Against this backdrop, this study aims to show that a reconsideration 
of Tang Junyi’s political thought can shed light on a critical strain within mod-
ern Confucianism that has so far been largely ignored.
Like many contemporary intellectuals, Tang was aware of the fact that 
“Confucianism,” or the adjective “Confucian,” is often used as a vague denomi-
nator for a wide range of political ideas and practices that can serve to justify 
democratic, non-democratic, and even anti-democratic thought and institu-
tions. Yet Tang was not content with merely brushing over the entanglement 
of Confucian ideas and practices with non-democratic forms of government, 
before and after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. This com-
mon tendency is especially unsatisfying when a purportedly novel critique of 
Western-style democracies—and indeed even a superior concept of a future 
democracy—is presented in the name of Confucianism. It is not enough, 
therefore, to simply comb through classical Confucian texts in a highly selec-
tive manner in order to detect proto-democratic ideas. Equally unconvincing 
are arbitrary identifications of long-standing ideas, practices and institutions 
as ostensible “Confucian” achievements, no matter whether they pertain to the 
imperial civil service examinations, the political functions of imperial histo-
riography, or the “meritocratic” rules for the promotion and demotion of gov-
ernment officials. The problem here is that many political ideas, practices and 
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institutions like these evolved over long periods of time, and often without 
any connection at all to the “classical” works of Confucianism. Apart from the 
tendency to overstate the impact of Confucian thought at the expense of other 
political traditions (e.g. Legalism and Mohism) or in less prestigious, but in fact 
highly influential writings (such as manuals for imperial officials, legal texts 
etc.), there is a risk of committing stereotypical anachronistic distortions.7
Even if we were to concede that one might actually discern core democratic 
ideas in pre-modern Confucianism, their applicability to the political discourses 
of the 20th century and beyond would still present a major challenge. Unless 
time-honored Confucian traditions prove effective not only with respect to cri-
tiquing the shortcomings of contemporary democracies, but also, and equally 
important, those of contemporary non-democratic or  anti-democratic rule, 
they can only remain a dubious fellow-traveler of modern democratic thought. 
By the same token, it is not sufficient to simply espouse an intellectual “renewal” 
of Confucianism that contents itself with being able to explain the failure of 
Confucian traditions to establish democracy in China. If a reconstructed 
Confucianism is to function as an intellectual resource of democratic theory, it 
needs to prove that it can address fundamental challenges to democracy. These 
include, first and foremost, the totalitarian and authoritarian challenges that 
emerged in the 20th century.8 In as much as a renewal of Confucianism remains 
oblivious to such challenges, its critique (or affirmation) of extant democra-
cies must remain aloof to historical reality. What is more, given that the dis-
course on Confucianism and democracy is a fairly recent phenomenon that 
was accompanied throughout the 20th century by competing non-democratic 
7   The type of anachronisms at work here are of the kind that Quentin Skinner identified when 
he warned that “[a] given writer may be ‘discovered’ to have held a view, on the strength of 
some chance similarity of terminology, about an argument to which they cannot in principle 
have meant to contribute.” See Skinner, Visions of Politics. Volume 1. Regarding Method, p. 60 
(“Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas”).
8   It is well known that the concept of totalitarianism is highly problematic and gave rise to 
prolonged controversies in academic circles as well as in public discussions, not the least 
because it seems to imply a conceptual, functional, or otherwise detectable equation of 
National Socialism and Stalinism. Comparisons pertaining to the nature and function of 
death camps, to the ontological status of “class struggle” as compared to “racial struggle,” to 
the organizational structure of the regimes, and to the “difference between a state that com-
mits genocide and a genocidal state” are still controversial issues. In a review article from 
2006, Anson Rabinbach sums up this state of research by noting that “. . . until recently, few 
systematic comparisons on the current state of historical research have actually been under-
taken;” see Rabinbach, “Moments of Totalitarianism,” pp. 77–87 (for the above quotations, 
see ibid., pp. 77–78, 85).
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“Confucian” claims (ranging from calls for a Confucian state religion to vindica-
tions of authoritarian rule in terms of Confucian values in Taiwan, Singapore 
and South Korea), it is even more important to grasp Confucianism’s non- 
democratic or even anti-democratic undercurrents. This does not necessarily 
imply that modern Confucianism is inevitably vulnerable to being absorbed 
by anti-democratic ideologies or that it even contained proto-totalitarian 
elements.9
Just the same, it is regrettable that many contemporary advocates of 
Confucianism seem to take very little interest in analyzing anti-democratic 
currents in today’s world. To be sure, many of these advocates completely 
neglect the legacy of their predecessors, among them Tang Junyi, for whom the 
authoritarian and totalitarian challenges to democracy in the middle of 
the 20th century were of serious concern. His political philosophy may thus be 
considered “practical” in an emphatic sense. What is at stake here is the cred-
ibility of Confucianism with respect to liberal democracy. A critical interpreta-
tion of Tang’s response to totalitarianism, which has so far received only scant 
attention, is therefore all the more important (see Chap. 12).
As long as efforts toward Confucian revivals and reconstructions of 
Confucian humanism continue to neglect the darkest periods of the 20th 
century, they will continue to evoke uneasiness when it comes to the issue of 
the historical memory of post-war democracies. The fact that the Confucian 
revivals are currently flourishing on the Chinese Mainland, where the public 
memory of foreign and Chinese totalitarianism remains highly constricted by 
9   Gan Yang suspects continuities between “traditional societies” and “socialist states” that 
become manifest in the persistence of totalitarianism and a (totalizing) moral idealism. 
He ascribes to Confucianism strong moral- idealist tendencies and calls upon modern 
Confucianism to finally learn its historical lesson; see Gan, “Ruxue yu xiandai—jian lun 
ruxue yu dangdai Zhongguo,” pp. 607, 613–614. Xu Fuguan raised a similar criticism about 
Tang Junyi’s and Mou Zongsan’s modern Confucianism in the early 1950s; see Lee, Xu Fuguan 
and New Confucianism in Taiwan (1949–1969): A Cultural History of the Exile Generation, 
pp. 186–188, 192–204. More recently, Thomas Metzger presupposes with respect to modern 
China that what he calls “the four ideologies” (i.e. modern Confucian humanism, Chinese 
Marxism, Chinese liberalism, Sunism) were characterized by an “epistemological optimism.” 
He then suggests that his thesis “. . . that the structure of authority in China is closely con-
nected to a tradition-rooted, pervasive form of epistemological optimism contrasting with 
a much more pessimistic epistemology in Western liberal democracies meshes with Charles 
E. Lindblom’s view regarding the contrast between the epistemology of the latter societies 
and that of the U.S.S.R.” See Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between 
Chinese and Western Political Theories Today, pp. 175, 182.
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official ideological standards, only adds to this discomfort. The same might be 
said of the large-scale revival of Confucianism in post-war Taiwan. It began in 
the 1950s, again under conditions of an ideologically constrained memory cul-
ture, and intensified during the movement for the “Revival of Chinese Culture” 
from the mid-1960s onwards. For those who consider it crucial to maintain a 
historical awareness of the dangers of totalitarianism in contemporary dem-
ocratic societies, it is indeed difficult to fully approve the current Confucian 
revival agendas.
 Coherence and Comparison
Even though the present study does not conform to common approaches of 
comparative philosophy (for reasons that will be elucidated), it nonetheless 
entails elements of cross-cultural comparison. In order to adequately contextu-
alize the discourses under examination, two aspects deserve special attention:
First, it is necessary to address key aspects of conceptual transfers in mod-
ern Confucian philosophical discourses. This is even more critical given that 
modern Confucianism has deliberately produced an extraordinary blending of 
philosophical terminologies and intellectual traditions. The philosophical lan-
guage of modern Confucianism oscillates between modern and pre-modern 
European, American, Japanese and traditional Chinese philosophical vocab-
ularies, creating a discursive space of extreme permeability across cultural 
regions and historical periods. The appropriations of philosophical concepts, 
whether they stemmed from indigenous or exogenous discourses, greatly con-
tributed to the dynamic of modern Confucian thought. While the usage of 
familiar terms from Chinese sources might give the semblance of continuity, 
more often than not this was a matter of breaking up long-established con-
ceptual conventions “from within.” There is, for example, the notion of liang 
zhi, which figures prominently in modern Confucianism. From a diachronic 
perspective, it is noteworthy that in pre-20th century Chinese thought, liang 
zhi was a key term in moral philosophy and metaphysical speculation (e.g. in 
the school of Wang Yangming). In the case of Tang Junyi’s appropriation of 
liang zhi, the earlier moral-metaphysical meanings were retained, however 
with a fundamental shift towards an ontotheological dimension that is not 
to be found in earlier Confucian thought (see Chap. 5). From a synchronic 
perspective, the term “philosophy of history” (lishi zhexue 歷史哲學) that 
Tang and Mou Zongsan applied in the early 1960s can be taken as exempli-
fying a certain semantic strategy (see Chap. 11). By presenting their historical 
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speculation under the Western category of lishi zhexue—a term that was not 
available to Chinese thought prior to the 20th century—they unmistakably 
underscored that the function of modern Confucian discourse was to break 
with traditional forms of Chinese historiography. At the same time, lishi zhexue 
served to undermine contemporary currents in Western historical thinking of 
the 20th century by referring back to a type of historical speculation that had 
flourished in the 18th and 19th century. In addition to this, the usage of the term 
zhexue (as in lishi zhexue) served to put Western and Chinese “philosophy” on 
par with each other, hence functioning to leverage conventional Western, eth-
nocentric notions of philosophy in general and those European philosophies 
of history that excluded non-Western philosophical traditions in particular.
Second, the examination of modern Confucian discourses should obviously 
entail levels of social and intellectual contextualization, as well as an inter-
nal contextualization of ideas (in the broad sense) within an author’s oeuvre. 
“Levels” here relates, on the one hand, to the distinction between explicit tex-
tual references to certain historical or biographical constellations and, on the 
other, to references that the interpreter brings into play regarding given con-
texts. Take for instance Tang’s biographical account of his epiphany at age 26 
in his Life, Existence and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu xinling 
jingjie), or his mention of contemporary political events, such as the commu-
nist takeover on the Mainland. Beyond such explicit references, the interpreter 
might also find it conducive to consider, for example, the fact that Tang had 
briefly held a position within the GMD government, even though Tang does 
not elaborate on his collaboration with GMD right wing theoretician Chen Lifu. 
Certainly, such “external” contextualization on the part of the interpreter does 
not have to result in distorting claims about an objectified interpretation, but 
can help to explore Tang’s political background. As regards the level of inter-
nal contextualization of discourses, it is illuminating to compare, for instance, 
Tang’s conceptualization of a Confucian “main current” in the manifesto of 
1958 to other writings from the same period.
The present study neither describes Tang’s personality from a psychological 
point of view, nor does it strive to detect his allegedly original, inner motivation 
in producing his works. It is indeed a different matter to discern, as will be done 
here, Tang’s intentions on the basis of his ascriptions of meaning, purpose, and 
function to particular discourses in which he participated. Of central impor-
tance here is the epistemic status that Tang ascribed to “philosophy” as a disci-
pline, as a discourse, and as a way of life. In so doing, he referred to a particular 
taxonomy of knowledge which he derived from a civil-theological framework 
(see Chap. 5). Still, the question remains whether the  assumption that Tang’s 
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modern Confucianism is characterized by a “civil-theological framework” 
runs the risk of contributing to a so-called “mythology of coherence.” Quentin 
Skinner identified the latter as a serious flaw in the Western history of ideas 
that occurs when intellectual historians see it as their “task to supply these 
texts [under scrutiny—TF] with the coherence they may appear to lack.” Along 
similar lines, Skinner notes that interpreters ascribe to “the thoughts of the 
major philosophers a coherence, and an air generally of a closed system, which 
they may never have attained or even aspired to attain.”10 Skinner’s criticism of 
an excessive focus on coherence in historical interpretations is highly instruc-
tive, for it also pertains to misguided efforts to disclose the original motivation 
of a philosopher as a basis for an allegedly “true” interpretation. In its extreme 
form, this can involve the claim of privileged access to the philosopher’s hid-
den or latent intentions and self-understanding. From this vantage point, the 
interpreter assumes a position of analytical superiority, at times even vis-à-vis 
the philosopher him or herself. This is not to say of course that any attempt 
to retrace intentions is misguided per se. The writing of intellectual biogra-
phies, for example, may produce important psychological insights into the life 
and work of a philosopher. “Intention” in this case is rightfully understood as a 
psychologically informed concept in which the interpreter tries to empathize 
with the author in order to gain a better understanding of his or her subjec-
tive intentions. The present study of Tang Junyi’s thought, by contrast, is not 
an intellectual biography, and references to Tang’s biography are made with 
a more modest, hermeneutical purpose in mind. They either contribute to a 
general knowledge of Tang’s path of life, or shed light on certain aspects of the 
interpretation of his philosophical work on a secondary level. For example, 
Tang’s messianic zeal or his ambivalent judgments on the GMD may be further 
contextualized by references to biographical resources.
References to “intentions” in this study are, therefore, unburdened by the 
psychological task of a subjective analysis of the philosopher’s mind. They 
are rather understood, in line with Skinner, as intentions to act in the form 
of “illocutionary acts.” The latter are linguistic “entities with an essentially 
public character.”11 They can take the form of interventions into ongoing dis-
cursive contestations and comprise, for instance, the discussion of certain 
normative claims. Such interventions are to be examined against the back-
drop of respective linguistic conventions, i.e. the “locutionary force,” including 
common conceptual distinctions, shared identifications of problems, shared 
10   Skinner, Visions of Politics. Volume 1. Regarding Method, pp. 67–68.
11   Ibid., p. 97.
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vocabulary, etc. The illocutionary force of these acts is evident from the 
changes in the philosopher’s use of linguistic conventions.12 Even though 
this study does not strictly follow Skinner’s approach, his conceptualization 
of “intentions” informs its analysis of Tang Junyi’s re-appropriation of tradi-
tional Confucian terms and conceptual distinctions, together with Buddhist 
and Western intellectual traditions, to outline a civil theology in reaction to the 
failure of democracy in China.
The search for a closed system of thought is arguably even more likely to 
mislead interpreters of Tang Junyi’s work than an examination of supposedly 
hidden intentions. The voluminous scope of Tang’s complete works militates 
against gaining an overview of parts that seem to be systematically linked and 
those writings or passages that do not fit into a recognizable “system.” The 
identification of systemic coherence is made even more difficult by the fact 
that Tang was at times an impatient and digressive thinker. Apart from his 
more academic works such as the series On the Sources of Chinese Philosophy 
(Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun), his philosophical writings are often marked by 
greatly curtailed arguments and conceptual inconsistency. In fact, an inter-
preter of Tang’s work one would likely admit to being occasionally perplexed 
by his peculiar writing style and his readiness to make obscure allusions to a 
higher, non-discursive realm of spiritual existence at the cost of theoretical 
clarity. This lack of intellectual rigor is indeed challenging for anyone trying to 
follow his thought. These reservations aside, there is no doubt that Tang aimed 
for and managed to achieve a certain degree of philosophical coherence in 
his work. His monograph Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason is a prime 
example of this. Still, one need not go so far as to suggest that Tang created a 
“closed system.” I will argue instead in the present study that his oeuvre reflects 
a coherent philosophical/civil-theological framework. This is not to say that all 
parts of his work can or should be integrated into this framework—the inter-
pretation of Tang has to remain open to the possibility of non-coherence. The 
distinction between “closed system” and “framework” is admittedly heuristic. 
However, in response to Skinner’s warning against falling victim to the mythol-
ogy of coherence, one might add that not every effort to pinpoint comprehen-
sive philosophical coherence when interpreting seemingly loosely connected 
thoughts inevitably leads to distortions. Ultimately, the act of interpretation 
demands transparency with regard to one’s own projections of coherence. 
Undoubtedly, retracing a framework of coherence in Tang’s writings puts the 
12   Ibid., pp. 90–102, 91–127.
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interpreter at the risk of at least appearing as if he were still trying to uncover 
Tang’s hidden and only true intentions. This study has no such pretense.
It is therefore all the more important to show that the civil-theological 
framework of Tang’s modern Confucianism stands in contrast to the idea of a 
closed philosophical system that identifies conceptual thinking as the only “sys-
tematic” approach to truth. Indeed, Tang ascribed to philosophical discourse 
in general, and conceptual thinking in particular, merely an intermediate 
function with respect to the highest form of human cognition, i.e. the intui-
tive, non-reflective “innate knowing” (liang zhi) of the absolute (see Chap. 5). 
Significantly, Tang understood Confucian philosophy itself not as a unitary 
form of philosophy, but as a very comprehensive set of philosophies contain-
ing idealist, materialist, monist, pluralist, rationalist, or empiricist strands.13 
Overall, his modern Confucianism is only in a very limited sense the result of a 
specialized academic investigation into Western or Eastern philosophical writ-
ings and schools. It can be very difficult, if not altogether futile, to try to disen-
tangle the sometimes ambiguous, even contradictory reception of the Western 
and Eastern philosophical traditions. When looking back at his own intellec-
tual development in the middle of the 1950s, Tang frankly admitted that, while 
having studied books written by “thinkers of almost all philosophical schools,” 
he had never conducted “specialized research” into any of these philosophical 
schools. He rather made “choices” according to what he deemed to be true or 
false.14 Tang’s thought indeed remains elusive if it is interpreted solely from the 
standpoint of certain philosophical schools or currents. The closest Tang ever 
came to offering a conventional exposition of philosophical ideas was in those 
books and articles that were explicitly dedicated to an academic-philosophical 
readership, most of all An Outline of Philosophy (Zhexue gailun), an introduc-
tion to Eastern and Western philosophy, and the six volumes of the On the 
Sources of Chinese Philosophy series (1966–1975), which dealt exclusively with 
Chinese philosophy.
Trying to cope with Tang’s modern Confucianism by adhering to a strictly 
comparative approach can turn out to be disappointing, especially if one 
expects to learn a “method” of philosophizing from studying his work. 
13   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 363.
14   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 571. This admission can be confirmed by Tang’s 
diaries, which shed light on his reading habits. As his detailed listings of his daily philo-
sophical readings show, he rarely studied a particular philosophical work on two or more 
consecutive days. When he would continue his reading of a text, he usually did so after 
weeks, sometimes months—just as if he were again seeking further inspiration.
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When analyzed from distinctly comparative perspectives in a narrow sense, 
Tang’s writings seem to present a rampant and, at times, confusing array 
of  philosophical inspirations from other sources, defying a clearly demarcated 
philosophical reception. Yet, it would be a mistake to simply suppose that this 
is a case of misapprehension or an indication that Tang was an eclectic thinker 
in the negative sense. As mentioned above, his refusal to expound the modern 
Confucian project along fixed lines of conventional philosophical research, as 
well as the “unsystematic” mode of speculation result from the civil- theological 
taxonomy of “philosophy.” This does not mean that an informed discussion 
of Tang’s philosophy can afford to merely ignore his extensive philosophical 
readings. The present study rather aims to challenge the notion that modern 
Confucianism can be comprehended as the mere product of specific influences 
from Western or Chinese sources. Such a reception-based approach not only 
contradicts Tang’s own understanding of how to absorb Western and Chinese 
philosophy, but can also hardly avoid frustrating or even unsettling results 
(depending on one’s initial expectations). As I will discuss below, this holds 
also true for Tang’s own pursuit of Buddhist thought and German idealism.
Tang familiarized himself with Buddhism in an academic setting during 
his student days, when attending lectures by Yogācāra-inspired “Confucian” 
philosopher Xiong Shili.15 However, he admitted that he was unable to grasp 
Xiong’s famous A New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xin weishi 
lun 新唯識論) from 1932, and he appears to have kept his distance from Xiong’s 
philosophy, deeming it “too lofty.” In the same vein, he rejected Yogācāra 
Buddhism as a sort of “solipsism.” It is, therefore, hardly surprising that he 
did not subscribe to the teachings of Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943), 
who taught at the “China Institute for Inner Learning” (Zhina Neixue Xueyuan 
支那內學學院) where Tang’s father and Xiong Shili had studied Buddhism.16 
Even after abandoning the simplistic equation of “philosophy” with modern 
“Western” philosophy around 1940, he still declined invitations from both 
15   Tang first attended lectures by Xiong Shili when he was enrolled at Peking University from 
1925 to 1927 and then again when he studied at Southeastern University in Nanjing after 
1927; see Tang, Nianpu, pp. 16, 21.
16   See Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 568; Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, 
Vol. 24, pp. 470–471, 480; Tang, Nianpu, p. 23. Even though Tang was not a disciple of Liang 
Shuming and Xiong Shili, one might still agree with Ruichang Wang who states: “A few 
Confucian adherents such as Tang Junyi (1909–1978), Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), and Xu 
Fuguan (1903–1982) fled overseas and managed to develop significantly the conserva-
tive line of thought represented by Confucian masters Xiong Shili (1885–1968) and Liang 
Shuming (1893–1988) . . .;” see Wang, “The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary 
China,” p. 34.
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Ouyang Jingwu and Xiong Shili to continue his philosophical studies as their 
disciple. As the story goes, his suggestion that he would rather pursue broader 
interests in philosophy caused both Ouyang Jingwu and Xiong Shili to lose 
their temper.17
Notwithstanding Tang’s reservations about Ouyang Jingwu’s Yogācāra phi-
losophy and Xiong Shilli’s renewal of Confucian philosophy within a Yogācāra-
framework, there is only insufficient evidence to support Lao Sze-kwang’s 
contention that Tang’s philosophy was actually based on Huayan Buddhism.18 
Lao concedes that Tang’s alleged grounding in Huayan Buddhism would have 
given rise to a fundamental tension in Tang’s thought. He recounts how he once 
personally asked Tang how one might reconcile the fact that Huayan thought 
did not presume the existence of a factual reality whereas Confucianism 
indeed allowed for such a presumption. As Lao recalls, Tang did not have an 
answer to this question. Lao suspects that Tang had not reached a final con-
clusion about whether or not Confucianism had to assume the existence of a 
factual reality.19 To be sure, there is agreement in research that Tang, like Mou 
Zongsan, held Huayan thought in much higher esteem than Yogācāra. As Jason 
Clower observes, Tang relegated Yogācāra to the lowest position of Mahāyāna 
philosophy, treating it as “Huayan philosophy’s less perfect antecedent.”20 As 
Clower suggests, both Tang and Mou Zongsan considered Yogācāra thought 
to be “a dialectical stage in a certain process of philosophical development.”21 
This assumption about a dialectical sequence is consistent with Tang’s depic-
tion of the historical formation of Chinese humanism which also takes the 
form of a historical sequence. Here, Tang concluded that Buddhism in general 
had only partial access to the humanistic “main current.” Buddhism, in other 
words, was not to be taken as a framework for the reconstruction of China’s 
17   Tang, Nianpu, pp. 41–42; see also: Li et al., “Tang Junyi qi fo gui ru zhi yuanyin chutan,” 
p. 21.
18   Lao Siguang (Lao Sze-kwang), “Cong Tang Junyi Zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan 
Zhongguo zhexue de weilai,” pp. 20–21.
19   Ibid. Be that as it may, there is quite extensive research on Huayan-Buddhism in Tang’s 
Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun—yuan dao pian, which is one of his six volumes on Chinese 
philosophy.
20   See Clower, “Chinese Ressentiment and Why New Confucians Stopped Caring about 
Yogācāra,” p. 378. Clower refers in this context to Tang’s Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun—yuan 
dao pian (p. 407). Li Yufang and Zhang Yunjiang assume, too, that Huayan was Tang’s 
favorite Buddhist school, not only in terms of academic research but also more generally; 
see Li et al., “Tang Junyi qi Fo gui ru zhi yuanyin chutan,” pp. 21–22.
21   Clower, “Chinese Ressentiment and Why New Confucians Stopped Caring about Yogācāra,” 
p. 388.
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humanistic tradition. In this context, one even finds very negative assessments 
of Buddhism such as the assumption that, by the times of the neo-Confucian 
revival in the Song period, Buddhism had already turned into an individualis-
tic religion that was unfit to integrate diverging social currents.22 These kinds 
of critical statements are not unusual in Tang’s writings and are in accord 
with his depiction of the historical “forms of religious consciousness” in his 
book Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, 
pp. 494–506). Despite expressing great esteem for the Buddhist “religious con-
sciousness,” the book leaves no doubt that the (renewed) Confucian religiosity 
is at a higher level within the “main current.” If Huayan thought was really the 
hidden foundation of Tang’s philosophy, as Lao Sze-kwang suspects, it would 
be odd, to say the least, that Tang downgraded Buddhism, including Huayan, 
to a lower stage within the historical development of Chinese humanism and 
also never explained (as he did with respect to Confucianism) how the Huayan 
tradition would have to be reconstructed under modern conditions.
A similarly complex picture emerges from Tang’s encounter with German 
idealism, which was equally ambiguous. During the 1950s and 1960s, Tang read 
widely in Western philosophy, paying special attention to German idealism 
and its British reception. There are indeed multi-layered affinities between 
the “study of mind and [human] nature” (xin xing zhi xue 心性之學) of the 
modern Confucian project and the thought of Hegel, Fichte and, to a lesser 
degree, Kant and Schelling. Yet, it is obvious that Tang was neither a Hegelian 
nor a follower of Fichte—although comparisons with ideas found in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the Philosophy of Right and in Fichte’s Foundations 
of the Entire Science of Knowledge are clearly helpful for interpreting certain 
sections of Tang’s philosophy (e.g. the concepts of ethical life [Sittlichkeit] and 
the modern state, or the somewhat Hegelian arrangement of topics in Cultural 
Consciousness and Moral Reason). It is quite likely that the highly selective 
assimilation of German idealist philosophy was, to some degree, the result of 
Tang’s interest in Anglo-American Neo-Hegelian philosophy as represented by 
22   On this assessment, see Zhang Yunjiang’s and Li Yufang’s analysis of Tang’s evaluation of 
Buddhism in his Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan from 1957. Tang stated here that 
Buddhist thought is “trans-humanistic” (chao renwen de 超人文的) and thus departs 
from China’s essentially humanistic tradition. By the time the “aesthetic spirit” blossomed 
in the Wei-Jin period, the “original religious spirit” of Buddhism had already been lost 
and during the period of the neo-Confucian revival Buddhism had become a mere “reli-
gion of individuals;” see Zhang et al., “Tang Junyi dui  Zhongguo Fojiao sixiang de zhengti 
panshi,” pp. 111–112.
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Thomas Hill Green, Francis Herbert Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and Josiah 
Royce, all of whom were cited in Tang’s writings.
Frederic Wakeman Jr. examined traits of Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism 
that seemed to reverberate in modern Chinese thought. He highlights, for 
instance, congruities between Bosanquet’s concept of an “omnipotential,” 
yet “empty” principle which becomes manifest in human life and mind, and 
Wang Yangming’s speculation about a “Heavenly principle” (tian li 天理) 
and liang zhi. According to Wakeman, the philosophy of Chinese “syncretists 
of the 1920s” (Zhang Junmai, Xiong Shili and others) came particularly close to 
English Hegelian thinkers in maintaining “that life expressed a cosmic moral 
conscience reflecting man’s free will.” In addition to Wakeman’s observations, 
one can further note the conformity between “the depiction of political soci-
ety as an instrument of individual realization” in the thought of Tang Junyi 
and Thomas Hill Green. However, as will be shown, Wakeman’s conclusion 
that the Chinese “syncretists” tended to “blur the singular individual” in their 
speculation about the spiritual unification of man’s consciousness with the 
“soul of the world” does not apply to Tang’s philosophy.23 In his “absolute ide-
alism” ( juedui de weixin lun 絕對的唯心論), Tang clearly affirmed the impor-
tance of the individual effort for enabling the human being to “see” that the 
“world of phenomena” (or the “objective reality”) is in fact a “manifestation” 
of “the one mind of Heaven” (yi tian xin 一天心).24 It should be noted that 
Tang avoided the term lixiangzhuyi 理想主義 (which was commonly used to 
denote German idealism up to the 1950s25) when referring to his own brand of 
metaphysics. This is in line with his decision not to categorize Confucianism as 
23   Wakeman, History and Will. Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung’s Thought, pp. 285 
(on Wang Yangming and Bosanquet), 287 (on the Chinese syncretists), 293 (on Green).
24   In regard to the development of his metaphysical speculation, Tang once expressed his 
intention to move from absolute idealism to what he called “transcendent realism” (chao-
yue shizai lun 超越實在論), or a “blending” of these two: Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode 
lixing, p. 363.
25   Lixiangzhuyi was a common translation of “idealism” since the mid-1920s; see Shangwu 
Yinshuguan Bianshen Bu, Zhexue cidian, p. 634. In a long manuscript from the early 1950s, 
Tang used lixiangzhuyi in reference to German idealism: see his “The philosophical spirit 
of modern Western idealism (Xifang jindai lixiangzhuyi zhi zhexue jingshen 西方近代
理想主義之哲學精神)” in: Tang, Zhexue lunji, pp. 601–751. But Tang’s terminology can 
be confusing, as he variously used lixiangzhuyi, weixin lun and guannian lun 觀念論 to 
refer to Western “idealism;” see Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, pp. 301–332.
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lixiangzhuyi, most likely because it might give the false impression that mod-
ern Confucianism was merely a Chinese reinterpretation of German idealism.26
Obviously, Tang did not reconstruct Confucian philosophy as if it were a 
branch of German idealism. This would have compelled him to react against 
the devastating criticism that philosophers like Hegel and Kant, but also 
Herder, leveled against what they perceived as Confucianism and a Confucian 
China. In his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Hegel had rel-
egated China (as part of the “Oriental world”) to a historiological position 
that was still outside of the world history that Hegel’s philosophy of history 
claims to retrace.27 Hegel’s demotion of China certainly did not encourage 
Chinese philosophers to adopt his philosophical speculation about history. 
Tang, though, simply disregarded Hegel’s judgment in this regard in his for-
ays into idealist philosophy. What is more, as will be shown, Tang’s modern 
Confucianism also shares focal concerns, topics, and ideas with philosophi-
cal anthropology (e.g. Max Scheler’s)—a philosophical current that rejected 
significant parts of German idealism, including philosophies of history. The 
reason for the seemingly contradictory inclusion of elements from German 
idealism and philosophical anthropology must be sought in Tang’s extensive 
search for inspiration across the boundaries of philosophical “systems.”
Apart from Buddhism and German idealism other intellectual currents 
might be illuminating for comparative purposes, even if Tang did not actu-
ally study them. Especially promising is a comparative study of texts writ-
ten by Tang and Nishida Kitaro 西田 幾多郎 (1870–1945) as well as other 
26   See e.g. Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 368. The term “weixin 唯心,” as in juedui 
weixin lun, indicates an interest in the philosophy of Wang Yangming and his followers. 
Yet, weixin here does not refer to Xiong Shili’s weixin philosophy, for Tang used weixin 
broadly, e.g. in references to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, British, and American idealism; see 
also the use of weixin in the translation of “objective idealism” (keguan weixin lun 客觀 
唯心論): Zhexue gailun, Vol. 1, pp. 443–445, or in reference to the philosophy of Wang 
Yangming: Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, p. 376.
27   See Hegel’s statement about the lack of “subjectivity” in a historically immobile Chinese 
empire: “Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it is found at this day; 
for as the contrast between objective existence and subjective freedom of movement in 
it, is still wanting, every change is excluded, and the fixedness of a character which recurs 
perpetually, takes the place of what we should call the truly historical. China and India 
lie, as it were, still outside the World’s History, as the mere presupposition of elements 
whose combination must be waited for to constitute their vital progress. The unity of 
substantiality and subjective freedom so entirely excludes the distinction and contrast of 
the two elements, that by this very fact, substance cannot arrive at reflection on itself—at 
subjectivity.” Hegel, The Philosophy of History, pp. 132–133.
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 philosophers of the Kyoto School—even though Tang did not explicitly refer 
to them and, indeed, may never have even read them.28 Nishida and Tang offer 
equally ambitious readings of Western philosophy, and especially of German 
idealism, and Buddhist thought, as both attempted to transcend, not only 
epistemologically, but also ontologically, dichotomies of subject and object, 
self and absolute, consciousness and reality. James Heisig’s observation about 
Nishida’s thought also applies to the work of Tang, namely, that the reader 
finds there the “crowning argument that all of reality can be grounded in a 
direct intuition, a ‘self-awareness’ in which the knower had transcended the 
subject-object world.”29 Equally consistent with Tang’s thoughts on intuition 
(liang zhi) is Nishida’s statement that “[w]hen we submerge ourselves into the 
depths of self-awareness in active intuition and take the standpoint of a self 
whose seeing has negated the seer, all things that exist are transformed into 
a self-awareness and a self-expression.”30 As regards moral philosophy, Tang 
and Nishida were therefore much more interested in fathoming “morality as a 
state of awareness”31 than in devising a virtue ethic or a deolontological type 
of moral philosophy.
There are further striking similarities between Tang’s and Nishida’s thought 
with respect to the epistemological status of philosophical language. When 
reading Tang, one can readily identify parallels with Heisig’s contention 
“. . . that in his [Nishida’s] philosophical writings . . . allusions to self or true self 
are little more than metaphor for one’s inner nature that is one with the nature 
of reality itself, or for the ascent of the subject to an awareness where the ordi-
nary self-centered subject gives way to a more profound principle of identity.”32 
Yet for all its proximity to the Kyoto School, modern Confucianism must be 
understood as an intellectual enterprise in its own right, and not only because 
it emphatically addressed Confucian thought. In both form and content, its 
attempt to relate the speculation about the transformative self-realization to 
a reflection on modernity that entails political thought and ethics as well as 
cultural and social philosophy is distinct from the Kyoto School.
The scope of large-scale comparisons could be extended until a kind of phil-
osophical mosaic emerges. The heuristic surplus value of such an approach 
 
28   In the following, I draw from James Heisig’s superb study Philosophers of Nothingness. An 
Essay on the Kyoto School.
29   Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness. An Essay on the Kyoto School, p. 47.
30   Quote from: ibid., p. 59.
31   Ibid., p. 60.
32   Ibid., p. 52.
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would continuously decline, however, and eventually become counterproduc-
tive by creating the false impression that Tang’s thought is occasionalistic in 
nature. Such a conclusion would belie the fact that, due to its civil-theological 
vantage point, his modern Confucian project was neither occasionalistic nor 
relativistic at its core, but remained oriented toward an emphatic truth claim. 
This orientation involved an awareness of the limits of discursive thinking 
with regard to the ultimate, non-discursive “innate knowing” of the “Heavenly 
principle” and consequently unburdened the discursive practice of philoso-
phy from clinging to an absolute truth claim. At the same time, it encouraged 
the human being in his quest to attain self-fulfillment in the intuitive act of 
“knowing Heaven.” Thus, in a manner of speaking, the inter-relation of lan-
guage, time, meaning and truth ultimately defies explanation on this point. 
The implications are severe. However, to quote Adorno’s famous phrase, Tang’s 
philosophy can be absolved from leaping into a mere “jargon of authenticity.” 
Adorno took issue with Heidegger’s philosophy, in which he detected a jar-
gon which “obliterates the difference between this ‘more’ for which language 
gropes, and the in-itself of this more.”33 In contrast, such a pretension is absent 
from Tang’s thought, for the difference between the “ ‘more’ for which lan-
guage gropes, and the in-itself of this more” is the pivotal point upon which 
his civil theology and its taxonomy of conceptual knowledge turns. Still, the 
civil- theological link between reason and intuition is ultimately fragile and 
it pushes Tang’s modern Confucianism to the brink of irrationalizing human 
self-awareness and the individual’s orientation to the world. 
33   Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, p. 12.
© thomas fröhlich, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004330�39_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
CHAPTER 3
Common Perspectives on Tang Junyi’s Thought
 Conservatism
Tang’s exilic perspective significantly deepened the “modern” turn in his inter-
pretation of China’s intellectual and social traditions. The continuation of tra-
ditions was no longer a matter of quasi-natural perpetuation, but based on 
efforts of renewal, rediscovery, re-appropriation, re-implementation and, most 
of all, discursive justification. As a private individual, Tang reacted to the exilic 
threat of a loss of traditional life forms by paying serious attention, apparently 
for the first time in his life, to the religious-ritual importance of holidays and 
festivities. He dealt with this topic quite exhaustively in his book The Spiritual 
Values of Chinese Culture, which he wrote shortly after arriving in Hong Kong.1 
At home, he now worshipped ancestors, and he put up spirit tablets of Heaven 
and Earth (tian di 天地), his ancestors (zuzong 祖宗), and saints and worthies 
(sheng xian 聖賢).2
Still, Tang did not advocate an unconsidered, habitual perpetuation of tradi-
tional life. He never followed the traditionalist belief that the spheres of politics, 
economics, and science should be reined in and made directly accountable to 
a substantial set of values and virtues stemming from China’s Confucian past.3 
He consequently refrained from embracing the ideal of a thoroughly moral-
ized “humanistic world” covering all social and cultural spheres of modern life. 
Even when strongly insisting on the need to uphold China’s long-standing cul-
tural traditions, he highlighted the aspect of reflexivity, i.e. the importance of 
a conscious re-appropriation of traditions from a transnational perspective. 
He thus clearly distinguished his brand of cultural conservatism from blatant 
traditionalism:
All these matters which have to do with [the notions] that “rela-
tives should not forget their familial ties, nor old acquaintances their 
 friendship,” that one “does not forget an old agreement however far back 
it extends,” that one should “not forget what [the old arrangements] were 
1   See Chap. 9 of Tang’s Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi; see also Tang, Nianpu, p. 107.
2   Tang, Tang Junyi zhuanlüe, p. 63. Other rituals like the burning of paper money were not 
practiced at Tang’s home (ibid.).
3   See e.g. the manifesto of 1958: Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 4–5, 18, 32–33, 35.
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at first” and that one should “not lose one’s roots,” are wrongly deemed 
by contemporary psychologists, sociologists and specialists of historical 
culture as mere habits. [In fact,] these are [all issues of] conservation. I 
can sternly admonish the people of the world that these are certainly not 
mere habits, but indeed [issues] through which men truly achieve [their] 
being as humans, [and] through which I truly achieve myself—this is [at 
once] a factual and also normative principle. (. . .) The source of this con-
servation lies indeed in the immediate presence of man, [that is in the 
fact that he or she] has a strong and at the same time deep self-awareness 
about the past, the history, and the origins on which one’s life rests and 
[in which it] is rooted.4
In labeling Tang’s thought as conservative, as he did himself (see Chap. 4), it is 
necessary to differentiate between his culturally conservative position and a 
political conservatism, which he never advocated. He, indeed, wholeheartedly 
welcomed the revolution of 1911 and the founding of the republic in 1912. In 
fact, his modern Confucianism aimed to strengthen the republican order and 
to reinforce it by means of democratic-constitutional institutions. Tellingly, 
Tang also refrained from making political arguments against strands of ratio-
nalism, except for those totalistic tendencies which he identified with parts of 
the New Culture Movement. He criticized the latter for the false propagation 
of “science,” which entailed a dangerously vague use of the label “unscientific” 
that served to depreciate other cultural values.5 Such criticism of New Culture 
rationalism, however, did not deter Tang from believing that individuals are 
able to lead their private and public lives in a reasonable and socially respon-
sible way without a need to turn to political or religious authorities.
4   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 16. Tang quoted here passages from The 
Analects and the Book of Rites: 1) “that relations should not forget their relationship . . .:” 
The Book of Rites II.2 section 3.24 (Legge, The Li Ki, Books I–X, p. 199); 2) “does not forget an 
old agreement . . .:” Lunyu XIV.13 (Legge, Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine 
of the Mean, The Works of Mencius, p. 280); the full passage reads: “The man, who in the view 
of gain thinks of righteousness; who in the view of danger is prepared to give up his life; and 
who does not forget an old agreement however far back it extends:—such a man may be 
reckoned a COMPLETE man.”; 3) “not forgetting what they were at first:” The Book of Rites 
VIII.2 section 2.8 (Legge, The Li Ki, Books I–X, p. 408); the passage reads: “In ceremonial 
usages we should go back to the root of them (in the mind), and maintain the old (arrange-
ments of them), not forgetting what they were at first.”
5   On this criticism by Tang, see Huang, “Lun ruxue zhi zongjiao xing: yi Tang Junyi, Mou 
Zongsan xiansheng weili de sikao,” p. 124.
Common Perspectives on Tang Junyi’s Thought  45
It is also significant that Tang’s “conservative” standpoint embraces the 
anticipation of a future Chinese constitutional democracy, and hence neither 
defends the current state of affairs nor contemporary political institutions. Not 
even the events of 1949 caused Tang to contemplate a rapprochement with the 
GMD state, as Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990), his fellow emigrant to Hong Kong, 
had done. A sound understanding of his conservatism requires that these pecu-
liarities be taken seriously. Regarding typically conservative strains of thought, 
three stand out in Tang’s Confucianism. First, there is the notion of an invari-
ant human nature which is characterized by imperfection, seductiveness, 
and potentially insatiable desires. For example, in his analysis of the human 
desire for power Tang presumed that this desire was primordial and insatiable 
(see Chap. 7). The good in men thus becomes manifest only when they pre-
vail over the subjectively evil and permanently exercise control over desires 
and instincts, thus reining in their unsociable side. Second, social, political, 
and economic inequality is interpreted as an inevitable consequence of the 
freedom of individuals in a society. Social hierarchies are hence to be seen as 
an appropriate expression of man’s natural inequality. Thirdly, social deficien-
cies and malformations are said to be essentially the result of shortcomings 
in intellectual attitudes, spiritual outlooks, and distortions of cultural values.6
Another important topos of conservativism is absent from Tang’s thought: 
The assumption that there exists a normative primacy of supra- individual 
orders (such as the state, traditions, the nation, the people, the community) 
over individuals. Tang refrained from making any claim that the individual 
obtains his or her correct standing in the world mostly through the work-
ings of such orders. As he saw it, individuals do not actually need to subor-
dinate themselves to such “greater” collectivities in order to overcome their 
egotism. On the contrary, Tang’s civil theology is centered on the individual 
and posits the notion that the individual’s self-fulfillment is the focal point 
of sound political judgment. Overall, then, Tang’s conservatism aims to pre-
serve the intellectual and cultural preconditions that will be needed to achieve 
the future modernization of China. Given that modernization is an ongoing 
process of normative, institutional, and functional differentiation, it is little 
surprising that Tang’s “modernizing” conservativism puts forward a concept of 
Confucianism that anticipates such differentiation.
6   On these three topoi in “classical” German conservatism, see Lenk, Deutscher Konservatismus, 
pp. 37–38 (on the first topos), pp. 66–67 (on the second), pp. 42–46 (on the third).
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 Neo-Confucianism
Two monographs written by Tang during the 1950s offer a concise overview of 
his approach to traditional Chinese speculation and Confucian thought in gen-
eral. These monographs are The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo 
wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi) from 1953, and Cultural Consciousness and Moral 
Reason (Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing) from 1958. The Spiritual Values of Chinese 
Culture was written shortly after Tang’s arrival in Hong Kong and is marked 
by an emphasis on early Chinese speculative thought, especially in the Book 
of Changes (Yijing 易經).7 Although Tang’s interest in early Chinese specula-
tion bears the imprint of neo-Confucian traditions of interpretation, he clearly 
attempted to move beyond neo-Confucianism. This can be seen prima facie 
from his categorization of neo-Confucian speculation under the “Western” 
label of xingshangxue 形上學—a loan word which was coined in Japan for the 
translation of the term “metaphysics.”8
What is more, Tang did not conduct research on neo-Confucianism with 
the traditionalist intention of adopting key concepts and ideas from neo- 
Confucian thinkers as ready-made elements for contemporary philosophical 
use. He was convinced instead that the modern perspective required a thor-
ough reinterpretation of neo-Confucian thought. Tang’s own research in the 
field reached its peak with the volumes On the Sources of Chinese Philosophy—
The Sources of Teachings (Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun—yuan jiao pian 中國哲
學原論—原教篇, 1973) and On the Sources of Chinese Philosophy—The Sources 
of [Human] Nature (Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun—yuan xing pian 中國哲學 
原論—原性篇, 1974). Here, and in a number of articles and essays about neo-
Confucianism, the focus is on notions of enlightenment and on the topic of 
self-cultivation, whereas less attention is paid to neo-Confucian writings on 
political issues, rituals, and social practice.9
7   Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, pp. 75–173. Tang emphasized the great impor-
tance of the Book of Changes for the development of speculative thought in China; see ibid., 
p. 92.
8   For example in: Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, Chap. 19 (pp. 359ff.). Sanetō lists xing’ershangxue 
形而上學 (identical with xingshangxue) as a Japanese loan word: Sanetō, Zhongguoren 
liuxue Riben shi, p. 232.
9   Cf. Lin, “Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan de yangming houxue yanjiu,” pp. 23–24. Tang concen-
trated on the following neo-Confucian figures: Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077), Zhou Dunyi 
周敦頤 (1017–1073), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1078), Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033–1107), Cheng Hao 
程颢 (1032–1085), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), Lu Jiuyuan, Wang Yangming, Liu Zongzhou 
劉宗周 (1578–1645) as well as post-Wang Yangming thinkers and figures from the so-called 
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Neo-Confucianism remained important for Tang’s thought throughout the 
entire middle period of his intellectual development, as well as in his later 
work. At one point, he identified the Yijing and the Zhongyong 中庸 as par-
ticularly influential texts within the history of Confucian metaphysics. Yet the 
climax of neo-Confucianism was reached, according to Tang, in the work of 
Wang Yangming.10 The philosophy of Wang Yangming and his followers is con-
ventionally referred to as the “study of the mind” (Xin xue 心學)—although 
this label was first introduced by their opponents. Wang Yangming himself 
called his brand of Confucianism “learning of the sage” (Sheng ren zhi xue 
聖人之學), or “school of the sage” (Sheng men 聖門).11 The latter label is pro-
grammatic and clearly indicates the practical aims of Wang’s teachings. It can 
be found in the Chuan xi lu 傳習錄, the seminal compilation for the study of 
Wang Yangming. The Chuan xi lu indeed influenced Tang’s own philosophical 
project, which also pertains, to some degree, to the repetitive style of argu-
mentation; the circular arrangement of topics, which are often discussed from 
different perspectives in different sections of a text; the didactic, if not to say 
homiletic, rhetoric of appeals; and the tendency to overwhelm readers by lead-
ing them again and again along similar lines of thought.12
Nevertheless, there are also fundamental differences between Wang’s and 
Tang’s philosophy, one of which concerns the former’s aim to infuse specu-
lative thought with practical import and describe a related way of living. 
Whereas Wang Yangming tried to do this in many sections of the Chuan xi lu 
and hence addressed his students in the role of a teacher or even leader of a 
sectarian group, Tang generally refrained from offering dogmatic prescriptions 
for individual and collective forms of life. It was his belief that everyone ulti-
mately needed to follow his or her own path to the inner source of “sagehood.” 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that when Tang discussed topics of self-cultivation, 
  Donglin movement (ibid.). In terms of academic impact, one can still agree with Chan 
 Wing-tsit’s statement from 1985 that Tang’s (and Mou Zongsan’s) seminal studies on neo- 
Confucianism received only scarce attention in the United States (and in Europe, for that 
matter); see Chan, “Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy Abroad,” p. 11.
10   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, pp. 374, 378.
11   Wang, Chuan xi lu, pp. 88 (I.49), 178 (I.124), 295 (II.162). “Sheng men” is an old term that 
was used already by Ban Gu 班固 (32–92) in his Youtongfu 幽通賦 in reference to follow-
ers of Confucius (see Hanyu da cidian 漢語大詞典, Vol. 8, p. 669).
12   This view is in accordance with Thomas Metzger’s assumption that Tang had a “Buddhist-
Confucian faith” which he “used to structure his whole philosophy” and that his writings 
were, thus, “fairly redundant, reflecting the religious impulse to return repeatedly to the 
same healing message:” see Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific, p. 185.
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he mostly used newly coined terms like “spirit” ( jingshen 精神) and “values” 
( jiazhi 價值). These terms lend themselves to such differentiating concepts 
as “cultural spirit,” “religious spirit,” “humanistic spirit,” “philosophical spirit,” 
“cultural values,” “spiritual values,” and “political values.” They are consistent 
with modern differentiations into spheres of law (politics), morality (human-
ism, religion), science (philosophy), and aesthetics (culture). The implications 
of these normative, functional, and institutional differentiations with respect 
to concepts of culture and value would have been incomprehensible to Wang 
Yangming. Consequently, he would have missed the irony of using distinctly 
modern terms such as “jingshen” and “jiazhi” in order to affirm the continuity 
of China’s cultural traditions and, simultaneously, to deflect the compulsory 
nature of modernity.
 Humanism and Religiosity
The differences between Tang and pre-modern Confucian thinkers do not 
end here, however. Tang remained skeptical towards the political legacy of 
Confucianism throughout the middle period of his philosophical develop-
ment. Given that his immersion in Confucian thought did not take place prior 
to the 1940s, it is likely that he was critical of political ideas from Confucian tra-
ditions right from the outset.13 Unfortunately, the intellectual circumstances 
that prompted Tang’s turn to Confucianism, which occurred at around the 
time when he wrote the book The Establishment of the Moral Self (Daode ziwo 
zhi jianli, 1944), remain obscure.14 He briefly stated in this regard:
. . . around 30, I took a liking to Western idealism. This was indeed not to 
be expected. From here, I again turned to reading Chinese Confucianism 
from the pre-Qin period, Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism, finally real-
izing [in what respect] pre-Qin Confucianism, neo-Confucianism and 
Buddhism for their part surpassed Western idealism. It was, however, not 
until the 37th year of the Republic [= 1948; TF], that is around five or six 
13   Liu Guoqiang applies a different periodization when concluding that Tang had turned to 
Confucianism at around the age of 30; see Liu, “Tang Junyi cong xin wu dao xin jing de 
sikao,” p. 246. This assumption is difficult to substantiate.
14   However, in that book he also professed his general agreement with Hinayana-Buddhism 
as regards the view that the world itself was only a transitional state of existence and 
human life was bitter and, ultimately, illusionary; see Li et al., “Tang Junyi qi fo gui ru zhi 
yuanyin chutan,” p. 21.
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years [ago], when writing the article about the original nature of religious 
consciousness, that I finally acknowledged the value of religions, and at 
the same time recognized the religious spirit within Confucianism.15
Prior to 1948, Tang had in fact only published eight articles on topics related to 
Confucianism, some of which were written when he was very young.16 When 
he studied philosophy, first at Peking University and then at Southeastern 
University (Dongnan Daxue 東南大學) in Nanjing, he had taken an outspo-
kenly critical stance towards contemporary Confucian thinkers like Liang 
Shuming, Xiong Shili, or Fang Dongmei 方東美 (Thomé H. Fang; 1899–1977), 
whom he had personally met in classrooms and at lectures.17 Of course, this 
does not preclude the possibility that he absorbed ideas at this formative stage 
of his intellectual development that would contribute to his immersion in 
Confucian thought later in his life. Although he did not subscribe to any par-
ticular school or philosopher at that time, it seems likely that those intellectual 
currents of the 1920s which advocated a renewed interest in China’s Confucian 
past and a reinterpretation of Confucianism as a humanistic tradition had 
made an impression. Southeastern University was a hotbed for intellectuals 
who were critical of the New Culture Movement’s totalistic tendencies. Some 
of them gained prominence by participating in a loose network of scholars 
who published essays and translations of Western scholarship in the journal 
Xueheng (學衡; The Critical Review), founded in 1922. Contributors include the 
literary scholar and philologist Wu Mi 吴宓 (1894–1978), the literary scholar 
Mei Guangdi 梅光迪 (1890–1945), the biologist and educator Hu Xiansu 
15   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 571 (this passage is from Tang’s account “Wo duiyu 
zhexue yu zongjiao zhe jueze 我對於哲學與宗教之抉擇”). Tang’s own reference to his 
article on the religious consciousness is unclear. According to the Chronological Table of 
[Tang Junyi’s] Writings, he published an article entitled “On the Original Religious Faith 
and Confucianism in China” in the March 1948 issue of the journal Ideal, History and 
Culture (Lixiang, Lishi yu Wenhua 理想, 歷史與文化). In 1950, an article about the “origi-
nal nature of religious consciousness” appeared in the May issue of the journal Ideal and 
Culture (Lixiang yu Wenhua); see Tang, Zhushu nianbiao, pp. 15, 17.
16   See Tang, Zhushu nianbiao, pp. 3–15. Tang discussed in these articles the Xunzi, the 
Mencius, Confucius and Goethe, the Book of Changes and the Doctrine of the Mean, Zhu 
Xi, and neo-Confucianism in general.
17   Tang attended lectures and courses taught by Xiong Shili, Fang Dongmei, Tang Yongtong 
湯用彤 (1893–1964) and others while studying philosophy as a major and literature as a 
minor at Southeastern University. Nevertheless, as Tang Duanzheng put it in the Nianpu, 
he was still convinced that the teachings of the ancient Chinese sages were of little if any 
use to the contemporary world; see Tang, Nianpu, pp. 21, 23–24.
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胡先驌 (1894–1968), the philosopher Liu Boming 劉伯明 (1887–1923), and the 
historians and philologists Liu Yizheng 柳詒徵 (1880–1956), Chen Yinke 陳寅
恪 (1890–1969), and Tang Yongtong.
None of these scholars figure prominently in Tang’s work, nor does the 
American classical scholar and Harvard professor of French literature Irving 
Babitt (1865–1933), who was the academic teacher of Wu Mi and the central 
figure of the so-called New Humanism in America. All the same, it is likely 
that ideas and positions from Xueheng and its introduction of Babbitt’s “New 
Humanism” to a Chinese readership helped stimulate the common interest in 
a modern renewal of Confucianism. The influence of Xueheng intellectuals on 
modern Confucianism is much more obvious with regard to the selection of 
topics and a generally critical outlook on the contemporary world than par-
ticular analyses and interpretations of scholarly works. There was, above all, a 
cosmopolitan culture, purportedly on the rise worldwide, that was fostered by 
Western and Eastern strands of humanism and also included religious tradi-
tions.18 This burgeoning humanistic culture was expected to counteract some 
of the worst side effects of social modernity. The latter were addressed under 
such topics as rampant materialism, consumerism and urbanization, the 
decay of the “republican spirit,” the upsurge of a misguided scientism in educa-
tion and scholarship, and the triumph of Marxism and communism. Besides, 
Xueheng joined in Babbitt’s call for an “aristocracy of character and intelli-
gence.” Its members were to receive their formation in a broadly  humanistic, 
liberal and moral education that predetermined them to take up political 
18   See Liu, Translingual Practice. Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—
China 1900–1937, pp. 248, 251, 432. Lydia H. Liu contends that “the idea of new Confucianism 
was first imported from the West” (p. 432, note 41) and refers to Hu Xiansu’s translation 
of Irving Babbitt’s “Humanistic Education in China and the West,” which was published 
in Xueheng in 1922 (see Bai, “Bai Bide Zhong Xi renwen jiaoyu shuo”). The fact that the 
term “renwen 人文” (“humanistic”), which was to become a key concept in modern 
Confucianism, figures prominently in Hu’s translation is indeed remarkable (see also Liu, 
ibid., p. 251). Even though it is problematic to pinpoint, as Liu does, the formation of an 
intellectual current which is as comprehensive in scope and intrinsically diverse as mod-
ern Confucianism, Liu’s contention is relevant for a historically sound understanding of 
how the initial interest in reinterpreting Confucian traditions as “humanistic” took shape. 
The complexity of this formation in terms of intellectual history can be highlighted by the 
fact that Hu translated Babbitt’s call for a “new” Confucian movement with the term “xin 
Kong jiao zhi yundong 新孔教之運動” (see Bai, “Bai Bide Zhong Xi renwen jiaoyu shuo,” 
p. 48). Years later, Tang and his fellow advocates of modern Confucianism were careful to 
reject the invocation of a renewed Confucianism as “Kong jiao,” a term that was closely 
linked to earlier attempts to establish Confucianism as a state religion.
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and educational duties and thus to contribute to the sound foundation of the 
republican community in civic virtues and values.19
It is along this spectrum of a critique of modernity that the vestiges of 
Xueheng ideas can be found in Tang’s philosophy. The correlations, however, 
do not cover the whole breadth of Tang’s reflections on modernity, neither in 
terms of the range of topics, nor with regard to the analytical depth. Indeed, it 
is hardly surprising that Tang departed in many respects from the earlier crit-
ics of modernity given that he developed the main body of his philosophical 
work in exile after 1949. This was not only more than three decades after the 
Xueheng-discourse was at its peak, but also in a vastly different historical con-
text. For one, Tang was no longer concerned with the problems of political mass 
participation by illiterates. He also did not subscribe to the idea of a political 
elite serving as role models for citizens or as paragons of the republican spirit. 
Nonetheless, he still emphatically referred to the need to retrieve a “classical 
spirit” in modern society to counter rampant materialism. He also described 
“ideal politicians” as if they belonged to an “aristocracy of character and intelli-
gence” within an otherwise egalitarian society (see Chap. 11). Notwithstanding 
these prima facie affinities with Xueheng, there is no evidence that Tang ever 
shared the conviction that scholar-poets or cultural heroes could actually 
shape modern society. Nor did he endorse the idea of obtaining politically 
effective values from classical scholarship and literature. Tang ultimately con-
ceived of the interrelations between the humanistic and the political realm 
in a much more complex manner. For example, he subscribed, among other 
things, to the notion that the humanistic sphere in modern societies should be 
relieved from the burden to produce an immediate political effect, whether in 
the form of political values and norms or in politically exemplary personalities 
(see Chap. 9).
Clearly, Tang’s account that his intellectual development was character-
ized by the fact that his interest in Western idealism predated his immersion 
in Confucianism does not convey the full picture. He had been attracted to 
a broad range of intellectual currents before he thoroughly familiarized him-
self with Confucian thought. Apart from German idealist philosophy, New 
Humanism and readings into the Western canon of classical philosophy, he 
had read works of Marx and Lenin, Bertrand Russell, Henri Bergson, Alfred 
North Whitehead, and others. At one point, he also studied contemporary 
19   For an excellent overview of the intellectual agenda of Xueheng-intellectuals like Wu Mi 
and Liu Boming, see Hon, “From Babbitt to ‘Bai Bide’: Interpretations of New Humanism 
in Xueheng,” pp. 255–256, 259, 261; see also Schneider, “National Essence and the New 
Intelligentsia,” pp. 73–75.
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scientific theory. These readings were probably stimulated by his intellectual 
development at Peking University, where he was enrolled from 1925 to 1927. 
While there, he attended lectures and courses taught by Liang Qichao, Zhang 
Dongsun, Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 (1895–1984), Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962), and others.20
Tang’s following turn to Confucianism bears the imprint of a religious con-
version that befitted his strong sense of mission and messianism (an aspect 
described in more detail in Chap. 4). By adopting his Confucian agenda with 
these proclivities, Tang entered the ranks of thinkers who, since the Song 
Dynasty, had professed experiencing a sort of personal enlightenment in turn-
ing to Confucianism (mostly by renouncing Buddhism). In the late 19th and 
early 20th century, Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) and Liang Shuming, for 
instance, displayed a strong world-saving missionary sense in their accounts of 
their Confucian conversion. As for Tang, he stated that when he experienced 
his own personal epiphany at the age of 26, he did not believe in Buddhism.21 
That said, he was almost certainly familiar with Yogācāra Buddhism at that 
time, especially as his father was deeply impressed by the Buddhist scholar 
Ouyang Jingwu.22
In light of his familiarity with Buddhism, it is less surprising that Tang took an 
immediate interest in the religious dimension of Confucianism. When explor-
ing the possibilities of reinterpreting Confucianism as a form of “religiosity,” 
he tapped into neo-Confucian currents by applying a terminological strategy 
of introducing new terms to determine the meaning of traditional notions. 
References to the notion of “Heaven,” for example, are linked with the philo-
sophical term for the “absolute” ( juedui 絕對), which is not found in Chinese 
texts predating the 20th century. Still, Tang’s approach to Confucian religiosity 
drew on neo-Confucianism, including notions of sagehood and speculation 
20   On Tang’s readings of Western philosophy, see Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, 
Vol. 24, pp. 470–473; Tang, Nianpu, pp. 18, 23–24. Thomas Metzger states that, prior to his 
interest in German idealism, Tang had criticized it from the perspective of empiricist 
theory; see Metzger, Escape From Predicament. Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving 
Political Culture, p. 244). On Tang’s attendance of classes and lectures held by Liang 
Qichao, Hu Shi, Zhang Dongsun, Jin Yuelin, and others, see Tang, Nianpu, pp. 16, 18–19.
21   Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, p. 470. Tang’s account of his epiphany 
in Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie may suggest that he experienced some sort of 
“Confucian” awakening. However, he was at that time not deeply immersed in Confucian 
thought.
22   Ibid., p. 480. Tang had received an early education by his parents and was instructed up to 
the age of 10 by his father, who read to him the Dao de jing 道德經, poetry from the Tang 
period, and other texts outside of the Confucian canon; see Tang, Nianpu, pp. 5–7.
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about the relation between man and “Heaven.” Rodney L. Taylor highlights “the 
religious character of the goal of sagehood . . . as an experience of unity of self 
with Heaven. This provides a basis for the soteriological or transformational 
character of learning and self-cultivation.”23 In reference to Tang’s thought, 
one can agree with Taylor’s conclusion that “[r]eligion thus involves a percep-
tion of, knowledge of, or insight into, that which constitutes the Absolute and, 
in addition, the ability to provide a means for the individual to engage in an 
ultimate transformation toward that which is regarded as the Absolute, the 
fulfillment of the relationship between the individual and the Absolute.”24
 Dogmatism
Whereas Tang’s turn to the religious dimension of Confucianism is affirma-
tive in character, a different picture emerges with regard to his approach to 
Confucian traditions of political thought. In the early 1950s, his appraisal was 
generally still positive, for example in The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture.25 
It then turned negative in his writings from the mid-1950s onwards, as he iden-
tified a number of problematic issues in Confucian political thought and prac-
tice. While conceding that Confucianism had produced some ideational and 
mental “roots” of democratic government, he emphasized that neither demo-
cratic practices nor constitutional government or the rule of law had evolved 
out of Confucian political traditions. Even worse, the political heritage of 
Confucianism as exemplified by Yuan Shikai and, later on, the GMD of the post-
1949 period hardly appeared to have been immune to the lure of dogmatism 
and political authoritarianism. The question at hand, therefore, was whether 
the political traditions of Confucianism could in any way contribute to the 
future formation of a democratic Chinese nation-state. Tang’s critical reflec-
tion on this question was also motivated by his interest in the problem of evil 
23   Taylor, The Way of Heaven. An Introduction to the Confucian Religious Life, p. 7. Taylor 
raises another point which is relevant for Tang’s concept of religiosity, namely that 
“[n]otions of the Absolute within religion can appear in different forms—transcendent 
or immanent, theistic or monistic.” See Taylor, “The Religious Character of the Confucian 
Tradition,” p. 82. With respect to the identification of sagehood as a “religious goal,” Taylor 
affirms that this is “a question left largely to the interpretation of the individual scholar.” 
See Taylor, “The Study of Confucianism as a Religious Tradition: Notes on Some Recent 
Publications,” p. 149.
24   Taylor, “The Religious Character of the Confucian Tradition,” p. 84.
25   See e.g. Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, p. 772.
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and power in the political realm—an interest that was perhaps aroused less by 
his philosophical readings than close observation of particularly violent meth-
ods of political rule in the PRC since the 1950s (see Chap. 9 and 12). It seems that 
the aim of coming to terms with political reality necessitated a reconceptual-
ization of politics and power, and yet traditional Confucian thought had little 
to offer in this regard. Consequently, Tang’s political philosophy greatly differs 
from pre-modern Confucian political thought due to its sharp conceptual dis-
tinction between politics and ethics and its theory of power. Mou Zongsan is 
perhaps the only other philosopher of modern Confucianism to follow a simi-
lar path in criticizing traditional notions of a politico-ethical continuum.
Current discussions of Tang’s ideas, however, are often burdened by inad-
equate depictions of his philosophy as a thoroughly traditionalist brand of 
Confucianism or as a lofty metaphysical effort prone to lead to an estrange-
ment of philosophy from the historical world. Yu Yingshi 余英時, for example, 
assumes that Tang, like Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan, was a follower of Xiong 
Shili’s philosophy and thus belonged to a philosophical school which produced 
arbitrary (“subjectivist”), quasi-religious interpretations, or even distortions, of 
Confucianism. These interpretations, if we are to follow Yu’s critique, rest on a 
sectarian-like “arrogance of liang zhi” that in effect endorses a dangerous irratio-
nalizing of social and political life. Yu wants to counter such aberrations, while 
also emphatically excluding his teacher Qian Mu from any culpability in this 
regard. He thus offers a reinterpretation of Confucianism that contents itself 
with questions pertaining to the individual’s everyday life, rather than clinging 
to vain hopes of inscribing Confucianism into political institutions.26 But, Tang 
was not a “disciple” of Xiong, at least not in the traditional sense of a master-
disciple relationship. He also would not have welcomed the establishment of 
a sectarian Confucian school, let alone the founding of such a school within 
political or religious institutions. Yu is certainly correct to raise the issue of 
irrationalizing tendencies in Tang’s (and Mou Zongsan’s) Confucian philoso-
phy. Yet contrary to what Yu observes, the problem is not with a hypostasis 
of intuitive enlightenment (through liang zhi) at the expense of discursive 
forms of practical reason. After all, Tang did not simply negate reason with an 
 irrational belief in intuition. He rather attempted to link practical reason to the 
spiritual realm of liang zhi.
The issues Yu addressed were also raised by contemporary critics of 
Tang from the Mainland. However, their criticism has been challenged. In a 
26   Yu, Xiandai ruxue lun, pp. 125 (on Xiong Shili as a founding figure), 155 (on the critique of 
liang zhi-thought), 171–179 (on the reinterpretation of Confucianism).
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trenchant refutation, Lee Ming-huei rejects Liu Xiao’s generalizing assessment 
that modern Confucian philosophers systematically confounded politics and 
ethics, as well as the subjective will and objective social relations. Liu’s mis-
judgement seems to be due, as Lee points out, to a lack of familiarity with the 
writings of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan.27 Like Liu Xiao, Jiang Qing depicts 
modern Confucianism or what he calls in English “mind Confucianism” (xin-
xing ruxue 心性儒學) as a philosophy that deals exclusively with questions of 
“life” (shengming 生命), ethics, and metaphysics, while completely neglecting 
political aspects.28 Similar criticism had been levelled earlier against modern 
Confucianism by Yin Haiguang 殷海光, Zhang Foquan 張佛泉, Wei Zhengtong 
韋政通, Lin Yusheng 林毓生 and Zhang Hao 張灝. They all deplored that mod-
ern Confucianism was too abstract in thought, too “metaphysical,” and unduly 
inclined to the belief that complex problems of modern societies could be 
solved altogether in the sphere of “culture.”29 One may also include here Lao 
Sze-kwang 勞思光, who wrote an essay suggesting that a “Chinese cultural 
movement” needed a “fundamental” concept to overcome the “deficiencies 
of traditional culture.” Lao clearly implied that Tang’s modern Confucianism 
lacked such a concept and was therefore essentially apologetic.30
Wei Zhengtong and Lin Yusheng, both of whom had been close intellectu-
ally to Yin Haiguang for some time, were particularly critical of Tang’s alleg-
edly apologetic stance towards Chinese traditional culture, and, most of all, 
27   See Li Minghui (Lee Ming-huei), Rujia shiye xia de zhengzhi sixiang, pp. 271–272; for Liu 
Xiao’s critique, see Liu, Xiandai xin rujia zhengzhi zhexue, p. 328.
28   Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue, pp. 20–23, 25. Jiang Qing reiterates this statement about “mind 
Confucianism”—a label that includes the philosophy of Tang Junyi as well as Mou 
Zongsan—when identifying as its “main concern . . . the existential life of human indi-
viduals and their minds, rather than socio-political institutions.” See Jiang, “From Mind 
Confucianism to Political Confucianism,” p. 18. Perhaps such distortions are not just a 
matter of limitations in the reception of Tang’s philosophy, but rather a case of keeping 
silent about a critical strand of Confucian political thought that does not fit certain politi-
cal agendas.
29   For an overview of this criticism, see Chen, “Tang Junyi de ziyou renquan guannian,” p. 46.
30   Lao’s essay appeared shortly after Tang’s death in 1978, when close to one hundred 
commemorative texts were published in Hong Kong and Taiwan; see Lao Siguang (Lao 
Sze-kwang), “Chengbai zhi wai yu chengbai zhi jian—yi Tang Junyi xiansheng bing tan 
‘Zhongguo wenhua’ yundong,” p. 78; Fang Keli agrees with Lao’s assumption and main-
tains that it pinpoints the crucial reason why the “movement” of modern Confucianism 
did not succeed; see Fang, Xiandai xin rujia xue an, Vol. 1, p. 37.
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Confucianism.31 In an extensive academic interview on Tang Junyi from May 
1978, Wei suggested that Tang had never abandoned “traditional values” and 
had simply neglected the need to comprehensively reflect on modernity. 
Tang was allegedly content to dissect some weaknesses in modern man and 
consequently never directly dealt with modernity, either psychologically or 
intellectually. In the same vein, Wei assumed that in the context of the anti-
Confucian tendencies from the Republican period, there were personal and 
psychological factors at work which fueled Tang’s “missionary” zeal to propa-
gate Confucianism. Wei even mockingly referred to Tang as the “shepherd of 
the Confucians,” who was driven by strong religious “feelings.”32 Lin Yusheng, 
too, found fault with the alleged absence in Tang’s work of a critical approach 
to “China’s traditional culture” and ascribed this deficiency to Tang’s supposed 
assumption that “all the things past” were “reasonable.” This has the familiar 
ring of similar criticisms of Hegelian philosophy, and Lin indeed depicts Tang’s 
philosophy as an ill-conceived, even “chaotic” mélange of Huayan Buddhism 
and Hegel’s philosophy of history. To make things worse, Tang ostensibly failed 
to thoroughly criticize Hegel’s philosophy for its complex but, according to Lin, 
close connection to the later rise of fascism. Tang is also said to have had a 
“state of mind” that kept him from voicing profound criticism of “traditional 
Chinese culture.” As a consequence, instead of adequately reacting to the 
problem of intertwining a complex cultural tradition (i.e. Confucianism) with 
an equally complex modernity, Tang merely resorted to an escapist attitude.33
Both Wei Zhengtong and Lin Yusheng argue at times ad hominem and, as 
Lin’s generalizing remark on Hegelian philosophy and fascism exemplifies, 
they do not shy away from polemics. Still, the problem with their criticisms is 
31   In his account of his own intellectual background and development, Wei refers to Lin 
Yusheng as a “disciple” of Yin Haiguang; see Wei, Sixiang de tanxian, p. 93. Wei also 
recounts how he and Yin Haiguang had first met in Taibei in May 1965 when Yin invited 
him to deliver a lecture at National Taiwan University. Thereafter, Wei and Yin met regu-
larly and remained in close intellectual exchange until Yin’s death in 1969; ibid., p. 74. 
According to Wei, Yin Haiguang had made “new Confucianism” (xin rujia 新儒家) his 
prime intellectual foe. Wei and Yin agreed that modern Confucianism should not be 
considered representative of the Confucian tradition; see Wei, Chuantong de gengxin, 
pp. 270–271.
32   Wei, Chuantong de gengxin, pp. 205–207, 221–227.
33   Lin, Sixiang yu renwu, pp. 413–416 (reprinted from Zhongguo luntan 中國論壇, Vol. 15, 
No. 1 [Oct. 10, 1982], pp. 21–24.) Li Zhifu’s judgment is diametrically opposed: He praises 
Tang for his apologetic attitude towards China’s national culture and the thought of 
Confucius; see Li, “Tang Junyi sixiang zhi minzu wenhua guan ji qi aiguozhuyi jingshen 
zhi tantao,” pp. 221, 227.
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not that they were completely off the mark. As discussed in Chapter 4, there 
are indeed parts of Tang’s work where he was prone to a highly declamatory 
writing style. He also occasionally shows a tendency to cling to China’s spir-
itual culture that has a chauvinistic ring to it. Yet his thought is ambiguous 
in this regard. There is in fact a strong tendency in this work to criticize the 
political tradition of Confucianism for its alleged dogmatism and its failure 
to clearly distinguish between the spheres of politics and ethics. Overall, the 
above criticism of Tang’s supposed apologetic approach to China’s intellec-
tual traditions does not withstand scrutiny. What is more, the critics convey a 
rather one-sided view of Tang Junyi’s reflections on modernity. While he may 
certainly be criticized for making particular assumptions, it simply does not 
do justice to Tang’s philosophical endeavor to say that he never engaged in 
a comprehensive reflection on modernity. It should be noted here that Lin 
Yusheng himself remarked that he had not engaged in “systematic research” on 
the works of modern Confucian thinkers.34 It is also ultimately not clear which 
of the works by Tang formed the basis of Wei Zhengtong’s and Lin Yusheng’s 
interpretations.35
A more extensive reading into Tang’s work would have shown that Tang was 
keenly aware of the ideological dangers lurking around an apologetic approach 
to Confucianism under modern conditions. Tang warned against the reduc-
tion of Confucianism to a “profane utilitarianism and positivism,”36 for it could 
then be easily turned into a means to bolster political dogmatism. His restraint 
in presenting ready-made “Confucianized” political solutions when it came to 
problems occurring in social modernity was due to this anti-dogmatic outlook. 
Not only was he highly critical of Confucian political traditions in general, but 
he also took issue with a self-contained intellectual attitude in which conven-
tions and traditions are upheld without prior reflection. He even contended 
that such an attitude might represent a breaking point for totalitarianism:
34   Lin, Sixiang yu renwu, p. 411.
35   Lin Yusheng’s detailed and insightful analysis of the manifesto of 1958 must hence be 
considered to be exceptional. Lin takes issue with the manifesto’s assumption that there 
are intellectual resources in Confucianism (among them the notion of moral subjectiv-
ity) that initiate by necessity the formation of a liberal democracy in Chinese modernity. 
Lin also critically notes the modern Confucians’ conviction that the triggers of historical 
development were in essence ideational forces. He calls this a “cultural-intellectualistic 
approach,” which is also observable in May Fourth anti-traditionalism; Lin, Zhengzhi 
zhixu yu duoyuan shehui, pp. 341–345.
36   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 370. The critics of such profane 
Confucianism would be compelled, according to Tang, to take up the unworldly role of 
monks; ibid., pp. 366–367.
CHAPTER 358
Finally, [as regards whether] I comply with my common perceptions 
which naturally evolved, or [whether I] think according to prevalent per-
ceptions, or follow what I discovered in my own true cognition (zhen zhi 
真知), this is what we must decide first. If we think solely by complying 
with our own, [naturally evolved] perceptions or the prevalent percep-
tions, then . . . [we] are at any time prone to be misled by all [kinds] of 
political, religious, and social propaganda . . . People of this kind are most 
suited as subalterns and slaves in a totalitarian system. (. . .) In fact, the 
great majority of people [remain] in everyday life most of the time in 
a passive state of mind, lastingly tied down by [such] perceptions. This 
is indeed a hopeless situation. However, the beginning of the decision 
to think should [be marked by] the resolution to strive for transcend-
ing this [passive] state of mind . . . and to strive, in all respects, to follow 
what [we] have reached by [our] own true cognition. (. . .) At different 
times, men can pursue various kinds of true cognition. According to their 
respective dispositions, they are likely to pay special attention to pursue a 
particular kind of true cognition throughout their lives. In so doing, they 
turn into different types of entrepreneurs, scholars, or exponents of reli-
gions. [But] no matter what kind of true cognition they are striving for, 
autonomous and sovereign judgments are equally indispensable.37
Tang’s warning against misinterpretations of Confucianism might also have 
been readily applied to the GMD’s efforts at a grassroots level to foster Confucian 
values among the Taiwanese population during its campaigns for the “Revival 
of Chinese Culture” in the late 1960s and for a “Cultural Reconstruction (wen-
hua jianshe 文化建設)” in the 1970s. In terms of civic consciousness, these 
campaigns attempted to establish the claim that in order to become a good 
citizen, one had to adopt “Confucian” values.38 This conviction fundamentally 
contradicted Tang’s assumption that the course of  modernization necessitated 
a conceptual distinction between the good citizen and the good person.
In light of more recent claims that Confucianism should be viewed as an 
integral element of the modernization effort in post-Deng China, Tang’s 
cautioning against a misrepresentation of Confucianism has not lost its rel-
evance. To be sure, Tang himself had to cope with the propaganda efforts of 
37   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 572–573 (this passage is taken from Tang’s 
account “Wo duiyu zhexue yu zongjiao zhe jueze”).
38   Tu, “Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong de shixian yu zhanwang,” p. 304 (on campaign 
measures of the GMD, such as presenting model citizens with official rewards).
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the GMD regime, and not the CCP. Already in the “New Life Movement,” the 
GMD contended that political, economic, and cultural sectors of society could 
be unified by its one-party rule and claimed that the movement would fos-
ter cultural and ideological unity by infusing Confucian values into Chinese 
society.39 Even though the GMD’s campaign met with little success, the party, 
and Chiang Kai-shek personally, continued in the decades that followed to lay 
claim to a “traditional culture,” which they identified with “Confucianism” and 
declared essential for the advancement of modernization.40 After its retreat to 
Taiwan, the GMD redoubled its efforts to lay claim to “Confucianism” for the 
nationalist conquest of (Taiwanese) society. Chiang Kai-shek explicitly called 
Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People an eminent expression of China’s 
age-old Confucian heritage.41
In further propaganda efforts instigated in post-war Taiwan, “Confucianism” 
was said to catalyze the GMD’s “revolution” and to serve as a bulwark against 
“heretical” ideas—i.e. communism.42 Chiang Kai-shek took special interest in 
Wang Yangming’s liang zhi thought, interpreting it in highly voluntaristic fash-
ion as a philosophy of action. According to Chiang, this entailed an ethics of 
conviction and the belief that if one’s intentions were truly good and upright, 
one would certainly succeed in realizing them in practice.43 Obviously, the 
GMD’s modernizing efforts to reinvigorate (and reinvent) “traditional culture” 
and “Confucianism” were opposed to genuinely traditionalist convictions. The 
GMD advocated a constructivist approach to the past, which was depicted as a 
reservoir of “progressive” cultural elements that could bolster the GMD’s claims 
to a scientifically and ethically sound modernization program. In contrast, Tang 
39   De Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition. Volume Two. From 1600 Through the Twentieth 
Century, pp. 339–346.
40   See Chiang Kai-shek’s address to the “Society for the Study of Confucius and Mencius” 
from 1963, in: Zhongguo wenhua xiehui (ed.). Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong. Cankao 
ziliao, pp. 6–7.
41   See Chiang’s address from 1961: Ibid., p. 6; in 1963: Ibid., p. 7; and from 1966: Ibid., pp. 4–5; 
see also Tu, “Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong de shixian yu zhanwang,” p. 301.
42   See Chiang’s address from 1960 on Confucianism as a bulwark against heretic ideas, in: 
Zhongguo wenhua xiehui (ed.). Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong. Cankao ziliao, pp. 5–6; 
and his address from 1962 on Confucianism as a means in the fight against communism 
and as a basis for the GMD’s revolution; ibid., p. 6.
43   Munro, The Imperial Style of Inquiry in Twentieth-Century China. The Emergence of New 
Approaches, p. 39. On Chiang Kai-shek’s interest in Wang Yangming, see e.g. Chiang, 
China’s Destiny & Chinese Economic Theory, p. 188; see also Brière, Fifty Years in Chinese 
Philosophy 1898–1950, pp. 59–60.
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favoured a hermeneutical approach to “Chinese culture” and its Confucian 
humanistic “main current” which rejected claims to the positivistic identifi-
cation of allegedly progressive cultural elements. He maintained that inter-
pretations of the past were inevitably shaped by historical contexts—i.e. the 
process of modernity in which the interpreter was encapsulated—and would 
never yield guiding principles or values of “objective” validity (see Chap. 4, 11).
Significantly, Tang never joined the chorus of those modernizers who 
declared that the need for national self-assertion justified violating the institu-
tions of individual rights since it was in the name of a higher interest. Since 
the 1920s, considerable enthusiasm for Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation44 
had helped to corroborate such a nationalist stance in Chinese intellectual 
circles. Tang, however, and in spite of his philosophical interest in Fichte, 
remained aloof from this discussion. His concept of China’s national culture, 
as flawed and outdated as it may appear today, is not in accord with cultural 
nationalism, let alone the GMD’s self-serving conflation of national culture and 
Confucianism. 
44   On the Chinese reception of Fichte; see Kurtz, “Selbstbehauptung mit geliehener Stimme,” 
pp. 221–223.
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CHAPTER 4
Exile, Modernity, and Cultural Patriotism
 The Convergence between Exile and Modernity
Coming to terms with the modern world was for Tang Junyi not simply a mat-
ter of emulating or criticizing the West or appraising the relevance of Chinese 
intellectual, social, and cultural traditions for contemporary societies. Nor is 
Tang’s thought confined to juxtapositions of Chinese culture and Western civi-
lization, of traditional and modern world-views, or of urban life styles in indus-
trialized countries and the remnants of traditional life patterns in modernizing 
countries. Tang’s philosophical reflection on social modernity goes beyond 
such schematism and entails a much more ambitious agenda which comprises 
a cosmopolitan notion of cultural patriotism that is set within a post-colonial 
“East Asian” context. But above all, there is a bold attempt to fathom the sig-
nificance of the exilic condition in relation to the process of modernity as he 
perceived it in the mid-20th century. The post-1949 exile thus acquired a new 
meaning as a specifically modern experience. In his writings on the condition 
of exile, Tang often described the hardships of emigration in a manner that 
is similar to the way he depicted the fate of modern man, whom he found to 
be displaced, deracinated, and socially isolated. As will be discussed, Hong 
Kong for him was just as much a symbol of exile as it was a representation of 
the disenchanted, reified world of modernity. The exilic experience coincides 
here with and even reinforces the downsides of “modernization” (xiandaihua 
現代化).1 It is hence no exaggeration to say that this perception of the mod-
ern world is shaped by his profound experience of exilic life in Hong Kong 
after 1949. In order to explore this relation between exile and modernity, and 
especially the intersecting descriptions of their downsides, Tang’s perception 
of social modernity will be taken as a point of departure.
What has been called elsewhere “the dual character of the fundamental 
experience of the modern”2 is clearly evident in Tang’s discussion of modernity. 
This dual character encompasses two intertwined aspects of the  individuals’ 
lives in modern societies: on the one hand, their experience of liberation from 
religious and traditional restraints leading to social, political, and intellectual 
1   The term “xiandaihua” is used rather seldom by Tang; see e.g. Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu 
shijie, p. 33.
2   Rosa, Identität und kulturelle Praxis, pp. 17, 308–309.
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emancipation, and, on the other, the dissolution of communal ties and the 
disintegration of traditional social and political values, triggering feelings of 
intellectual isolation and social alienation. Tang made a number of observa-
tions about modern life consistent with this diagnosis while travelling in the 
United States in 1957: Individuals, while enjoying increasing freedom in join-
ing diverse social, economic and cultural associations, also face the peril of 
such forms of particularity. To use Tang’s expression, they can lose sight of and 
become indifferent toward “universal ideals of humanity.” If this tendency con-
tinues unabated in America and elsewhere, the outcome would be a global 
degeneration of freedom. The “transcending, comprehensive spirit” of human-
ity might then decrease on a daily basis and with it, the desire for establish-
ing the freedom of humanity. In spite of his sometimes very blunt criticism 
of what he perceived as the detrimental social impact of rampant egotism in 
the United States and Western societies in general, Tang did not qualify these 
tendencies as a specifically Western phenomenon. It is rather a case of a global, 
but also inevitable consequence of the progressive division of labor and spe-
cialization in production, science, technology, and education. This might lead 
to the gradual replacement of an “objective consciousness of values” by “outer 
values of efficiency” which would leave individuals unable to grasp the “inner 
value” of their work. What is at stake, in other words, is nothing less than the 
increasing “reification” (wuhua 物化) of the human being.3
Tang restated his dire diagnosis of modern man’s reification in various texts 
from the 1950s to the 1970s. In a particularly succinct passage from an article 
on “World Humanism and Chinese Humanism” from 1959, he maintained that 
since humanity has lost control over the things it produces in affluent societies, 
a severe threat has emerged for Eastern and Western humanism, and even for 
humanity itself. This threat entails a surfeit of science and technology resulting 
in the production of weapons of mass destruction, as well as a severe spiritual 
crisis among urban citizens who live isolated, empty lives. Finally, a “hitherto 
unknown” “scientification” of modern political organizations might occur and 
lead to the establishment of highly rigid organizations in which the individual 
merely figures as a statistical number, unable to exert the “freedom of a  spiritual 
life.” Tang depicted two types of materialism from a global perspective that 
have emerged in this context: first, Soviet-style communism, which produced a 
3   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 111–112. Tang did not elaborate on his use 
of the old expression “wuhua,” which can be found for example in Zhuangzi, Chap. 2. For an 
example of Tang’s attack on selfish individualism in the United States, see one of his articles 
in the Mingbao from 1974: Ibid., pp. 425–426.
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“conceptual materialism” that locks human beings in an “intellectual cage” and 
triggers a “comprehensive reification of man;” second, the materialism found 
in the large cities of America and Europe, where a “behavioral materialism” 
effectuates the calculation of all human values against monetary standards. 
Both types of materialism coincide in their negative effect of depriving human 
beings of their subjectivity. Any solution to this crisis must therefore consist 
of enabling the human beings to “magnify themselves” and to spiritually rise 
above the sphere of material production.4
Tang’s concept and diagnosis of modernity do not lend themselves to the 
romantic idea of a swift return to pre-modern humanistic traditions as an 
escape from the reifying tendencies of the modern world. This is also evident 
from his reflection on the basic structure of modern society: According to 
Tang, it is characterized by an increasing differentiation of institutional and 
ideational/value-based spheres (i.e. law, art, morality, science). The “principles 
of societal organization” are hence such that the integration of and within 
these spheres is not realized through substantial traditions anymore, but con-
tracts and laws.5 By taking the stratified, functionally differentiated societal 
structure as constitutive of social modernity, this conception is reminiscent 
of Max Weber’s discussion of the “rationalization” of “occidental” culture lead-
ing to a functional “differentiation of ‘spheres of values’ (science, law, morality, 
art) that held their own particular ‘logic of judgments about facts, justice or 
taste’.”6 Tang and the co-authors of the manifesto of 1958 found China lack-
ing in this regard and consequently proposed that a modern Chinese society 
would need a firm institutional differentiation of spheres of values. The mani-
festo stated accordingly that an individual’s self-awareness and actions should 
not be solely related to the sphere of moral demands:
We say that Chinese culture, in accordance with its own demands, should 
deploy a cultural ideal of driving the Chinese not only to self-consciously 
[recognize] their self as a “subject of moral practice” on the basis of 
the [Confucian] study of mind and [human] nature (xin xing zhi xue 
4   Ibid., pp. 55–56.
5   Ibid., p. 136.
6   For the quotations: see Habermas on Weber in: Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der 
Moderne, p. 206. Tang might have been familiar with Weber through the work of Talcott 
Parsons; on the significance of Parsons for the Chinese reception of Weber in the 1950s: see 
Gransow, “Die chinesische Rezeption des Werkes von Max Weber oder Fremdverstehen and 
Selbstverstehen als Kategorien der Chinaforschung,” p. 63.
CHAPTER 464
心性之學). [The Chinese] should, at the same time, in politics strive to 
attain the ability to self-consciously [recognize their self] as a “political 
subject,” and in the realms of nature and knowledge, [they should strive 
to] become an “epistemological subject” and a “subject of the activities of 
applied technologies.” This is also to say that China needs a truly demo-
cratic national reconstruction as well as science and applied technolo-
gies. In Chinese culture, [we] must accept Western, or global cultures. 
(. . .) [This] will drive the personalities of the Chinese to attain an even 
higher perfection. The objective spiritual life of the Chinese nation [will 
thus] attain an even higher development.7
Against this backdrop, the manifesto leaves no doubt that a modernizing 
China needs to conform to the ostensibly global structural outline of social 
modernity, even at the cost of abolishing traditional patterns of social and 
moral thought:
If the Chinese want to possess this Western spirit of the theoretical sci-
ences, then it is, in turn, indispensable that the Chinese are able to tempo-
rarily restrain their practical activities and moral goals. But since the end 
of the Ming Dynasty, this point was never clearly grasped by [Chinese] 
thinkers.8
Overall, one may conclude that the concept of a functional and institutional 
differentiation of spheres of values in modern society is indeed a normative 
reference for the whole modern Confucian project of China’s humanistic 
“reconstruction.”
This reconstruction would require a broad range of efforts in moderniza-
tion. The manifesto of 1958 bluntly states that industrialization in China had 
not yet reached a sufficient level, and the same is said to hold true for the 
development of modern science and technology in general. The deficits in 
democratic politics are also diagnosed as symptoms of failing moderniza-
tion: Democratic institutions faltered already right after the promulgation 
of the republic in 1912 when representative government crumbled, leaving 
the plurality of social interests without a political voice, and denying local 
autonomy an adequate standing. Apart from these institutional failures, the 
7   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 32–33.
8   Ibid., p. 35; on the differentiation of politics, ethics, religion in Western civilization and their 
conflation in Chinese history see ibid., p. 18.
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manifesto deplores the fact that there were only very vague “notions of peo-
ple’s rights and democracy” among the people.9
Yet the crisis that had to be addressed by the Confucian project of recon-
struction was even more severe. It had effects that went far beyond the 
above-mentioned, current deficits in Chinese modernization—effects that 
were already observable in the West. In order to understand why Tang was 
convinced that this mattered to China, one needs to recall that he conceptu-
alized modernity as a globally ongoing process of modernization. He eluci-
dated this concept in a paper entitled “The Reconstruction of Confucianism 
and the Modernization of Asia,” which he presented in July 1965 in Seoul at 
the “International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia.” 
Furthermore, he pointed to what he believed would eventually emerge as 
the general direction of modernity, namely, the formation of nation-states in 
the political form of liberal democracies that safeguard fundamental human 
rights, complete with a scientific-technologically progressive, industrial-
ized society.10 This anticipation of a global convergence in modernization 
is clearly in line with the mainstream of modernization theories which had 
reached their climax in the United States in the 1950s and were prevalent in 
social sciences well into the 1960s.11 Whether Tang had actually studied such 
theories in-depth is unclear—after all, his own reflection on modernity has a 
rather weak footing in social science—but it is still likely that he had acquired 
some general knowledge of them. Be that as it may, it is this perspective of 
convergence that allowed him to depict China’s historical development since 
the mid-19th century not as an aberration or anomaly of modernity, but as 
an integral, albeit temporally distinct, evolution within the modern world. The 
modern Chinese nation-state, in other words, was, like its Western counter-
parts, still in the making, albeit with a considerable backlog. Tang, however, 
did not share the common assumption of American modernization theories 
that a market-induced type of (originally Western) modernization would by 
necessity, sooner or later, effect similar political and cultural transformations 
in societies across the world. He thus also did not expect that cultural particu-
larities would be eliminated or rendered altogether irrelevant in the course of 
modernization. Even though modernization, according to Tang, entails strong 
universal tendencies, it still allows, as an incomplete global process, for cultur-
ally particular manifestations. Nor did Tang subscribe to the general view that 
9    Ibid., pp. 41–42.
10   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 361; see 
also an interview from 1974: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 312.
11   Knöbl, Spielräume der Modernisierung, pp. 11–12, 30–32.
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there exists an insurmountable chasm between modernity and tradition. He 
rather anticipated that Asian societies eventually succeed in securing the co-
existence of modernized and tradition-based social subsystems.12
In spite of this generally optimistic outlook, Tang did not expect that China 
would easily escape the dangers of modernity that were already threatening 
Western societies. It would not be feasible for the Chinese to simply side-step 
the downsides of Western-type modernization and implement only those 
selected parts that seemed to have been beneficial to Western societies. The 
open-ended global process of modernization described by Tang is too dynamic 
to be reduced to such a scheme. Nor would this scheme be consistent concep-
tually with Tang’s ambition to outline a Confucian reconstruction for address-
ing global problems of modernization. This ambition is evident, for example, in 
the manifesto of 1958, which claims that the project of modern Confucianism 
is significant in terms of a world philosophy.
It is against this backdrop of global concern that Tang turned to the prob-
lem of mankind’s submission to the instrumental rationality fortified in the 
capitalist economy and the modern bureaucratic state—a criticism that was 
also expressed by Max Weber and other Western theoreticians on moder-
nity. Tang warned of the coercive nature of an instrumental modernity and 
the dangers of mankind’s reification, calling attention to the “new bondage” 
which humanity experiences in “the modern industrialized community” and 
the “new slavery in the modern social and political systems.” He saw modern 
man in the figure of an uprooted, socially isolated city dweller and worried 
that freedom and equality in modern societies are in danger of becoming 
simple formalities which have no practical repercussions for social relations. 
In a sober conclusion, he observed that, due to the progressive dissolution of 
family structures, it will be difficult for the modern individual to develop a 
moral personality according to the Confucian ideal.13 Modern man and the 
émigré thus share the predicament of having to reconstruct a social context 
of common values in a situation where considerable parts of their lifeworld, 
including binding traditions and conventions, have dissolved. When the place 
of emigration is a rapidly modernizing society like Hong Kong, the disorient-
ing effects of the forceful nature of modern rationalization and emigration 
12   This alignment of Tang’s concept of modernization is to some extent in accordance 
with Tu Wei-ming’s introduction of the concept of multiple modernities to the Chinese 
and East-Asian context; see Tu, “Multiple Modernities—Implications of the Rise of 
‘Confucian’ East Asia.”
13   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” pp. 370–371.
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converge and are felt even more keenly. Tang addressed this convergence by 
 conceiving a type of normative reintegration in modern/exilic society that 
might be achieved without taking a harmful shortcut in traditionalism—that is, 
without haphazardly proclaiming the ostensibly healing effect of a return to 
communal life dominated by a substantial ethos, religion or mandatory set of 
virtues.
The general assumption of Confucianism about modernity is that even 
though modernity has a forceful nature, it is not characterized overall by 
inevitability. Thus modernity retains, according to modern Confucianism, 
its optional nature as a project of modernization. This project can largely 
be guided by normative inputs stemming from shared political convictions, 
moral standards, and cultural conventions.14 The predominance of structural 
constraints and instrumental rationality over humanistic cultural resources in 
modern society is therefore not seen as an inevitable outcome of modernity, 
but rather as a manageable deficiency. This perception of modernity leaves 
room for hope—however dwindling it may be—that “culture” can be liberated 
from the rampant, blind consequences of an all-pervasive socioeconomic pro-
fessionalization, fragmentation, and reification. To this end, the historical evo-
lution of such negative consequences of modernity must be made intelligible.15 
This expectation is in stark contrast to Weber’s famous diagnosis of an admin-
istered society, in which shared values and norms are regularly restricted by the 
inner workings of instrumental rationality. In depicting modern society as an 
“iron cage of dependence” that is forged by the modern bureaucratic state and 
the capitalist economy, and from which no human agent, whether individuals 
or collectivities, can ever escape, Weber’s outlook is unavoidably pessimistic.16 
His diagnosis of an irreversible disempowerment of historical subjectivity in 
the course of modernity thoroughly discredits any notion of human agents 
acting as helmsmen of their own history.
Just the same, Tang’s modern Confucianism is not naively optimistic to the 
point of proclaiming that the predicaments of modernity may be eradicated 
as such, once and for all, by concerted human action. Consequently, Tang 
remained critical of ideas concerning a substantial reconciliation of all inner 
contradictions in modern societies, as, for instance, Kang Youwei’s notion of 
a homogeneous world state of “Great Uniformity” would have it (see below). 
14   Ibid., pp. 370–371.
15   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 392–393.
16   For a concise analysis of Weber’s modernity theory, see Habermas, “Konzeptionen der 
Moderne,” pp. 208, 212; and Sandkühler, “Säkularisierung/Modernisierung,” pp. 166–167.
CHAPTER 468
Nor did he propose a model for a traditionalist infusion of modern society with 
pre-modern, communal forms of collective life. Rather, the modern individuals 
are to be enlightened to the increasing contradictions between, on the one hand, 
their subjective inwardness, dispositions and feelings and, on the other, the 
objective modern world, which is the outcome of an irreversible historical pro-
cess. Calls to substantially reintegrate the different ethical, political, economic, 
and cultural roles (or “subjectivity”) of individuals in modern societies would 
thus be futile. Therefore, a final reconciliation of subjectivity and  objectivity—
of spiritual inwardness and “outer,” “objective” social, economic, legal, political, 
and intellectual relations—is unattainable in the modern world,17 as much as 
exile is an inextricable, fateful state of existence for those who have to emigrate. 
The very form of modern and exilic life is hence characterized by alienation.
The fundamental, albeit implicit, message of Tang’s reflection about moder-
nity and exile may be summarized as follows: if the individuals can fathom the 
inner workings of modernity and exile, they might then be able to see through 
and grasp their own experience of alienation as the historical form of the mod-
ern world. This insight would mitigate the experience of alienation somewhat. 
But Tang did not demand from the individual a complete submission to an 
alienated form of life. Instead, he assumed that, based on a reflective grasp of 
modernity and exile, there might emerge, if not a perfect modern society, than 
at least a society whose members retain the freedom to strive for their own 
spiritual perfection. Against this backdrop, his modern Confucianism aimed 
to reconstruct ideational inputs—political, social and ethical ideas, values and 
norms, religious convictions, and historical consciousness—that are condu-
cive to breaking up the dominance of instrumental rationality in modernizing 
societies. This endeavor, a crucial part of which involved a critical reconstruc-
tion of “humanistic culture,” could just as easily take place in exile.
The exilic setting of this endeavor had far-reaching implications. Tang 
deemed the Chinese nation-states on the Mainland and on Taiwan both unfit 
to live up to the democratic promises of their respective republics and, hence, 
to fulfill an integral requirement of a modern nation-state.18 For all its con-
straints, the place of exile was well-suited to reconsidering the foundations of 
modern China. After all, whereas the regimes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
17   With respect to the concept of modernity, Tang’s thought is here in line with Hegel’s; see 
Ritter, Metaphysik und Politik, p. 215.
18   For Tang, the true “Republic of China” (Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國), that is a “demo-
cratic Chinese nation-state,” had not been established so far, but is a state in the making; 
see Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 175–176.
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curtailed the social and political deliberation about modernization, the condi-
tion of exile, for all its restraints, opened up a discursive space for an undog-
matic approach to China’s modern problematic. According to the authors of 
the manifesto, the experience of emigration and exile was the decisive catalyst 
for their attempt to reconsider “the problems of China” in the modern world 
(see below). Yet this positive outlook on the exilic situation cannot betray the 
fact that Tang experienced exile first and foremost as an intellectual and his-
torical void.
 Exile as Horror Vacui
Tang published two long essays at the beginning of the 1960s in the peri-
odical Zuguo Zhoukan which were entitled “On the Fall and Demise of the 
Flowers and Fruits of the Chinese Nation—on the Meaning and Value of 
Conservation and a Message for Persons Overseas,” and “The Fall and Demise 
of the Flowers and Fruits and the Planting of a Holy Tree through the Self.”19 
Earlier, Tang had spoken only in isolated moments about exile, above all in 
the second half of the 1950s. Specific examples can be found in his address to 
students at the beginning of a new term of study at the New Asia College, in 
shorter articles in journals and in the above-mentioned manifesto of 1958.
From the exilic perspective, Tang depicted Hong Kong as a non-place in the 
sense of Marc Augé’s anthropological theory of supermodernity. The city was an 
alienating habitat, where individuals no longer recognize themselves because 
they cannot situate this place in their own historical, biographical, and genera-
tional narratives. Following Augé, Hartmut Rosa sees this particular deepen-
ing of inter-generational alienation as a sign of the modern  transformation 
of places into non-places.20 Neither Augé nor Rosa considers the condition of 
exile, however, which indeed may be depicted as a paradigmatic non-place. 
It is significant that Tang, in contrast to Augé, traced the reasons for the 
19   “Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling—jian lun baoshou zhi yiyi yu jiazhi bing 
jinggao haiwai renshi 說中華民族之花果飄零—兼論保守之意義與價值並敬告海
外人士,” Zuguo Zhoukan, 35, No. 1 (1961); “Hua guo piaoling ji linggen zi zhi 花果飄零及
靈根自植,” Zuguo Zhoukan, 44, No. 4 (1964). Both essays were published in book form in 
1974, together with a reprint of the manifesto of 1958 and two sets of lecture notes which 
had been published earlier in Mingbao Yuekan 明報月刊: Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu 
zhi hua guo piaoling.
20   Augé, Non-lieux, p. 100, cf. also: Rosa, Identität and kulturelle Praxis, pp. 205–206.
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divisions between generations in daily life not only back to modern phenom-
ena of accelerated social change, but also to exile. Ultimately, the exiles in 
Hong Kong society experienced isolation in their daily life due to the singular 
event of their emigration. This was further exacerbated by the experience of 
intellectual, personal, and biographical isolation, which at least tacitly sepa-
rated the exiles from the non-exiled generation of their parents and from the 
succeeding generation of youngsters, who were born in Hong Kong and had 
not experienced emigration. In other words, the exiles constitute a genera-
tion unto themselves. Since their horizon of experience is hallmarked by their 
experience of emigration, they are separated from the older and the younger 
generations by a deep gulf. In this insular, exilic present, in which common 
inter-generational contexts are by and large lost, the emigrants face the danger 
of being unable to express their own personal identity in the contexts of shared 
values, lifestyles, and common cultural practices. The exilic self, possibly even 
more so than the modern self, is required to establish new value horizons and 
normative links from within the self. In the process of doing so, the individual 
is inevitably confronted with a new, puzzling plurality of horizons of meaning 
and lifestyles. This, in turn, hampers the stabilization of his or her personal 
identity within common horizons of cultural meaning.
It is significant therefore that Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan and 
Zhang Junmai describe the start of their exile as an experience of intellectual 
and emotional isolation and emptiness, in which they “looked around to all 
sides and saw only endless distance.”21 Tang’s description of the exile is not 
always lyrical, in some places his language is distinctively declamatory: His 
vocabulary includes terms such as “native soil,” “homeland” or “motherland,” 
terms that smack of a lingering nationalist chauvinism. It is important to bear 
in mind here, however, that such expressions do not have the same histori-
cal baggage in the Chinese context as they do in European languages. As will 
be demonstrated, Tang’s language is not that of a nationalist, but rather of a 
conservative patriotic thinker. At times, for example when he confessed his 
yearning for the landscapes he loved when he still lived on the Mainland, there 
is a coincidental, but all the same illustrative, consistency between his emo-
tional writing style and the way cosmopolitan philosophers of the European 
Enlightenment expressed their own patriotic fervor. If nothing else, this con-
gruence reminds us that cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not mutually 
21   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 4. The wording quoted here comes from a poem 
attributed to the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (Koxinga 國姓爺; 1624–1662) 
who retreated to Taiwan with his remaining forces when the Ming cause was finally lost 
on the Chinese Mainland after the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in 1644.
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exclusive. Lao Sze-kwang was therefore mistaken when he suggested that Tang, 
in professing his longing for the mountainous landscape of his youth in his 
later writings, displayed a “national-cultural” consciousness and “love for tradi-
tion” together with a “strange” yearning for the reconciliation of human values 
with the “old society.”22 Rather, Tang expressed here an emotional attachment 
to the landscape of his youth and an alienation from his place of exile— 
Hong Kong.
Tang Junyi perceived Hong Kong from an anti-colonial perspective as a “col-
ony of Englishmen” which had, as he explicitly stated, no more significance 
for him as “our land” than the English had as “our people.”23 At the same time, 
he described Hong Kong as a center of business and trade, in which the emi-
nent spheres of “humanistic culture”—ethics, philosophy, art, music, literature 
and religion—have barely been developed. It was to him, to a certain extent, 
a historically empty place where neither historical époques nor intellectual- 
historical dimensions of culture could be experienced. He thus posed the fol-
lowing rhetorical question to the students of the New Asia College at the 
beginning of the new term in September 1959: “What intellectual ties do you 
have to ‘Hong Kong’?” According to Tang, in Hong Kong there were only ties 
related to tycoons and businessmen from industry and trade. Hong Kong, in 
his view, was meaningless, since there were no notable libraries, museums, 
academic symposia or societies to be found. The only things available were 
traded goods from all the world’s leading countries.24
Here, Tang painted a picture of a creeping, intellectual, emotional and prac-
tical colonialization of the lives of the exiles, a process that went hand-in-hand 
with their acclimatization to the emptiness of the non-place “Hong Kong.” The 
historical and cultural awareness of the emigrants as a community of exiles is 
permanently at risk of becoming gradually dispersed under the colonial condi-
tions of life, until the emigrants finally forget where they have come from and 
how they came to find themselves suffering from colonial repression. Against 
this backdrop, Tang assigned the exiles in Hong Kong and Taiwan the task of 
keeping alive the consciousness of their community—a community that was 
bound by a common fate in the face of a Chinese populace of Hong Kong, which 
accepted the colonial situation as an everyday reality. It is out of such concern 
22   Lao Siguang (Lao Sze-kwang), “Cong Tang Junyi Zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan 
Zhongguo zhexue de weilai,” p. 21.
23   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 29; cf. ibid., p. 43. Tellingly, Tang 
wanted to be laid to rest in Taiwan, not in Hong Kong, and explained this by stating that 
Taiwan was native soil; see Tang, Nianpu, p. 217.
24   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, pp. 505–506.
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that Tang, in 1956, observed that it is not only those students of the New Asia 
College born in Hong Kong who appear to have no interest in the problems of 
Chinese statehood, nationhood and humanistic culture. In fact, the “youth” 
and “high-ranking intellectuals” who are essentially living in “exile” (liuwang 
流亡) are by now also experiencing noticeable difficulties in recognizing their 
responsibility in these matters.25 In Tang’s view, this change in mindset had 
taken place between the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Not only 
in Hong Kong, but also in Taiwan, South East Asia, Europe and America, many 
“compatriots overseas” gradually came to terms with “living far away from 
home.”26 Such a transformation is also evident in Tang’s conclusion that only a 
steadily decreasing number of emigrants still experiences exile as an anomaly 
to be suffered.27 Thus, even within the generation of exiles, there are those emi-
grants who become increasingly oblivious to their status of exile and gradu-
ally adapt to a normalized everyday life in spite of the colonial circumstances. 
Emigrants like Tang consequently felt increasingly isolated as an exiled genera-
tion, sharing a particular horizon of experience that is specific to their lifetime. 
We may assume that the related feelings of social isolation, atomization and 
marginalization turned exilic space even more into a non-place.
One of the core experiences of exile is undoubtedly the fact that answers to 
the question of origin within exile circles no longer seem so unambiguous. A 
wide range of identification with “China” as a place of origin comes to the fore-
front and, along with it, the possible diversity within such an identification. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Tang thus continued to speak consistently of “China” 
as Zhongguo 中國 or—with stronger cultural connotations—Zhonghua 中華 
as the place of origin of Chinese living outside the Mainland. But, at the same 
time, he employed a more differentiated terminology. In Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, there was a “Chinese youth” (Zhongguo qingnian 中國青年) and a Chinese 
society, which he termed Huaren shehui 華人社會 (society of Hua people) or 
Zhongguoren zhi shehui 中國人之社會 (society of the Chinese).28
25   Ibid., pp. 428, 431. Origins also play an important, although secondary role here. Tang 
notably pointed out that Chinese people born in Hong Kong “originally come from the 
Mainland:” Ibid., p. 432.
26   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 1.
27   This use of the term “generation” follows sociological work in the field of migration 
research, whereby immigrants are categorized as “first generation”, and those born 
to immigrants are known as “second generation:” Pan, The Encyclopedia of the Chinese 
Overseas, p. 17.
28   In today’s language usage, “Zhongguoren” sometimes has connotations of nationality 
(People’s Republic of China or Republic of China) and “Huaren” ethnic and/or cultural 
links to “China;” Tu, “The Periphery as the Center,” pp. 25–26. In Tang’s writings, the 
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For Chinese communities in other countries, he used the term “societies 
of Chinese sojourners” (Huaqiao shehui 華僑社會), which clearly has much 
weaker national-cultural connotations.29 Characteristic of these societies of 
overseas Chinese is a situation in which old traditions and customs are hardly 
maintained.30 This situation, however, is not indicative of an emancipatory, 
gradual dismantling of oppressive traditions, but much more a symptom of 
increasing repression in places of emigration. In Tang’s view, Chinese commu-
nities in the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Burma 
continued to be disadvantaged culturally, politically and economically. No less 
troubling was the fact that the “Chinese youth” from Taiwan and Hong Kong—
he was thinking here in the first instance of the educated elite—had been 
dispersing across the globe for some time and taking on foreign nationalities 
in “comparatively civilized states” such as the United States of America. His 
fear, therefore, was that in forty or fifty years, the societies of Chinese sojourn-
ers could completely disappear. The “sojourning Chinese” (Zhongguo qiaomin 
中國僑民) would then not even remain Chinese in name. Tang repeatedly 
described the Chinese communities in Hong Kong and Taiwan and those in 
other parts of the world henceforth as “societies of Chinese sojourners” and 
thus dispensed with the terms “Chinese youth” and “society of Hua people,” 
which would indicate much closer cultural ties with China.31 In this way, he 
made it clear that the progressive assimilation of Chinese communities into 
immigrant societies constituted a threat to the survival of “Chinese” communi-
ties outside the Mainland, not only in terms of sociological evidence, but also 
from a normative perspective.
According to Tang, the threat to Chinese communities was not in the first 
instance due to any physical danger facing their members. It was rather the 
self-conception of the emigrants as belonging to the Chinese nation that was 
in danger, and even more so since 1949: On the one hand, emigration prompted 
the question of the desirability of the individual’s continuing identification 
with the nation, particularly in a colonial situation where the issue involved 
the choice between assimilation and anti-colonial opposition. On the other 
terms “Zhongguoren” as well as “Huaren” appear to denote ethnic and/or cultural links 
to “China.”
29   The term “Huaqiao” 華僑 dates back to the late 19th century and implies migration out-
side China. From 1910 until the regulation of its official use in the People’s Republic, the 
term “Huaqiao” suggested belonging to the Chinese nation. Pan, The Encyclopedia of the 
Chinese Overseas, p. 16.
30   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 5.
31   Ibid., pp. 1–3, 39.
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hand, emigrants had to weigh the question of how the Chinese nation should 
be defined and whether there could be to some extent an alternative “China” 
outside the communist Mainland and beyond a Taiwan ruled by the GMD. In 
Tang’s opinion, the survival of China as a cultural nation was unquestionably 
in acute danger. He depicted this danger in 1961 by using the image of a large 
tree for the Chinese nation: The tree is threatened with extinction; its flowers 
and fruits are falling off and decaying, and some are gradually carried off by 
the wind. Only certain seeds continue to survive in the foreign soil of “other 
men’s gardens,” in shadowy, moist ground, and in the corners where they ben-
efit from the muddy soil.32 As the metaphor implies, the Chinese nation may 
no longer be able to preserve its territory, history and culture, and, along with 
this, its morals and ethics, traditions and customs, and language and script.33
Tang’s metaphor underwent an optimistic change in Tu Wei-ming, whose 
edited volume on “cultural China” is entitled The Living Tree.34 The contrast-
ing metaphors may well be taken as indicators of a fundamental shift from an 
exilic to a post-exilic perspective. Tu Wei-ming retraces, from a post-exilic per-
spective, the current situation of Chinese sojourners to its voluntary nature:
Increasingly, overseas Chinese (huaqiao) have chosen to be Chinese 
(huaren) in their adopted countries. As emigrants, they have voluntarily 
severed their political ties with their mother country and, as immigrants, 
they have deliberately opted to settle down in the new land.35
Tu adds an observation that stands in stark contrast with Tang Junyi’s wor-
ries about the dissolution of a common orientation toward China’s cultural 
traditions among intellectuals in exile and overseas communities: “The term 
‘cultural China,’ coined in the last decade or so . . . is itself an indication of the 
emergence of a ‘common awareness’ among Chinese intellectuals throughout 
the world.”36 Unlike Tu, Tang, in the 1950s and 1960s, was concerned with the 
allegedly imminent decay of China’s national culture. He felt that this might 
hinder the (cultural) “merging” and “absorption” within the nation, but also 
undermine the individual members’ “intellectual determination” to protect 
32   Ibid., p. 2.
33   Ibid., p. 22.
34   The contributions by Tu follow Tang’s use of the term “cultural nation:” Tu, “Preface to the 
Stanford Edition,” p. viii; Tu, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” pp. 25–26.
35   Tu, “Preface to the Stanford Edition,” pp. ix–x.
36   Tu, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” p. 25.
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the nation and its culture. In assessing the current situation, Tang found that 
this determination had diminished among the diasporic communities of 
Chinese, which was equivalent to the “beginning of the complete collapse of 
the national spirit” and the imminent “great tragedy of the nation.” Yet, Tang 
explicitly maintained that this was not a case of a “moral problem.” The emi-
grants had no moral obligation toward the nation and its culture, and the exilic 
individual’s interpretation of nation and culture was not to be morally judged.37
Therefore, instead of moralizing, Tang addressed the threatening con-
sequences of converging exilic and colonial experiences. This convergence 
was a symptom of the continuing demise of the Chinese cultural nation. In 
Hong Kong and even in Taiwan, Tang saw signs of a (self-)colonialization of 
the “social and cultural consciousness.” He found evidence of the colonial-
ized servant’s consciousness in the fact that interest in the Chinese heritage 
in the fields of science, education, and the arts was dwindling. In these fields 
the Chinese no longer set their “own standards,” and consequently even “the 
standards for Chinese scholarship have fallen into the hands of outsiders.” 
Tellingly, the exhibits from the Palace Museum in Taiwan were only appre-
ciated by the Chinese when they were on loan to an exhibition, after having 
first aroused interest in the United States.38 No less worrying for Tang was the 
declining use of Chinese languages (Zhongguo yuwen 中國語文), which were 
no longer spoken even in the “homes of many high-ranking Chinese intellectu-
als in America and Europe.” He critically observed that at a meeting in Hong 
Kong on the founding of the Chinese University of Hong Kong the majority of 
people did not have any qualms about speaking in English. For Tang, this was 
a new development. He pointed out that during the Republican period even 
the representatives of the so-called New Culture movement, who were critical 
of Chinese tradition, still used the Chinese language.39 He also deplored that, 
in the meantime, it had become commonplace that Chinese academics study 
abroad in order to gain recognition from their compatriots. An unfortunate 
consequence of this was that those like the graduates of the New Asia College 
37   On “intellectual determination” see Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 5; 
on the “collapse of the national spirit” see ibid., p. 37; on the “tragedy of the nation” see 
ibid., p. 23; on the “moral problem” see ibid., p. 2.
38   Ibid., pp. 33–38. Tang did not elucidate any further here the link between the colonialized 
consciousness and Hegel’s famous master and servant dialectic.
39   Ibid., pp. 4–5.
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in Hong Kong, who had not studied abroad, became disadvantaged in their 
careers and socially marginalized.40
 Intellectual Ethos and Messianic Vision
As an intellectual and social critic in exile, Tang did not engage in practical 
politics. There were no political parties that had developed within Confucian 
exile circles, nor had a Confucian social movement emerged as such. Still, the 
politically active Zhang Junmai did speak of a Confucian “movement” in 1962 
and he identified the periodical Rensheng 人生, founded in 1951 in Hong Kong, 
as its mouthpiece. Early references to a “new Confucianism” in the post-war 
period can indeed be traced back to articles published in Rensheng in 1963. 
In addition, Zhang described the New Asia College as a “center for the reap-
praisal and revival of Confucianism.” He additionally pointed to the existence 
of a programmatic platform, whose written testimony was the manifesto 
A Declaration to the World for Chinese Culture from 1958.41 In support of the 
assumption that there was a “new” Confucian movement at that time, some 
scholars have also pointed to certain related developments prior to 1949 such 
as the establishment of academies and publications from 1939 onwards.42 As 
early as 1941, the philosopher He Lin 賀麟 (1902–1992) had made mention of 
a “new Confucian movement” in reference to a “modern culture” in China. 
The movement’s impact as a main strand within politics, society, and culture 
was said to be only a matter of time.43
Yet there is sufficient reason to doubt whether there was really a “move-
ment” in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, the locations of the persons men-
tioned above would seem to contradict the idea of a concentrated Confucian 
engagement with political or social forces: Zhang Junmai mostly lived in the 
40   Ibid., pp. 36–37; cf. also ibid. Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, 
pp. 491–492. Yet it seemed that not all was lost: Tang also recognized signs for China’s 
increasing cultural significance in the world, such as the presence of Chinese culture and 
language as subjects of study at foreign universities. Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua 
guo piaoling, p. 44.
41   Chang (Zhang Junmai), The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, Vol. 2, p. 7. On 
the Rensheng-articles from 1963; see Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New 
Confucianism,” pp. 26–27.
42   For example, Fang, Xiandai xin rujia xue an, Vol. 1, 17–19, 22–24; Bresciani, Reinventing 
Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement, pp. 18–21.
43   He, “Rujjia sixiang de xin kaizhan,” pp. 611–612.
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United States after 1949; Tang Junyi and Qian Mu had lived in Hong Kong since 
1949; Mou Zongsan stayed in Taiwan until 1960, before moving to Hong Kong; 
and Xu Fuguan also moved to Hong Kong nine years later. By that time, the 
journal Rensheng had already ceased publication.44 As regards the New Asia 
College, which Zhang had identified as the institutional “center” of the move-
ment, Grace Ai-Ling Chou concludes in a recent study on its formation and 
development that “New Asia’s attempt to construct a cultural education that 
would be Confucian in content, structure, and style was far from straightfor-
ward.” Chou further explains that the founders of the college allowed for a con-
ceptual breadth in their understanding of culture that “. . . although potent in 
its very vagueness and inclusiveness, would lead to increasing uncertainty over 
the exact scope and nature of the Chinese culture they aimed to preserve.”45
There were, moreover, significant political differences among these 
Confucian intellectuals. Even though Tang, Zhang, Xu, Mou, and Qian all held 
anti-communist convictions, they expressed divergent criticisms of world 
communism and Chinese communism. Their political outlook was even more 
inconsistent when considering their attitude toward the nationalist govern-
ment of the GMD on Taiwan. For example, Qian Mu, who was not among the 
signatories of the above-mentioned manifesto, had much fewer reservations 
about the rule of the GMD in post-war Taiwan than Tang or Zhang Junmai did 
during the 1950s. The political differences and ambiguities do not end here, 
however. There was also room for disagreement in the field of political the-
ory. Tang and Xu Fuguan, for instance, openly and intensely discussed their 
concepts of democracy and the relationship between science and politics at 
the beginning of the 1950s.46 As a matter of fact, at no point in Tang’s lifetime 
did modern Confucianism have a common political program. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that Tang indicated in private correspondence on the manifesto 
that the rumors about an alleged desire to come together as a political party 
were to be dismissed.47 What is more, the manifesto of 1958 was not conceived 
44   Rensheng appeared until 1968; another important periodical, Minzhu Pinglun, was 
founded in 1949 in Hong Kong and existed until 1966.
45   Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War: Chinese Cultural Education at Hong 
Kong’s New Asia College, 1949–76, p. 3.
46   Mou Zongsan declared himself in favor of Tang: Lee, Xu Fuguan and New Confucianism 
in Taiwan (1949–1969): A Cultural History of the Exile Generation, pp. 186–188, 192–204. 
Differences also arose between Qian Mu and Xu Fuguan towards the end of the 1950s and 
at the start of the 1960s, ibid., pp. 208–218.
47   Tang, Shujian, p. 116 (letter of November 28, 1957 to Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan).
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as a partisan platform, and Tang himself in fact explicitly stated his disinter-
est in political activism.48 His position is thus markedly different from that of 
Zhang Junmai, who, 22 years his senior, had already founded a political party 
at the beginning of the 1930s, and, at the start of the 1950s, tried in vain during 
a short but intensive period to organize a political “Third Force.” Tang, by the 
way, never joined Zhang’s “Third Force” activities, even though his own politi-
cal vision of a future unified and democratic China was basically in line with 
Zhang’s outlook.49
What was actually achieved in the 1950s and 1960s within the Confucian 
exile circles was a rather loose intellectual, academic, and cultural-political 
collaboration—such as the one between Tang and Qian when they worked 
together in founding the New Asia College. None of these intellectuals, how-
ever, was engaged in political or social activism. It is, therefore, no coincidence 
that the programmatic term “new Confucianism” only rarely appears in the 
exilic writings of Confucian intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, and, when it 
does, that it varies greatly in meaning. Even Zhang Junmai did not use this 
term in the first instance to describe contemporary Confucianism of the 20th 
century, but rather Confucian currents of the late imperial period.50
Although Tang was not part of a movement and abstained from practical 
politics, his life in Hong Kong was also not entirely one of quiet scholarly har-
mony. For despite his experience of exilic hardship, he never fully retreated 
into the academic world. In fact, besides his work in academic philosophy, 
a central component of his intellectual activities consisted of writing texts 
and delivering lectures that addressed a general audience. He had already 
been active in this respect at the very outset of his life in exile and published 
a remarkable number of articles in a variety of journals and magazines tar-
geted at a well-educated readership.51 Furthermore, from 1950 onwards, Tang 
organized a series of public lectures and seminars with various speakers and 
hosted over 100 events, mostly for small groups of 20 to 30 attendees. In 1962, 
together with the philosopher Mou Zongsan and others, he founded the Study 
Society for Eastern Humanism (Dongfang Renwen Xuehui 東方人文學會) in 
Hong Kong, which assembled about 70 members worldwide. In addition, he 
48   For instance in an article that was published in 1955 in the journal Ziyou Ren 自由人: 
Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, p. 421.
49   Xue, Minzhu xianzheng yu minzuzhuyi de bianzheng fazhan—Zhang Junmai sixiang yan-
jiu, pp. 52–53.
50   Cf. his essay in Rensheng, No. 297 (March 1963) entitled “Xin rujia sixiang shi xie wan 
yihou 新儒家思想史寫完以後.”
51   See Feng, Tang Junyi xiansheng jinian ji, pp. 7–28.
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was continuously involved in a diverse range of academic societies.52 The New 
Asia College’s public lecture series which was conducted from 1950 to 1955 is 
worth noting in this regard. It comprised 122 lectures on a wide range of top-
ics, including a “Comparison between Chinese and Western Medical Theory,” 
“Buddhism and Christianity,” “The Spirit of Kantian Philosophy,” “Islamic 
Scholarship in Medieval Times,” “The American Presidential Election System,” 
and “The Position of Science in a Free Education.” Tang participated himself in 
this series, delivering altogether sixteen lectures.53
The above-mentioned intellectual activities, while quite diverse, shed some 
light on Tang’s self-image as an intellectual in exile. His activities were borne 
of the conviction that intellectual engagement—as social critic, writer, lec-
turer and educator—could contribute to an enhancement of China’s “national 
spirit.” This belief was probably motivated by both foreign and Chinese influ-
ences. Inspiration from abroad ranged from Babbitt’s New Humanism to the 
German philosopher Rudolf Eucken, who had gained enormous popularity on 
the eve of the First World War by publishing texts like Der Sinn und Wert des 
Lebens (1908) or Zur Sammlung der Geister (Leipzig 1913).54 Important Chinese 
stimuli, on the other hand, included models for exerting intellectual-spiritual 
influence, among them the communities of followers of Confucian “masters” 
(beginning with Confucius himself), and the Confucian academies in late 
imperial China. The founding of academies in the Confucian circles of the 
Republican period continued to point in this direction, as did the establish-
ment of the New Asia College in Hong Kong.55
52   Fang, Xiandai xin rujia xue an, Vol. 1, pp. 23–24.
53   Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War: Chinese Cultural Education at Hong 
Kong’s New Asia College, 1949–76, pp. 39–41.
54   On Eucken, see Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte, 
p. 179. Eucken was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1908 and became an internationally 
renowned public speaker. As Lübbe expounds, Eucken’s brand of idealism was marked by 
its “Weltanschauungscharakter” (character as a world view) and primarily aimed to reach 
a non-academic public. Its focus was clearly on the “geistige Tat” (intellectual-spiritual 
act). Accordingly, the aim of the so-called Eucken-Bund, a sectarian association founded 
in 1922, was to contribute to “the moral strength of German life.” See ibid. Eucken’s thought 
became popular in China in the 1920s and 1930s; see Meissner, China zwischen nationalem 
‘Sonderweg’ und universaler Modernisierung. Zur Rezeption westlichen Denkens in China, 
pp. 82–110.
55   As Chou observes: “The New Asia founders believed the traditional Chinese academy, 
the shuyuan (书院) of Song and Ming times, to be the ideal institutional form for the 
fostering of ‘well-rounded talent’ since it nurtured students not only academically but 
also morally through its encouragement of close student–teacher relationships. In such 
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But Tang was neither nostalgic about the pre-modern idea of exemplary 
Confucian figures, nor did he expect that the educational ideals exemplified 
by Confucian academies in late imperial China could be implemented in con-
temporary Hong Kong. He thus summed up the impact of New Asia College in 
skeptical, rather pessimistic manner in 1960:
This academy was intended to carry on the tradition of Neo-Confucianism 
in the Song and Ming Dynasties, but it is still far from reaching that goal. 
Song and Ming academies had no concern for the career of their gradu-
ates. The primary requirement for disciples of Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming 
was to make up their mind to “carry on the teachings of past sages that 
would otherwise be lost and usher in a time of peace to last forever.” This 
is beyond any career. (. . .) Such an ideal is of course somewhat too high 
for today’s students, and no teacher dares to compare himself to Zhu Xi 
or Wang Yangming. In addition, our perception of the times cannot be 
the same as theirs in the Song and Ming Dynasties . . . (. . .) In the past, if 
a scholar would not take the imperial civil service exam, he could study 
in the countryside while making a living as a farmer, which is impossible 
today. That is a major problem facing us. We are caught between the past 
and the present, the ideal and the reality, what is beyond career and the 
need to face it.56
Overall, the intellectual’s ethic of responsibility, upheld by Confucian emi-
grants after 1949, differed sharply from the traditional ethos of the Chinese 
literati. The latter demanded that an educated person promote the common-
weal and encouraged him to take office in the imperial administration. The 
traditional ethos did not vanish altogether, however, with the founding of the 
republic in 1912. Roger T. Ames has pointedly observed that “[m]any Chinese 
philosophers of our generation continue the tradition wherein scholar-officials 
are institutionalized intellectuals who have the practical responsibility to forge 
a ‘way’ for the daily workings of government and society.”57 But in the colonial 
relationships, teachers were to serve not merely as dispensers of information but as per-
sonal mentors and moral guides . . .” Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War: 
Chinese Cultural Education at Hong Kong’s New Asia College, 1949–76, p. 23.
56   See Tang’s article in New Asia Life Biweekly, Vol. 1, No. 17, pp. 1–2 (1960); quoted from: Hong, 
“The Characteristics and Prospect of the Confucian Academy: A Commentary on Jiang 
Qing’s Ideas on the Confucian Academy,” p. 190.
57   Ames, “New Confucianism: A Native Response to Western Philosophy,” p. 79.
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environment of Hong Kong, the ethos of the scholar-official inevitably faded 
away and became little more than a romantic social idea.
Since opportunities for political and social engagement were no longer the 
same as on the Mainland prior to 1949, let alone in imperial times, intellectu-
als in exile inevitably found themselves faced with the fundamental question 
of their self-image. It seems that the experience of exile strengthened Tang’s 
personal determination to advocate for a reconstruction of Chinese “national 
culture” and humanism. At the same time, he grew increasingly critical of the 
democratic achievements of the various Chinese regimes in the 20th century. 
At the same time, intellectual life on the exilic periphery not only meant that 
Tang was physically detached from the Chinese governments on both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait, but it also provided him with a unique opportunity: He was 
now able to adopt the role of an intellectual unburdened by the traditional 
ethos of scholar-officials. Since he was no longer subject to status-based obli-
gation to become a civil servant or an advisor to those in power, he was free to 
become an unrestrained social critic.
The socialist state of the PRC and the GMD state in Taiwan did not allow 
for a public sphere in which social critics, safeguarded by constitutional 
rights, could be active. While in exile, Tang thus addressed the democratic 
Chinese state and its public with futural concepts, i.e. normative anticipa-
tions. In the same vein, he conceived of a type of cosmopolitan intellectual 
who so far had been largely absent in China. The ethos of this intellectual 
was informed by the awareness that in order to shoulder social responsibility 
for the moral-humanistic betterment of humankind, it was necessary to act 
from the peripheral position of a critical observer in exile. Equally impor-
tant, the ethos contained elements of self-blame insofar as the intellectual 
elite felt obliged to take responsibility for China’s belated efforts to modern-
ize, the failings of Chinese democracy, and the “loss” of the Mainland in 1949. 
It is thus no surprise that Tang, in pondering the reasons for the failures of 
the republic after 1912, assigned considerable blame to the role played by 
Chinese intellectuals (see Chap. 9).
The language of the Confucian intellectual in exile was “philosophical,” 
albeit in a more popular than strictly academic sense. Tang was well aware of 
the difference between academic and popular philosophy, attributing to the 
latter the task of addressing broader social issues.58 Tang moreover aspired to 
 
58   See, for example, his foreword (from 1974) to the reprint of his book Renwen jingshen zhi 
chongjian (p. 19). In the foreword to the first edition of this book, Tang already states that 
the book does not intend to address specialists, but people engaged in social and cultural 
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the conception of a unity of philosophy and a philosophical way of life, which 
he inscribed into his modern Confucian project. The aim to instill his philoso-
phy with practical import entailed the risk of undermining critical reflection 
on modern society by relegating philosophy to a resource (or “wisdom”) for 
an unburdened individual conduct of life. Indeed, the continuous struggle to 
negotiate between these two poles without however retreating to either of one 
of them characterizes Tang’s philosophical endeavor.
Tang’s self-image as intellectual and philosopher is even more ambivalent 
than it might initially appear. In looking back on his personal and intellec-
tual development, he professed that early in his life he had felt responsible 
for setting out on a mission to save humanity. According to Tang Duanzheng’s 
Chronicle of the Life and Work of Tang Junyi, Tang Junyi believed at age 26 or 
27 that he had grasped—in a moment of sudden enlightenment—the funda-
mental truth of the universe and of human life, and was convinced that all 
humanity should do so as well. This epiphany allegedly occurred in 1935 at 
Xuanwu 玄武 Lake in Nanjing and appears to mark a turning point in Tang’s 
intellectual life.59 It is difficult to know the degree to which this messianic self-
awareness actually has come to bear in Tang’s philosophical writings.60 He 
generally divided his roles between the intellectual who dealt with the his-
torical world and the messianic visionary who embraced the ultimate realm of 
liang zhi. It seems likely nonetheless that he was deeply convinced throughout 
his life that he should strive to guide the minds of his fellow men to the high-
est realm. Kevin Cheng harshly comments: “When he [Tang] was 27 (1935) he 
matters, including activists, educators, journalists, editors, those active in the field of reli-
gions, and the “youth” (ibid., p. 22).
59   Tang, Nianpu, p. 33. Tang also recounted how before the age of 30, he often felt that his 
“mind” (xinling 心靈) was located at the periphery of the world, adding that he frequently 
practiced meditation (quiet-sitting; jingzuo 靜坐) and experienced what “Western mysti-
cism” would call “enlightenment” (zhengwu 證悟); see Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling 
jingjie, Vol. 24, p. 476. There is unfortunately still no biography to date of Tang that psycho-
logically interprets this account or the letters to his wife Xie Tingguang from November 
1941, which indicate that he experienced a severe personal crisis at that time; see Tang, 
Nianpu, pp. 48–51.
60   At times, Tang even struck a more playful note in trying to carry out his mission: For 
example, he wrote a philosophical children’s story entitled “The Journey of Human Life” 
(Rensheng zhi lüxing 人生之旅行, first published by Zhonghua Shuju in 1939/40), and 
the “Songs in Praise of Mind, Principle and the Way” (Xin Li Dao Song 心理道頌); see 
Tang, Rensheng zhi tiyan, pp. 237–298 (Rensheng zhi Lüxing), pp. 299–337 (Xin Li Dao 
Song; 1941).
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arrogantly considered himself as having mastered the foundational truths 
of the universe and human life.”61 Perhaps this was indeed just a matter of 
arrogance. Just the same, Tang found himself in the company of renowned 
Chinese and Western thinkers who were equally unswerving in their testimony 
and sense of mission, including many of his neo-Confucian predecessors like 
Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, prominent contemporary Confucians like Kang 
Youwei and Liang Shuming, but also Western masterminds like Hegel, Fichte, 
Comte, and Eucken.
Tang’s messianic self-awareness also resonates from his own account of a 
crucial childhood experience in which he realized the end of human times. It 
is not the biographical credibility of this narrative that is of interest here, but 
rather the much more telling fact that Tang portrayed himself in his mid- forties 
as a thinker who had always been driven by the notion of an end of human 
time. Even though he did not envisage an eschatological end of humanity, his 
reflection on an end time nonetheless bears the imprint of a personal awaken-
ing to transcendence:
In retrospect, the root of my antipathy towards any thoughts that regard 
man as a natural animal, which is the source of my philosophical think-
ing, can be traced back to an experience when I was only six or seven 
years old. One day my father told me the scientific prediction that the 
light and heat of the sun would [one day] vanish. The earth would then 
reach its final day. By the time of the earth’s final day, there would be 
only one man with his dog. I remember that this story roused my bound-
less interest. Several days later, the earth of our courtyard cracked and 
warped in the sun after a rain. At that time, I thought that the earth might 
split and collapse. By now, the situation in the courtyard occurred already 
61   Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral Life: 
A Comparative Study, p. 483. Tang’s strong sense of mission is also evident in his own 
description of the state of mind that he achieved when writing in an inspired manner: 
“This self which resides in tranquility seems like a spirit which is totally alone and has 
nothing to cling onto from the above and from below. This spirit, on the one hand, opens 
up the door of Heaven so that the horizon of principles descends upon me; and on the 
other hand surveys the world below. To myself and to those who exist in reality, some-
times I am sympathetic and compassionate, and sometimes I am pious and celebrating. 
Therefore when I am writing I often feel a tender passion pulsating within me, and I am 
so touched that I cannot restrain myself from tears.” (Tang in Rensheng zhi tiyan; quoted 
from: Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral 
Life: A Comparative Study, pp. 325–326).
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forty years ago. I still remember it very vividly. This is, I believe, the source 
of my philosophical thinking and all my opinions about human nature. 
Why do people think of the destruction of the world? Included in this 
[contemplation] is the mystery and dignity of human nature and the dif-
ference between man and animals. (. . .) How can I imagine the havoc 
of the world while bearing this very existence in my mind? Later on, 
I reached the firm understanding that man is [a form of] existence 
which entails the transcending of the material world.62
Insofar as Tang’s own account points to the theological layers of his philoso-
phy, it provides more insight than those enthusiastic judgments that portray 
him as a heroic guardian of China’s humanistic traditions in a hostile mod-
ern environment. The most influential words of such praise came from Mou 
Zongsan who, in a commemorative text after Tang’s death, called him a “giant 
in ‘the universe of cultural consciousness.’ ” Mou further compared Tang’s intel-
lectual standing to that of Newton, Einstein, Plato and Kant as well as Huang 
Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695), Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682), and Wang Fuzhi 
王夫之 (1619–1692) in their respective fields and times.63 The problem with this 
facile judgment is not only its enthusiasm, but also the fact that it labels Tang 
with the cliché of a defender of Chinese spiritual culture. This cliché might, 
moreover, lead to the insinuation that Tang, as such a defender, belongs to the 
ranks of philosophers of life like Rudolf Eucken, who had diagnosed Germany 
as being in the midst of a spiritual crisis of unprecedented dimensions. Eucken 
had warned that the deluge of “reflection, criticism and negation” would put 
the country in danger of betraying its intellectual and spiritual imprint that 
had been given to it by “men like Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven,” and the 
philosophers of German idealism.64 In contrast, Tang Junyi was not primarily 
concerned with threats to the intellectual-spiritual life or the Seelenleben of 
the nation as such; his focus was much more on the decay of intellectual and 
cultural preconditions for the individual’s ability to exert “reflection, criticism 
and negation” in modern society.
62   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 566 (this passage is taken from Tang’s account 
“Wo duiyu zhexue yu zongjiao zhe jueze”); I follow here the translation of Yuk Wong (see 
Tang, “My Option Between Philosophy and Religion,” pp. 414–415), albeit with some alter-
ations and amendments.
63   Mou, “Aidao Tang Junyi xiansheng 哀悼唐君毅先生 (Feb. 12, 1978),” pp. 272–273.
64   For an analysis of Eucken’s diagnosis (as elaborated e.g. in Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens), 
see Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte, pp. 180–182.
Exile, Modernity, And Cultural Patriotism  85
 Nation and Culture
Tang Junyi proposed to the various communities of Chinese emigrants that 
they adopt a self-image that reflected the common experience of exile as 
one of suffering due to the looming demise of China’s national culture. Just 
the same, many emigrants were apparently no longer linked as a community 
by the shared experiences of cultural vulnerability. In the eyes of Tang, this 
transformation had far-reaching consequences, because isolated individuals 
would not be able to cope with the experience of exile, which is only possible 
through participation in a cultural community. The idea of such a community 
was, however, neither embodied in contemporary communities of emigrants, 
nor in the nationalist definition of China established in Taiwan by the GMD 
regime. The desirable community envisaged by Tang would consist of mem-
bers who agree that the binding qualities of the nation are humanistic and 
cultural in nature. They would furthermore assume that the nation consists 
of an ongoing, open process of interpretation and identification of national 
culture by its members. Any dogmatic definition of the national culture would 
undermine the continuation of the national culture itself.
Even if Tang could not avail himself of a phrase in Chinese for “cultural 
nation,” he interpreted the Chinese nation to a certain extent in the classical 
manner as a cultural nation. Cultural-nation theorists assume, first of all, that 
the nation is a form of community worth striving for, mostly because it allows 
its members to autonomously achieve political unity. As the term suggests, 
the nation acquires its cohesive power through its “national culture,” which 
functions as a source of communal values, including equality, justice, freedom, 
autonomy and solidarity, and common daily life practices.65 It goes without 
saying that those who see themselves as members of the nation assume that 
historical reality befits the national culture as well as the nation itself.66 Tang, 
too, presented China’s “national culture” as the central cohesive force for the 
65   It was Max Weber who identified a feeling of solidarity as the crucial criterion of any 
claim to establish a nation: “In the sense of those using the term [“nation”—TF] at a given 
time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that it is proper to expect from certain 
groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups.” Weber, Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, p. 922.
66   Lepsius, “Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland,” pp. 193–194, 197. As is well-known, 
the term “imagined community” calls to account the fact that the nation as opposed 
to the nation-state has at its disposal neither fixed international borders, nor clearly identi-
fiable constitutional institutions. See, for example: Koselleck, “Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, 
Masse,” pp. 148–149, 388; Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, pp. 5–7; Geulen, “Die Metamorphose der Identität,” p. 348.
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Chinese nation and, at the same time, as the point of reference for endow-
ing individuals with orientation and shared interpretations of the historical 
world. In emphasizing the continuity or longue durée of the nation, the con-
cept of the Chinese cultural nation as developed in modern Confucianism is 
also consistent with classical theories of the cultural nation. Accordingly, the 
national culture is imagined to be a time spanning horizon of shared values, 
ideas, norms and practices, which extends from the past to the present and 
into the future. While conceding that contingency plays a part in the history of 
the nation, Tang and the co-authors of the manifesto of 1958 were convinced 
that the longue durée of the nation was mainly the upshot of ideational, inten-
tional factors, among which Chinese philosophy and religion were particularly 
influential.67
In his narrative of the historical formation of China’s national culture, Tang 
highlighted the topics of unity and continuity. He claimed that Chinese cul-
ture evolved out of a “single root” and took the form of a single “cultural sys-
tem” early on, whereas Western cultures evolved in different currents.68 Even 
though he conceded that there were distinct “cultural regions” in Chinese 
antiquity, and thus different cultural “trunks,” he believed that a consistent 
current of cultural transmission had already emerged as early as the age of the 
Three Dynasties (Xia, Shang and Zhou; third millenium BCE to 221 BCE). He 
further suggested that in the imperial age of the Qin, Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, 
Ming and Qing Dynasties, a “continuous course” of “transmitting the way” in 
culture, scholarship and thought had persisted despite changing periods of ter-
ritorial and political “separation” ( fen 分) and “unification” (he 合).69
67   With regard to philosophy and religion, the authors of the manifesto placed particular 
emphasis on the respective “notions of human life” in this context: Zhang, Zhongguo wen-
hua yu shijie, p. 27.
68   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 13. According to Tang, there were three dominant 
currents in Western culture: Greek (in philosophy), Hebrew (in religion), and Roman (in 
law). On this basis, “relatively autonomous domains in culture and scholarship” evolved, 
as Tang claimed; see ibid., p. 14. In a similar manner, Tang referred to Whitehead’s distinc-
tion of Western notions of transcendence in the form of ideas of fate in Greek tragedies, 
the Roman notion of law, and the Christian notion of creation; see Tang, Zhongguo wen-
hua zhi jingshen jiazhi, pp. 75–76.
69   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 13. The use of fen and he is allusive to the quasi- 
metaphysical elevation of the empire as narrated in the The Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms. In the same context, Tang was also using the common allegory of the “great 
river” to refer to the course of China’s national culture and its “humanistic spirit” which 
was said to continuously absorb both religion and politics in spite of dynastic change; see 
Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 414.
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Tang’s depiction of the Chinese nation and culture is clearly tautological. 
First, he treated the national culture as a historical fact and described its alleg-
edly typical features, such as an inherent consistency and continuity. He then 
assumed that these features of national culture were expressed in the nation, 
i.e. in the “national” way of life. This entailed humanistic traditions, spiritual 
values, and popular, as well as elitist culture. The national culture, it would thus 
seem, is manifest in the nation, which, in view of the tautology, is unquestion-
ably an objectively existing entity. Since the nation exists, therefore, so must 
its essential resource, the national culture. The tautology does not end here, 
however, for it also includes the conflation of a factual and normative proposi-
tion that basically amounts to the following statement: Because there is such a 
thing as the Chinese nation objectively speaking, the national culture should be 
made to persist. This tautological approach, taken together with its schematic 
patterns of cultural essence, chauvinistic portrayal of non-Chinese cultures70 
and claim of the longue durée of the nation and its culture, is reminiscent 
of the so-called “metaphysics of Germanness” (“Deutschtumsmetaphysik”) 
which was current in Germany in the early 20th century. Much like the meta-
physics of Germanness, the manifesto of 1958 claimed global significance for 
national culture and derived a strong sense of a historical mission from that 
fact. One of the eminent philosophers of the “German spirit” was indeed the 
same Rudolf Eucken whose writings Zhang Junmai and others had intensively 
studied since 1920.71
It was on this basis that Tang’s modern Confucianism strongly emphasized 
the importance of Chinese national culture and the Chinese nation. In the 
metaphor of the uprooted tree, the final collapse of China is, significantly, tan-
tamount to the collapse of the nation, which, in turn, results from the dissolu-
tion of its cultural cohesive forces, and not simply from the seizure of power 
on the Chinese Mainland by communist armed forces in 1949. Tang thus did 
70   See, for example, the judgment about Indian culture as lacking self-consciousness: Zhang, 
Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 26. In a similar manner, there are assertions that in antiq-
uity the “value” of “Chinese” culture was higher than the value of “barbarian” cultures; 
ibid., p. 30.
71   On Eucken’s metaphysics of Germanness, see Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland. 
Studien zu ihrer Geschichte, pp. 187–188. It is also noteworthy that beginning in the early 
1950s, in the context of the formation of modernization theory, there was a strong ten-
dency in American anthropology, social sciences and historical research to posit essen-
tialist concepts of more or less unchangeable elements of American culture and national 
character. Notions of an American exceptionalism and book titles like The American 
Mind were not uncommon; see Knöbl, Spielräume der Modernisierung. Das Ende der 
Eindeutigkeit, pp. 135–138.
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not accord key significance to the territorial boundaries of the nation. Indeed, 
if territorial integrity were solely responsible for the nation’s survival in the 
form of a nation-state, Tang would no longer have needed to trouble himself 
with pondering the future course of the Chinese nation after 1949. When he 
still referred to the Chinese nation long after the communist takeover, he was 
evidently aware that its territory no longer constituted a unified nation-state. 
The cultural nation, in other words, no longer had any state territory to lose. 
It was, however, in danger of losing its national culture. Herein lay its true 
vulnerability:
On the other hand, considering it objectively, Chinese culture can per-
sist in the world, whereas the Chinese nation withers away, just like the 
Greek culture persists, whereas the Greek nation withered away. There 
is no guarantee for a necessary integration of any nation and culture. 
However, this fact itself is again causing me pain. (. . .) Neither have we 
resigned to the Chinese nation’s withering away or to the persistence 
of Chinese culture solely in the mind of Sinologists. (. . .) Culture might 
surpass the nation and have an influence on other nations, whereas the 
nation cannot part from its original culture.72
The exilic project of Tang’s modern Confucianism, therefore, did not need to 
join with the political and military struggle of the GMD regime to recover the 
territory of the Chinese nation-state on the Mainland. Instead, it was sufficient 
to react to the concerns about the continuity of China’s “national culture.” 
This was not about defending outer, territorial borders of the nation-state, 
but a matter of ensuring the inner cohesion of the nation by renewing the 
appeal of national culture among Chinese communities worldwide. Toward 
this end, Tang introduced, concomitantly with other representatives of mod-
ern Confucianism, the notion of a “main current” (zhu liu 主流) within China’s 
national culture. This current is said to consist of the so-called “study of mind 
and [human] nature,” which allegedly constitutes the “core” (hexin 核心) or the 
72   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 53. In this context, a statement made 
by Michael Walzer on the South African poet and exiled intellectual Breyten Breytenbach 
sounds familiar: “If he [Breytenbach—T.F.] is marginal to the world that apartheid has 
made, he nonetheless declares himself to be in the mainstream of his own history and his 
national culture.” Walzer, The Company of Critics, p. 218.
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“essence” (benzhi 本質) of Chinese culture and scholarship.73 This essence, in 
fact, is said to be the spiritual lifeline of China’s national culture:
As mentioned above, in conducting research about Chinese history, cul-
ture and scholarship, we have to consider these as manifestations of the 
objective spiritual life of the Chinese nation. But where is the core of this 
spiritual life? We can say that it is amidst the thought or philosophy of 
the Chinese. This is not to say that Chinese thought or philosophy would 
determine the culture and history of China. But it is to say that only by 
starting from Chinese thought or philosophy can one illuminate the spir-
itual life in Chinese culture and history.74
The reference to “thought or philosophy” might have been misleading 
because the “study of mind and [human] nature” was not to be mistaken for 
academic philosophy. According to Tang, the aim was not only to coin a scien-
tific theory or to indulge in pure reflection on human practice. The “study of 
mind and [human] nature” was, after all, imbued with religious ideas, many 
of them about human nature, the position of man in cosmos, and the spiri-
tual embodiment of transcendent agents (such as “Heaven,” Buddha, gods) in 
the human being. Although these concerns are of course not exclusively found 
within Confucianism, the manifesto of 1958 strongly asserts that the “main cur-
rent” attained its most comprehensive expression in the context of Confucian 
traditions and experienced its heyday during the Song and the Ming Dynasty.75
The meaning of “Confucian” is understood here in its very broad sense. 
Accordingly, the concept of Confucian traditions does not rely on references to 
a clearly defined canon of authoritative texts that would comprise the point of 
departure for a sought-after contemporary revival of Chinese culture.76 For all 
its essentialist aspects, this depiction of a main current is generally intended to 
73   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 8, 21. At times Tang also used the term “discourse 
on mind and [human] nature” (xin xing lun 心性論) instead of “study of mind and 
[human] nature;” see for example: Ibid., p. 389.
74   Ibid., p. 12. In this context see also Tang’s rejection of the assumption that the contents 
of national culture may be defined in an “objective,” positivistic manner: Tang, Shuo 
Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 8.
75   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 21.
76   On the identification of “Confucian thought” as a main intellectual current within China’s 
national culture, see, for example, Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian [Hong Kong], 
p. 592; Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 374, as well as Zhang, Zhongguo 
wenhua yu shijie, pp. 8, 11–12, 21.
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provide a basis of inclusion for non-Confucian thought. This is demonstrated 
by the way in which Tang presented the historical development of the main 
current, dating it back the period of the so-called Warring States (403–221 
BCE).77 He asserted here that one salient feature of the “study of mind and 
[human] nature” is the various notions of continuancy, which were coined in 
a broad range of references and over the course of millennia. They covered, for 
example, Daoist notions of longevity, religious practices such as the ancestor 
cults during the Zhou Dynasty, Confucian notions of the human mind’s “per-
meating the mind of Heaven” (tong yu tian xin 通於天心), but certainly also 
the very idea of preserving the Chinese nation and its culture.78 That the “main 
current” is not thought of as exclusively Confucian is also evident from a refer-
ence to Buddhism, which is said to converge to some extent with the “study 
of mind and [human] nature.” Yet as inclusive as it may seem, this approach 
still bears the imprint of a Confucianization of non-Confucian thought, as the 
discussion of Buddhism in the manifesto of 1958 clearly shows: The authors’ 
interest in Buddhism is focused explicitly on its quasi-Confucian aspects, and 
the evaluation of Buddhism is accordingly based on this criterion. Buddhism 
is thus appraised for its convergence with the “study of mind and [human] 
nature,” and Buddhist-inspired scholars of the late Qing-period like Kang 
Youwei, Zhang Taiyan’s 張太炎 (Zhang Binglin 張炳麟, 1868–1936) and Tan 
Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865–1898) are lauded for their interest in the “study of mind 
and [human] nature.” The manifesto is quick to add, however, that Buddhist-
inspired interpretations do not grasp the “study of the mind and [human] 
nature” in the same manner as the “Chinese Confucians” of the Song and the 
Ming-periods.79
Whenever the tradition of the “study of mind and [human] nature” was 
presented as crucial for understanding how the history and culture of the 
Chinese nation attained their remarkable consistency, the focus was on the 
Confucian humanistic belief in the human being’s ability to “know human 
nature” (i.e. “its essence”; zhi qi xing 知其性), and thereby to “know Heaven” 
77   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 27.
78   On Daoism (Tang refers to the Daodejing 道德經) and Confucianism (with references to 
the Yijing and Zhongyong 中庸): Ibid., pp. 27–29; on filial piety: Ibid., p. 29.
79   Ibid., pp. 21–22. The accentuation on Chinese Confucians indicates that the reference to 
the periods of the Song and the Ming has strong  national-cultural and/or ethnic connota-
tions and significantly excludes Confucian thought from the “non-Chinese” periods of the 
Yuan and the Qing. These connotations are also present in the Chinese term Song Ming 
lixue 宋明理學 which is often translated as “Neo-Confucianism.”
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(zhi tian 知天) by “exerting his mind” ( jin qi xin 盡其心).80 In Tang’s interpre-
tation, Confucian humanism elevates the human being to the position of the 
“soul” of this-worldly reality (the “ten thousand things”) and accords an “abso-
lute” value to individual personhood. While Confucian humanism is different 
from a belief in “objectively [present] gods,” it still has a religious dimension 
which centers on the belief that the human mind may permeate “Heaven.” The 
Confucian humanism that Tang had in mind was thus not at all antagonis-
tic to religions; on the contrary, humanism was “complete” only insofar as it 
acknowledged the importance of religions. It is on the basis of this premise 
that Tang stressed the potential of Confucian humanism to accept and incor-
porate non- Confucian religions, while at the same time comparing this quasi- 
transcendental outlook of Confucian humanistic religiosity with Western 
forms of idealistic philosophy. He consequently described Confucian human-
ism as an “idealistic humanism” or “humanistic idealism.”81 To delineate the 
broad range of possible manifestations of Confucian humanism, Tang further 
referred to it as a “view of life,” a “thought,” an “attitude” and a “belief.” Like 
most forms of Western humanism, Confucian humanism strongly emphasizes 
a comprehensive intellectual, moral and spiritual education of the individual. 
It also with humanism in Western traditions the reverence for “humanity and 
its culture” in general. Tang actually asserted that Confucian humanism attri-
butes an even higher position to culture.82 Further similarities pertained to 
the  emphasis on ethical relations and the focus on the historical dimension of 
the world.83 Equally consistent with common depictions of Western human-
ism was Tang’s judgment that Confucian humanists were immune to the lures 
of dogmatism. When encountering “non-humanistic” or “anti-humanistic” 
80   Cit. from Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 60; see also Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua 
yu shijie, pp. 23–24, 26. Tang refers here to Mencius VIIA.1: “Mencius said, ‘For a man to 
give full realization to his heart ( jin qi xin) is for him to understand his own nature (zhi 
qi xing), and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven (zhi tian).’ ” This is D.C. 
Lau’s translation: Lau, Mencius, p. 182.
81   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian (Hongkong), pp. 592–597. On the above-mentioned 
notion of a “complete” humanism, see a passage in Tang’s Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen 
jiazhi as quoted in He, “Tang Junyi lun rujia ‘sanji’ de zongjiao jiazhi,” p. 68.
82   Tang elaborated in this context on the term “wen” in “renwen” and is aware of the fact 
that “wen” has certain layers of meaning that are not fully covered by Western concepts of 
humanism: see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian (Hongkong), pp. 591–592. He identi-
fied a passage from the Yijing as an early occurence of the word “renwen,” but he did not 
present an interpretation of it; see ibid., pp. 590, 594.
83   Ibid., pp. 596–597.
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thought, Confucian humanists apparently made no effort to suppress it, but 
rather tried to understand the respective “psychological, personal, cultural and 
historical background” and in this way potentially overcome their own hostile 
attitude.84
This insistence on the undogmatic attitude of Confucian humanism is 
rather typical of the ambivalence that characterizes Tang’s reflection on nation 
and national culture in general. For all its culturalist and essentialist simplifi-
cations in favor of “Confucianism,” Tang’s hypostasis of national culture and its 
humanistic “main current” does not amount to a traditionalist reaction. He nei-
ther assumed that there is an unbroken normative validity of traditional cul-
ture in the modern world, nor did he subscribe to the idea of a return to a safe 
haven of tradition. The cultural nation, in his eyes, did not persist in eternally 
valid, fixable elements of national culture or a rigid arrangement of customs 
and values from a Confucian orthodoxy. The normative relevance of the “main 
current,” according to Tang, could not be taken for granted. It was a matter of 
reflexivity which meant that it had to be reconstructed without any claim to a 
historically incommutable essence. The historical transmutations and chang-
ing expressions of the “main current” have to be retraced from within a hori-
zon spanning the modern world and its exilic dimension. In other words, the 
“main current” itself cannot be isolated from this horizon of interpretation in 
order to constitute an objective truth. The reader of those texts in which Tang 
reflects on the topics of China’s national culture, the exilic situation and the 
process of modernity may indeed find Tang to be a hermeneutic thinker: He 
maintained that the “main current” was not simply a result of interpretation, 
but an integral part of the cultural horizon of a community of interpreters, 
that is, a historical context of the act of interpretation per se. In accordance 
with this hermeneutic approach, the humanistic-cultural “essence” or “main 
current” is to be understood as a sort of normative web that ceaselessly trans-
forms itself in light of new identifications, interpretations and appropriations.85 
84   Ibid., p. 598.
85   This concept of cultural essence differs from the concepts which were presented in the 
Journal of National Essence (Guocui Xuebao 國粹學報) after 1905 and by members of 
the Southern Society (Nanshe 南社) after 1909. Those concepts focused on philological and 
literary traditions, and not on “Confucian” traditions. Furthermore, they did not assume 
that the national essence itself might be subject to historical change. Zhang Taiyan’s con-
cept was a notable exception in both regards, even though he refrained from singling out 
Confucian traditions. Later on, the circle of authors of the Critical Review (Xue Heng 學衡) 
also identified a national essence of different contents; see Furth, “Culture and Politics in 
Modern Chinese Conservatism,” p. 31; Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte, pp. 82, 109–112; 
Laitinen, Chinese Nationalism in the late Qing Dynasty, pp. 116–118.
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The hermeneutic approach thus imposed limits on the essentialist extent 
of the interpretation of humanistic culture and its Confucian “main current.” 
On this basis, the question as to whether “Western” thought could be removed 
from the horizon of interpretation altogether in modern times never even 
arose.86
 Cultural Patriotism
A topic that did arise in this context was the coping of individuals with the fate-
ful experience of exile. Tang’s concept of interpretation took account of dis-
tinctly exilic experiences by inscribing the exile into a comprehensive horizon 
of interpretation and meaning. The constitution of the hermeneutic subject, 
i.e. the individual interpreter of the “main current,” was understood as inextri-
cably linked to the exilic situation, that is, the specific context of the process 
of interpretation itself. The individual suffering in exile was thus infused with 
hermeneutic relevance: The manifesto of 1958 declared that only by virtue of 
the particular experience of intellectual and emotional isolation—shared by 
the exiled intellectuals at the beginning of their time as emigrants—was it at 
all possible to “once again” and in a “fundamental manner” turn to “Chinese 
scholarship and culture, as well as the problems of China.” Tang also suggested 
that the “problems” of China and its culture are only clearly recognized in exile 
and, moreover, that “true wisdom” emerges out of the “suffering” (in exile). 
This suffering, in other words, gave rise to an intellectual openness, or, as Tang 
called it, “a transcendental and all-encompassing state of mind” that had not 
been present “ten years earlier.” In Tang’s view, what was at issue here was the 
liberation of the interpretation of national culture from a “fixed pattern of life” 
and an overcoming of the “narrowness of one-sided opinions.”87
Tang emphatically defended the hermeneutic openness of his understand-
ing of national culture against determinism in the historiography of China’s 
national history. The nation’s historical course as a whole was in no way to be 
determined by the hermeneutics of a national-cultural essence, nor predeter-
mined in any other way. The “historical future” has no “particular imperative 
direction,” and even if there were such a thing, Tang explained, no one would 
86   On a programmatic statement in favor of a broad inclusion of Western thought and tradi-
tions: see e.g. Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 46–59.
87   Ibid., p. 4; see also: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, p. 478. Tang 
was undoubtedly aware of Mencius’ claim that personal suffering was an impetus of indi-
vidual cultural productivity (cf. Mengzi VI B.15).
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be capable of recognizing it. The course of national history was unpredictable. 
Tang’s understanding of the “tragedy” of the Chinese nation thus had the sta-
tus of an interpretation, not a scientific diagnosis or prognosis. Equally unpre-
dictable were the duration of exile and the “methods” by which the condition 
of exile might be overcome. It was precisely these unknowns that triggered the 
sense of despair in exile, which, Tang stated, could not be eluded. The exiles 
could not truly find “hope” or “trust” in the promises for the future provided 
by a nationalist ideology; instead they had to engender such positive senti-
ments from within themselves. A prerequisite for this, in the first instance, was 
a “true to life experience” of despair, far beyond the dazzling allure of ideology. 
Only then could a thorough reflection on the reasons for despair begin that 
would allow autonomous individuals to establish “ideals” and form their own 
“will,” provided that their reflection entailed some sort of meditation on the 
history and culture of China in a state of “emotionally reminiscent gratitude.” 
Here, Tang’s language once again appears to suggest a nationalist attachment 
to China, but he in fact took great pains to point out that normative insights 
(“the ideals”) could only be gained in conditions of “absolute liberalism.” 
Thus what is true for the process of reflection is also borne out in practice: 
Neither the cultural nor the political activities that befit normative insights are 
predetermined.88
The distinction between nationalism and (cultural) patriotism is crucial 
for understanding the basic orientation of modern Confucianism. For Tang, 
the highest purpose of China’s humanistic culture was not tied to the nation or 
the nation-state. His modern Confucianism was indeed not nationalistic, but 
rather an expression of a conservative, defensive type of cultural patriotism.89 
As a Confucian patriot in exile, Tang strove above all to preserve China’s 
humanistic culture. Such preservation should, of course, secure the continua-
tion of China’s national culture and thus guarantee the existence of a Chinese 
nation. But Tang was unwilling to subject China’s humanistic tradition to the 
nationalist cause of preserving the nation for its own sake. He did not con-
88   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, pp. 47, 49–54, 59–60.
89   Tang did not use the Chinese term “aiguozhuyi” 愛國主義, which is the common transla-
tion for “patriotism,” most likely because “aiguozhuyi” is part of the ideological  vocabulary 
of the PRC. However, his brand of cultural patriotism is consistent with European concepts of 
patriotism from the 19th century, when patriotism was increasingly related to concepts 
of nation and finally served as a concept countering ideas of an expansive nationalism. 
On patriotism and its link to cosmopolitism and Enlightenment in Europe of the 18th 
century: see Alter, Nationalismus, p. 12; Giesen, “Vom Patriotismus zum Nationalismus,” 
p. 273; Kluxen-Pyta, Nation and Ethos, pp. 163–165.
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template saving the nation and the nation-state at the price of sacrificing 
humanistic ideals. Nor would he have subscribed to an agenda of cultural 
nationalism that essentially uses cultural symbols, traditions, or even myths to 
give expression to a nationalist call for mobilization. Tang’s reconceptualiza-
tion of Confucian humanism thus stands in stark contrast to Liang Qichao’s 
nation-state-centered Confucianism. Liang had introduced such an approach 
prior to the founding of the republic during the 1900s. In doing so, he rele-
gated Confucianism from the sphere of the imperial cult of state to the sphere 
of the citizen’s political and private virtues and values. In Liang’s scheme, 
Confucianism would henceforth fulfill a complementary function within the 
nation-state.90
Tang also maintained a critical distance from the unifying nationalism 
of the GMD regime. His concept of national culture differed considerably from 
the sort of (Confucianized) nationalism which the GMD installed in the 1950s 
and 1960s as the ruling ideology in Taiwan. It is therefore not surprising that 
he clearly distinguished his Confucian cultural patriotism from Sun Yat-sen’s 
brand of nationalism and Sun’s claim that the nation-state requires ethnic 
homogeneity in order to safeguard its existence. According to Tang, such a 
premise amounted to nothing less than an elimination of the idea that the 
citizens shall decide to strive for unity within a state by reasonable choice. In 
bolstering his argument against Sun Yat-sen’s ethnic nationalism, Tang con-
tended that national consciousness does not emerge as a direct, “natural” 
upshot of common origins, language, beliefs, traditions or culture, but indeed 
arises from the individuals’ reasoned “self-awareness” of these commonalities. 
He  therefore insisted that the citizens develop their national consciousness in 
terms of a “rational” construct.91
What is more, Tang’s Confucian cultural patriotism entailed a Pan-Asian 
outlook as well as an insistence on the cosmopolitan ideal of a world citizen. 
In this context, Tang’s education ideal for the New Asia College, which he 
declared with much pathos, is highly illuminating. He exhorted the students 
not to content themselves to be simply citizens of Hong Kong, for after all, 
this was what they were purely by virtue of living in Hong Kong. The role of 
the New Asia College was to support the students in becoming “impressive 
Chinese [personalities]” and “world citizens of colossal [intellectual] stat-
ure.” This congruence of patriotic and cosmopolitan personality ideals was 
90   On Liang’s notion of Confucianism in relation to his concept of the state, see e.g. 
Machetzki, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao und die Einflüsse deutscher Staatslehren auf den monar-
chischen Reformnationalismus in China nach 1900, pp. 56, 59.
91   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 183.
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characteristic of the quest to enable the (exilic/modern) self to achieve 
authenticity. Tang advised students of New Asia College to focus their research 
on Chinese and Western humanism, philosophy and literature. Students 
might study Confucius, Menzius, Xunzi and Zhu Xi, as well as the poets Du 
Fu and Li Bai, and, equally important, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Dante and 
Shakespeare. All of these illustrious names were apparently considered to be 
outside Hong Kong’s narrow intellectual spectrum. The “intellectual inten-
tions” of the New Asia College were, as Tang suggested, not limited to Hong 
Kong, but included China and the entire world.92 Significantly, Tang was con-
vinced that the renewal of China as a cultural nation could only succeed if 
Western civilization was even appraised in those core areas of Chinese cul-
ture, in which individuals attain the “intellectual determination” to save the 
nation.93
The Asian perspective should not be dismissed, however. Bringing “new life” 
to Asian cultures, including Chinese and Indian cultures, which were older 
than European cultures, was important. This was particularly true, as Tang 
asserted, given that Asia had been degraded as Europe’s largest colonial area 
over the previous 200 to 300 years. But despite Asia’s backwardness in terms of 
scientific and industrial-technological developments, one was not to assume 
that the entire “spirit” of Asian cultures was backward.94 Notwithstanding 
this essentialist reference to Asia’s cultural spirit, Tang’s culturalist concept 
of a new Asia stopped short of proposing any ideas of ethnic homogeneity of 
a “yellow race.” It clearly differed in this respect from previous forms of Pan-
Asianism, which became popular in Japan in the 1890s and were propagated by 
Liang Qichao between 1896 and 1899. Tang’s interpretation of a “new Asia” was 
closer to Liang’s post-1919 concept of cosmopolitism, in which Liang empha-
sized that each individual member of the Chinese nation has responsibilities 
toward world civilization.95 It was in relation to this cosmopolitan framework 
that Tang referred to a singular Asian culture and a new Asia, and the same 
may be said of other Pan-Asian notions, such as “Eastern/Oriental cultures” 
(Dongfang wenhua 東方文化) or “people from the East/Orient” (Dongfangren 
東方人). By “people from the East/Orientals” Tang meant Chinese, Japanese 
92   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, pp. 505–506; cf. also p. 488.
93   See, for example, Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 4–5, 18, 32–35, 41–42.
94   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, pp. 457–458.
95   Huang, “Liang Ch’i-ch’ao: The Idea of the New Citizen and the Influence of Meiji 
Japan,” pp. 80–82 (on Pan-Asianism); Tang, Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of 
Modernity, pp. 192–193 (on cosmopolitism).
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and Koreans. He distinguished “true” from “ordinary” Chinese, Japanese and 
Koreans and assumed that there was a common attitude toward life among 
“people from the East/Orientals,” which he quite schematically distinguished 
from Western attitudes with respect to inwardness and quietness (Eastern) as 
well as outwardness and activity (Western).96
Nevertheless, Tang’s cosmopolitism was entrenched in (post-)colonial Pan-
Asian ideas about the global relevance of East-Asian cultures in the modern 
world. His depiction of the current differences between Western and Asian 
modernization is at times rather crude and also belies his own sophisticated 
explorations into Western philosophy.97 The reasons for the ambivalence of 
Tang’s intellectual open-mindedness toward Western civilization and his per-
sonal resentment towards “the West” most likely stem from profound feelings 
of inferiority. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Tang gave frank testimony 
about his inner conflict: He loathed neither Western thought nor cultural tradi-
tions, but deplored the fact that most people when he travelled to Europe and 
the United States in the late 1950s did not show him much respect or interest. 
Rather than asking him for his opinion of Western cultures, they treated him 
instead like some insignificant traveler. He concluded that most Europeans 
and Americans do indeed look down on visitors from East Asia, as if they were 
visitors from an inferior region.98 Yet this estrangement is not merely a conse-
quence of suspicions he had of Western cultural imperialism. When travelling 
in the West, he astutely observed his own reactions to personal encounters 
he witnessed between people from Western and East Asian countries. He pro-
fessed to having had some resentment even with regard to physical differences. 
For instance, he recalled his discomfort in noticing how an East-Asian person 
of short stature was forced to look up to a taller person from the West when 
shaking hands. He felt similarly uncomfortable when he observed that the 
bridge of a Westerner’s nose was higher and his eyes more deeply set. He even 
suspected that it was also perhaps why Westerners had been so proud and the 
East Asians so submissive in their personal encounters during the second half 
of the 19th century.99
96   See his travel notes while visiting Korea in 1965: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie 
bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 354, 367. Similar juxtapositions of Eastern and Western cultures and 
attitudes had been debated in China since the mid-1910s (see influential writings by Du 
Yaquan 杜亞全, Li Dazhao 李大釗, Chen Duxiu and others).
97   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 365.
98   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 364.
99   Ibid., p. 349.
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Apart from these psychological issues, Tang had other reasons for being 
concerned about the prejudiced view of East Asian culture. A loss of norma-
tive validity for what he called “East-Asian traditional culture” would have seri-
ous consequences for modernization. Given the conception of modernization 
as concerted collective action based on conscious cultural transformation, a 
postcolonial self-deprecation in East-Asian countries would have had disas-
trous consequences if allowed to go unchecked. It might indeed have under-
mined the belief that the process of modernity could be reined in by firmly 
establishing “cultural” forces within modern societies. Tang thus underscored 
the need for a reinterpretation of (East-Asian) culture and advocated a “spiri-
tual reawakening,” a “revival” of the “innate spirit” of a culture in a “new form.”100 
This “spiritual reawakening,” he suggested, should also take the form of a “spiri-
tual renewal on a daily basis” in the education and cultural ideals as well as in 
the ideals of the New Asia College.101
Contemporary Japan was an exemplary case in this regard. In an article 
from 1971, Tang identified the country’s potential to develop its “traditional 
culture” within the modern world.102 He believed that Japan so far has been 
more successful than Korea, the communities of overseas Chinese, European 
countries and the United States in preserving many elements of a traditional 
“cultural way of life.” This comprised a form of ethical life characterized by the 
prominence of arts, literature, ethics, religion, and wisdom in everyday life. 
Tang added, however, that Japan was also now struggling with the effects of 
industrialization and a growing tendency among Japanese to take up Western-
style attitudes of “utilitarianism.” There were even signs of a gradual demise of 
traditional ethical life among the “lower stratum” of Japan’s industrial society 
and in the student protests of 1969 some of which he witnessed when visiting 
in Kyoto. But he apparently only took note of these developments in passing 
and remained optimistic overall with respect to Japan’s ability to conquer this 
cultural “crisis.”103
Such optimism is symptomatic of a vision of modernity based on a sugar-
coated Pan-Asian construction of “East-Asian” culture. For all his astute obser-
vations on the downsides of modernity, Tang seems to have been oblivious 
to the deleterious effect of militant Japanese Pan-Asianism and its euphe-
mistic “East-Asian” rhetoric. Indeed, he had little apprehension when visiting 
100   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 361.
101   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, p. 459.
102   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 212.
103   Ibid., pp. 208–210.
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Japan in the late 1950s, as evidenced by his letters to his wife.104 He showed no 
interest in analyzing the formation of Japanese militarism in the context of 
 modernity—a topic he treated only occasionally and never in-depth.105 Yet it 
has not always been a case of too little interest in the matter: On August 1, 1957, 
Tang delivered a speech at Asia University in Tokyo (founded in 1941) on “The 
progress and self-consciousness of humanity” in which he deigned in a vexing 
manner to play down the Japanese war crimes committed in China during the 
Second World War, stating that the Sino-Japanese relations had turned into 
an “unfortunate relationship.” He assumed that this “unfortunate” state would 
not last forever, quoting from the famous Chinese novel Water Margin (Shuihu 
Zhuan 水滸傳) the phrase “no fighting, no friendship,” and adding that “quar-
rels among elder and younger brothers are perhaps due to the fact they have a 
relationship in which the feelings [for each other] are too good”(!).106
Overall, it seems that Tang was not especially interested in Japan as such, 
but more in its promise of a better modernity. Japan had seemingly been very 
successful in establishing an industrialized society while preserving traditional 
forms of an ethical life. Tang suggested that this was the upshot of a conscious 
effort by the Japanese, and not just the result of a unique and fortunate histori-
cal constellation. In other words, post-war Japan symbolized the human ability 
to consciously withstand the negative forces of modernity by making specific 
choices related to humanistic culture. This constellation had an even more 
intimate relevance from the Chinese perspective insofar as Japan in many ways 
was portrayed as just another, albeit more successful, “China.” Tang was in fact 
convinced that the Japanese still orientated their choices concerning human-
istic culture and forms of ethical life toward the Chinese model, taken from the 
periods of the Tang and the Song Dynasties: So it was a “Chinese culture on a 
small scale” that was still extant in Japan and which, moreover, never collided 
with the exigencies of modernization. Tang added, tellingly, that it should be 
even easier for the Chinese than it was for the Japanese to achieve such a form 
of modernization.107
104   Tang, Zhi Tingguang shu, pp. 330–331 (letter dated February 22nd, 1957), p. 334 (letter 
dated February 23rd, 1957).
105   See, for example, Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 210, Tang, Zhonghua 
renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 358.
106   See Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 312–313.
107   See an interview by Tang in the Mingbao from 1974: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin 
shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 313, 327.
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The depiction of contemporary Japan as a model for a future China stands 
in stark contrast to the bleak situation of the Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s. 
It seems that when emigrants like Tang were forced to accept the unfortunate 
truth that the type of Chinese nation-state which they preferred was neither in 
the making on the Chinese Mainland nor in Taiwan, the appeal of Pan-Asian 
ideas and the Japanese model grew considerably. The latter apparently served 
the purpose of compensation for the loss of hope of rescuing the Mainland 
from communism: In exile, the intellectual struggle for the political and cul-
tural emancipation of Asia, together with an orientation towards an emerging 
world culture in East Asia, gradually supplanted the hopeless struggle to save 
the Chinese cultural nation on the communist-ruled Mainland. If the Chinese 
contribution to the modernization of East Asia and to the modern world more 
generally was based on a reconstruction of China’s humanistic traditions, the 
exilic space might indeed become a bridgehead in the struggle for future mod-
ernization. China’s responsibility toward the modern world would then take its 
due course. As Tang envisioned in a letter to his wife in 1965, the reconstruction 
of China’s humanistic traditions would first encompass Japan and Korea and 
then India, Europe and the United States.108
 Defending Authenticity
Notions of reconstructing Chinese and (East-)Asian cultures, along with the 
idea of recovering a humanistic “main current” or a cultural “spirit,” are highly 
charged with normative meaning, not only in the context of Tang’s diagno-
sis of modernity, but also of his reaction to the exilic experience. In reflecting 
on exile, Tang assumed that coping with the exilic fate requires individuals 
to situate their own biographical narratives and actual lifestyles in terms of a 
humanistic-cultural continuum. In other words, only those exilic individuals 
who succeed in identifying themselves as historically, culturally, and ethically 
situated subjects might be able to attain a sound notion of personal selfhood.
Tang applied here a pathos-rich language of authenticity with phrases such 
as “true self-awareness” and a “true self:” human beings, who were called to 
life as “biological beings,” might achieve their authentic “existence” only by 
clearly recognizing their “true reality.” This required them to absorb “instruc-
tion and nourishing” through the medium of the language, history, culture, 
108   Tang, Zhi Tingguang shu, p. 488.
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customs and traditions of their nation.109 Such a process required that the nor-
mative significance of the “past and present” of the national culture be “con-
served.” Authentic self-awareness was thus related to the (re-)interpretation 
of the national culture itself—that is, by acts of interpretation in which the 
individual is already embedded through his or her very existence:
But as the ecumene-as-family (tiaxia yi jia 天下一家) has not yet been 
reached, the individual can only strive to authentically live and exist in 
the past, present, and future of his own state, nation and historical cul-
ture [in order to] set the self at ease and establish destiny (an shen li ming 
安身立命).110
Tang’s culturally conservative yet effusive language tends to mask the critical-
emancipatory substance of his concept of authenticity of the self: Even though 
he assumed that the perpetuation of national culture can occur in a “natural” 
or “direct” manner and thus, to a certain extent, without critical reflection, cul-
tural “conservation” was not to be misunderstood as an uncritical absorption. 
Rather, it required a guiding conservative principle of conscious reappropria-
tion. Tang emphasized that because each decision about the transformation of 
elements of national culture was difficult by itself, conscious changes should 
only be allowed in cases in which there was no doubt that those elements 
called into question are now “without value.”111 This preference for a critical, 
albeit defensive, stance towards national culture, and not for a blind apology, 
was also apparent in the announcement that it would “self-evidently” be better 
if all individuals were to “analyze and reflect on” the national culture, instead 
of simply following established habits.112 The highest authority with respect 
to the personal adoption of the national culture was therefore the individual 
109   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, pp. 8, 11. In his late work Shengming 
cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Tang further developed this notion of the embeddedness of the 
subject. He introduced the notion of so-called “horizons” of the subject’s interrelation 
with its physical, historical, intellectual, emotional and spiritual environment. Only in 
relation to these horizons could the human being acquire self-awareness and subjectivity, 
as well as views of life, world views etc. For a brief introduction to the idea of “horizon” in 
Shengming cunzai yu jingjie, see Liao, “Tang Junyi ‘panjiao lilun’ de chubu kaocha,” p. 39.
110   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 9, p. 484; cf. Shuo Zhonghua minzu 
zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 24.
111   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 8.
112   Ibid., pp. 12, 16.
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“conscience” (liang xin 良心). It was here that the conserved elements of 
national culture must stand the test.113
The freedom of conscience was a necessary, albeit not sufficient precon-
dition for authentic self-awareness. Two more components were required, 
namely, the expression and the situating of the self.114 In Tang’s philosophy, 
expressivity plays a crucial role in coping with intellectual, emotional, and 
social isolation in exile and in the modern world in general. The creation of 
opportunities for overcoming this isolation presupposes, according to Tang, 
that individuals retain the ability to express themselves as members of a 
national-cultural community whose ongoing interpretations of the human-
istic “main current” are bound together with a sense of cultural patriotism. 
Individuals would thus affirmatively identify certain collective ties in society 
and the state as integral elements of their own historical and biographical nar-
ratives. Otherwise, there would be no way for them to cope with their unique 
experiences of alienation, except by falsely retreating into purely subjective 
inwardness. In Tang’s modern, romantic-expressivist notion of authenticity, 
the individual’s self-awareness requires, in order to become authentic, oppor-
tunities for expression in social contexts. Here, Tang presumes that the very 
expression of such self-awareness involves a “place” (chu 處) where common-
ality can be experienced. Tang relates this to the exilic situation in a passage 
from 1961:
[Only] if we would have been formerly completely without ideals exist-
ing in our consciousness with respect to the state and politics, could we 
also be without suffering [now that we] see all kinds of facts that are in 
disagreement with them. But amidst this [current situation] men must 
strive for a place where [they] can express confidence and hope, and, in 
turning our heads in such manner, [we may] become aware of the exis-
tence of these ideals. I can have any ideal and I can then begin for myself 
to put this ideal into practice. What I can put into practice, [other] peo-
ple can [put into practice] too. In that case, this place has then already 
become the place where I may express confidence and hope. [. . .] This is 
113   Ibid., p. 20. In this context, see also Luo Yijun’s commentary on Tang’s understanding of 
“self-awareness:” Luo, “Shidai beiqing yu wenhua xinxin,” p. 57.
114   For the following analysis of Tang’s interpretation of authenticity, Hartmut Rosa’s critical 
analysis of Charles Taylor’s conception of authenticity proved very thought-provoking: 
see Rosa, Identität und kulturelle Praxis, pp. 24–25, 93–94, 149–155, 191–212.
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then also the place where we all may, in any environment, express confi-
dence and hope.115
Exile would thus lose its character as a non-place and the exilic subject could 
situate him- or herself within the long continuum of interpretation and appro-
priation of China’s humanistic culture. Consequently, Tang saw the authentic 
self being realized in “concrete human beings” ( juti de ren 具體的人) and con-
crete world citizens, who are able to preserve their moral autonomy and to 
assure themselves of their manifold collective ties, including their affiliation 
to a state or a nation and belonging to a cultural tradition. Only in this way 
could they achieve self-esteem, or in Tang’s words: an “independent personal-
ity of colossal stature.”116
To be sure, these “independent personalities of colossal stature” would nei-
ther reduce China’s humanistic traditions to a mere context, nor scrutinize 
them as rigidly fixed objects. Instead, they would realize that national culture 
emerges only in the process of interpretation itself and consequently finds 
its “place” in the interpretation. In terms of coping with the exilic experience, 
this re-conceptualization of national culture is of crucial importance. It exem-
plifies the conviction that the Chinese nation, while in danger of immediate 
extinction after 1949, might still survive in the hermeneutic place of its renewal 
through exilic cultural patriotism. This vision of a historical and normative 
continuity in interpretation has itself a compensatory effect insofar as it posits 
the longue durée of interpretations, thereby temporally expanding the experi-
ence of historical time and bridging the generational isolation experienced in 
exile. It is at this point that the exilic hermeneutics of the national culture and 
the hope for its salvation converge in modern Confucianism’s sense of mission.
In contrast to the self embedded in the context of national culture, Tang 
elucidated the characteristics of a self that is not situated in the hermeneutics 
of national culture. What he had in mind here above all are “pure believers,” 
who seek their salvation by placing unmitigated trust in God or in an even-
tual paradise,117 and “abstract world citizens,” who advocate a false and empty 
universalism. According to Tang, the latter was demonstrated, for example, in 
an interpretation of the old ideal of “the ecumene as one family,” the locus 
115   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, pp. 54, 59 (for the sentence after the 
omission). Spatial topics with respect to the subject of individual self-awareness figured 
prominently in the philosophy of the Kyoto school. However, I could not locate any sub-
stantial reference from Tang to discussions of this topic within the Kyoto school.
116   Ibid., pp. 56, 58.
117   Ibid.
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classicus of which can be found in the Record of Rites (Li ji 禮記; Chap. “Li yun” 
禮運). Tang wholly disagreed with those who accept this ideal out of a yearn-
ing for China’s absorption into a “culture of humankind,” which would entail 
the complete disappearance of particular national cultures. Although he did 
not mention any names, he obviously opposed Kang Youwei’s idea of the uni-
formity of mankind, elucidated in The Book of Great Uniformity (Da tong shu 
大同書). It had an air of admonition when Tang stated that such misguided 
universalistic notions did not constitute a moral problem as long as they are 
solely expressed as private opinions.118
Yet the situating of the self in the hermeneutics of the national culture was 
also threatened in exile by those positivist currents in the social sciences and 
the humanities that Tang declared philosophical war against. He again men-
tioned no names, but remarked nonetheless that some within the emigrant 
elite engaged in the humanities asserted a positivist concept of culture under 
the influence of Western schools of thought. The positivist currents falsely 
conceive of “Chinese culture” as a conglomeration of relics from a lost cul-
ture and reduce the interpretation of culture to a crude dichotomy of enquiry 
between subject and object. This stands in stark contrast to Tang’s own idea of 
an “authentic” understanding of national culture which must take as its herme-
neutic horizon the humanist “main current” of China’s national culture. As we 
have seen, Tang expected the interpreters to perceive the “main current” not as 
a mere object of scrutiny, but as belonging to their own horizon of understand-
ing. An “authentic” interpretation, therefore, cannot claim to represent objec-
tive truth. He consequently argued that positivist approaches failed to live up 
to their own claims of objectivity.119 Tang did not turn against these currents 
merely because they were anti-traditional. Their positivist tendency to objec-
tify “culture” and hence isolate it from the individual subject was effectively a 
mirror-image of exilic isolation. He located this aberration in contemporary 
sociology, psychology, historical studies and cultural anthropology and traced 
118   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 7, 28.
119   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 9–11. This critique explicitly comprised the histori-
cal studies of the so-called “reorganization of the national heritage” (zhengli guogu 整理
國故), which was one of the dominant tendencies in historical research from the 1920s 
onwards. Its representatives, among them Hu Shi, claimed to lay the groundwork of a 
new, “scientifically” accountable cultural and social consciousness in China by conduct-
ing comprehensive scientific research in Chinese history; see Fröhlich, Staatsdenken im 
China der Republikzeit (1912–1949). Die Instrumentalisierung philosophischer Ideen bei chi-
nesischen Intellektuellen, pp. 335–336.
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the reasons for the anomalous objectivism back to untenable epistemological 
stances in the concerned academic disciplines. Positivist approaches in these 
disciplines, he suggested, had restricted themselves to the detection of suppos-
edly objective facts, which then must be accepted as “reasonable.”120
However, this apparently academic critique of the theoretical and method-
ological implications of rampant objectivism in the humanities did not consti-
tute Tang’s actual line of attack. The real bone of contention was the objectivist 
pretense of identifying “true values.” The positivist appropriation of “cultural 
theory” accorded the human being the position of an ahistorical subject and 
hence rendered it impossible for the individual to create an authentic form of 
self-awareness. As an “abstract self,” the individual would no longer command 
any “historical reality.” It was the status and the significance of the “tragedy” 
of the Chinese nation that was really at stake in dealing with the untenable 
objectivism described above. Inasmuch as positivist approaches “rationalized” 
the  ostensibly imminent demise of China’s national culture, the awareness 
of the tragedy dissolved. This would have severe consequences for the indi-
vidual’s chances of attaining an authentic self.121
Yet by contrasting the objectivist approach to China’s national culture and 
history with what he called an attitude of “empathic understanding” (tongqing 
de liaojie 同情的了解),122 Tang himself exceeded the limits of philosophical 
hermeneutics. He in fact demanded much more from a sound interpretation 
of national culture than just a hermeneutical awareness of its own historical 
and practical boundedness and a reflection on the Wirkungsgeschichte (effec-
tive history) of seminal writings. For Tang, the interpreters should in addition 
take on the role of performers of national culture and be willing to infuse their 
intellectual interest with an emotional attachment to their “own” national 
120   On sociology, psychology, historical studies and cultural anthropology, see Tang, Shuo 
Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 18. On the problem of objectivist aberrations, see 
ibid., pp. 18, 28.
121   On the rationalization of the “tragedy,” see Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaol-
ing, pp. 7, 18; on the epistemological position of the subject of interpretation, see ibid., 
p. 12; on the “abstract self” see ibid., pp. 18, 28.
122   The concept of empathic understanding had been current in Chinese reflections on histo-
riography at least since 1930, when the German-trained historian Chen Yinke called for an 
“empathetic understanding” of the historical manifestations of China’s “national spirit” 
(e.g. in Chen’s article on the first volume of Feng Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy); 
see Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte. Zwei chinesische Historiker auf der Suche nach 
einer modernen Identität für China, pp. 135–136; Schneider, “Reconciling history with the 
nation? Historicity, national particularity, and the question of universals,” p. 127.
CHAPTER 4106
culture. “Authentic understanding” would hence require empathy and respect 
for the national culture. Thus, for all Tang’s critique of dogmatism and positiv-
ism in the humanities, he himself opened the door to a notion of interpreta-
tion that is only partially reconcilable with philosophical hermeneutics.123
The considerable strain placed on hermeneutics in Tang’s exile philosophy 
is to a large degree due to his insistence on the authentic self-awareness of a 
historical self situated in national culture:
Here, we have to clearly recognize, first of all, that the life of human beings 
(ren zhi shengming 人之生命) does not exist solely due to its abstract 
probability, but exists due to its genuine reality. God and nature may cre-
ate me in any society or territory; this is merely an abstract probability 
from [the time] before I have been created. But within this abstract prob-
ability, I am indeed without a life of authentic existence (zhenshi cunzai 
真實存在). My life of authentic existence still exists in that I am created 
as a member of the Chinese nation and accomplished by receiving an 
education and upbringing in the languages, culture and social customs of 
China; and this whole education and upbringing as well as the Chinese 
nation out of which I am created cannot be distinguished from the exis-
tence of my life. Whether I am self-conscious of that from which I have 
been created and about the whole existence of education and upbringing 
is in fact the same thing as whether I am truly self-conscious about the 
existence of my life.124
This passage reads like a nationalist avowal which also borders on denying self-
consciousness to those who refuse to identify with China’s national culture—
even more so because of its almost intimidating tone. One cannot brush the 
statement easily aside, especially because it is hardly a unique occurrence in 
Tang’s writings of the 1950s and 1960s. The question therefore arises once again 
of whether Tang crosses the line from a culturally conservative patriotism to 
outright nationalism. The picture remains ambivalent given Tang’s aforemen-
tioned diffidence with respect to the ethnic nationalism of the GMD and his 
unswerving insistence on “absolute liberalism” for individuals to choose their 
own ideals. To help clarify this ostensible inconsistency, it should be noted that 
Tang made the above statement in a text that explicitly deals with the prob-
lem of exilic life. From this perspective, his message appears to be much less 
intimidating than defensive, stemming from an existential concern that the 
123   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 10–11.
124   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 11.
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experience of emigration might deny the individual any awareness of histori-
cal belonging. One of the fundamental lessons of Tang’s exilic philosophy is 
that an isolated individual cannot attain such awareness. To be meaningful to 
the exilic individual, the awareness of belonging to China—even if this China 
is only present in the form of interpretations of national culture—requires 
that the individual be able to assure him- or herself that other individuals 
share the same awareness and similarly identify themselves as “true Chinese.”125 
Without this shared awareness among the emigrants, the exilic space inevita-
bly turns into a non-place.
In exilic thought, avoiding such a vacuous existence and the demise of the 
Chinese nation necessitated, as we have seen, a concept of national culture in 
which its “main current” was dissociated from the territorial boundaries of the 
contemporary Chinese nation-states. According to this imagined transgres-
sion of external boundaries that were imposed politically and intellectually, 
the nation and its culture would now be able to exist outside the two Chinese 
nation-states on the Mainland and on Taiwan. Even outside of these territories, 
however, there were intellectual boundaries imposed by modern, “(self-)colo-
nizing” tendencies which threatened the continuation of the “main current.” 
As a consequence, the Chinese nation had to retreat behind “inner” bound-
aries, which were continuously drawn and redrawn through reflection and 
reinterpretation of the national culture.126 Tang reflected on the “inner bound-
aries” in an allegorical way: He professed that, as an emigrant, he could only 
seek shelter in Hong Kong, and even if his life in exile was an unhappy one, 
he could still reach Shenzhou 神州 in his “dream-ego.”127 Shenzhou tradition-
ally represents two visions: A mythological place inhabited by immortal beings 
and a territory from which the civilization of the Chinese empire emerged. By 
expressing his longing for Shenzhou, Tang asserted that under the current con-
ditions of exile and modernity his subjective yearning for transcendence had 
not yet been obliterated and his identification with China’s national culture 
had not yet been annihilated. 
125   Ibid.
126   On the concepts of inner and outer boundaries, see the analysis of Fichte’s Reden an die 
deutsche Nation in: Kallscheuer, “Deutsche Kulturnation versus französische Staatsnation? 
Eine ideengeschichtliche Stichprobe,” pp. 156–161.
127   Tang, Shuo Zhonghua minzu zhi hua guo piaoling, p. 29.
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In the manifesto from 1958, Tang and his co-authors suggested that 
Confucianism is characteristically based on a notion of human nature (xing 
性).1 In explicit accordance with Confucian and neo-Confucian predecessors, 
Tang placed the human being at the center of a cosmic order which he referred 
to as “Heaven” (tian 天). Similar to Wang Yangming’s “study of the mind,” Tang 
singled out, as we have seen, a passage from Mencius VIIA.1: “Mencius said, 
‘For a man to give full realization to his heart ( jin qi xin) is for him to under-
stand his own nature (zhi qi xing), and a man who knows his own nature will 
know Heaven (zhi tian).’ ”2 Tang interpreted this as a proposition about the 
human being’s potential to fully actualize him- or herself. This actualization 
is said to be equivalent to a “penetrating awakening” which allows the human 
mind to access “the ultimate source of the universe and human life” (yuzhou 
rensheng zhi benyuan 宇宙人生之本原). In this sudden realization, then, 
the human being will apprehend Heaven and hence the spiritual source of 
all reality.3
What Tang meant by “mind” may be approximated by reference to Max 
Scheler’s broad concept of mind (Geist), which ascribes to it discursive thought 
(Ideendenken) as well as “[a] specific type of ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) . . . of 
original phenomena or contents of essence” and thus “a specific class of voli-
1   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 25.
2   Lau, Mencius, p. 182; see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 60; see also Zhang, Zhongguo 
wenhua yu shijie, pp. 23–24. For a concise discussion of Mencian speculation and its impact 
on neo-Confucianism, see Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, pp. 369–380. Mencius VIIA.1 is of 
great importance for Wang Yangming’s thought: see Wang, Chuan xi lu, p. 20 (see also Chan, 
Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming: I.6), 101 
(ibid., I.66), 202 (ibid., II.134), 216 (ibid., II.136), 334 (ibid., III.174).
3   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 577. Tang provided equivalent formulations such as 
the ability of the human being to penetrate the “metaphysical ultimate source of universe” 
(yuzhou zhi xingshang de benyuan 宇宙之形上的本原) or the “absolute pattern of Heaven” 
( juedui de tian li 絕對的天理): Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 586; also cf. Zhang, 
Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 29 where the authors state that the human mind can “pen-
etrate the mind of Heaven” (tong yu tian xin 通於天心).
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tional and emotional acts such as benevolence, love, remorse, awe, intellec-
tual amazement, beatitude, and despair, free choice.”4 Referring to Confucian 
and neo-Confucian speculation with a similarly broad concept of mind, Tang 
used the Chinese word xin5 and assumed that “mind” appears in the realm of 
finite being, which includes the human being. He identified xin as the essence, 
the inner principle of the human being and, as such, as the subjective mind 
which functions as the intermediary or agent of Heaven: “In this, as seen with 
regard to the way of Heaven, the fulfilling of this mind and this principle by 
this human being is indeed the self-realization of the way of Heaven (tian dao 
zhi ziji shixian 天道之自己實現).”6
Tang’s “study of mind and (human) nature” rests on three basic assumptions: 
1) the foundation of all life in a cosmic process referred to as “Heaven”; 2) the 
possibility of human self-elevation to the point where the human being par-
takes in the “way of Heaven;” and 3) the essential unity of human existence to 
be achieved through a human being’s insight into the absolute (“Heaven”).7 By 
inscribing these assumptions into a theological framework, Tang distinguished 
his speculation from the thought of Mencius and Wang Yangming. What is at 
stake here is the epistemological status of the speculation on human nature. 
The locus classicus is Mencius IIA.6, which depicts the famous instance of 
someone experiencing an instantaneous urge to save a child from falling into 
a well. To be sure, neither Mencius nor Wang ever narrated such an instance 
in order to discuss the epistemological implications of making propositions 
about human nature. But the question remains as to whether they understood 
this narrative as an allegory, as an observation or as something else.8 Possibly, 
4   Scheler, Schriften zur Anthropologie, p. 158 (my translation).
5   Tang distinguished between “mind” and “consciousness,” translating the latter in most cases 
with the neologism yishi 意識.
6   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 369. Tang’s notion of such a relation between the 
human and the Heavenly mind is in loose convergence with Scheler’s metaphysical anthro-
pology. Tang studied Scheler’s thought however only in passing; cf. a brief reference in Tang, 
Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, p. 652.
7   Roger Ames suggests a fundamentally different understanding of Tang’s speculation which he 
describes as “a radical empiricism” that offers “an understanding of agency [which] is wholly 
naturalistic in that it makes no appeal to a metaphysics of self” (p. 150). Ames is accordingly 
compelled to translate Tang’s use of term tiandao 天道 with such variants as “the natural 
and cultural processes,” or the “natural and cultural legacy,” (p. 145); see Ames, “Achieving 
Personal Identity in Confucian Role Ethics: Tang Junyi on Human Nature as Conduct.”
8   Iso Kern speaks of Mencius’ “examples” that Wang Yangming had taken up, albeit with a dif-
ferent interpretation; see Kern, Das Wichtigste im Leben, pp. 208–210.
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they presumed to identify here an empirically accountable proposition about 
the essential dispositions of human beings. Wang’s discussion of such disposi-
tions, especially of those mentioned in Mencius IIA.6, shows that he believed 
that human beings were naturally endowed with a potential to act upon moral 
intuition (“innate knowing”: liang zhi). The following passage from the Chuan 
xi lu with its rhetorical question is telling in this regard: “When I see a child fall 
into a well [and have a feeling of commiseration], there must be the principle 
of commiseration. Is this principle of commiseration actually in the person of 
the child or is it in the innate knowledge (liang zhi—TF) of my mind?”9 Unlike 
Mencius and Wang, Tang explicitly reflected on the epistemological status 
of his speculation on human nature and moral intuition. He interpreted the 
Mencian proposition on human nature and the possibility to “know Heaven” 
as a statement of religious conviction or “faith” (xinyang 信仰):
That all human beings are equal in their nature and that there is nothing 
which [by nature] is not good in them, is [a matter of] a transcending 
faith. As it [= this faith] cannot seek to obtain encompassing proof by 
direct experience, there is nothing I can do, if you want to raise doubts. 
But this faith itself flowed from the inner spirit of a human being endowed 
with the spirit of humaneness. If a human being thoroughly recognizes 
its own humaneness and the goodness of its nature, it will spontaneously 
be able to suddenly attain the [following] immediate realization: in the 
nature of all human beings, there is nothing that is not good, and nobody 
is not endowed with humaneness.10
By rephrasing the Mencian idea of human nature as a matter of religious faith, 
Tang shifted the foundation of his reflections. He accordingly ascribed to his 
modern Confucianism the quality of “religiosity” (zongjiaoxing), and hence 
related it to the field of religions.
Tang’s notion of religion puts strong emphasis on how religions respond to 
human concerns about the highest good, eternal justice, a higher truth, the 
9    Wang, Chuan xi lu, p. 209 (Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian 
Writings by Wang Yang-ming: II.135) as translated in Chan, Instructions for Practical Living 
and other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming, p. 99.
10   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 418; cf. p. 60. Wang Yangming had also professed 
his “faith” (xin) in liang zhi at the latest stage of his philosophical work. According to 
Kern’s impressive study on Wang, this stage was marked by Wang’s new, “religious- 
enthusiastic” concept of liang zhi; see “Kern, Das Wichtigste im Leben, pp. 187–189.
The Theological Accentuation  111
eradication of sin and evil, or an afterlife.11 He assumed—in the compara-
tive context of the world religions—that religions provide the human beings 
with answers to their longing for immortality (Daoism), absolute justice 
(Islam), overcoming pain and suffering (Buddhism), and redeeming sin and 
evil (Christianity). What is more, religions characteristically “confirm” the exis-
tence of an afterworld, including notions of immortality, an afterlife or res-
urrection, as well as notions of God, Allah, Brahman, Buddha, Bodhisattva or 
the Immortals.12 Tang added that a human being needs myths, miracles, and 
artistic representations of religious notions in order to “break through” to the 
sphere of religion. Myths, miracles, and religious art thus fulfill a double func-
tion by fostering the belief in a transcendent power, while at the same time 
expressing the human longing for transcendence. Nevertheless, neither myths 
nor miracles are the defining features of Tang’s concept of religion.13 In reflect-
ing on the distinction between (world) religions and (Confucian) religiosity, 
Tang pointed out that Confucian religiosity did not evolve out of notions of 
miracles, myths, original sin, and divine grace.14 Still, the Confucian person 
is said to believe in a “transcendent power” (chaoyue liliang 超越力量).15 The 
manifesto of 1958 even suggests that the Confucian belief reaches deep enough 
into individuals to produce Confucian martyrs.16 This reference to Confucian 
martyrs echoes Zhang Taiyan’s claim that the Confucian martyr’s spirit is mani-
fest in the Confucian’s willingness “to die in the performance of benevolence.”17 
The idea of a Confucian belief in a “transcendent power” is crucial for Tang’s 
reflection on modernity. He suggested that religions and religiosity might 
play an important part in deflecting the danger of a Western type of moder-
nity which submits mankind to materialism, positivism, and instrumental 
rationality.18 In the future, Western culture should therefore “revert to the 
11   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 363–364, 368, 380–385; Tang, Renwen jing-
shen zhi chongjian, pp. 587–589.
12   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 587.
13   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 363–364.
14   Tang, “The reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” pp. 366–367; 
Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 363–365.
15   Ibid., p. 364.
16   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 19–20.
17   See chap. 5 (“Ru xia” 儒俠) in Zhang’s Book of Persecutions (Qiushu 訄書 [old edition, 
published in 1900 or 1901]); quoted from: Shimada, Pioneer of the Chinese Revolution, p. 112.
18   Tang listed the following philosophical opponents of religions: materialism (most danger-
ous in his eyes), logical positivism, empiricism and, to some degree, naturalism; see Tang, 
Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 595.
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divine” in order to avoid the reification of the human being as a material object. 
What is necessary, in other words, is a “revival” of religions, and hence the com-
mon perspective of world religions and Confucian religiosity in modernity.19
By emphasizing the religious core of Confucianism, Tang addressed an issue 
which had been raised by Max Weber, who famously denied that Confucianism 
had any metaphysical or religious outlook. Weber made this assertion in 
the context of his large-scale comparative investigation into the formation 
of modernity. Tellingly, the manifesto A Declaration to the World for Chinese 
Culture from 1958 thoroughly refutes the Weberian notion that “Chinese cul-
ture” is void of “transcendent feeling of a religious nature”20—albeit without 
explicit mention of Weber’s thesis about Confucianism.
An important aspect of Tang’s version of Confucian religiosity concerns its 
ritualistic elements. Tang strongly highlighted the so-called “three forms of 
ritual sacrifice” (san ji 三祭) to “Heaven and Earth” (tian di 天地), to the “ances-
tors” (zuzong 祖宗), and to “saints and worthies” (sheng xian 聖賢). He was 
convinced that these rituals had existed over a long period of time and were 
practiced within a large segment of society.21 For reasons which he did not 
elaborate, he treated these rituals as specifically Confucian, and even identi-
fied them as the “center” of Confucian rituals.22 The rituals not only entailed 
the worship of Heaven and Earth, the ancestors, and the saints and worthies, 
but also the Heavenly call to the worshippers to realize their individual self- 
fulfillment in intuition. If the rituals are carried out with attentiveness, the 
creative “virtues” (de 德) of Heaven and Earth, of the “lord on high” (shangdi 
上帝), of the ancestors, and of the saints and worthies might “appear” (cheng 呈) 
in the mind of the worshipper and “directly manifest [themselves]” (zhijie bia-
oxian 直接表現).23 In the course of the rituals, the worshipper thus realizes 
that he or she is summoned to “connect in [mutual] affection” (gantong 感通) 
with a transcendent existence.24 The worshipper can then “set the self at ease 
19   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 26–27.
20   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 16.
21   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 374.
22   Ibid., p. 389. On the three forms of ritual sacrifice, see also: Tang, Zhongguo renwen 
jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 374–389; Tang, “The reconstruction of Confucianism and the 
Modernization of Asia,” pp. 363–364.
23   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 387.
24   Ibid., p. 375. For Tang, “gantong” is a mode of activity in which recognizing, feeling and 
intending are simultaneously taking place and the distinctions between agent/receptor 
and subject/object are suspended. The scope of gantong is not limited to religious experi-
ence, but may also include sensory perception and intellectual activity. On gantong see 
Liao, “Tang Junyi ‘panjiao lilun’ de chubu kaocha,” pp. 40–44. As for the relation between 
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and establish destiny” (an shen li ming 安身立命), thereby realizing the funda-
mental sense of the “Confucian teachings” (Ruzhe zhi jiao 儒者之教).25
Tang further explained that the notion of the human condition, as manifest 
in these rituals, is not determined by feelings of sinfulness, as in Christianity, 
nor by an existence marked by pain and suffering, as in Buddhism. Instead, 
these rituals express the aspiration of the Confucian worshipper to “tran-
scend” or “enlarge” his or her “self” (zi wo 自我), and thus “permeate” (tong 
da 通達) Heaven and Earth, the ancestors, and the saints and worthies.26 In 
pathos-rich language, Tang assumed in this context that the “pure Chinese” 
(chuncui de Zhongguoren 純粹的中國人) who believe in Confucianism are 
convinced that they can fulfill the “essence” (benzhi 本質) of the human spirit. 
But to achieve this it will not suffice to simply “establish destiny” in philosophy, 
science, literature, art, politics, or economy. One also has to reach for the infi-
nite “realm” ( jingjie 境界) beyond these fields.27 Against this backdrop, Tang 
called for a contemporary revival of Confucian ritual practice, including rites 
de passage which should not be left entirely to the followers of other religions.28
The (modern) Confucian faith is, according to Tang, not a matter of rev-
elation, but is based on human reason and feeling and is characterized by a 
conflation of belief and knowledge in the ultimate realm of insight into the 
absolute.29 Tang’s theological metaphysics thus contains a medial double-
principle (mediales Doppelprinzip), to borrow a term from research on Fichte: 
in an act of intuition, the human mind recognizes and realizes itself as an 
appearance of Heaven, and at the same time, Heaven manifests itself through 
intuition, thereby recognizing itself in the human mind.30 As Tang put it: 
“Heaven recognizes [itself]” (tian zhi 天知) as it “appears” in the human “self,” 
and the self-realization of Heaven is “identical” with intuition.31 In partaking 
in the self-attainment of Heaven, the human mind is lifted above itself. 
Still, this self-transcendence does not extinguish the human mind, and the 
gantong and liang zhi, one might tentatively propose that the mode of cognition in liang 
zhi is to be called gantong.
25   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 365.
26   Ibid., p. 384.
27   Ibid., pp. 365–366, 374–375.
28   Ibid., p. 390.
29   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 363. In 
this conflation, Tang’s theological metaphysics is similar to Fichte’s metaphysical realism; 
on Fichte see Oesterreich, Der ganze Fichte, pp. 203–204.
30   For a discussion of the medial double-principle in research on Fichte’s allegories of light 
see Oesterreich, Der ganze Fichte, pp. 221–224.
31   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 587.
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difference between the mind of Heaven, which Tang understood as a meta-
physical reality, and the human mind is preserved in the illuminated mind as 
“the sage mind.”32 According to this notion of the absolute, Heaven attains self- 
realization by manifesting itself in the mind of the human being (the “sage”; 
sheng ren 聖人), whereas the latter apprehends in an act of (moral) intuition 
the ultimate principles of reality (the “principles of Heaven”).33
With respect to notions of the sage in Chinese history, Tang explained that 
the sages were considered to have “descended from Heaven” during the Han 
Dynasty, whereas the neo-Confucians shared the belief that the way of becom-
ing a sage could be studied by mortal beings. Neither the sages themselves nor 
their virtue were understood by neo-Confucians as being produced solely by 
Heaven, but also by the “power” of men.34 Tang’s outlook is indeed in line with 
most neo-Confucian notions of sagehood in that he associated sagehood with 
an elusive spiritual state that is attainable by every human being, even though 
it remains, in fact, inaccessible for the vast majority of believers. By the same 
token, Tang followed his neo-Confucian predecessors by downplaying the influ-
ence of Buddhist teachings in shaping neo-Confucian ideas about  sagehood.35 
The human “self-belief” (zi xin 自信) in the spiritual potency of becoming 
a sage is said to set Confucian religiosity apart from the world religions. Yet 
Tang also conceded that Chan Buddhism, Christian mysticism, and the Daoist 
teaching of the all-encompassing truth (quanzhenjiao 全真教)  contain similar 
ideas.36 He even hints at a basic convergence of Confucianism and Daoism in 
32   Tang, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy” [1959], p. 33.
33   The translation of tian li as “principles of Heaven” stems from the English text: Tang, “The 
Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang Chi,” p. 188. 
Although this translation is not Tang’s own, it is likely that he approved of it, since he dis-
cussed the difficulties of translating Chinese concepts into English at length, and at times 
took issues with prevalent terminology of translation (see below on liang zhi).
34   See Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 522; Tang, Zhongguo renwen zhi jingshen fazhan, 
pp. 25–26. On the sage in an ideal humanistic world, see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi 
chongjian, p. 63. In the following, “sage” will be used with respect to Tang’s speculation, 
even though Tang’s usage of the term is ambivalent. At times, he used terms like sheng 
xian 聖賢 (“sages and worthies”) and sheng ren in an apparently colloquial way to refer to 
individuals of a “personality of highest integrity” who bear great responsibility for society 
and therefore deserve special reverence from others; see e.g. Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode 
lixing, pp. 288, 612; Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 63, 65, 395–396.
35   For a highly instructive overview of notions of the sage and sagehood in the Chinese con-
text, see Angle, Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy, 
pp. 14–17.
36   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 369.
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their belief that Heaven achieves its self-fulfillment in the “great person” (da 
ren 大人), the “sage,” the “true person” (zhen ren 真人) or the “Heavenly person” 
(tian ren 天人).37
A key aspect of Tang’s understanding of sagehood concerns temporality: 
Sagehood is conceptualized as an ephemeral, intuitive state that is, in fact, not 
to be mistaken for an enduring form of social existence. The “sage” embodies at 
once the actualization of human nature and the self-realization of Heaven, but 
he is not a figure of historical temporality. Tang consequently refrained from 
depicting a historical perspective of a society governed by sages.38
It is significant that Tang explicitly referred to the transcendent break-
through of the individual who becomes a sage as a “religious intuition” 
(zongjiao de liang zhi 宗教的良知).39 In his theological metaphysics, such 
intuition is not a mental activity of an individualized subject, but the work-
ing of the ultimate reality,40 i.e. the mind’s convergence with self-illuminating 
37   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 22, p. 362.
38   Metzger takes Tang’s reference to the topic of becoming a sage at face value, thus por-
traying him as a stern, ideologically misguided believer in the feasibility of a permanent 
and comprehensive actualization of human nature on a social scale; see, for example, 
Metzger’s discussion of a passage from Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie: Metzger, A 
Cloud across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories 
Today, p. 238. As I will argue below, this interpretation misses the point of Tang’s civil 
theology. Although Tang’s late metaphysical work Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie 
is strewn with soteriological expectations and inklings to salvific history, his political 
thought clearly highlights the idea that individuals may attain the state of sagehood only 
in fleeting moments, thus remaining for the most of time in an imperfect world. This 
indeed may not prevent the believer from having faith in the possibility of achieving a 
perfect world populated only by sages, but the thrust of Tang’s political thought is not 
based on a “faith in the practical possibility of the world’s total moral transformation” 
as Metzger would have it (Metzger, ibid.). In fact, Tang was well aware of the ideological 
dangers involved in such a vision (for his critique of the notion of a “great uniformity” [da 
tong] see Chapters 4 “Defending authenticity,” 12 “Overcoming totalitarianism?” in this 
book).
39   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 593.
40   Tang followed here a fundamental assumption of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming: see 
Shimada, Die neo-konfuzianische Philosophie, p. 133. As regards modern Confucianism, 
Tang related his metaphysics to the speculation of Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, but not 
to Feng Youlan’s who was, as Mou recalled, rebuffed by Xiong for claiming that liang zhi 
was a mere “hypothesis” ( jiading 假定) of the subjective mind, and not a (spiritual) fact; 
see Mou, Wushi zishu, p. 88.
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“principles” of Heaven.41 Tang rephrased this notion many times. We find, for 
example, the statement that the “way of Heaven,” to be understood as the pro-
cess of change of all reality, becomes manifest within the empirical “reality of 
phenomena” in “the way of man.” The latter is thus said to culminate in the 
intermediation of the mind of Heaven by the human mind in the act of intu-
ition. Through this intermediation, the “self-realization of the way of Heaven” 
is achieved.42 As co-creator, the human being is not a creature, but rather, as 
it were, Heaven in the making. What unfolds is a “relationship of mutual pres-
ervation and merging”43 in the course of which the human being “enriches” 
reality as produced by Heaven.44 In this respect, Tang’s theological metaphys-
ics is not in line with the metaphysical realism developed by Fichte, who did 
not elevate the human being to the position of co-creator and identified, in his 
later work (after 1801), the “absolute being” with “God.”45
The fact that one may discern the above-mentioned double-principle in 
Tang’s speculation does not mean that he was following Fichte specifically, since 
the double-principle has had several proponents in the Western history of meta-
physics, as Max Scheler reminds us: “It is this old notion of Spinoza, Hegel and 
many others: the original being (“das Urseiende”—TF) becomes aware of itself 
in man in the very same act in which man sees himself based in it.” Scheler went 
on to observe critically that this tradition has been represented so far in a way 
that was “far too one-sidedly intellectualistic.” Instead, he proposed to reinter-
pret the idea of self-realization to the effect that, in correspondence with the 
“ideal demand of the deity (Deitas),” self-realization is seen as “a consequence 
of the active installment of the center of our being.” Scheler continues:
The place of this self-realization—we can also call it self-deification 
(Selbstvergottung)—which the being-that-exists-through-itself (Durch-
sich-seiende-Sein) seeks and, for the sake of its coming into existence, 
it puts up with a “history”—this is indeed man, the human self and the 
human heart. These form the only place of becoming god which is within 
our reach.46
41   Tang, “The Spirit and Development of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 79; see also Wang, Chuan xi 
lu, p. 130.
42   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 369.
43   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 587.
44   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 369; see also Wang, Chuan xi lu, p. 211 (Chan, 
Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming: 
II.135).
45   On Fichte see Oesterreich, Der ganze Fichte, pp. 228, 237.
46   Scheler, Schriften zur Anthropologie, p. 215 (there are all my translations; all emphases are 
Scheler’s).
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Tang would have agreed with Scheler’s strong emphasis on the active, partic-
ipatory part of the human being in the course of the self-realization of the 
absolute, though he would not have identified his notion of Heaven with 
Scheler’s monotheistic notion of god. For Tang, the vision of the human being 
as Heaven in the making is indeed one of the salient features of the Confucian 
religious faith. Nevertheless, he did not consider the notion of the absolute’s 
self-realization as an exclusively Confucian idea, but as being wide-spread 
within Eastern and Western traditions. Significantly, he referred to the abso-
lute with a whole range of different terms such as “Heaven,” “deity” (shen 神), 
“tathatā, bhūtatathatā” (zhenru 真如), the “supreme ultimate” (tai ji 太極), and 
“Brahman.”47
At this point, we may thus identify several key elements of Tang’s theological 
agenda. The first of these is the exposition, explanation, and systematization of 
what Tang varyingly called “faith,” “philosophical faith,” “feelings of transcen-
dence,” etc. At the core of this theological discourse we find: (a) the notion of 
an absolute, non-personal “Heaven” which achieves its full realization in the 
mind of the sage; and (b) the notion of the human being’s inborn longing to 
overcome his detachment from “Heaven” by transcending his individual exis-
tence (thereby becoming a sage, i.e. a co-creator or a Heaven in the making). 
The second key element is the infusion of the modern Confucian ethos of indi-
vidual self-fulfillment with theological limit-concepts of intuition and sage-
hood. These positive limit-concepts fulfill an orienting function with respect to 
the individual’s conduct of life. They are positioned, as it were, precisely on the 
border between social reality, on the one side, and the realm of ultimate real-
ity, on the other. Thirdly, even though Tang’s theological Confucianism does 
not advocate clerical or liturgical institutions, let alone a Confucian church, 
his notion of a Confucian religiosity entails propositions about the form and 
meaning of ritual practices. The fourth key element pertains to the civil-
theological taxonomy of human knowledge and cognition based on the limit-
concepts of intuition and sagehood as its rationale. In accordance with these 
limit-concepts, the taxonomy of knowledge and cognition neither contains 
sacred scriptures nor an orthodox canon of classics. And, lastly, the fifth key 
element concerns the stipulations for the “true” philosopher, which include a 
messianic sense of mission.
47   Cf. Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral 
Life: A Comparative Study, p. 318.
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 The Taxonomy of Knowledge and Intuition
Tang’s civil-theological taxonomy of knowledge and intuition serves as a frame 
of reference for integrating the political, moral, religious, cultural, and histori-
cal aspects of modern Confucianism. The point of departure for establishing 
this taxonomy is Tang’s decision to accord a higher status to the intuitive cog-
nition of the principles of Heaven than to discursive knowledge (in philoso-
phy, metaphysics, and the special branches of science). Specifically, the highest 
level of cognition is said to be achieved in an act of intuition.48 This accentua-
tion, however, does not amount to a denial of the relative autonomy of science 
and philosophy. They are rather affirmed by the taxonomy as forms of rational 
knowledge on an intermediate level.
In a historical and comparative perspective, all claims to universally valid 
definitions of philosophy are highly problematic, as Tang stated. He further 
elaborated that the contemporary Chinese neologism for “philosophy,” zhexue 
哲學, is not identical with Western concepts of “philosophy.” Zhexue is far more 
comprehensive than what is usually referred to as “philosophy” in the West 
and includes Chinese, Western, and Indian philosophies in a very broad sense.49 
Moreover, Tang reminded his readers that there is no generally accepted defi-
nition of philosophy in the West, and that probably every Western philosopher 
would answer differently the question “What is philosophy?” He added the 
observation that Western books presenting an overview of philosophy often 
fail to offer a definition of philosophy and, further, that even those authors 
who provide such a definition, tellingly, usually put it at the end of the book.50
These terminological and conceptual difficulties of defining philosophy not-
withstanding, Tang arranged philosophy, i.e. zhexue, within the civil-theological 
taxonomy of knowledge and intuition. The taxonomy is structured according 
to the rationale of forms of knowledge that assist the human mind in attain-
ing an intuitive apprehension of the absolute. Within this taxonomy, phi-
losophy is situated between the fields of scientific research and the intuitive 
realization of the “principles of Heaven.” With respect to this intuitive real-
ization, philosophy has two supreme functions, both of which are related to 
48   Ibid., p. 567. This assumption entails a notion of a spiritual self who attains intuition and 
is thereby able to pass correct judgments on the whole range of human behavior; see 
Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 585–586.
49   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 21, pp. 16, 19–20. On this topic see also Peng Guoxiang’s close 
reading of the prefaces and the first section of Vol. 1 of Zhexue gailun (pp. 1–33): Peng, 
“Tang Junyi de zhexue guan—yi ‘Zhexue gailun’ wei zhongxin,” pp. 111–117.
50   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 21, pp. 19, 26.
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the notion of intuition (liang zhi) as an act of realization, which is located— 
to use an image in line with Tang’s own allegorical language—on the very bor-
der of philosophical reflection: liang zhi is neither completely detached from 
discursive philosophy, nor is it a process of philosophical reflection.
The first function of philosophical reflection is to initiate the opening of the 
human mind in order to allow intuition to take place. To this end, philosophy 
reflects on the many forms of reification of the human subject’s relation to itself 
and to the social and natural environment. In the course of such reflection, the 
human being may become aware that it is not restricted to its empirical self, but 
able to transcend the empirical self to reach beyond the realms of reification. 
In his An Outline of Philosophy (Zhexue gailun), Tang called this type of philo-
sophical reflection “transcendental reflection” (chaoyue de fanxing 超越的 
反省) and explained: “The transcendental-reflective method means that we do 
not attach ourselves to but transcend our speech, understanding, knowledge 
of existence, and value.”51 According to Shun Kai Kevin Cheng, Tang intended 
here to delineate the “center of all philosophical method.”52 But if we are to 
comprehensively analyze Tang’s concept of philosophy, it will be insufficient 
to solely rely on this statement about philosophical method. What needs to be 
considered are the limits of philosophical reflection as outlined by Tang him-
self. Cheng assumes that in Tang’s vision “[t]he decree of Heaven is revealed 
in the present immediacy,”53 and that this “immediacy” is fully embedded in 
philosophical language and reflection i.e. transcendental reflection. However, 
Tang’s notion of intuitive immediacy points to a deep gap between the philo-
sophical (transcendental-reflective) initiation of such intuitive immediacy 
and the very act of intuition itself. As shall be shown below, this notion of a 
gap plays a crucial role in determining the function of philosophy in general, 
and metaphysics in particular as building a “bridge” for human consciousness 
to cross into intuition. When depicting the function of philosophical language, 
Tang suggested the image of opening a gate to one’s own spirit and to all exis-
tence, and referred to the philosophical soliloquies of St. Augustine, Zhuangzi 
and Kierkegaard which took, according to him, the form of prayers.54
51   Quoted from: Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization 
of Moral Life: A Comparative Study, p. 294.
52   Ibid., p. 295.
53   Ibid., p. 324; Cheng refers here to Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, 
pp. 233f.
54   See Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, pp. 520–521. The speculation about 
the fundamental gap between philosophical reflection and immediate, intuitive cogni-
tion (liang zhi, “wisdom” etc.) constitutes a central issue in modern Confucianism. For 
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The second function of philosophical reflection is to devise discursive rep-
resentations of intuitive cognition. These representations include core ele-
ments of Confucian religiosity, namely, the individual’s spiritual self-assurance 
that human nature as endowed by Heaven calls the human being to transcend 
its empirical self and achieve immediate unity with Heaven. Philosophy takes 
here the form of a “teaching” ( jiao 教) which is inscribed into the framework of 
Confucian theology. Tang highlighted the importance of philosophical teach-
ing in a mystifying retrospection of his own intellectual development. Looking 
back at the past 30 years, he declared that the point of departure of his philo-
sophical development was a “feeling of transcendence” (chaoyue de ganqing 
超越的感情) which led him to experience manifold “awakenings to transcen-
dence” (chaoyue de huiwu 超越的會晤). This statement is even more remark-
able for it is one of the very rare instances where Tang at least hinted at the 
effects that such a spiritual awakening might have on an individual’s conduct 
of life. As regards the theological foundation of philosophy, he explained the 
philosophical “transformation [of the individual] through teachings” ( jiaohua 
教化) consists of familiarizing oneself with the many contradictions between 
different philosophical schools and ideas. Such contradictions, after all, are 
due to a “secret intention of Heaven.” Tang consequently professed that he 
himself hardly ever intended to devise theories, preferring instead to reflect 
on a constellation in which mutually contradictory statements contribute to 
intuitively “accomplishing the teaching” (cheng jiao 成教).55
Both philosophical tasks are obviously difficult to achieve, and the latter is 
particularly challenging since intuition is, from the standpoint of symbolic rep-
resentation, elusive by necessity. Any attempt to translate intuition into termi-
nologies and grammatical structures can at best amount to an accommodation. 
Even so, philosophy, and especially metaphysics, assumes a leading role among 
the various types of symbolic rapprochement with intuition. It is telling in this 
context that Tang repeatedly attested to the great significance of the religious 
orientation of his philosophy by highlighting personal experiences of spiritual 
example, Mou Zongsan’s philosophy also highlights the problem of reflection about such 
a gap. As Sébastien Billioud shows in his excellent study of Mou Zongsan, this becomes 
particularly evident in the context of Mou’s moral philosophy. Billioud concludes that 
Mou “does not provide enough elements to enable us to better characterize (hence, better 
understand) the noncausal links between the radical rupture implied by dunwu [sudden 
enlightenment—TF] and an intermediate process of moral integration that takes place 
through retrospective verification;” see Billioud, Thinking Through Confucian Modernity, 
p. 226; also cf. Ibid., pp. 218–232 for a comprehensive discussion of this issue.
55   Ibid. 
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awakening.56 The origin of philosophy is, if we are to follow Tang, a yearning 
for transcendence—“a specific uncertainty” of the human being longing to 
“transcend” the “limitations” of its consciousness (in an intuitive perception 
of Heaven). Thus, philosophy shall lead to intuition, while remaining separate 
from the non-rational perception of Heaven itself. Human beings may, through 
philosophy, attain a discursive “self-consciousness” (zijue 自覺) of the “whole-
ness of their spiritual potency” (qi xinling zhi quan 其心靈之全), which initi-
ates their “turning back” to the “source” of all knowing and which cannot be 
gained by strictly compartmentalized scientific activity.57 It is at this point that 
the “realm of void potency of the mind” (kong ling xin jing 空靈心境)—a state 
which itself remains aloof from philosophical thought—might be reached.58
The delineation of the “realm of void potency of the mind” serves as the 
background for a concept of philosophy that outlines the unity of all sciences. 
Yet Tang was most of all interested in conceptualizing philosophy in terms of a 
human mind-set, or “spiritual attitude” ( jingshen taidu 精神態度).59 After all, 
he did not accept the claim of inductive metaphysics which sets out to con-
struct a comprehensive world view by delineating a synopsis of all branches of 
science. According to Tang, this “formal idea” of a “philosophical synthesis” 
of all branches of science cannot be achieved anymore in a modern world of 
rapid evolution of knowledge. Inductive metaphysics is only of interest to Tang 
insofar as it shatters the respective claims to a totality of knowledge within 
specific branches of science and, at the same time, points toward the urge of 
the human mind to reach beyond the range of scientific knowledge. Hence, the 
pursuit of a uniform foundation of the various systems and orders of knowl-
edge is relevant for the emergence of a “pure consciousness of a transcendent 
and all-embracing disposition” (chuncui zhi ju chaoyuexing hangaixing zhi 
yishi 純粹之具超越性涵蓋性之意識).60 In turn, this can lead the human mind 
to an awareness of an ultimate reality.61
Tang suggests that intuition is neither bound to scientific systems of knowl-
edge, nor to specific scientific methods, theories or discoveries, and it clearly 
cannot be understood as a synthesis of empirical or theoretical knowledge. 
56   Cf. Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 556–589 and Shengming cunzai yu xinling 
jingjie, Vol. 24, pp. 453–524.
57   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 576; on the “turning back” see Tang, Wenhua yishi 
yu daode lixing, p. 369.
58   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 364, 373.
59   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 563.
60   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 355–356.
61   Ibid., pp. 353, 366.
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Metaphysics, too, is not exempt from this limitation of discursive knowledge 
in comparison with intuited cognition. Consequently, Tang conceptualized the 
function of metaphysics as a sort of philosophical meditation on the limits 
of human cognition, on the essentially irrevocable human aspiration to over-
come these limits, and on the human potential to do so in an act of intuition. 
But metaphysical reflection, as Tang understood it, does not necessarily have 
to lead to a new system of knowledge. The value of metaphysics ultimately lies 
in its function to question or even destroy all forms of “relative knowledge,” 
including metaphysical systems themselves.
As a result of this destruction of knowledge, the “realm of void potency of 
the mind” may (suddenly) become accessible to the human mind. Tang there-
fore spoke of metaphysics as a bridge leading from symbolically represented 
cognition to the immediate presence of intuitive knowing.62 He emphatically 
reminded his readers that one should attempt to cross this bridge without lin-
gering on it.63 At this point, there is a clear shift of emphasis in Tang’s thought 
in favor of a non-intelligible ultimate reality.64 This sharp line of demarcation 
between discursive thought and intuition separates Tang’s theological meta-
physics from earlier Confucian and neo-Confucian speculation, which did not 
construct such a tension between philosophical and theological metaphysics.65 
Insofar as meditation in metaphysics leads one to the other side of the bridge, 
discursive thought comes to a temporary halt: In a “moment” ( ji 機), the sub-
ject “realizes” (tihui 體會) “the metaphysical reality of the absolute mind and 
pattern” ( juedui de xin yu li zhi xingshang shizai 絕對的心與理之形上實在).66 
But contrary to what the bridge-allegory might seem to imply, Tang subsumed 
intuition itself within the notion of metaphysics, thereby proposing “meta-
physics” as a term for the interlacing of philosophical and theological aspects 
of the study of mind and (human) nature. We may assume that he did so with 
respect to the above-mentioned double function of philosophy in relation to 
62   Ibid., pp. 364, 373. Contrary to Henri Bergson’s new metaphysics, Tang did not bind intui-
tive perception to a passage through the positive sciences.
63   Ibid., p. 366.
64   Arlt gives an account of Max Scheler’s metaphysical anthropology which can be seen as 
pointing in a similar direction: see Arlt, Philosophische Anthropologie, pp. 23–24.
65   Cf. Tang’s own account of neo-Confucian speculation in Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jing-
shen jiazhi, pp. 87–91; Tang, “The spirit and development of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 68.
66   For these concepts see Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 365–366; also cf. ibid., 
pp. 364, 373.
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intuition—the moment of intuition hence remains accessible to philosophical 
thought, even though the intuition itself transcends reflection altogether.
Within the framework of his theological speculation, Tang interpreted the 
transcendental philosophical reflection on the categorical limits of cognition 
as the liberation of the human mind from dogmatic fetters. He described this 
in Buddhist terms as a spiritual initiation to the “unpinning” (chaoba 超拔) of 
the consciousness from its “limitations,” and thus as an “appearance” of the 
“non-‘limited’ ” (wu “xian” 無 “限”—Tang’s emphasis).67 This vision amounts to 
a post-transcendental return to theological metaphysics. It entails the claim 
that the ultimate reality will disclose itself as an upshot of the destruction 
of pure reflection and of the Kantian self-limitation of transcendental phi-
losophy. From this perspective, Kant’s transcendental reflection on the con-
stitution of empirical cognition is seen as a philosophical impetus to the 
self- transcendence of the human consciousness in intuition.68 Thus, Tang’s 
focus is not so much on the destruction of discursive knowledge per se, but 
rather on the taxonomical demotion of forms of knowledge prone to categori-
cal and conceptual fixation. Seen from Tang’s Buddhist-inspired aspiration of 
attaining intuition by pushing the mind through the breakdown of discursive 
thinking, Kantian critical philosophy with its insistence on conceptual and 
categorical thought must be restrained.
The goal in setting up such a taxonomy of knowledge is neither the con-
struction of a methodologically defined system of knowledge, nor the formula-
tion of an epistemology. Significantly, Tang spoke of a “very long and winding 
road” leading from Western philosophy and its main currents of epistemol-
ogy, philosophy of science and analytical philosophy to the ultimate realm of 
intuition. He further assumed that while travelling along this road, one may 
easily be bogged down by “intellectualism.” But this should not be mistaken 
as an attempt by Tang to initiate a struggle of Western science and philoso-
phy vs. Eastern philosophy for supremacy over the construction of a mod-
ern world view. On the contrary, he explicitly stated that the road of Western 
philosophy was “more suitable for the present age.”69 Instead of supporting 
an opposition to Western science, modern Confucianism aspires to a mutual 
67   Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, p. 100.
68   Tang’s approach must be clearly distinguished here from Scheler’s philosophical anthro-
pology which defines philosophy in a fundamental sense as “evidential cognition of 
essence” (evidente Wesenserkenntnis) and, in contrast, portrays neo-Kantian philosophy 
as an absurdity; Arlt, Philosophische Anthropologie, p. 84.
69   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 577–582. 
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relief or task-sharing with an allegedly over-burdened scientific world view. 
Scientific research cannot bear fruit if it is supervised, at every step, by moral 
considerations. The manifesto of 1958 bluntly states: “The crucial point—why 
the Chinese lack this kind of scientific spirit—is basically the overemphasis 
on moral practice in Chinese thought.”70 Regarded from the standpoint of its 
social functions, Tang’s modern Confucianism set out to embrace scientific and 
technological progress in much the same way as religions may do in Western 
societies of the post-Enlightenment age.71
 Limits of Philosophical Exposition
Tang’s writings are characterized by an unusual, hybrid style that cannot, first 
of all, be clearly identified as either written vernacular Chinese (baihuawen 
白話文) or classical literary Chinese (wenyanwen 文言文). While the hybrid 
nature of his writing style requires further research, Anja Steinbauer had made 
an astute observation of two characteristic traits of his style: 1) Tang’s texts 
are abundant with passages where he introduced terms as if he “expected 
from his readers an associative and intuitive understanding [of these terms];” 
2) Steinbauer discerns a tendency of Tang to compose very long sentences with 
utterly complex grammatical structures, which are difficult to understand. It 
seems to her that Tang tried to “overcome the limitations which were imposed 
on him by language as a vehicle—if not through a deliberate attempt to break 
(these limitations) up, then at least through non-observance [of conventions of 
academic writing].”72 We may suppose that Buddhist inspirations again come 
into play here. The peculiarities of Tang’s writing style seem to convey his con-
cern about the limits of philosophical exposition as a means to attain intuitive 
insights, but also as a medium suitable for giving an account of intuition itself. 
Besides, when immersing oneself in Tang’s texts, one almost cannot help but 
suspect that he deliberately chose to express himself in a thorny style. Perhaps 
70   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 34.
71   On this aspect of religions in modern Western societies, see Lübbe, Religion nach der 
Aufklärung.
72   Steinbauer, Tang Junyis System der neun Horizonte des Geistes, pp. 103, 105 (English trans-
lation: TF). Thaddeus Hang (Xiang Tujie) came to a similar conclusion in an article 
on Tang Junyi and Xiong Shili published in 1979, when he critically remarked that “ . . . 
[r]eading the writings of Mr. Tang, . . . I feel that they are suffused by literary and poetic 
sense rather than strict logical reasoning.”; quoted from: Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi 
on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral Life: A Comparative Study, p. 297.
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he wanted to slow his readers down and draw them deeper into a meditation 
on the text, or to at least provide his readers with a first-hand experience of his 
own struggle with language as an inadequate vehicle for a speculation about 
intuition. Viewed from this perspective, both reading and writing seem to be 
part of a philosophical-meditational practice of self-fulfillment. The fact that 
Tang’s writings abound with frequent and tedious rephrasing of statements 
substantiates this assumption.
Moreover, it is conceivable that he wanted to express, at a formal level, his 
suspicion of modern scientific civilization: his allusive, allegorical, at times 
obscure writing style should serve as an antidote to modern tendencies to reify 
human existence under conditions of instrumental rationality and, accord-
ingly, to restrict the human mind. We can furthermore assume that Tang tried 
to bring the form (style) of his writings into complete accordance with his 
basic philosophical intention in this way. He apparently aimed for a totality 
of authentic expression by creating a type of philosophical exposition which 
generated a coherence between philosophy and intuition, not only in terms of 
their content, but also in formal and linguistic respects. Such coherence could 
not, as we have seen, take the form of a conceptual (Western) philosophical 
language. The quest for authenticity here refers, first of all, to the philosopher 
who, by aiming at an intuitive insight, relativizes conceptual claims to truth 
and thereby tacitly acknowledges linguistic and terminological ambiguity. This 
in turn accords with the peculiarities of Chinese philosophy as Tang identified 
them. He contended that the language of Chinese philosophy “merely” fulfills 
the function of a makeshift bridge between the existential and spiritual realm. 
After the bridge is crossed, it is “transcended.” Theoretical/philosophical reflec-
tion, in other words, has no exclusive claim to truth. It is as provisional as other 
truth claims. Besides using language of a “theoretical nature,” Chinese philoso-
phers, according to Tang, also placed great importance on a “literary” language 
and the forms of philosophical dialogues and letters.73
73   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 420–421. In the course of a recent dis-
cussion about whether some of Tang’s works should be “rewritten” in a more accessible 
style, as Wu Rujun has suggested, Zhao Jingbang quotes a passage from Tang’s Rensheng 
zhi tiyan that indicates the quasi-soteriological function of language in Tang’s work. Tang 
states that in his “written language” (wenzi 文字), he deliberately let “the margins of 
the realm of li 理 become enveloped in fog.” He apparently believed that his writings 
were thus “even richer in evocativeness and guiding [function],” which in turn caused 
his “spirit” ( jingshen 精神), upon reading his own texts, to “ascend to this realm of li 
with even more ease.” See Zhao, “Dui Wu Rujun xiansheng jianyi chongxie Tang Junyi 
xiansheng zhuzuo de yi xie fansi,” pp. 119–120.
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A further attempt to integrate form and content can be detected on the level 
of terminology in Tang’s thought. In Tang’s usage, zhexue, as we have seen, has 
a very broad scope, comprising Chinese, Indian and Western traditions. This 
notion of zhexue has repercussions on the philosophical vocabulary in Tang’s 
texts. Hence, we find passages where Tang paralleled neologisms and terms 
from pre-modern Chinese thought to denote the same notion, for example 
juedui 絕對 / tian li 天理 as a pair within the semantic field of the absolute. 
In other instances, he indicated the flexibility of the Chinese philosophical 
vocabulary by using the same Chinese word for different philosophical notions 
(Western or Chinese), depending on its use as terminology for the translation 
of Western philosophy, or as terms stemming from pre-modern Chinese phi-
losophy. This holds also true for the core concept of liang zhi. Tang introduced 
several terms to delineate his notion of intuition, but he clearly singled out the 
term liang zhi. With the use of liang zhi, he explicitly referred to the thought of 
Wang Yangming and his followers. In fact, he considered the theory of liang zhi 
to be at the center of Wang’s philosophy,74 which he described as the climax of 
the Mencian theory of human nature.75
Tang himself was reluctant to translate liang zhi into English, refusing to 
use the common English translation “innate knowledge” and relying, instead, 
on the transliteration “liang-chih.”76 The terminological difficulties do not end 
here, since Tang, in his discussion of British philosophy, translates the term 
“conscience,” apparently without hesitation, as liang zhi in Chinese. Yet, this 
should not be taken as a hint to, conversely, translate liang zhi in the context 
of Confucian philosophy simply as “conscience.” The ambiguities surrounding 
Tang’s references to liang zhi in Chinese and English serve as a reminder that 
his philosophical vocabulary is highly stratified and open to complex cross-
references.77 Perhaps unsatisfied with the transliteration “liang-chih,” but 
unable to coin an adequate English translation, Tang proposed several English 
expressions as equivalents. Obviously, the results of his effort failed to con-
vince even himself—rightfully so, one may add, as his translations indeed offer 
74   Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to 
Wang Chi,” p. 188. On the topic of “liang zhi,” Tang recommended Mou Zongsan’s Wang 
Yangming zhi zhi liang zhi zhi jiao 王陽明之致良知之教: Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi 
chongjian, p. 587.
75   Tang, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy” [1968], p. 6.
76   See his remarks in Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang 
Yang-ming to Wang Chi,” p. 188.
77   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 2, index p. 39; see also Tang, “The Development of the Concept 
of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang Chi.”
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little help. Some of these translations even create new problems, for example 
the highly interpretative translation of liang zhi as “consciousness of li” (理). 
First of all, in the semantic field of intuition, the term “consciousness” must be 
understood in a very broad sense (namely, designating a state of mind where 
the distinction of subject and object is not present). Furthermore, Tang cre-
ated more translation problems with his use of another transliteration (li).78 
The same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of other translations of liang zhi 
into English introduced by Tang in various of his writings: “conscientious con-
sciousness of mind”;79 “original-good-conscientiousness” (a translation which 
should express, according to Tang, the fact that liang zhi was not just “original 
knowing,” but also has a derivational meaning of “good,” and is always “sensi-
tive” towards “values of good”) and “original-good-conscientious-knowing”;80 
Tang also proposed “moral consciousness” and “being of the moral mind” as 
possible translations, hence positioning liang zhi unmistakably in the field of 
moral philosophy.81
Tang’s struggle with a conceptual fixation of liang zhi seems to be less a 
matter of a struggle with language than about language and its limitations 
for discerning the inner workings of intuition. Consequently, he tried to coin 
adequate terms not only in English. As for Chinese terms introduced by him 
to refer to liang zhi, they also serve as testimony of his difficulties to concep-
tualize it. We find, for example, the following terms relating to Tang’s idea of 
intuition: “the wisdom (zhihui 智慧) of realizing metaphysical reality;”82 or 
just the “absolute . . . cognition ( juedui 絕對 . . . zhishi 知識).”83 Neither zhihui 
nor zhishi adequately convey Tang’s understanding of liang zhi as intuition in 
actu. More helpful for a tentative conceptual approach to liang zhi are per-
haps the following: “immediate awareness;”84 to “realize” the “metaphysical 
reality of absolute mind and pattern;”85 and “to know” “mind” and “[human] 
78   Tang, “The Spirit and Development of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 80.
79   Ibid., p. 79.
80   Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang 
Chi,” p. 188.
81   Tang, “The Spirit and Development of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 80.
82   Tihui xingshang shizai zhi zhihui 體會形上實在之智慧: Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode 
lixing, p. 367.
83   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 359.
84   Zhi jue 直覺: Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 363 and Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi 
chongjian, p. 567.
85   Tihui 體會, juedui de xin yu li zhi xingshang shizai 絕對的心與理之形上實在: Tang, 
Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 365; see also: “to realize” (tihui), “this mind” (ci xin 此心) 
and “this pattern” (ci li 此理) Ibid., p. 366.
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nature.”86 As we have seen, Tang called the spiritual state in which the human 
being is prepared to attain intuition the “void potency and bright awareness of 
the mind.”87 The terms xu ling 虛靈 (void potency) and ming jue 明覺 (bright 
awareness) also figure in Wang Yangming’s reflection on intuition to indi-
cate that the immediacy of intuition is “void” insofar as intuition is neither 
bound to sensory perception, nor restricted to other modes of experience.88 
Significantly, the original state, in which Heaven is in motionless self-identity, 
is often referred to in the neo-Confucian vocabulary as the “great void” (tai xu 
太虛). The dynamic notion of an identity of Heaven and human mind in the 
act of intuition requires the human mind, according to Wang Yangming, to 
achieve a state of “great void” in which it is able to attain intuition.89
Like Wang Yangming before him, Tang used allegorical language to describe 
the process of intuition. Allegories of light play a particularly important role, 
as Tang took up two allegories from Wang Yangming’s Chuan xi lu, one depict-
ing eyesight, the other sunlight.90 In his analysis of these two allegories, Tang 
introduced the conceptual pair of substance and function, but without any 
intention of proposing a definition of the absolute as a substance in the sense 
of an ontological difference between substance and function. The absolute is 
said to manifest itself in a permanent process of becoming, which creates all 
reality, but this is not meant to imply that substance precedes its own mani-
festation (or functions). On the contrary, the terms “substance” and “function” 
apply to the idea that substance and function are inseparable in the ongoing, 
permanent manifestation of the absolute itself. Similarly to the “substance” 
of eyesight, which does not simply exist as eyesight as such, but only in its 
“function” of perceiving colors, the “substance of the mind” (xin zhi benti 
86   Zhi 知, xin 心, xing 性: Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 371.
87   Xin zhi xu ling ming jue 心之虛靈明覺: Ibid., p. 363.
88   Wang, Chuan xi lu, p. 477 (Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian 
Writings by Wang Yang-ming: III.274): xu ling; and p. 334 (ibid., III.174): ming jue.
89   Wang, ibid., p. 472 (Chan, ibid.: II.269).
90   Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang 
Chi,” pp. 189, 194. Tang’s references to 3.19 (allegory of sunlight) and 2.19 (allegory of eye-
sight) are based on an edition the Chuan xi lu from 1917 (Shanghai) which I have not been 
able to cross-check. His reference to “3.19” is probably identical with Wang, Chuan xi lu, 
p. 486 (Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang 
Yang-ming: III.282) according to the prevalent arrangement of the text. I was not able to 
locate the allegory of eyesight.
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心之本體)—i.e. the “pattern of Heaven”91—exists inasmuch as the mind man-
ifests itself in liang zhi.92 The allegory of sunlight also illustrates this notion 
of substance: where there is light, there is a sun. Accordingly, the absolute is 
referred to as the “substance of liang-chih’s substance”—in other words as the 
“substance” of a human mind attaining liang zhi.93
As the absolute emerges in the human mind by shining into it, liang zhi 
manifests itself as a vision or illumination in the mind that takes the form of 
intuition in actu, i.e. of a “happening” (shi 事).94 At the same time, the absolute 
recognizes itself in the light which shines into the mind: Liang zhi, therefore, 
is “the self-illumination and self-consciousness of the pattern of Heaven.”95 In 
this “self-illumination and self-consciousness” of the absolute, human cogni-
tion is achieved as an immediate and affective unity of appearance and insight. 
This does not mean that the human mind passively “sees” or conceptualizes 
the absolute. After all, the latter cannot be objectified or therefore take the 
form of an image or a concept. Tang himself explicitly attested to the inad-
equacy of language to give expression to the absolute and consequently paid 
only scarce attention to related terminological distinctions.96
The human being’s vision of the absolute is itself a phenomenon of the 
absolute’s manifestation. Instead of conceptualizing the absolute, the human 
spirit should therefore try to apprehend it by intuitively taking part in it. Such 
91   See Wang, Chuan xi lu, pp. 27 (Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-
Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming: I.8), 174–175 (ibid., I.122).
92   Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang 
Chi,” p. 194. The idea that colors are not properties existing independently of perception 
was neither for Wang Yangming nor for Tang Junyi a matter of discussion, but one may 
suppose that both of them would have agreed with this idea; see also the famous allegory 
in the Chuan xi lu: Wang, Chuan xi lu, p. 479 (Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and 
other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming: III.275).
93   Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang 
Chi,” p. 189.
94   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 380.
95   Tang, “The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang 
Chi,” p. 188. The expression “the self-illumination and self-consciousness of the principles 
of Heaven” is not my translation. The corresponding Chinese expression is tian li zhi zhao 
ming ling jue 天理之照明靈覺. This is an interesting case for questions concerning lin-
guistic analysis of Tang’s philosophical language. Tang obviously agreed with this transla-
tion, and thus with the interpretation of zhao ming and ling jue as reflexive expressions 
(“self-”).
96   On this see William Ng’s study about Tang’s Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie: Ng, “T’ang 
Chun-i on Transcendence: Foundations of a New-Confucian Religious Humanism,” p. 296.
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 participation results, according to Tang, from a complete actualization of “rea-
son” (lixing 理性). This entails a “transcending of self-awareness” on the part of 
the human being. In his use of the Chinese term lixing for “reason,” Tang explic-
itly stated that reason in the sense of lixing is not to be reduced to the func-
tion of a “universal lawgiver,” since it transcends human self- consciousness. 
He then suggested that the term liang zhi may be used instead of lixing.97 By 
equating lixing with the non-conceptual and quasi transrational liang zhi, 
Tang obviously negated any identification of lixing / “reason” with a calculating 
and instrumental type of rationality. Here, Tang’s thought is in general agree-
ment with a popular critique of the European Enlightenment’s philosophical 
naturalism and its concept of rationality. Charles Taylor regards this criticism 
of the “disengaged reason” of enlightenment as one of the main aspects of 
German, French and British Romanticism; it seems reasonable to add modern 
Confucianism to this list.98
 The Limit-Concepts of “Philosophical Faith”
Judging from Tang’s taxonomy of knowledge, the mind aspires to overcome 
its own limitations in all areas of human cognition, either directly or indi-
rectly, consciously or unconsciously. The arrangement of this taxonomy fol-
lows the pattern of a spiritual and intellectual endeavor which, ideally, would 
lead a human being to his or her spiritual self-fulfillment. The underlying 
idea of this taxonomy—namely an increasing detachment of the human 
mind from finite states and from conditional knowledge—is very likely the 
97   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 379–380. The term “lixing” is highly ambivalent in 
the context of modern Confucianism and it is sometimes difficult to determine whether 
Tang was using it as neologism (thus referring to Western philosophical vocabularies 
of reason/rationality) or in relation to the semantic field of “liang zhi” indicated above. 
In the second preface to his Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason, Tang explained 
that lixing was the equivalent of what the Chinese Confucians called “xing li 性理.” He 
equated it with the “original substance” (ben zhi 本質) or “selfhood” (zi ti 自體) of the 
moral self, spiritual self and transcendent self; see Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, 
(author’s second preface), p. 19.
98   Consider the following quote from Taylor’s Sources of the Self: “The Romantic order, in 
contrast, was not organized on principles which could be grasped by disengaged reason. 
Its principle of order was not exoterically available. Rather it was itself an enigma, and 
one could only understand it fully by participating in it.” Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 380; 
see also pp. 382–384.
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result of Buddhist inspiration.99 Tang referred to this spiritual endeavor as the 
attainment of “transcendental spirituality” leading the human mind towards 
 intuition.100 This endeavor is part of a multifaceted practice which is thought 
to lead to the full actualization of the human being’s spiritual nature. Tellingly, 
Tang inscribed the notion of the sage onto the “spirit of practice” of Chinese 
philosophy, contrasting it to what he perceived as the mainstream of Western 
 philosophy.101 Hence, the longing of Chinese philosophers to reach beyond the 
conceptually knowable world and its corresponding orders of knowledge is 
supposedly particularly strong.
Such an understanding of philosophy highlights the “effort” (gongfu 工夫) 
to recover the “wholeness” of a “harmonious human existence” by striving 
to connect diverse types of knowledge. This orientation towards the existen-
tial dimension of philosophy, by the way, stands in stark contrast to the criti-
cism that modern Confucianism is overly theoretical and lofty (see Chap. 3: 
“Dogmatism”). In fact, the outlook of Tang’s modern Confucianism is in line 
with, and was perhaps influenced by, the concept of philosophy presented by 
Rudolf Eucken and other philosophers of life from the early 20th century. Even 
though Eucken did not devise a civil theology, he placed great emphasis on the 
existential dimension of philosophical thought and highlighted the respon-
sibility of philosophy to function as a form of intellectual engagement with 
social reality.102 For Tang, too, philosophy is not a purely intellectual effort. It 
is also a teaching which ultimately aims to “thread together” the processes of 
“cognition” (zhi 知) and “action” (xing 行) in an act of intuition whereby the 
ultimate reality reveals itself. It is thus hardly surprising that Tang introduced 
the term “philosophical faith” (zhexue de xinyang) in this context.103 The self-
realization of the absolute in intuition, however, is not perforce  conditioned 
99   Metzger’s observation on the influence of the idea of pan jiao 判教 (i.e. the division of 
Buddha’s teachings) on Tang’s arrangement of different philosophical ideas seems to con-
firm this interpretation; see Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific, pp. 229–230.
100   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 361.
101   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 469.
102   Zhang Junmai had visited Eucken for four months in Jena in 1920 and published a German 
book entitled Das Lebensproblem in China und Europa together with Eucken in 1922. On 
Zhang Junmai’s relation to Eucken, see Fröhlich, Staatsdenken im China der Republikzeit 
(1912–1949). Die Instrumentalisierung philosophischer Ideen bei chinesischen Intellektuellen, 
pp. 140, 151, 165. On Eucken’s concept of philosophy, see Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in 
Deutschland. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte, pp. 182–186. 
103   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 21, pp. 27, 32–33.
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by philosophy, but may occur spontaneously, i.e. without prior philosophical 
reflection and without explicit (philosophical) faith.
Whereas the historian of philosophy can conduct research without per-
sonally “believing” in any philosophy, the “true philosopher,” as Tang added 
in an autobiographical reference, must have such philosophical faith and a 
“spiritual attitude of [taking] responsibility,” especially when he or she is not 
blessed with living in peaceful times. Otherwise, the philosopher will be noth-
ing more than a “wandering ghost” (you hun 游魂).104 In a personal retrospec-
tion of his own work, Tang elaborated on the responsibility of the philosopher 
and emphatically declared that the value of philosophy has to be found in its 
capacity to assist individuals who wish to restore their faith by overcoming 
their doubts.105 Tang’s enthusiasm was almost delirious when he proclaimed 
that a philosopher must have a soteriological intention of redeeming the 
world and should strive for his or her own awakening as well as that of other 
human beings.106 Here, Tang’s idea of philosophy as a way of life points to a 
moral dimension. From this perspective, he discussed moral intuition which 
is simultaneously present as moral behavior. Through intuition, the human 
being apprehends “original moral principles” in the form of principles which 
are given to it as moral orders that in turn effectuate simultaneous moral con-
duct. In contrast to moral intuition, discursive moral philosophy has its ori-
gin at the very point of a discontinuity, or a “break” (duan 斷), between moral 
truth and moral cognition or between moral truth and conduct—in other 
words: moral philosophy is necessary where moral intuition is not accessible. 
Moral philosophy ideally evokes, according to Tang, original moral principles, 
which then become visible in the derived form of “principles of concrete 
existence.”107 In that sense, moral philosophy is quintessentially the quest for 
a discursive recovery of moral truth, and at the same time a form of spiritual 
exercise to recover the individual’s original moral sensitivity.108 It seems that 
Tang had in mind an enhancement of moral sensitivity through a continuous 
104   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 562–563.
105   Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, p. 493.
106   Ibid., p. 519. Tang was convinced that those who conduct philosophical research in a 
strictly academic manner also fulfill an important task. Yet, by academically pondering 
philosophical problems, they set only themselves, and nobody else “at peace:” ibid.
107   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 371.
108   On Tang’s description of a moral way of life as characterized by continuous moral self-
examination of the individual: see ibid., pp. 521–522.
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effort of the individual which would thus further develop a disposition to act 
morally.109
The theological twist of this endeavor is explicitly stated by Tang when he 
identified faith as the root of ethics: “In the Chinese style [of ethics], the source 
of the moral mind is the belief in the humaneness (ren 仁) of human nature 
as the humaneness of the way of Heaven.”110 He further reflected, in a general 
manner, on the necessity of religious faith with respect to sustaining moral 
efforts:
We hence need to believe that behind and above all the irrationalities 
which we cannot but bear there should be an absolutely reasonable oth-
erworld, a universal divine being. This otherworld or divine being is the 
source of our reasonable moral efforts, and it is also the highest guaran-
tee for their authenticity, and the setting place of all moral efforts. It is 
this otherworld or divine being wherein the human being’s metaphysical 
true nature and true spirit exists.111
Tang apparently did not take this claim to mean that religious faith is the cause 
of morality, but rather the anchorage or foundation of morality (if not in the 
Kantian sense). In terms of moral practice, the idea of moral intuition belongs 
to the same category as the related notion of the sage (who serves as a symbol 
of moral intuition): the status of these notions in Tang’s philosophy is that of a 
positive limit-concept. Although Tang never explicitly referred to the notions 
of the sage and moral intuition as “limit-concepts,” he indeed ascribed to them 
a limiting and orienting function with respect to the religious dimension of 
Confucianism, but also to its political, social and moral dimensions. As posi-
tive limit-concepts they are neither completely outside of historical and social 
reality nor fully inside. Or as Tang writes in a typically allusive description:
The realization of liang-chih is a way to sagehood because every man has 
it in himself to be a sage. We could even say that in the depth of every 
man’s heart there lies hidden a sage waiting to be revealed when the 
closed door of the mind is opened.112
109   It is in this sense that Tang’s following statement might be understood: The “origin” of 
moral judgment is “moral wisdom” and it is displayed in “moral practice:” Tang, Renwen 
jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 585.
110   Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, p. 109.
111   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 313.
112   Tang, “The Spirit and Development of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 82.
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Sages are, then, neither god-like figures dwelling in a sphere beyond reality nor 
hermits living outside of the human community. Nor do they directly intervene 
in the human world as benevolent and wise rulers (as many philosophers from 
the Confucian tradition would have it). For individual members of different 
types of human communities, including the political community, the notion 
of the sage is accessible as an orienting prescription for a paradigmatic human 
being. Yet the sages will never appear in the guise of saintly historical figures, 
moral teachers, virtuous politicians, benevolent social leaders, or model intel-
lectuals. Sagehood, in other words, is an elusive state of the absolute’s instan-
taneous realization, and neither a form of social existence nor reflective of 
a superior type of moral or ethical deliberation. In turning the notion of the 
sage into a positive limit-concept here, Tang moved beyond the mainstream 
of Confucian traditions—and possibly without being guided by any other 
tradition.113
With his depiction of the sage as a paradigmatic figure, Tang had no inten-
tion of reducing the sage to a mere rational construct of the human mind. The 
notion of the sage is not a negative limit-concept that functions, in the Kantian 
sense, to relieve human reason from the burden of engaging in futile efforts 
to reach beyond the knowable. On the contrary, Tang insisted that everyone 
may instantaneously become a sage, even though this may not constitute a 
permanent state of social existence. While someone arguing from within the 
framework of neo-Confucian concepts of sagehood might presume that this 
distinction indeed means that “one could argue that sagehood was irrelevant,”114 
Tang’s modern Confucianism takes this distinction as a crucial element for 
developing renewed conceptualizations of politics, ethics and religiosity.
Given that the immediacy of a (moral) intuition in actu forgoes any symbolic 
representation of knowledge, insight or cognition, sagehood as understood in 
terms of intuition cannot constitute a state of cultivation or education. There 
is a fundamental gap between the cultural and educational praxis of individual 
self-fulfillment, on the one hand, and the instantaneous spiritual transforma-
113   Lao Sze-kwang believes that Tang, as well as Mou Zongsan, devised “limiting concepts” 
with respect to the perfectibility of the human being, but failed under Buddhist influ-
ence to distinguish between limiting concepts and “goal concepts” (i.e. positive concepts 
of something that can be actually achieved in social reality). Lao, who hardly gives any 
evidence to support his assumption of Buddhist influence, in fact means negative limit-
concepts by “limiting concepts”. Lao merely alludes here to the Buddhist idea of a “com-
prehensive doctrine” (yuan jiao 圓教); see Lao Siguang (Lao Sze-kwang), “Cong Tang 
Junyi Zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan Zhongguo zhexue de weilai,” p. 25.
114   Angle, Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy, p. 26.
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tion into a sage, on the other. The consequence of this gap becomes particularly 
evident when Tang ascertains that one can actually attain an immediate real-
ization (liang zhi) without actual awareness of having attained it.115 The dis-
cursive inaccessibility of intuition itself impedes the individual’s recounting of 
the intuition, and, literally, his or her ability to come to terms with it. Tellingly, 
Tang stated that the many efforts of what is often summarily addressed as “self-
cultivation” are indeed situated as such outside of the “realm” of the sage:
. . . the final realm of the way of learning [to become] a sage . . . is attained 
without effort and reached without thinking.116
One who achieves the full development of his moral life or the re-
alization of the essence of his moral nature ( jen) is called a sage in 
Confucianism. In the sage mind, there is no borderline of differentia-
tion between the fully developed mind and the universe, and this kind 
of mind can be taken as both originated from the sage-man and revealed 
from Heaven. (. . .) The idea of “universal attainability of [being a] sage” 
itself may be taken as a metaphysical belief, since no empirical verifica-
tion in the ordinary sense can be found.117
In contrast to human beings who cannot live in a continuous state of intuition 
(which would mean that they stay in an infinite realm beyond any discursive 
forms of communication and also beyond any symbolic representation), the 
sage belongs to an elusive, immediate presence. The salient characteristic of 
a sage is thus not a form of discursive wisdom, but his or her intuitive access 
to the “sublime realm” (shengshen zhi yu 聖神之域) of “knowing Heaven.”118 A 
society populated by sages is consequently not within the reach of human his-
tory, and any hope that the sages could be saviors of the human world is as vain 
as it is misguided:
115   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 463.
116   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 380. “ . . . attained without effort and reached with-
out thinking” is a quote from The Doctrine of the Mean 20.18. Tang also referred here to the 
“worthy person,” but makes no distinction between the sage and the worthy, thus placing 
the latter in the realm of the former.
117   Tang, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy” [1959], p. 33.
118   Tang explicitly ascribed this notion to the “orthodox school of Chinese metaphysics” 
(Zhongguo xingshangxue zhi zhengzong 中國形上學之正宗): Tang, Zhexue gailun, 
Vol. 22, p. 374.
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But no matter how men [engage in their moral] refinement and cultiva-
tion, and no matter how they remake their [actual] conditions, in the 
end, they can neither enable everyone to become sages and worthies, nor 
have their [own] conditions conform completely to [their] ideals. There 
will always remain many things which can neither be transformed nor 
reached through human strength. It is for this reason that the opposition 
between the irrational and moral ideals will still persist.119
Tang emphatically asserted that even if all the sages, from antiquity to the pres-
ent, were to appear in the contemporary world, they would still not be able to 
save the world, because they do not wield power themselves, but exist solely 
in the mind of all people. Any hope that sages can or will intervene in histori-
cal reality is therefore futile. What is needed instead is the willingness of the 
people to orientate their actions toward the sage’s path.120 This is why Tang 
refrained from calling a society which is not governed by the moral intuition 
of the sages a manifestation of human failure. These limit-concepts, then, do 
not cause a “predicament” of imminent and constant failure, even though the 
sage and moral intuition are in fact beyond the reach of individuals and col-
lectivities. Their grip on praxis is not destructive in the sense that they install 
standards and convey expectations for human behavior which cannot actu-
ally be met. Therefore, one cannot agree with Thomas Metzger when he stated 
that Tang “conceptualized praxis as a resolute ‘inner’ effort to implement 
 ideals . . .”121—such a narrow concept of praxis would permanently damage 
social reality since it would be seen solely from the perspective of unfulfilled 
“ideals.” With his notion of limit-concepts, Tang exactly avoided this strangula-
tion of praxis by overwhelming ideals.122
Neither the sage nor moral intuition are “ideals” in the strict Kantian sense. 
In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant exemplarily cites the notion of the sage in 
Stoicism when stating that ideals have a practical function. According to Kant, 
ideals are relevant in praxis insofar as they function like “regulative princi-
ples,” which means that they serve as a standard for actions (“Richtmaß von 
Handlungen”), albeit without prescribing specific rules for moral conduct.123 
119   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 312.
120   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 429.
121   Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific, p. 191.
122   It is, by the way, no coincidence that social figures such as the worthy (xian 賢) or the 
noble man ( junzi 君子), who mark distinct stages on the path to sagehood in many 
Confucian traditions, are largely absent from Tang’s modern Confucianism.
123   Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 549–550.
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Tang assumed in the same vein that the notions of the sage and moral intuition 
have practical relevance, but his limit-concepts do not function as standards for 
actions. The insights gained by intuition are unforeseeable after all, and cannot 
serve as a standard for decision-making. Instead, Tang’s limit-concepts fulfill 
their practical, regulative function by delineating and stabilizing an ethos of 
individual self-fulfillment. This entails another important difference between 
Tang’s limit-concepts and Kant’s ideals: Whereas Tang wanted the individual 
to believe that the goal of becoming a sage is, in principle, attainable, Kant not 
only declares that those who uphold an ideal should keep in mind that they 
will not be able to fully realize it, but adds that any attempt to do so will harm 
and weaken the ideal, because the inevitable failure to implement it would 
eventually make people believe that the ideal was illusory and without practi-
cal relevance.124 Suffice to say that Tang’s limit-concepts have even less in com-
mon with Kant’s “pure concepts of reason” than they have with Kant’s notion 
of an ideal.125 
124   Ibid.
125   “God,” according to Kant, is a pure concept of reason, which means that reason needs 
such a notion of “an absolutely necessary being” (“absolut notwendige[s] Wesen”) to 
regulate the intellect. But the fact that reason needs the idea of “God” is of course not 
to be mistaken as a proof of an “objective reality” of god—it is, after all, a “mere idea” 
(“bloße Idee”): ibid., p. 567. Concepts of reason, or “ideas,” find their symbolic objectifica-
tion, according to Kant, in “ideals” which function, as mentioned above, as a yardstick or 
standard for action, see Baruzzi, “Kant,” pp. 152–153.
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The differences in the practical philosophy of Kant and Tang Junyi go beyond the 
Kantian concepts of ideals and regulative ideas, on the one hand, and positive 
Confucian limit-concepts, on the other. Contrary to Kant’s deontological moral 
philosophy, Tang’s moral thought cannot be categorized as an ethics based on 
principles. Understanding his moral thought as “moral intuitionism,” however, 
offers a sufficient point of departure. Yet this should not belie the fact that 
Tang did not elaborate a full-fledged moral theory. After all, we do not find 
a comprehensive meta-ethical discussion about methodological issues in his 
writings on moral philosophy. Tang, though, dealt with practical ethics in more 
than just a pedestrian way.1 Notwithstanding these reservations, we may first 
relate his moral philosophy to theories of moral realism, and, in a following 
step, to moral intuitionism. This will shed some light on implicit assumptions 
in Tang’s moral thought which pertain to the issue of moral truth, its relation 
to reality, and the lingering question of moral subjectivism and irrationalism.
According to David McNaughton, moral realism is best understood in terms 
of several different assumptions,2 all of which can be found, with some modifi-
cations, in Tang’s moral thought. First of all, there is the claim that moral real-
ity exists independently of human ideas, opinions, and perceptions. Moral 
values as elements of an independent moral reality can thus be detected or 
discovered, without the need to construct them philosophically. This assump-
tion is indeed in line with Tang’s notion of the absolute moral reality of the 
“moral nature of Heaven” (daode de tian xing 道德的天性).3 In discussing 
“spiritual values,” Tang insinuated that even though values can be discovered, 
the role of the human being is not restricted to that of a passive recipient of 
pre-existing values. He hence  transformed Lincoln’s famous formula by stat-
1   On the tripartition of moral philosophy in practical ethics, moral theory and meta-ethics, see 
McNaughton, Moral Vision, pp. 15–16. Tang sketched out central topics of his moral thought 
in Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 515.
2   The following passages on moral realism draw on McNaughton, Moral Vision, pp. 4–5, 7–8, 17, 
24, 39–40, 51–52, 96.
3   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 62.
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ing that “spiritual values” are characterized by their threefold relation to the 
(human) mind: they are “by the spirit,” “for the spirit” and “of the spirit.” This 
somewhat enigmatic statement may be interpreted in different ways, but it 
seems safe to say that the human spirit is understood here as taking a more 
active part than merely contemplating the realm of values. One interpretation 
may run as follows: Spiritual values are detected and enacted “by the spirit,” 
inure to the benefit of the human mind (“for the spirit”), and cannot exist with-
out the participation of the human mind (“of the spirit”).4
According to Tang, human agency is essential in value-formation because 
even if values may originally belong to the realm of “Heaven”—a point which 
is not entirely clarified by Tang—the realization of values hinges on the par-
ticipation of human agency.5 Inasmuch as liang zhi is not identical with mere 
contemplation but amounts to an intuition in actu, values are not just objects 
of contemplation, for they must be enacted in order to become real. Such 
enactment by liang zhi is not a matter of a human subject implementing some 
transcendent value-objects, because liang zhi takes place as an intuition that is 
not structured by a subject-object relation. The human mind cannot grasp the 
absolute moral reality of “Heaven” by objectifying it, but only by partaking in 
its realization as a sage.
Tang, however, is not in agreement with an important qualification of moral 
realism introduced by McNaughton. Even if we were to assume that moral real-
ity exists independently of human ideas and perceptions, McNaughton points 
out that human beings’ apprehension of moral reality still cannot be sepa-
rated from their respective world views. An immediate perception of moral 
reality is, in other words, unattainable. In contrast to such a view, modern 
Confucianism’s notion of liang zhi assumes that human beings have the capac-
ity to attain a moral intuition which equals an immediate apprehension of an 
absolute moral reality (i.e. the “moral nature of Heaven”). It is on this premise 
4   See Tang, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” pp. 1–2.
5   It is this premise which must be taken into account when examining Tang’s concept of value 
according to which whole categories of values such as moral and aesthetical values are in 
fact attributes of “nature” (ziran 自然). Tang even claimed that this assumption about values 
is a crucial feature of Chinese culture in general, and a focal point of distinction between 
Chinese and early modern Western cultures (see Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 
pp. 107–108). He characterized values (as well as virtues [de 德 or dexing 德性]) as a capac-
ity within “events and things” (shi wu 事物) to mutually affect each other to the effect of 
enabling development and growth. The partaking of the human spirit in the realization of 
the moral nature of Heaven is thus to be understood as the highest form of such interaction; 
see Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi pp. 106, 110–112.
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that Tang labeled his brand of Confucian moral thought an “absolute idealism” 
( juedui weixin lun) or “moral idealism” (daode weixinlun 道德唯心論).6 But he 
did so, as we have seen, in the context of his explicit intention to move from 
such idealism to a “transcendent realism” (chaoyue shizai lun), or some sort of 
synthesis of the two.
Based on the idea that moral reality exists independently of human ideas 
and perceptions, moral realists conclude that reality can function as the crite-
rion of moral truth. Standards of moral truth are hence non-conventional, that 
is, independent of opinions, linguistic specifications etc. Propositions about 
moral right and wrong are thus seen as truth-apt in principle. Tang’s vision 
of Confucianism is basically in line with this tenet of moral realism. What is 
more, Tang’s moral thought shares similarities with the non-naturalistic type 
of moral realism represented by G.E. Moore, who held that moral properties 
cannot be described as natural properties. Moore characterized the identifica-
tion of moral propositions with descriptions of natural properties as a natural-
istic fallacy. Tang would have agreed with Moore that the meaning of “good” 
cannot be apprehended by a linguistic description, but only by an immedi-
ate perception, that is, an intuition. He therefore equated liang zhi with the 
“self of moral reason” (daode lixing zhi ziwo 道德理性之自我) calling the latter 
the “self which is able to judge the good and the non-good of our acts; [it is the 
self which] makes the good perfect and detests the non-good.”7 For Tang, as 
for Moore, the concept of moral good defies a language-based definition 
as much as the meaning of a color cannot be apprehended without a sensual 
perception.8
In conclusion, Tang’s moral intuitionism holds a minor position within 
moral realism. This is mainly due to his assumption that absolute moral truth 
can be attained by an intuition which is in principle independent of world 
views and sensual perception. Significantly, Tang had no intention of accom-
modating Western strands of moral intuitionism, a moral theory which is also 
outside of the mainstream of moral philosophy. Even though Tang was familiar 
with G.E. Moore, Nicolai Hartmann, and Max Scheler, to name but a few expo-
nents of moral intuitionism (some of whom had been discussed also by Zhang 
6   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 368.
7   Ibid., p. 531.
8   On Moore see Ricken, Allgemeine Ethik, pp. 66–68, 70–71.
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Junmai9), he explicitly stated his preference for Mencian moral thought when 
it came to moral intuitionism.10
In spite of this affinity for a non-Western tradition, Tang’s moral thought 
shares with Western moral realism and moral intuitionism not only the above-
mentioned features, but also the precarious assumption about the justifica-
tion of moral judgments. Specifically, if propositions about right and wrong 
have the status of propositions about an absolute moral truth gained by intu-
ition, there is no need to deliberate about moral judgments in the first place. 
In terms of the justification of moral judgments, it would suffice that those 
who claim to pronounce or enact the truth assert that they obtained it by intu-
ition. This has invited the criticism which blames moral intuitionism of being 
inherently irrational, subjectivist, and inaccessible to any moral philosophy 
that tries to justify its propositions in terms of inter-subjective reasoning. The 
reproof of subjectivism might be countered by the assertion that intuitionism 
does not in fact intend to establish the idea that moral truth is the result of sub-
jective perceptions or opinions, but claims, on the contrary, that moral truth is 
absolute. Yet this offers no solution to the problem of justification. Even if one 
were to accept the assertion that Confucian sages are capable of intuitively 
apprehending moral truth and that an ascription of moral judgment to sages 
may therefore serve as a justification, such a solution would be fundamentally 
flawed. This is because there is no comprehensive description of a sage which 
might, in turn, qualify claims to sagehood. The elusiveness of the sage is, after 
all, beyond description and bears silent witness to the moral vision of the sages 
9    Zhang identified Chinese ethics in general, including Mencian “theory of liang-chih,” as 
a sort of virtue ethics. He explained that “Chinese ethical theory” was focussing on issues 
of moral obligation and stipulated that judgments on moral obligation were to accord 
to “one’s own conscience” (p. 176). Mencian theory of liang-chih included, according 
to Zhang, ideas on how to attain liang-chih and the ability to pass sound judgment on 
one’s moral obligations (p. 178). When discussing the controversy between G.E. Moore 
and H.A. Prichard, whom Zhang called “an extreme intuitionist,” Zhang claimed that 
their controversy was about the question of “whether good or right is to be the funda-
mental concept of ethics,” with Moore insisting on “good,” Prichard and David Ross on 
“right” (pp. 180–182). With respect to Chinese (Mencian) ethics, Zhang concluded that 
they posited that “right and good being identical in their meaning, all controversy on 
this issue has been avoided.” The “Chinese intuitionists,” Zhang continued, would agree 
with Moore that the good “cannot be expressed in words,” while upholding the idea that 
“[g]ood consequences are but the natural result of right action” (pp. 182–183); see Chang 
(Zhang Junmai), “Mencius’ Theory of Liang-Chih and the Intuitive School of Ethics in 
Contemporary Britain.”
10   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 515–516.
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who are solitary bearers of moral truth. If sages were to participate in an open 
moral discourse, they would be indistinguishable from imposters.
The sagely mastery of moral intuition remains so elusive that it rejects any 
reference to the moral heroism of virtuous role models. Tang was certainly 
aware that moral heroism was prone to authoritarianism. Referring to elu-
sive “sages” in the context of moral judgment was thus not entirely without 
its benefits. All the same, his eschewal of the problem of moral justification is 
unsatisfying and seriously questions his concept of moral values, which plays 
an important role in his moral theory. If moral values are indeed to be seen 
as manifestations of intuition-based action, value-based activity would then 
appear to be ultimately grounded in a transrational (or irrational) realm of 
intuition free of deliberation. To be sure, as Hans Joas observes, there is now a 
broad consensus in philosophy that individuals do not acquire their personal 
value-orientation in a rational (deliberative) manner. To say that a person 
can deliberate about his or her choice of values and justify it in hindsight, is, 
after all, not the same as claiming that one’s value- orientation itself initially 
resulted from rational, deliberative choices.11 The illusion that an individual’s 
value-credo is the product of a rational selection and can therefore be “ratio-
nally” manipulated may be attractive to those who dream about cultural engi-
neering in modern society. Indeed, many proponents of Confucianism since 
the 20th century seem to share such an aspiration, often prescribing allegedly 
superior Confucian values for individuals in a modernizing Chinese society. 
Tang’s moral thought, however, did not lend itself to such a prescriptive cul-
tural objective (see below).
Tang’s moral intuitionism not only invites critical questions with regard to 
the justification of moral judgments. As a matter of fact, even the core concept 
of liang zhi is beset by ambiguity. When elaborating on the individual’s abil-
ity to autonomously pass moral judgment (“cognize out of itself” zi zhi 自知), 
Tang introduced three ways to attain moral judgment, namely “utilitarianism,” 
“rationalism,” and the “principle of liang zhi” (liang zhi zhuyi 良知主義). Yet 
he also claimed that these three modes of moral judgment actually form one 
single, tripartite position and that any autonomous moral judgment is to be 
called liang zhi.12 This seems to imply, first, that correct moral judgments are 
not an exclusive matter of liang zhi, and yet also, second, that any correct moral 
judgment can be made by liang zhi. In other words, while moral judgments of 
11   Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte, pp. 16, 22–23.
12   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 532–533. Tang related moral autonomy to the abil-
ity of the individual to consciously develop moral ideals that take effect as orders issued 
from and addressed to the self; see ibid., p. 520. Here, Tang insinuated that “moral ideals” 
may emerge in liang zhi.
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utilitarian or rationalist provenance may be confirmed or rejected by liang zhi, 
the opposite is not necessarily possible. There are thus moral judgments made 
by liang zhi that remain outside of the scope of utilitarianism or rationalism.
What is more, the scope of liang zhi cannot be defined.13 In Tang’s under-
standing, liang zhi is not restricted to moral intuition, but can also cover the 
intuitive apprehension of a hierarchy of values that are not moral in the nar-
row sense. Tang equated liang zhi with an immediate “awareness of values” 
that enables the individual to “acknowledge,” “confirm,” and “judge” the hierar-
chy of values with respect to “scientific, aesthetic, religious, political and eco-
nomic acts”—or even more generally “acts of human life and culture.”14 He 
claimed in this context that in an “initial step,” the “cognizing” (renshi 認識) 
and “realizing” (tiyan 體驗) of values is not a matter of reflection.15 There is, 
according to Tang, the example of the scientist who intuitively knows that in 
science the values of fame and wealth rank lower than the value of truth, and 
that the value of truth-seeking, in turn, ranks below the value of “stimulating” 
liang zhi in other people.16 This hierarchy of values is clearly in line with his 
taxonomy of knowledge and cognition. Still, the identification of liang zhi with 
an awareness of objectified values and hierarchies is problematic even from 
the point of view of Tang’s own intuitionism. The intuition in actu cannot, it 
would seem, yield objectified ideational units such as values, because the intu-
ition itself operates without subject-object relations.17
More problems arise here, none of which Tang addressed. It is doubtful, 
to say the least, whether the example of the scientist’s intuition may indeed 
be considered a matter of intuition. After all, there are explicit rules of con-
duct and ethics in the scientific profession which mandate the highest regard 
for the search for truth. Intuition, then, is not only unnecessary, but perhaps 
even precluded by such conventional ethics. Furthermore, the search for truth 
13   In fact, even with regard to moral intuition in the narrow sense, Tang did not offer a clear 
definition of the scope and contents of liang zhi. On the one hand, as we have seen, he 
equated moral intuition with an immediate apprehension of particular “original moral 
principles” and moral “orders;” on the other, he referred in the same context to “the 
entirety” of all moral values, which is apprehended “instantly” (by “self-consciousness” 
[zijue]): Tang, Daode ziwo zhi jianli, p. 92. For a discussion of Tang’s concept of “zijue” in 
this context, see Ng, “Tang Junyi’s Spirituality: Reflections on Its Foundation and Possible 
Contemporary Relevance,” pp. 386–387.
14   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 585.
15   Ibid., p. 380.
16   Ibid., p. 585.
17   This problem becomes even more obvious in a manuscript from 1972 which Tang 
marked—possibly for this reason—as “unfinished;” see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dan-
gjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 458–468.
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as the highest value of science may not be taken out of its historical context. 
Depending on the situation, science might consider values pertaining to the 
good—such as producing acceptable living conditions or the preservation of 
life—to be more important than the quest for truth.
These ambiguities notwithstanding, Tang’s moral thought points to what we 
may call, with some qualification, ethical pluralism. According to such  pluralism, 
correct moral judgments are not an exclusive matter of moral intuitionism, but 
can be attained by other forms of morality, too. Since moral intuition, after all, 
is not available to the individual as he or she may wish, non-intuitive moral 
theories are, in the meantime, virtually indispensable. They fulfill the interim 
double-function of providing moral judgment while at the same time increas-
ing the individuals’ moral sensitivity, which consequently enhances his or her 
ability to attain moral intuition. Given such a pluralistic outlook, any dogmatic 
claim to moral truth and to an ultimate justification of moral judgment is sus-
pended by the ever-pending confirmation through moral intuition. Moral theo-
ries and teachings that rely on discursive forms of moral justification all rest 
on an equal footing insofar as none of them may claim that they amount to 
an intuitive apprehension of an absolute moral truth. Based on Tang’s moral 
thought, then, discursively interacting individuals, who know their interlocu-
tors currently have no moral intuition, should acknowledge that there may be 
multiple acceptable moral theories on the mediate discursive level.
Here, ethical pluralism rests on a notion of contingency that is derived 
from Confucian civil theology: The moral judgments which are gained by intu-
ition are contingent insofar as they cannot be summoned at will, neither with 
regard to time or a given situation. The unpredictability inherent in intuition 
thus necessitates recourse to alternative forms of moral judgment in an indi-
vidual’s actual moral life, even though none of the judgments that are derived 
without intuition can assume ultimate authority, either in content or form. 
It suggests by itself that this civil-theological qualification of ethical plural-
ism has far-reaching theoretical consequences. First and foremost, those moral 
theories that reject the claim that moral propositions are truth-apt and that 
an ultimate justification of moral judgment is feasible or even desirable would 
certainly find it hard to agree to the civil-theological underpinnings of such an 
ethical pluralism.
 Struggling with “Self-Cultivation”
In Tang’s modern Confucianism, ethical pluralism is closely related to the 
issue of the individual’s striving for self-fulfillment as a sage. Because such 
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self-fulfillment culminates in an immediate apprehension of the absolute, no 
ethical teaching, fixed catalogue of virtues, values or practices is given prefer-
ence as the exclusive trajectory for sagehood. Such openness is obviously in 
accord with Tang’s taxonomical arrangement of spheres, forms, and applica-
tions of knowledge, which suggests that there are many different ways to real-
ize sagehood. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that moral reflection and 
moral practice play a particularly important role, even if the reasons for their 
accentuation are not always explicitly stated by Tang. He, indeed, refrained 
from providing his readers with a comprehensive explanation for why they 
should center on their development as moral persons when striving for sagely 
intuition. Even so, we still find scattered across Tang’s works traces of an expla-
nation, which points to fundamental assumptions about self-cultivation in the 
framework of Confucian civil theology.
In research on Confucianism, the term “self-cultivation” has become com-
mon currency when referring to ideas about the individual’s quest to real-
ize self-fulfillment in sagehood. Yet there is no term in Chinese that exactly 
matches the English word “self-cultivation.” This is not to say that there were 
no notions of self-cultivation in Confucian thought. Still, when using the term 
“self-cultivation” in the analysis of Tang’s thought, it is important to note that 
for Tang self-cultivation neither implies that becoming a sage is a cultural 
achievement resulting from self-improvement, nor that sagehood itself a state 
of culture. For those Confucian thinkers like Tang Junyi who conceived of sage-
hood as an intuitive communion with the absolute or the sublime, the ephem-
eral state of the sage is a result of the human being’s de-individualization and 
self-transcendence. As such, it is detached from “culture.” Self-cultivation—if 
one chooses to use this term—hence comprises the idea of a “cultural” prac-
tice that aims at overcoming or transcending itself. The limit-concept of the 
sage marks precisely this cleavage between the “cultural” practice of an indi-
vidual striving for self-fulfillment, on the one hand, and the non-individualistic 
spiritual reunion with “Heaven,” on the other.
With respect to this cleavage, it is significant that Tang and other proponents 
of modern Confucianism neither envisioned this reunion, nor its actual enact-
ment as a collective experience related to a cult, ceremony, or ritual. Although 
they agreed with the mainstream of neo-Confucian philosophers that “learn-
ing” to become a sage is not a mere intellectual task, but also includes, apart 
from ethical and aesthetical concerns, ritualistic and ceremonial knowledge 
and practice, they did not maintain that the culmination of such learning is to 
be achieved in a ritualistic or ceremonial context. Tang did not highlight the 
idea of ritualized, regular conduct with respect to liang zhi, but instead elab-
orated on the notion of one-way crossings leading to the realm of intuition. 
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There are, then, no overland roads that can be traversed back and forth. The 
self-cultivating practice, in other words, is certainly not technical in the narrow 
sense, because whatever measures may be applied toward this end, they will 
be dissolved in the sought-after realm (i.e. sagehood).
Sagehood is thus characterized by a transcendence of technical mastery 
and a suspension of the techniques of self-cultivation. The status of cultural 
activities in general is therefore precarious vis-à-vis sagehood, including the 
sphere of humanistic culture and the so-called “main current” of Chinese 
culture itself. As a consequence, Tang avoids any hypostasis of particular his-
torical cultures or cultural practices. He rather deems the human being to 
be culturally polymorphic, thus arguing in favor of cultural plurality. Against 
this backdrop, there is a strong tendency to relate the individual’s quest for 
self-fulfillment to a holistic notion of culture which encompasses not only 
ethics, education, religion, and the arts, but also individual dimensions such 
as a person’s moral preferences, spiritual outlook, and the molding of his or 
her character. In addition, “culture” pertains here to the realm of science, 
politics, economics, and law. Tang’s understanding of culture, as it is man-
ifest in self-cultivation, thus appears to have an explicit normative mean-
ing: In order to realize their individual selfhood and mold their personality, 
human beings need to consciously refer to and apply cultural standards and 
practices. Yet culture as a normative resource remains in a suspended state, 
because, as we have seen, the cultivated selfhood of the individual marks a 
mere interim state. Eventually, the realization of sagehood in liang zhi will 
elevate the human mind above and beyond any adhesion to the cultural exis-
tence of the empirical self. Culture, in the end, becomes a self-suspending 
means of the individual’s spiritual self-transcendence.
Individual acts of self-cultivation serve, first of all, to mediate between a 
human being’s animalistic traits and his or her moral “nature”. Tang believes 
that as long as human beings are driven by baser instincts (lust, passion, etc.) 
their ability to enact moral intuition cannot be fully developed. Cultural acts 
are therefore concordant with moral acts insofar as they both require some 
measure of self-control:
We therefore say that amidst all cultural acts there are, unconsciously, 
moral acts involved and the moral good is being realized. However, by 
saying that these cultural acts involve moral acts and entail the real-
ization of the moral good, [we] also [refer to instances in which] the 
formation of these cultural acts is restrained. The moral acts and the real-
ization of the moral good] stem from our personality, and our personality 
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 commands these cultural acts. We have to discuss this [from the perspec-
tive of] the self which controls and dominates itself.18
The moral potential of cultural acts lies, as Tang suggests, in the self-control 
that individuals effectuate. Morality is thus “immanent” (neizai 內在) in cul-
tural activities, albeit in a “latent” (qianzai 潛在) manner and “without [moral] 
self-consciousness” (bu zijue 不自覺).19 In this sense, the individual’s quest 
to “complete his personality” (wancheng qi renge 完成其人格) by “creating 
culture”—in “literature, the arts, philosophy, science, religion, politics, econ-
omy, law, etc.”—is morally relevant.20 In the second preface to his Cultural 
Consciousness and Moral Reason, Tang stated somewhat cryptically that the 
realization of cultural ideals requires individuals to “transcend” their “concrete 
natural psychic disposition and natural instincts” and thus amounts to a mani-
festation of moral reason.21
Tang, however, holds that “cultural manifestations” cannot fully express the 
moral consciousness of the individual, as they do not completely accord with 
the “criteria of morality.”22 For one, the main values in morality differ from 
those in other cultural spheres. With respect to morality, Tang highlighted 
“the good,” while allocating “justice” (in the distribution of rights and duties) 
to the sphere of politics, “wealth” to economy, “truth” to science, “beauty” to 
the arts, and “deification” to religion. Whereas cultural values require an objec-
tive manifestation (in “practice” and “things”), Tang claims that moral values 
exist inside the personality of the individual.23 The moral value of diligence, 
for example, is not to be mistaken for the external results achieved by diligent 
efforts, because the moral value applies exclusively to the individual’s “tran-
scending” of the “empirical self.” The same holds true for the moral value of 
(secondary) virtues such as orderliness, bravery, forbearance, and circumspec-
tion. The moral value, according to Tang, pertains here to the willingness of the 
individual to endure discomfort caused by the attempt to overcome the natu-
ral inertia of the empirical self. Consequently, happiness is to be discounted as 
a moral value. Tang indeed argued that disregarding one’s personal happiness 
18   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 519.
19   Ibid., pp. 516–517, 528.
20   Ibid., p. 304.
21   Ibid., (author’s second preface), p. 15.
22   Ibid., p. 374.
23   Ibid., pp. 516–518.
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is a moral value insofar as it attests to the transgression of limitations imposed 
by the empirical self.24
Tang’s notion of a latent presence of morality within the sphere of culture 
is “modern” insofar as it provides the basis for a functional differentiation of 
spheres of values and institutions without subordinating cultural plurality to 
the moral dictates of world views, ideologies, or ethical convictions. According 
to this view, however, cultural acts are not morally neutral since they share 
with moral acts an essential requirement, namely, a certain degree of self- 
restriction imposed by the individual. It is this idea of conquering the empiri-
cal self that served Tang as a point of reference for identifying the latent moral 
potential of cultural activities, artifacts, or institutions. Given this assump-
tion of a proto-moral surplus of cultural acts, Tang’s notion of self-cultivation 
captures the coherence of morality and culture, albeit without merging them 
into one. Significantly, Tang maintained that the realization of moral values 
depends much more on the individual’s willingness to initiate an “effort” in 
moral “refinement and cultivation” (xiu yang 修養) than on being inspired by 
culturally creative “men of genius” (tiancai 天才). He hence concluded that 
the realization of values in moral and other cultural activities entails different 
“forms of consciousness” (yishi xingtai 意識形態).25
According to Tang’s notion of self-cultivation, individual “efforts” may vary 
greatly in form, contents, and mode, and are by no means simply a matter of 
repressing natural instincts. Tang discussed in this context, for example, artistic 
creation: Whereas a piece of art in its material form has no moral value as such, 
the process of artistic creation has moral value insofar as the artist does not 
selfishly keep his notion of beauty to himself. By expressing his vision of art, 
he or she shows a willingness to transcend an egotistic, subjective  inwardness.26 
It is significant that Tang refrained from considering the artist’s motivation 
to produce an object of art. The focus lies solely on the artist’s willingness to 
“transcend” restrictions imposed by the empirical self, such as his inclination 
to withdraw into an isolated inwardness. In a similar way, Tang introduced 
the traditional notion of “music” as expressed in the “spirit of rites and music” 
(li yue zhi jingshen 禮樂之精神). He interpreted “music” in a very broad sense 
as an equivalent to the arts in general and related it to an “artistic conduct 
24   Tang, Daode ziwo zhi jianli, pp. 55–57. This line of thought is at once incompatible with 
Utilitarian ethics and Kant’s categorical imperative (see also Tang’s reflection on the 
moral value of altruistic acts where he again highlighted the overcoming of the empirical 
self as the criterion for moral value); see ibid.
25   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 519–522.
26   Tang, Daode ziwo zhi jianli, p. 59.
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of life.” The subjective consciousness temporarily “forgets” the empirical self 
when appreciating the beauty of art or creating a piece of art. The moments of 
artistic self-oblivion occur in the immediacy of producing and contemplating 
art and entail, as Tang believed, the type of self-oblivion that a scientist may 
experience when conducting research in a highly concentrated manner. Here, 
the containment of the instinct-driven self happens, as it were, as a side-effect. 
Tang thus deemed these experiences to be spontaneous ways of restraining the 
“selfish spirit,” and thereby of unfolding the individual’s “social nature” (shehui-
xing 社會性).27
Contrary to what one may expect from Confucian ethics, Tang had no 
intention of establishing rigid moral standards for self-cultivation. In fact, his 
approach rather implies the opposite, namely, an attenuation of morality in the 
narrow sense within a very broad range of (self-) cultivating practices. The lat-
ter comprises a variety of moral, intellectual, spiritual, aesthetical, and bodily 
practices, as well as ritual acts performed, for example, in the “three forms of 
ritual sacrifice.” There is hence no notion of a moral dictate, nor is there an 
avowal of a thorough moralization of all spheres of culture. The various self-
cultivating efforts, including ethical practice, are all inevitably separated from 
the realm of sagehood. Consequently, when identifying the moral conscious-
ness as the highest form of cultural consciousness, Tang referred merely to its 
function of “harmonizing,” instead of subordinating, cultural activities. The 
ensuing transformation of the “spontaneous” self is said to enhance further 
cultural activities.28
The tendency to attenuate morality within self-cultivation becomes partic-
ularly evident in Tang’s thoughts about the individual’s “moralization of [his or 
her] conduct of life” (shenghuo zhi daodehua 生活道德化). His discussion of 
“ten prescriptions” is the closest that he ever came to providing prescriptions 
for self-cultivation. The overarching focus here is the domination of “instincts, 
impulses and desires” that afflict the individual. One of Tang’s fundamen-
tal, albeit implicit, assumptions is that any attempt to directly resist human 
instincts and passions is doomed to fail. What the practitioners of self-cultiva-
tion should learn instead is how to avoid being severely afflicted by the baser 
instincts in order to circumvent a clash with moral duties. Overall, the ten pre-
scriptions are aimed at a preparatory state of the individual’s mind which facil-
itates his or her immersion in moral reflection and practice. The prescriptions 
therefore contain neither an explication of moral theories, principles, values 
or virtues, nor an elaboration of ethical conventions. Tang’s own extensive use 
27   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 64–66.
28   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 525–526.
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of the word “morality” in this context should neither be understood in terms of 
a Kantian or post-Kantian concept of morality, nor virtue ethics.
The main thrust of the ten prescriptions consists in a reflection on the tran-
scendent self, and on the limitations, narrowness, and ignorance of the empiri-
cal self. The Buddhist inspiration is explicit. Tang wanted the practitioners to 
read into “philosophy and Buddhism”—to contemplate the impermanence 
and the “principal and secondary causes” of reality (prescription 5), and to 
refrain from striving for happiness for the sake of happiness (prescription 8). 
Meditation and bodily exercises are not mentioned, however. The only 
instances where the effort of self-cultivation is directly tied to physical activity 
is the advice to go into nature (as a way to contemplate it) and to submit one-
self to strict physical discipline (prescriptions 4 and 9). With respect to the ten 
prescriptions, we may state that Tang apparently deemed “moral” any effort 
to restrain natural instincts, impulses, and desires, no matter whether it actu-
ally involves moral reflection or even a moral struggle against an insufficiently 
moral world. As a result, the “moral” effort might also comprise the individual’s 
decision to not resist an adverse environment at any cost, but rather to adjust 
to unchangeable circumstances in order to minimize or bring to an end the 
continuing affliction by overwhelming impulses and desires (prescription 7).29
To conclude, the ultimate goal of such self-cultivation is not the formation 
of a moral individual or a moral world for the sake of morality. Rather, the 
aim of self-cultivation is to prepare the subject’s mind to overcome the pull of 
natural instincts, passions and desires, but also to transcend reflective activities 
altogether, thereby generating a “transcendental spirituality” or “void potency” 
(xu ling) of the mind. Here, the void potency is conceptualized as a dynamic 
spiritual condition in which the ultimate spiritual reality permeates the sub-
jective mind. Moral reflection and practice are instrumental to this effort inas-
much as they serve to restrain any digressions of the practitioners’ mind. Still, 
as important as they may be, they are not the sole pathway to the spiritual state 
of void potency.
Tang’s notion of self-cultivation may indeed warrant questioning a common 
assumption in research on Confucianism which posits that self-cultivation is 
quintessentially guided by moral concerns (in the above-mentioned sense). If 
29   Tang, Daode ziwo zhi jianli, pp. 80–83. Tang’s approach to self-cultivation which aims to 
eliminate obstacles to realizing liang zhi in everyday life is reminiscent of post-Wang 
Yangming thinkers like Qian Dehong 錢德洪 (1497–1574), Zou Shouyi 鄒守益 (1491–
1562), Nie Bao 聶豹 (1487–1563), Luo Hongxian 羅洪先 (1504–1563); cf. Lin, “Tang Junyi, 
Mou Zongsan de yangming houxue yanjiu,” p. 28.
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interpreted strictly in terms of deontological ethics and virtue ethics, Confucian 
teachings of self-cultivation often seem to fall short. Indeed, it might appear as 
if they merely offer the moralistic promise that “the more diligent you practice 
self-cultivation, the more virtuous (or moral) a person you will become.”
Moreover, self-cultivation does not denote a practice which simply pre-
scribes the individual’s immersion in the cultural realm for the sake of 
 character-building and moral sensitizing. Tang was aware, much more than 
many of his fellow Confucians, of imminent, potential dangers arising from 
the individual’s commitment to self-cultivation. The cultural inventory of 
self- cultivation could be distorted, or even manipulated, and thus lead to 
the deception, and possibly even the self-deception, of individuals under the 
dulcet label of self-cultivation. As a matter of fact, various forms of oppres-
sion loom in the effort towards self-cultivation exactly because it entails the 
strenuous attempt to rein in the empirical self. Though Tang did not explic-
itly discuss the possibility that the label of self-cultivation serves to conceal 
authoritarianism, it seems safe to say that he recognized such a danger all the 
same. Indeed, he left no doubt that culture and cultural activities may serve 
evil ends and even warned of a “higher ranking” evil that emerges when the 
values of the true, good, and beautiful are subjected to an “inversion” and all 
value- standards become distorted.30
Perhaps even more unsettling is the danger that self-cultivation may have 
repressive psychic effects on the individual practitioners which are self-
inflicted and difficult to discern. This problem concerns the inherent claim 
of self-cultivation that practitioners bolster the formation of their individual 
selfhood by internalizing social and ethical standards. It is due to this sup-
posedly reassuring promise that the practitioners are prone to submit them-
selves to an internalization of practices, norms and values that may have a 
detrimental effect on them. This particular problem concerns the question of 
how individuals might grasp the psychic impact of their effort to “cultivate” 
the empirical self. In more blunt terms: “Who is actually ‘cultivating’ whom?”; 
or, in more explicitly Freudian terms: “How can the ego authenticate his or her 
self-cultivating practices and distinguish them from the super-ego’s oppressive 
rule?” Tang largely disregarded the dangers to the individual’s psychic health 
that may accompany the implementation of “self-”cultivation. These dangers 
entail an internalization of repressive images, values, conventions, and prac-
tices of the self that are disguised by the ideal of moral self-improvement, 
but in fact produce pathological forms of selfhood. Yet, for Tang “culture” 
30   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 107–108.
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and “self-cultivation” are civil-theological, not psychoanalytical, concepts. 
Modern Confucian thought in general shows very little interest in Freudian 
psychoanalysis and related social philosophies and theories, in spite of its 
considerable interest in the formation and development of individuality and 
subjectivity. Tang’s thought is no exception here, as one finds only scattered, 
predominantly negative comments on Freud in his writings. Among them, 
there is his blanket repudiation of theories that liken the human being to any 
other living being, such as Freud’s view of the sexual drive, Nietzsche’s and 
Adler’s views about the will to power, Pavlov’s behavioral psychology, and also 
Marxism. Tang concluded that even though these theories arrived at “discov-
ering something about human nature,” they still fell short of genuinely “see-
ing the essence of human nature.”31 Tang’s hesitancy toward psychoanalysis 
in general is particularly evident in the above-mentioned ten prescriptions for 
the individual’s conduct of life. In his discussion of the human being’s animal-
istic traits, impulses, and desires, he did not conceptualize them in terms of a 
libido, which can never be fully restrained by “cultivation.” On the contrary, he 
called on the practitioners of self-cultivation to acknowledge that their mind 
is not bound to their physical body, since the latter is merely something inside 
the mind. Hence, the “importance” of the physical body could and should be 
“forgotten” as often as possible.32 We may assume, then, that this call to disre-
gard the physical body implies that the practitioners should not conceive of 
themselves as subjected to the libido and its ties to the unconscious.
It is not difficult to see why specific elements of Freud’s psychoanalysis 
were rejected by Confucian thinkers of the 20th century. The Freudian the-
ory on the formation of self-identity in childhood (involving the Oedipus 
complex) is obviously difficult to reconcile, in an affirmative manner, with 
Confucian notions of filial piety. Freud’s discussion of the “oceanic feeling” in 
Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilization and Its Discontents) is particularly 
challenging to Confucian thought.33 It seems likely that Freud would have 
31   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 565.
32   Tang, Daode ziwo zhi jianli, p. 81. In an interview in the monthly magazine Mingbao from 
April 1974, Tang took this expectation to the extreme when musing over the sexual “indul-
gence” he believed to be rampant in Europe and North America. He explained this as 
a reaction of the individuals to the overwhelming pressure of life in times of industri-
alization and commercialization, and accompanying feelings of meaninglessness. Tang 
assumed that if one’s life were truly “enriched, substantial and complete,” like it was for 
“some religious believers,” one could get by without having a sexual life at all. In this con-
text, Tang also referred to the notion of marriage life according to “the tradition of Chinese 
culture,” where the sexual life makes up an “extremely small part;” see Tang, pp. 325ff.
33   See Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, p. 197.
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concluded that the notion of sagehood as a state of mind where “there is no 
borderline of differentiation between the fully developed mind and the uni-
verse” is an expression of a (regressive) “oceanic feeling,” of something “bound-
less, limitless” (“wie von etwas Unbegrenztem, Schrankenlosem”). Freud was 
convinced that such an oceanic feeling or yearning could be retraced to a 
“regression” to an infantile, “early phase of self-awareness” (“frühe Phase des 
Ichgefühls”) that predates the ontogenetic formation of a clear demarcation 
between the “I” and the social and material environment. As Freud believed, 
the human being’s regressive longing for the return to such a state of undiffer-
entiated self-awareness may trigger “an initial effort of religious consolation” 
(“erster Versuch einer religiösen Tröstung”).34
Nonetheless, Tang’s disinterest in, and perhaps even aversion to, a psycho-
analytical theory of culture should not be mistaken for a blind defense of an 
optimistic concept of the human mind and psyche. Tang himself remained 
deeply skeptical when it came to the possibility of eradicating human evil 
through spiritual, self-cultivating efforts. He stated matter-of-factly: “But 
whether everything which is needed to eliminate the evil in the human mind 
is indeed merely related to engaging in a spiritual effort (xin shang yong gongfu 
心上用工夫) is yet another question.”35 As we have seen, Tang remained skep-
tical about self-cultivation and admonished individuals to not ignore the peril 
of being immersed in a false, distorted “culture” marked by an inversion of val-
ues. They also should not expect that they will be capable of eliminating their 
own malice once and for all.36 The question still looms large here of whether, 
and if so how, individuals can be certain when practicing self-cultivation that 
they do not in fact indulge in a harmful, possibly even deviant practice. The 
answer that may be gleaned from Tang’s work is as paradoxical as it is complex: 
Individuals have no way of knowing with absolute certainty whether they are 
going astray, unless they attain moral intuition.
34   Ibid., pp. 201, 204.
35   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 105.
36   Tang cautioned his readers with the warning that if “human nature” “degenerated” only 
for a single moment, “satan” would immediately appear; see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu 
dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 113. On the terminology and Tang’s concept of evil, see 
below Chap. 7 “The Political and Its Demonic Aspects.”
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 Outlines of a Confucian Ethos
The reader of Tang’s work learns much less about how to live a life devoted 
to becoming a sage than the reader of many neo-Confucian texts.37 Tang’s 
reluctance to provide detailed directions on how to practice self-cultivation is 
consistent with his concept of modernization. He recognized that binding pre-
scriptions of a catalogue of virtues and values to be followed by self-cultivating 
individuals in all spheres of life might curb the emancipative effects of the 
ongoing process of modernization. His awareness of the potential downside 
of self-cultivation and the janiform of culture certainly further contributed to 
his reluctance.
It is hardly surprising, then, that Tang only loosely related his ideas about self-
cultivation to Confucian texts and thinkers from pre-20th century periods. In a 
sketch of traditional Confucian self-cultivation in his book The Spiritual Values 
of Chinese Culture, he summarily referred to, among others, The Analects, The 
Book of Rites, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning, the Book of Changes, 
and to Cheng Hao, Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and Wang Ji 王畿 (1498–
1583).38 Although lacking a thorough analysis of these different notions of self- 
cultivation, Tang’s sketch is instructive as it reveals what he himself considered 
to be important elements of self-cultivation in the Confucian tradition. There 
was, first of all, the idea that self-cultivation requires the willingness of the 
practitioners to constantly examine whether they are behaving morally; this, 
in turn, would eventually enable them to instantly detect immoral intentions. 
Practitioners were furthermore obliged to lead disciplined lives. The quintes-
sence of self- cultivation was to effectuate a disposition and an attitude which 
allowed the individual to “naturally” conform to the requirements of moral con-
duct. Tang quoted (incorrectly) in this context from The Doctrine of the Mean 
20.18 to illustrate what it means to reach the highest sphere of morality: “[He 
who], without the exercise of thought, hits upon what is right, and without effort 
apprehends” (bu si er zhong, bu mian er de 不思而中, 不勉而得).39 In order to 
37   For a concise discussion of neo-Confucian practices of self-cultivation (including spiri-
tual exercises, ritual acts, reading of classics, practicing “attentiveness,” “reverence” and 
“quiet sitting”), see Angle, Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian 
Philosophy, pp. 144–160.
38   On this and the following sketch, see Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, 
pp. 224–226.
39   In Legge’s translation, the passage reads: “Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment 
of sincerity is the way of men. He who possesses sincerity, is he who, without effort, hits 
what is right, and apprehends, without the exercise of thought;—he is the sage who nat-
urally and easily embodies the right way. He who attains sincerity, is he who chooses 
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acquire the correct disposition and attitude, Confucian thinkers proposed that 
the practitioners should build their character by observing a broad range of cul-
tural and ethical conventions, many of which affected their daily life, such as 
family relations and various customs related to food and clothing. Other prac-
tices pertained to the rite de passage and to the arts. This “moral education,” 
to use Tang’s term, was to begin in one’s youth and thus entailed the idea that 
achieving an individual disposition to act morally was gradual. As we have seen, 
however, Tang did not have a traditionalist intention to reestablish the obser-
vance of pre-modern conventions, ceremonies, and rituals in the 20th century.
Tang’s reluctance to equate his own position with specific notions of self-
cultivation from Confucian traditions is consistent with his reservations about 
referring to specific moral theories—Western or Eastern—in order to identify 
prescriptions for individual self-fulfillment. He actually cautioned practitio-
ners about the adverse effect of confining their mind to a systematic reflec-
tion of moral theories. Tellingly, he gave preference to those (non-systematic) 
“teachings that go along with a [particular] person or a [particular] situation” 
and stated:
This is the reason why the highest ranking works of moral philosophy 
in the East and the West, such as The Analects, The New Testament, and 
The Nikāyas are all devoid of systematic exposition. Moral practices must 
involve a multitude of practical things, and with respect to a specific prac-
tical thing, they all hold a specific normative principle to be realized.40
Narrative forms of moral thought are thus particularly well-suited to self- 
cultivation, and this includes anecdotes about the moral conduct of virtuous 
persons. The focus here is not on analyzing principles of moral conduct, but 
on familiarizing oneself with the exemplary moral acts of virtuous persons and 
thereby retracing, in effect, their particular moral judgments. This entails—to 
refer to Max Scheler—a type of interpretation which is distinct from attempts 
to objectify virtuous models or imitate certain moral acts. Instead, it requires 
what is good, and firmly holds it fast.” Legge, Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, 
The Doctrine of the Mean, The Works of Mencius, p. 413. The underlined passage reads 
in The Doctrine of the Mean 20.8: bu mian er zhong, bu si er de 不勉而中, 不思而得. 
Perhaps, Tang, who quoted the passage correctly in Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian (see 
above) put here “without the exercise of thought” in front to underscore the fact that the 
intuition of the sage unfolds without reflection.
40   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 373.
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identification with the virtuous persons’ volition.41 In this way, it is the personal 
determination to attain sagehood as it becomes manifest in Confucius, which 
is to be emulated. In terms of volition, Tang highlighted the quality of “moral 
sincerity” (daode shang de zhen cheng 道德上的真誠).42 It is said to be crucial 
for the human being’s “partaking [in] and awakening [to] (can wu 參悟)” the 
“origin of the universe and human life.” Moral sincerity is not an exclusively 
Confucian virtue, but rather, as Tang believed, a common topic of “the path of 
Eastern philosophy,” including Buddhism and Daoism.43 There is, then, neither 
a need to establish a personality cult and sectarian idolization of Confucius, 
nor to strictly follow ideas about virtues from earlier Confucian texts.44 Tang 
remarked, however, that Confucius was better suited to serve as a model figure 
than Buddha or Jesus, because of his secular orientation and his recognition of 
the immanent and transcendent aspects of the “mind of humaneness.”45
Even though a detailed ethos of self-cultivation is not what Tang had in 
mind, the outlines of a modern Confucian ethos emerge nonetheless:
First, the commitment of individuals to an ethos of self-cultivation is not 
enforceable by legal, political, or social sanctions. With respect to inducing the 
individual’s willingness to engage in self-cultivation, Tang remained skeptical 
about whether virtue models from religious or other traditions could actually 
produce a sufficiently persuasive effect. He concluded that it would indeed be 
difficult to teach someone to instantly engage in self-cultivation.46
Second, Tang’s discussion of individual self-fulfillment strongly insinu-
ates that practitioners should acknowledge that self-cultivation is the path-
way for attaining the intuitive realization of sagehood. Practitioners were 
furthermore called to believe that the “mind” (or “pattern”) of Heaven is the 
41   Scheler, Schriften zur Anthropologie, p. 169; on Scheler see also Joas, Die Entstehung der 
Werte, p. 154.
42   Tang explicitly stated that the “effort of refinement and cultivation” (xiu yang zhi gongfu) 
must entail an “effort to consider sincerity” which in turn consists of an “effort to attain 
liang zhi;” see Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 567.
43   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 577.
44   Tang departed for example from the scheme of four cardinal virtues in the Mencius 
(VIA.16) by considering the “spirit of humaneness” to be fundamental to the unfolding of 
other virtues; see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 391–392, 416–418.
45   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 368, 383; on Tang’s statement in favor of the need 
to identify role models, see ibid., p. 63.
46   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 567.
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“ceaselessly self-generating” (sheng sheng 生生) “source” of our “moral nature” 
(de xing 德性).47
Third, the practitioners’ constant efforts to “transcend” the empirical self 
are expected to generate a personal disposition that facilitates the individual’s 
domination over his or her animalistic and selfish traits. These efforts not only 
comprise moral reflection and moral conduct in the narrow sense, but also 
various cultural, spiritual, and bodily practices aiming to rein in one’s baser 
instincts. Inasmuch as the practitioners develop and reinforce their ability to 
dominate their baser instincts, they enhance their capacity to attain moral 
intuition. Self-cultivation thus seems to propel moral progress towards moral 
intuition, even though it remains ontologically separated from intuition itself.
Nonetheless, the relation between the empirical self of self-cultivation and 
the transcendent self of moral intuition remains unsettled in Tang’s thought. 
Its vagueness resembles the ambiguity in Wang Yangming’s model of self- 
cultivation, which is based on the assumption that individuals have an inborn 
capacity to intuitively “discover” moral truth. It differs therefore from those 
development-models of self-cultivation that claim moral growth and continu-
ous moral progress gradually lead to the individual’s moral perfection. With 
respect to these two models, which are analyzed by Ivanhoe, Angle concludes 
that although Wang Yangming would not have subscribed to the idea that there 
is a “development of our moral sense(s),” he would have admitted that one’s 
commitment to strive for liang zhi may actually grow and deepen.48 Tang’s 
notion of self-cultivation conforms in this regard to Wang Yangming’s ideas.
Fourth, the practitioners’ “moral conduct of life” (daode shenghuo 道德生活) 
is to entail, albeit not exclusively, moral reflection and the orientation toward 
moral “ideals,” both of which are said to contribute to a constant embrace of the 
good. The “essence” of moral life is reflection,49 and not the submission of moral 
subjectivity to extant moral codes, mores, or traditions.
47   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 28–29. “Sheng sheng” refers, according to Tang, to 
a specifically Confucian notion: It posits that everything which is generated by human 
beings, as well as the capacity (the “virtue” [de]) that enables them to generate their 
world, is a manifestation of Heaven; see Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, p. 116.
48   Angle, Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy, pp. 115–117. 
Angle draws here from Ivanhoe’s examination of Confucian ethics, which depicts ideas 
ascribed to Confucius and Mencius as representative for the development-model of self-
cultivation; see Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mencius and 
Wang Yangming, pp. 48–50, 103–104.
49   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 521.
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Fifth, the practitioners must establish a personal attitude or habitus that 
grants leeway to ethical pluralism. An unyielding insistence on certain theo-
ries, principles, world views or ideologies would contradict the fundamental 
civil-theological assumption of this ethos, namely, the relativity of all discur-
sive truth-claims in relation to the immediate apprehension of the absolute in 
liang zhi. Tang’s Confucian civil theology consequently does not lend itself to 
the idea of a universal criterion which allows the practitioners to objectively 
assess whether they are making moral progress en route to self-fulfillment. 
After all, “the final realm,” as quoted above, will be reached without measur-
able effort and without “thinking.”
Sixth, the individuals who strive for self-fulfillment must act as social beings 
and not isolate themselves from their social environment.50 The “moral con-
duct of life” does not call on the practitioners to withdraw into a spiritual 
inwardness, but to engage in mundane matters and practical affairs. In the 
words of Tang: the “deep comprehension in immediate awareness” results 
from “practice” (shijian 實踐).51 Yet, the status of self-cultivation remains 
circumscribed with respect to the attainment of sagehood-as-intuition. Self-
cultivation is characterized here by a self-suspension of its techniques vis-à-vis 
inner sagehood. It is this unbridgeable gap which delineates the conceptual 
space for reconciling the universal foundation of self-cultivation in human 
nature as endowed by Heaven with the assertion that the practice of self- 
cultivation is subject to cultural and historical particularities.
Seventh, the self-cultivating individuals are not compelled to accept the 
world as an unchangeable reality which demands compliance and conformity 
as the only course of action. The modern Confucian ethos stands in contrast 
to Max Weber’s dictum on Confucian ethics. Weber assumed that Confucian 
ethics was “a rational ethic which reduced tension with the world to an abso-
lute minimum,” adding that “[t]his was true of its religious depreciation as well 
as its practical rejection.” He concluded that Confucianism entails an “ethic 
50   See for example Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 62. This aspect of Tang’s notion 
of self-cultivation is highlighted by Roger Ames who presents Tang as a representative of 
a type of role ethics which, according to Ames, does not entail the idea of an ontologi-
cal dualism. Given the crucial importance of such a dualism in Tang’s speculation about 
liang zhi, the interpretation of Ames seems to be questionable; see Ames, Confucian Role 
Ethics: a Vocabulary, pp. 128–134.
51   Tang, Daode ziwo zhi jianli, p. 92; on this see Ng, “Tang Junyi’s Spirituality: Reflections on 
Its Foundation and Possible Contemporary Relevance,” pp. 386ff.
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of unconditional affirmation of and adjustment to the world.”52 Even though 
modern Confucianism does not contain a notion of “afterlife” that might 
serve as the spiritual foundation of a radical denial of the mundane world, 
a “tension” in the sense of Weber’s analysis is indeed present in Tang’s civil 
theology. The latter, in fact, does not exclude a radical denial of the world, at 
least not in principle. Among the many passages that bear testimony to such 
a tension between a transcendent realm and the mundane world, we find the 
following: “The perfection, realness, and goodness in my yearning cannot be 
found in the world of reality . . . Therefore, I understand that my yearning has 
a . . . source that transcends the world of reality . . ..”53 The sort of historical 
optimism which permeates modern Confucianism (see Chap. 11) is thus differ-
ent from the “radical worldoptimism” which Weber ascribed to Confucianism 
and which was allegedly responsible for the Confucians’ inclination to merely 
muddle through mundane reality, unable to truly express their subjectivity by 
resisting the world altogether.54
Eighth, Tang suggested that ideas about the individual’s withdrawal from the 
world stem from Indian philosophy and referred to allegedly “Indian” notions 
of a “release” ( jietuo 解脫) and “unpinning” (chaoba) from the “real world.” 
Without further clarification, he proposed that Chinese thought, in contrast, 
“confirmed” things and events of the real world, along with the  practical 
52   Quoted from: Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, pp. 227, 229 (see 
also Weber’s Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, pp. 514–515). The international 
discussion of Weber’s analysis is very extensive. Thomas Metzger’s approach is particu-
larly convincing as he not only points to methodological problems in Weber’s research 
on Confucianism and to Weber’s limited knowledge of Chinese history and thought, but 
also discusses neo-Confucian philosophical ideas as well as attitudes and mentalities of 
neo-Confucian thinkers. In his response to Weber, Metzger highlights the “sense of pre-
dicament” (i.e. a sense of a tension to the world) of neo-Confucian thinkers who were 
keenly aware of the rift that existed between their own goals and ideals and the realities 
of the historical world (on this, see also Metzger’s seminal work Escape From Predicament. 
Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture.). But Metzger overstates his case, 
when he assumes that the apperception of a tension between ideals and historical real-
ity triggered a general tendency in all “modern Chinese thought” to develop utopian and 
moralistic schemes in order to overturn mundane situations; see Metzger, “Max Webers 
Analyse der konfuzianischen Tradition. Eine Kritik,” pp. 235–236, 244, 251, 254–255.
53   Translated from Tang’s The Establishment of the Moral Self (Daode ziwo zhi jianli) in: 
Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral Life: 
A Comparative Study, p. 293.
54   Quoted from: Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, p. 235 (see also 
Weber’s Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, p. 522.).
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engagement of the human being.55 This confirmation, it seems, is crucial for 
Tang’s exilic philosophy which claims that the formation of individual self-
hood is inseparable from the notion of the individual as an embedded social 
being. Here, the ethos of self-cultivation indeed echoes the concern about 
the ever-looming threat of social, intellectual, and emotional isolation of the 
individual in exile. The assumption that self-cultivation requires individuals 
to engage in the transformation of their life-world is certainly in accordance 
with the conception that exiles need to transform the non-place of emigration. 
55   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 22, p. 362. “Chinese thought” includes, according to Tang, 
Confucianism, Daoism and (Chinese) Buddhism. The distinction between Buddhism in 
China and India remains unclear.
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CHAPTER 7
Shifting the Foundations of Confucian 
Political Thought
 The Political and Its Demonic Aspects
Tang Junyi was well aware of the danger of political dogmatism stemming from 
Confucian traditions. In response, he rejected any idea of a traditionalist return 
to a pre-modern ethos of rule by virtuous elites, let alone “sages,” which might 
undermine the emancipative potential of modernity. By the same rationale, he 
rejected the traditional ideal that politics should be evaluated by purely ethi-
cal or “humanistic” standards. He instead re-conceptualized the sphere of the 
political as a sphere of action which was, by necessity, governed by wills for 
power. Modern politics thus had only a derivative function with respect to the 
realization of “humanistic” values in society and would merely serve to secure 
the collective preconditions for the individual’s quest for self-fulfillment by 
realizing his or her “inner sagehood.”
Tang’s Confucian civil theology assumes that the human being has an inher-
ent potential to actualize sagehood, but also to unleash his or her lust for power. 
The reflection on the human being’s struggle with his or her own lust for power 
is of fundamental importance to Tang’s political thought in general. It is against 
this backdrop that he explored the formation of the human being’s political 
and moral subjectivity in his two-volume monograph Cultural Consciousness 
and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing) from 1958 and in a number of 
articles published between 1950 and 1953.1 Here, Tang conceived of the human 
lust for power in a manner that was unprecedented in Confucian political 
thought. He now analyzed problems of power and evil with respect to politics 
and the individual’s existence far more  comprehensively than his Confucian 
1   Cf. the following articles: “The Sources of Humanity’s Evil” (first published in the weekly 
supplement of the Hong Kong Times [Xianggang Shibao 香港時報] in 1950; reprinted 
in Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 104–115); “Basic Knowledge 
about Humanistic Culture and Democracy” (first published in: Minzhu Pinglun, Vol. 3, No. 24 
[December 1952]; reprinted in Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 388–401); “Social 
Humanism and the Spirit of Democracy in China and the West” (first published in: Minzhu 
Pinglun, Vol. 4, No. 4 [January 1953]; reprinted in Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, 
pp. 402–425).
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predecessors. This shift in his thought seems to have occurred gradually, for 
he published an article as late as July 1949 in which he still highlighted well-
known Confucian topics such as the human being’s essentially social nature, 
the feasibility of harmonizing the community by fostering individual ethical 
self-cultivation, and the importance of relying on virtuous role models. At the 
time, however, he was already departing from these fundamental assumptions 
of traditional Confucian political anthropology.2
Tang’s new theory of power plays a pivotal role in his philosophical project 
of renewing Confucianism under conditions of social modernization. He now 
contemplated power and its demonic aspects in politics in a way that suggests 
he was reacting to the famous passages of Max Weber’s study on Confucianism 
in which he claims that Confucianism lacks a conception of radical evil. Among 
these passages, we find one about the Confucian state cult and Daoism, where 
Weber states that “[b]oth forms of religion lacked even the traces of a satanic 
force of evil against which the pious Chinese . . . might have struggled for his 
salvation.”3
One should bear in mind that while Weber’s study on Confucianism intro-
duces the concept of evil as a religious-ethical issue, Tang took an interest in 
the notion of evil with respect to the political. He thus discussed the meaning 
and relevance of the lust for power in the context of political action in general. 
It is therefore enticing to relate Tang’s reflection on power to the ideas about 
power and the nature of politics that Weber presents in his famous lecture 
Politics as a Vocation from 1919. Whether Tang actually reacted to Weber’s writ-
ings is uncertain, but it seems rather unlikely that he was familiar with Weber’s 
lecture. Nonetheless, a selective cross-reading of Weber and Tang reveals some 
illuminating intersections and disparities with regard to their concepts of 
power and the political.
Towards the end of Politics as a Vocation Max Weber draws the following 
conclusion:
Anyone who wishes to engage in politics at all, and particularly any-
one who wishes to practice it as a profession, must become conscious 
of these ethical paradoxes and of his own responsibility for what may 
become of him under the pressure they exert. For, I repeat, he is entering 
2   See his article “The Ideal Humanistic World” (first published in: Minzhu Pinglun [Hongkong], 
Vol. 1, No. 2 [July 1949]; reprinted in Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 59–72).
3   Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, p. 206 (for the German original, see 
Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, p. 490).
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into relations with the satanic powers that lurk in every act of violence. 
(. . .) Anyone who seeks the salvation of his soul and that of others does 
not seek it through politics, since politics faces quite different tasks, tasks 
that can only be accomplished with the use of force. The genius, or the 
demon, of politics lives in an inner tension with the God of love as well as 
with the Christian churches, and it is a tension that can erupt at any time 
into an insoluble conflict.4
Weber demands from politicians, particularly those who engage in politics 
as a vocation, that they perceive a specific political danger. This danger arises 
because the consequences—including the ethical consequences—of political 
acts inevitably elude safe calculation and control. Even more perilous is the fact 
that politics by definition involves the possibility of a forceful implementation 
of decisions that ultimately have unforeseeable outcomes. This fact, according 
to Weber, is especially distressing for those politicians who subscribe to a credo 
of ethics of conviction, which posits “that nothing but good comes from good 
and nothing but evil from evil.”5
In his Politics as a Vocation, Weber took a dig at politicians who are commit-
ted to such an ethics of conviction. Still, in the passage quoted above, Weber 
not only admonishes politicians, but all political actors, because they must 
face the danger inherent to the incalculable consequences of political deci-
sions and should therefore acknowledge that one cannot rely on claims to 
pure convictions or good intentions to achieve good ends in politics. As Weber 
understands it, a specifically political danger arises from the inevitable use of 
certain means which are characteristic of politics, namely those involving the 
exertion of power and force.6 Politics, according to Weber, means “to strive for 
a share of power or to influence the distribution of power, whether between 
states or between groups of people contained within a state.”7 There are two 
distinct aims that motivate people to strive for power in politics and other 
4   Weber, The Vocation Lectures. “Science as a Vocation” “Politics as a Vocation,” p. 90 (for the 
German original, see Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 64).
5   Weber, ibid., p. 86 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 60).
6   Weber, ibid., p. 86 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 60).
7   Weber, ibid., p. 33 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 8): For Weber, power is “the probability that 
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” See Weber, Economy and 
Society, p. 53. This passage is followed by Weber’s often quoted amendment that the concept 
of power is “sociologically amorphous” (ibid.).
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social relations. Both involve the longing for power “as a means in the service 
of other goals, whether idealistic or selfish, or . . . power ‘for its own sake’ . . . so 
as to enjoy the feeling of prestige that it confers.”8 In conceptualizing the quest 
for power as a sustaining element of politics, Weber places his focus on the 
state. From this perspective, he conceives of a peculiar relation between power 
and violence. Insofar as the quest for power is directed at the state, it involves 
the means of power that is specific to the state and which only the state may 
use in a legitimate manner: the use of coercive force.9
Political activity, in Weber’s conceptualization, entails an element of irra-
tionality, for those who apply specifically political means (i.e. coercive power, 
violence) cannot foresee whether or how they themselves will be transformed 
by the “demonic” impact of these means. In Weber’s view, it is characteristic of 
politics that not only political activity as such, but also its effects on the world 
and the political actors themselves may in the end contradict ethical stan-
dards. In fact, Weber emphasizes that “the ultimate product of political activity 
frequently, indeed, as a matter of course, fails utterly to do justice to its original 
purpose and may even be a travesty of it.”10 It is exactly this self-awareness of 
the potential of a political “travesty” which marks the peculiarity of politics 
vis-à-vis the realm of ethics and religion. What is more, whereas the ethics of 
capitalism and its inherent goal to accumulate profit have been ushered into 
Western society (albeit inadvertently, as Weber assumes) by Protestant asceti-
cism and its rejection of the world, the looming conflicts between the “satan of 
politics” and the “Christian God” remain “insoluble.” As Weber insists, politics 
indeed has its own reservoir of satanic powers.11
In Politics as a Vocation Weber harshly admonishes the proponents of what 
he calls a pure ethics of conviction for their inability to act in a politically 
responsible way. Whoever is unable to acknowledge that the credo of an ethics 
of conviction does not amount to a truism with respect to political action is “in 
fact a mere child in political matters.”12 The political immaturity of proponents 
of an ethics of conviction is manifest in their belief that “the ethical demands 
8    Weber, The Vocation Lectures. “Science as a Vocation” “Politics as a Vocation,” pp. 33–34 
(Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 9).
9    Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 29; see also: Lenk, “Max Weber,” pp. 310–311.
10   Weber, The Vocation Lectures. “Science as a Vocation” “Politics as a Vocation,” p. 78 (Weber, 
Politik als Beruf, p. 53).
11   See Von Ferber, Die Gewalt in der Politik, pp. 68–75.
12   Weber, The Vocation Lectures. “Science as a Vocation” “Politics as a Vocation,” p. 86 (Weber, 
Politik als Beruf, p. 60).
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made on politics” may remain untainted by the fact “that politics operates with 
a highly specific means, namely, power, behind which violence lies concealed”.13
To make things worse, those who subscribe to a pure ethics of conviction 
are also capable of applying violence as a means to realize ethical demands. 
Indeed, their fatal failure to cope with reality shows itself at the very point 
where they have to face the “problem of justifying the means by the ends,” 
and hence the use of violence. Here, there is some likelihood that “the rep-
resentatives of an ethics of conviction suddenly become chiliastic prophets,” 
who call upon their followers to participate in “the very last use of force” in 
order to overcome an insufficiently ethical world altogether: “[T]he man who 
embraces an ethics of conviction is unable to tolerate the ethical irrationality 
of the world.” Believers in pure ethics of convictions are dangerous, because 
they are unable to grasp the diabolic threat that accompanies the use of vio-
lence as a means of politics, and are thus inclined to sanctioning all means of 
violence in the attempt to attain salvation.14
In contrast, the type of professional politician Weber favored should opt 
for the maxim of an ethics of responsibility. Weber, in fact, considered the 
two maxims of an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility to be 
“irredeemably incompatible,”15 although he still warned that the ethics of 
conviction and the ethics of responsibility should not be treated as “abso-
lute antitheses.” They are, after all, “mutually complementary, and only when 
taken together do they constitute the authentic human being who is capable 
of having a ‘vocation for politics.’ ”16 In conclusion, Weber called on the pro-
fessional politician to endure this ethical tension with the “trained ability to 
scrutinize the realities of life ruthlessly, to withstand them and to measure up 
to them inwardly.”17 In doing so, he or she should not count on the “goodness 
and perfection” of their fellowmen, but must reckon with the “average human 
failings.”18 As for the Confucian individuals, they fail to live up to this demand, 
as Weber assumes. Instead, they believe that the world they live in is “the best 
of all possible worlds” and remain convinced that “human nature was disposed 
13   Weber, ibid., pp. 80–81 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 55).
14   Weber, ibid., p. 85 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 59).
15   Weber, ibid., p. 83 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 57).
16   Weber, ibid., p. 92 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 66).
17   Weber, ibid., p. 91 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 65). The reference to ruthlessness does not 
indicate that Weber favored a type of politicians who are driven by their lust for power. 
For Weber, the professional politician should not strive for power solely for the sake of 
power: Ibid., p. 78 (for the German original, see Ibid., p. 52).
18   Weber, ibid., p. 84 (Weber, Politik als Beruf, p. 58).
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to the ethically good” and “[m]en . . . capable of unlimited perfection . . . were 
in principle adequate for fulfilling the moral law.”19
Similar to Max Weber’s approach, Tang Junyi identified the core dogma 
of Confucian religiosity as the belief in the inborn ability of human beings 
to attain moral perfection. But in stark contrast to Weber’s depiction of 
Confucianism, Tang’s Confucian civil theology does not support the conviction 
that the human being is capable of fulfilling the “moral law” by merely follow-
ing conventional ethics. Tang, as we have seen, conceptualized self-cultivation 
as a multifarious effort that comprises, above all, moral self-reflection, but also 
forms of practical engagement in politics and society at large. The individual’s 
impetus for such practical engagement is not purely ethical. On the contrary, 
Tang called on individuals to consider their own egotistic side as a crucial 
impetus for their practical, and most of all political, engagement.
As Tang saw it, the Confucians in pre-modern times also addressed such a 
call to the practitioners of self-cultivation, but they insufficiently grasped the 
human lust for power. The Confucian “worthy” and “sages” hardly took notice 
of the fact that the “transformation through the teachings,” which they wanted 
to bestow on humanity, could be “fundamentally” resisted by the human lust 
for power.20 Nor did they reckon with the “deepest selfish desire” of the human 
being, namely, the “pure will for power” (chuncui de quanli yizhi 純粹的權力 
意志). Like Weber, Tang defined this pure will for power as the will to wield 
power solely for the sake of wielding power. It is in this sense that the pure will 
for power culminates in a decision about “leaving alive or killing, giving or tak-
ing, rewarding or punishing.”21
19   Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, pp. 227–228 (for the German 
original, see Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, p. 514).
20   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 396. Tang’s critique is echoed in Chang Hao’s 
famous essay “Dark Consciousness and Democratic Tradition.” Chang discusses differ-
ent expressions of pessimistic notions of human nature and the human being (hence 
the “dark consciousness” [you’an yishi 幽暗意識]) in Western and Chinese contexts and 
concludes that overall, Chinese philosophers gave only insufficient thought to the “dark” 
side of man. Chang’s essay is highly stimulating in many respects, but regrettably does 
not discuss Tang’s concept of evil. The only part of Chang’s book You’an yishi yu minzhu 
chuantong which deals with Tang’s philosophy is a general overview found in the Chinese 
translation of Chang’s English article “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis 
of Contemporary China”; see Zhang (Chang Hao), You’an yishi yu minzhu chuantong, 
pp. 3–32; see also pp. 33–78.
21   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 395.
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Among the “satanic” aspects of the pure will for power is the inclination 
for cruelty. Tang distinguished in his analysis different forms and degrees of 
cruelty. Their most despicable manifestation is reached whenever a person 
derives deep satisfaction from observing another’s suffering after insidiously 
harming him or her through planned, “rational” action, without revealing 
who the perpetrator was.22 The pure will for power may indeed apply rational 
means to achieve this end, but any analysis that disregards the irrational side 
of the lust for power inevitably falls short. The Marxist approach that exam-
ines the will for power through an analysis of socioeconomic structures and 
a calculation of interests is therefore misleading according to Tang. By way of 
example, Tang elaborated on the fact that there are cases where human beings 
apply a degree of cruelty which stands in no rational relation to the economic 
interests at issue. Furthermore, in the course of a conflict in which both par-
ties suffer great material losses, it is possible that the one party whose losses 
are less severe still gains some satisfaction from observing that their opponent 
has lost even more.23 Here, the pure will for power elevates destruction for 
destruction’s sake to a virtue of “satan” (sadan 撒旦). Moreover, in becoming 
satanic, the human consciousness lifts itself above the worthies and sages, who 
are now the object of contempt.24
Tang’s insights into the human lust for power and its potential for cruelty 
contain several references to “satan,” but also to “god” (shangdi 上帝) or “father” 
( fu 父).25 It is difficult to explain why Tang used such terms. To be sure, he did 
not introduce an ontological notion of evil here, and this also holds true for an 
allegorical passage in which he claimed that the satan is a “satan in the human 
mind,” who “stands at our side at any moment.”26 While Tang was not inter-
ested in situating evil ontologically, he did explain that it only emerges when 
22   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 564–565.
23   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 111.
24   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 395. It seems significant that Tang does not refer 
to the subject of the lust for power solely with the pronoun of the third person singular 
or by general references to “the human being” or “the lust for power.” These types of ref-
erences would insinuate a safe distance between the “I” of the interpreter and his read-
ers, on the one hand, and the subject of the lust for power under scrutiny, on the other. 
Instead, Tang often uses personal pronouns of the first person (“I,” “we”) in this context. 
He apparently had no intention to grant any exceptions from the potential affliction by 
the lust for power, thereby denying any pre-established moral superiority to himself or his 
readers.
25   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 113.
26   Ibid., p. 112.
CHAPTER 7168
“human nature cannot completely reveal itself.”27 He consequently suggested 
that the full actualization of one’s human nature, in which one has “exerted the 
mind” and “knows human nature,” is certainly without evil. Yet, the individual’s 
self-absorption with the lust for power seems to belong to human nature, too, 
and only momentarily dissipates at the stage of an ephemeral, sagely actual-
ization. There is a peculiar change in perspective here, inasmuch as the lust 
for power is not seen as the result of an unrestrained display of human nature 
(in terms of instincts and passions), but, on the contrary, as a symptom of the 
incomplete manifestation of human nature (xing) itself. According to Tang’s 
civil theology, this failure is due to the fact that the individual is still in a state 
of self-imposed constraint vis-à-vis his or her true nature.
The references to satan and god seem to be more allegorical than theologi-
cal in nature. Tang rarely used these allegories, and when he did, he did so 
without any specific relation to theological concepts from Jewish-Christian 
traditions. Significantly, there are passages in which he directly combined the 
terms “satan” and “god” with Confucian terms like (good) “innate knowing” 
(liang zhi) and (evil) “selfish desires” (si yu 私欲), without any elucidation of 
their mutual relation.28 The somewhat enigmatic notion of selfish desires does 
not denote a specific set of desires or behavioral impulses, but rather a particu-
lar, i.e. egotistic, way in which individuals try to satisfy their needs. It is in this 
context that Tang depicted the source of evil as an “unrestricted expansion of 
the will for power inside the substratum of the human mind,”29 which he thus 
identified with the pure will for power.
For Tang, evil, as it becomes manifest in the pure will for power, is a prob-
lem of human subjectivity. Even though he conceded that social structures and 
orders can effectuate evil results, he rejected the idea that human subjectivity 
and free will are completely subdued by social structures. He thus insisted that 
social systems should be regarded as if they were formed and validated by the 
human mind.30 Although he did not explicitly refer to the concept of freedom 
in this context, it is clear that his concept of the pure will for power is closely 
related to the free will. Evil is therefore neither a necessary consequence of 
economic, political, or social structures, nor an inevitable epiphenomenon 
27   Ibid., p. 107.
28   Ibid., p. 113. In this context Huang Zhaoqiang’s discussion of Tang’s Rensheng zhi tiyan 
is instructive: Huang quotes Tang’s statement that he takes the term “deity” (shen 神) to 
refer to the human being’s “immanent spirit;” see Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang Junyi 
de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai, p. 33.
29   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 108.
30   Ibid., p. 104.
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of the human being’s animalistic nature. In fact, the manifestation of a pure 
will for power lifts the human being beyond his or her animalistic nature: 
Because humans, unlike animals, are self-conscious and possess a “mind,” they 
have an insatiable lust for power, wherein the yearnings exceed the satisfaction 
of mere animalistic and materialistic needs. Tang elaborated on this notion of 
an insatiable lust for power by distinguishing between a pure “will for power” 
(synonymously, a “lust for power” quanli yu 權力欲), and an “unconscious” 
(bu zijue 不自覺) will for power. The latter, constituted by life-preserving 
instincts like the sense of hunger and the sexual drive, is common to both 
human beings and animals. It targets particular objects and can consequently 
be satisfied. It is hence “restricted” and not “necessarily” evil.31
In Tang’s view, it was the blind spot in the political thought of pre-modern 
Confucians that they overlooked the satanic, irrational presence of a lust for 
power, which is inherently insatiable and condemns the individual to a life of 
compulsive repetition (to use a Freudian expression). Tang wanted to elimi-
nate this blind spot, for there is a lot at stake:
[If] people do not recognize the existence of this evil [of the pure lust 
for power], they also cannot truly understand what socio-political sys-
tems and cultural forms [actually are] that really contain evil. Neither 
can they truly understand what socio-political systems and cultural 
forms are the best.32
It therefore will not suffice to put one’s confidence solely in the good deeds 
of the worthies and sages, who validated “the values of human existence and 
culture” (i.e. guiding values in ethics, religions, science, arts, education, and the 
economy). After all, the pure will for power may completely reject all the values 
and deeds of the worthies and sages at any time.33 What is more, the pure will 
for power is neither a mere pathological phenomenon, nor a demonic aberra-
tion of the human being, but rather a “natural” incitement for political action. 
As Tang argues, the very quest for political power marks the core of political 
history, and the lust for power is a motivational force which drives history.34
Nevertheless, striving for power is not an exclusively political phenomenon. 
As Tang’s theory of power posits, power itself as well as the lust for power are 
sociologically amorphous in the sense of Max Weber. They become manifest, 
31   Ibid., pp. 109, 111.
32   Ibid., p. 110.
33   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 395.
34   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 182.
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to cite examples provided by Tang, in a “concealed” manner in the mutual 
depreciation of scholars, writers and artists, in the dogmatic claims to truth by 
religious leaders and moral experts, and in people’s indulgence in debauchery 
and hunger for profit. Individuals may even become captivated by the lust for 
power when they strive for the values of truth, beauty, and good.35
 Introspection in the Will for Power
Tang defined politics, like Weber, on the basis of its specific means of power 
and force. He also related the function of politics conceptually to the sphere 
of the state. The function of politics, namely, is to ensure the existence of the 
state and to uphold, if necessary by the use of force, the social order.36 But 
unlike Weber, Tang tried to define politics with respect to its goal (its “essence,” 
in the words of Tang), which he thus defined as achieving “an arrangement for 
a reasonable distribution of power.” From this perspective, politics can be con-
ceptualized as a sphere in which one may strive for the good.37 This does not 
mean, however, that there was or could be a superior type of politics which is 
completely devoid of struggles for power. On the contrary, politics in general 
is characterized by particularly vehement manifestations of wills for power, 
including the irrational lust for power. After all, as Tang suggested, political 
actors must strive for power. They are thus distinct from scholars, writers, art-
ists, and religious leaders, who may at times orientate their actions toward the 
goal of gaining power, but may also go about their affairs without striving for 
power. In contrast, the political actors who want to attain a reasonable arrange-
ment of power in society do not have such a choice, for they need power if they 
want to achieve their goals.38
Tang obviously made good on the call of the manifesto of 1958 for a dis-
tinction between moral and political subjectivity by conceptualizing poli-
tics as a particular sphere of activity in which the actors inevitably strive for, 
and make extensive use of, power (including the legitimate use of force in 
terms of state power). In the course of struggling for power and force, and 
by making use of these means, political actors always run the risk of being 
severely afflicted by these means psychically and morally. Similar to Weber, 
Tang reflected on this sort of self-endangerment of political actors by call-
35   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 112.
36   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 390.
37   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 113.
38   Ibid., pp. 113–114.
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ing attention to the fact that the actors’ own lust for power may grow “eas-
ily” and in a “hidden” way. The danger of becoming completely absorbed by 
the lust for power is particularly great in the political sphere, since politics is 
essentially concerned with the arrangement of power, and it thus provides 
the “deepest” satisfaction for the lust for power.39 It is for this reason that Tang 
conceived of politics and political activity in terms of the exposure of actors 
to the “satanic” potential of their own lust for power.
Even though Tang conceptualized politics with an emphasis on irrational 
elements that are deeply rooted in the human lust for power, he also reflected 
on political action in terms of opportunities for actors to express their “innate” 
capacity for goodness. Hence the lust for power, though belonging to the natu-
ral endowments of the human being, does not completely dominate politi-
cal action. To argue this crucial point, Tang set out to establish that human 
beings are not held captive to the lust for power, but may lift themselves above 
it. He therefore undertook an analysis of the consciousness of power-seeking 
 individuals—an approach which entails a phenomenological introspection 
into the subjective consciousness as well as deeper psychic layers.
It is safe to say that Tang, in his analysis, had neither predecessors nor suc-
cessors in Confucian thought. The structure of the analysis is such that it 
reveals an inner dialectic of the individual will for power, which is related to 
the famous master-servant dialectic from Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit.40 
Yet Tang did not mention Hegel in this context, perhaps because he not only 
felt that the reference was all too obvious—he introduced the figures of “mas-
ter” (zhuren 主人) and “servant” (or “slave”; nuli 奴隸)—but also potentially 
misleading.41 Be that as it may, the focal point of Tang’s phenomenology of the 
39   Ibid.
40   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 185–197. In his article “The sources of human-
ity’s evil” (see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 104–115), Tang 
related the analysis of the pure will for power rudimentarily to the dialectical structure of 
the individual’s struggle for recognition.
41   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 189, 192. Liu Guoqiang does not elaborate on 
the proximity of Tang’s analysis to Hegel’s phenomenology of self-consciousness that 
introduces the notion of a struggle for recognition between “master” and “servant.” As 
a consequence, Liu interprets Tang’s thought as if Tang were to present a dogma which 
states that human self-consciousness naturally tends to transcend the (empirical) “self;” 
see Liu, “Tang Junyi de zhengzhi zhexue,” pp. 59–61. The fact that the notion of a (self-) 
transcending self-consciousness is fundamental to Tang’s thought is also stated by Shun 
Kai Kevin Cheng in: Cheng, Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the 
Realization of Moral Life: A Comparative Study, pp. 231–236, 247–248. Nevertheless, it 
seems problematic to interpret Tang’s analysis of the human consciousness of power 
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lust for power is the assumption that individuals, while giving in to the lust for 
power, may still attain an enlightening realization of their “true” moral nature.
For Tang, the human lust for power is first and foremost a desire to subdue 
others.42 This desire is initially sustained by a self-referential “blind adher-
ence” to power on the part of the empirical self (the “real self”). However, self- 
consciousness is not restricted to the empirical self—it is a “doubled self” which 
is revealed in the will for power itself:43 Apart from the empirical self, there is 
the “transcendent self,” which is manifested in the willingness to risk one’s life 
(i.e. the life of the empirical self) in the struggle for power. The transcendent 
self strives to overcome the opponent’s lust for power and force the opponent 
to acknowledge it as the superior will. The “very first impulse” of the transcen-
dent self to subdue the opponent consists in a yearning to gain such recogni-
tion. This necessarily implies that the transcendent self initially recognizes the 
opposing consciousness as equal, for otherwise the recognition (by an already 
inferior opponent) would be meaningless.44 Indeed, the depth of the satisfac-
tion which the will for power attains by subduing an opposing will depends 
upon the strength of the opponent.45 Nevertheless, once the opposing will is 
forced into submission, its recognition cannot continue to satisfy the victori-
ous consciousness of power, because the latter no longer  recognizes the  inferior 
will as an equal.46 At this point, the superior consciousness experiences a “great 
emptiness” (da kongxu 大空虛):
When, therefore, what is regarded as the human being’s will for power 
reaches [a point where it has] nothing left to achieve and [thus] perceives 
that there are no more human wills worthy of its antagonism, worthy of 
fighting [it] for supremacy, it will turn around and perceive a great emp-
tiness. This was so when Liu Bang could not help crying when [reciting] 
“Now that my might rules all within the seas;”47 and it was also so when 
Alexander, after unifying Persia and reaching India, gazed into the vast 
without taking note of his dialectical approach. For an insightful critique of his notion 
of (self-)transcendence, see Chan, “Tang Junyi: Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture,” 
pp. 316–318.
42   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 182.
43   Ibid., pp. 182–184.
44   Ibid., pp. 183–185.
45   Ibid., p. 186.
46   Ibid., p. 187.
47   Tang quotes here from the Song of the Great Wind, which is traditionally attributed to Liu 
Bang (canonized as Emperor Gao of Han; 256–195 BCE). Liu Bang is said to have written the 
song upon returning to his ancestral village after suppressing a rebellion in 196 BCE. 
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sea shedding tears. Hence, the will for power, true to its original nature, is 
in the end unable to find satisfaction. (. . .) Now that the constant surren-
dering of an antagonistic will must be continued, an antagonistic will is 
constantly being discovered, sought out and established, right until every 
antagonistic will is forced into submission, up to the point where [the 
will for power] arrives at the great emptiness.48
The dialectic structure of the recognition-based struggle for power propels 
self-consciousness into an idling cycle. Within this cycle, the pure will for 
power, which is by definition insatiable, restless and finally aimless, is perpetu-
ally trapped. But human self-consciousness is not dully tied to this cycle and 
may eventually overcome the blindness of the will for power at the very point 
where it gains insight into its inner self-contradiction as a will for power. The 
tears of Liu Bang, the founder of the Han Dynasty, and Alexander the Great 
testify to the awareness that the will for power cannot further expand into the 
“great emptiness” and is hopelessly trapped by its inner restlessness. At this 
point, a “reversal” towards moral consciousness may take shape, which Tang 
elucidated in the following step of introspection in the dialectic of the con-
sciousness of power. Toward this end, he again reflected on the victorious will 
for power and on the consolidation of its rule once victory has been attained.
As a point of departure, Tang established the fact that the victorious will 
must secure the obedience of the conquered will in order to safeguard its rul-
ing position. If the victorious will manifests itself solely as an irrational, ani-
malistic drive, it cannot expect obedience in the long run, for this requires the 
issuance of orders in a regular, normalized manner and form. The obedience 
it obtains is even deeper if it acquires honor and wealth during the course of 
its rule, which in turn earns it the admiration of the conquered will. Yet in 
striving for honor and wealth, it depends, nonetheless, on the conquered will 
to recognize the merit of such striving. What is more, the quest for honor and 
wealth involves objects that cannot be enjoyed by all wills to the same degree. 
They are the privilege of the ruling will, which inevitably gives rise to envy. The 
ruling will, therefore, cannot secure the obedience of the inferior will in a com-
plete and lasting way. For this reason, the ruling will is compelled to conceal its 
“selfishness” (si xin 私心).49
The above translation is Burton Watson’s; see Minford, Classical Chinese Literature. An 
Anthology of Translations Volume 1: From Antiquity to the Tang Dynasty, p. 415.
48   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 187.
49   Ibid., pp. 188–197.
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Permanent and “deep” obedience may only be established if the admiration 
of the inferior will is not due to the victorious will’s possession of an external 
object, but is directed at something internal to the victorious will. Inasmuch 
as the object of admiration is not extrinsic, material and quantifiable, but 
intrinsic to the will (i.e. related to inner qualities), it remains, at least in theory, 
accessible to all the wills. Part of these inner qualities is the ability to recognize 
and realize values related to truth and beauty. Because this specific ability does 
not require the possession of external, limited goods, the inferior will does not 
envy the victorious will, but rather recognizes its exemplarity stemming from a 
superior ability to realize certain values. Yet, the display of this ability in truth 
and beauty still involves goods that are external to the victorious will.50 At this 
stage, it therefore still receives no recognition solely for its own sake, but for 
the external values that it creates and embodies. Such recognition does not 
reflect the ultimate degree of recognition—the latter is only attained if the 
victorious will displays an exemplarity due to qualities that are completely 
inside the will itself and hence represent the highest degree of universality 
(in terms of being theoretically attainable by any will).51 This pertains, most 
of all, to “moral values” that become manifest within the victorious will and 
may thus be universally recognized as “objective values.”52 Significantly, the 
deepest, i.e. voluntary, obedience is therefore achieved only by those who take 
up their position of power as a “moral personality.”53 Tang highlighted this 
change of perspective towards the moral person as a “reversal” of the con-
sciousness of power:
The great emptiness, which [exists] after obtaining absolute power, 
causes the human being to perceive that since there is nothing to which 
power [may] be extended, [the absolute power] must also necessarily be 
reversed. Through such a reversal, the transcendent self reveals [itself]. 
In this way, [the absolute power] can also do an about-face and have 
compassion for the antagonist that it killed. It [can] even protect and 
care for the antagonists who surrendered; or it [can] divide power with 
human beings whom it initially ignored, like enemies who surrendered to 
it and those who are under its command. If the will for power, therefore, 
50   Ibid., pp. 197–200.
51   Ibid., p. 201.
52   Ibid., p. 202.
53   Ibid., p. 203. The reference to Kant is obvious; see also He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, p. 119.
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truly aspires to find peace, it will necessarily transform [itself] into or 
initiate a sort of moral will.54
Tang obviously assumed that once the will for power subjugates its antagonist, 
it falls into an abysmal idling cycle of restlessness. This compels it to perpetu-
ally repeat its power-driven behavior, even though it is already in a situation 
where no equal antagonist can emerge. The only escape from this “great empti-
ness” is the self-transformation (“reversal”) of the will for power into a “sort of 
moral will.” The will for power thus seems to be capable of overcoming itself 
and predetermined to do so exactly because, as long as it requires an antago-
nistic will, it inevitably fails to satisfy its claim to recognition from others in a 
self-sufficient manner.
However, this auto-therapeutic transformation is extremely demanding. It 
requires self-consciousness to fully grasp the dialectical mode of its own will 
for power and to recognize the inner contradiction of a will for power which 
collapses upon confronting a dead end, namely, the intrinsic impossibility of 
its own satisfaction. Tang, in fact, posited here that human beings, due to the 
very nature of their lust for power, ultimately strive to overcome once and for 
all an “inner,” psychic and intellectual state of restlessness by realizing their 
moral subjectivity. Significantly, Tang had dealt with the topic of eradicating 
the pull of the instincts and the lust for power in his reflections about the sub-
lime realm of sagehood, where the chasms of subject and object, self and oth-
ers, I and self are extinguished. It is therefore likely that his reference to the 
“transcendent self” and the initiation of “a sort of moral will” in the passage 
quoted above alludes to the state of sagehood as it unfolds in liang zhi.
With respect to the mundane life situation of the empirical self, the conclu-
sion presents itself that since the state of attaining sagehood (or liang zhi) is 
impermanent, the self-transforming reversal of the will for power also does not 
produce a permanent state of existence. Otherwise, by overcoming the absorp-
tion of the self in power-driven behavior, the individual could terminate the 
totality of his or her political life once and for all. But the promise of an apoliti-
cal life, which is free from the impact of power and power-seeking, is not what 
Tang had in mind here. The “reversal” rather constitutes a recurrent task in 
the individual’s moral endeavors. This understanding of moral self-reflection 
is highly optimistic. It entails the expectation that the ego’s introspection 
amounts to a self- liberation from the idle cycle of insatiable power-seeking. 
The ego is seen here as a self- consciousness capable of learning from its 
54   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 187–188.
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experience as a will for power and, consequently, of “rationally” choosing a 
superior mode of self- fulfillment. Given this capacity to dominate its irrational 
side, the ego advances to a position of self-mastery in which it no longer strives 
for the recognition of others anymore and therefore can refrain from futile 
power-seeking. To paraphrase Freud, the ego is thus portrayed as a master in 
its own house. Tang’s notion of an active initiation of the reversal also stands 
in stark contrast to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will in The World as Will 
and Representation. It remains open to debate whether Tang’s philosophy of 
the will for power was at all informed by Schopenhauer. Nonetheless, Tang’s 
notion of self-cultivation clearly contradicts Schopenhauer’s assumption that 
insight into the workings of the will only liberates the human being to res-
ignation and renunciation and merely offers the peace and consolation that 
comes from the knowledge that whatever befalls a person is inevitable and 
irreversible.
Tang’s analysis of the will for power has repercussions for his reflection on 
the foundations of socialization. As the foregoing analysis of the dialectic sug-
gests, even in constellations that are characterized by power struggles, indi-
viduals remain, albeit unintentionally, within the horizon of the moral will 
and moral subjectivity. Hence, the individual’s socialization ultimately rests 
not solely on a rational calculus of self-interests, but on the moral implications 
of the antagonistic structure of the struggle for recognition. Tang’s explana-
tion of the foundation of the social state of existence thus differed from con-
tract theories in Western philosophy, which place much more emphasis on the 
individuals’ (enlightened) self-interests as a basis for their willingness to par-
ticipate in collective life. It is therefore hardly surprising that Tang took issue 
with the Hobbesian theory of a social contract, as well as mainstream contract 
theories, by stating that such an approach conveys a one-sided and pessimistic 
image of human nature. He critically added that since these theories depict 
the individuals’ mutual recognition solely in terms of contractual provisions, 
such intersubjective recognition is inevitably restricted in terms of scope and 
duration.55
At first glance, there seems to be congruence between Tang’s and Hegel’s 
theory of recognition, which also took a critical stance towards contract theo-
ries. As Axel Honneth demonstrates, Hegel tried to show that “subjects can, 
on their own, reach a conflict resolution based on law (as formulated in the 
55   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 392, 416–417; see also Tang, Wenhua yishi yu 
daode lixing, pp. 245–249. On Tang’s criticism of social contract theories, see also Liu, 
“Tang Junyi de zhengzhi zhexue,” p. 65.
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social contract) even under conditions of hostile competition.” With this aim 
in mind, Hegel, in contrast to contract theories, conceptualized the adoption 
of the social contract not as an intellectual construct which claims theoreti-
cal necessity, but as an “empirical necessity” arising from the social constel-
lation itself. Hegel, according to Honneth, argues “that all human coexistence 
presupposes a kind of basic mutual affirmation between subjects” which 
entails a “moral potential evidenced in the individual’s willingness to recip-
rocally restrict their own spheres of liberty.” Thus, an “implicit form of legal 
consciousness” takes shape here. As Hegel assumed, individuals are ready to 
make the transition from the natural state to the social state “at the moment 
in which they become conscious of their prior relationship of recognition.”56 
Hegel therefore, like Tang, attempted to uncover the potential for ethical 
relations in the midst of present hostilities relating to empirical struggles for 
 recognition—a potential which Hegel understood to be foundational for the 
legal arrangement of coexistence.
There is, nonetheless, a fundamental difference between Hegel’s and Tang’s 
approaches insofar as Tang, in the end, did not anchor this ethical potential 
within intersubjective relations, but within the subjective inwardness of the 
individual who gains insight into the spiritual necessity of a “reversal.” It is cer-
tainly no coincidence that Tang exemplified the formation of moral subjec-
tivity, which arises from the power struggle for recognition, with the solitary 
figures of Liu Bang and Alexander the Great. Tang conceptualized the indi-
vidual’s willingness to restrain his or her own lust for power and engage in an 
intersubjective practice of self-cultivation, ethical life, and legal coexistence 
as stemming from the subjective mind’s own inner exploration. Indeed, it is 
in this existentialist sense that he interpreted the Mencian notion that a man 
should “give full realization to his mind ( jin qi xin)” in order to “understand 
his own nature (zhi qi xing).” Yet, Tang’s and Hegel’s ideas are in conformity in 
another important respect: Both denied that the subjectivity of the individual 
arises from a higher, pre-existing ethical harmony. In fact, they each suggested 
that the formation of subjectivity occurs only when traditional ideas of a sub-
stantive unity or harmony are shattered.
56   All quotes from Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, pp. 42–43.
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 The Moral Dimension of the Political Will
Tang Junyi had no intention of playing down the “satanic” impetus of the 
human lust for power as a mere prelude to the unfolding of moral subjectivity. 
His interest in the lust for power indeed centers on the question of how moral 
subjectivity emerges in the midst of the omnipresence of the lust for power in 
human existence. From this perspective, we may understand Tang’s specula-
tion as addressing a question which we may phrase in allusion to his allegorical 
language: How do we reconcile the Confucian belief in human nature, in which 
everyone can become a sage like the legendary emperors Yao or Shun, with 
the realization that in fact everyone wants to become a Liu Bang or Alexander 
the Great (if only in their daily struggle for prestige or wealth)? Tang did not 
content himself with the mere claim that individuals, even if they are involved 
in acts of utter cruelty, may still experience sudden moments of a “discon-
certment within the inner spirit” which indicate that moral intuition (“innate 
knowing”) is not absent altogether.57 He wanted to bolster this assertion with 
his analysis of the lust for power. His phenomenological introspection into the 
workings of its inner dialectic should demonstrate that individuals, who by 
all appearances are completely captivated by their lust for power, still accord 
with (self-)restrictions on their drive for power that point them in the direction 
of morality. The lust for power is hence intrinsically related to the formation of 
moral subjectivity. Tang consequently refrained from depicting morality solely 
as an antipode of the lust for power that tries to restrain, subdue, or even extin-
guish it. Morality is rather the ultimate escape that comes into view even as the 
will for power faces the “great emptiness,” i.e. the stagnancy of its dialectical 
movement, which is in terminal self-contradiction.
However, the “great emptiness” itself is clearly not the same as the vacuity 
of the “void potency [and] bright awareness” (xu ling ming jue), which the indi-
vidual achieves as the state of mind in which moral intuition (liang zhi) occurs. 
Neither Liu Bang nor Alexander the Great actualizes liang zhi and becomes a 
sage in the moment of despair when faced with the paralyzing emptiness after 
the last victory. The “great emptiness” is not identical with the “void potency,” 
which emerges from the successful practice of self-fulfillment. Whereas such 
practice leads the human spirit to the vacuity of the “void potency [and] bright 
awareness,” the engagement in power struggles only produces the consuming 
emptiness of a restless lust for power.
The distinction between the “great emptiness” and the vacuity of the “void 
potency [and] bright awareness” is also crucial because it indicates a line of 
57   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 565.
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demarcation between a Nietzschean conception of power and morality and 
Tang’s conceptualization. When solely considering Tang’s reflection about the 
formation of moral subjectivity in the “great emptiness,” a quasi-Nietzschean 
conclusion seems to suggest itself: Moral subjectivity ultimately evolves out of 
a frustrated, pure will for power. Even though such a conclusion does not entail 
the idea of a genealogical development of power vis-à-vis morality in human 
history, it still bears a Nietzschean imprint. As a matter of fact, Tang remained 
skeptical about (Confucian) claims that traditional ethical relations and prac-
tice (i.e. of self-cultivation) should be considered morally correct per se. Indeed, 
as we have seen, he even warned against the danger of an aberrant practice 
of self-cultivation that is carried out under the false pretext of moral educa-
tion. What is more, the dialectical analysis of the lust for power demonstrates 
that the “deepest” (voluntary) obedience is paid to a will that functions as a 
model of moral exemplarity. Here, too, one might therefore argue that morality 
remains closely intertwined with ulterior power-related issues. Yet, moral intu-
ition emerges in the vacuity of the “void potency [and] bright awareness,” and 
connotes a solitary, spiritual self-transgression of the subjective mind. This is 
the very point at which Tang departed from Nietzsche: Because moral intuition 
is situated in the state of spiritual vacuity, it is, in fact, detached from any inter-
subjective practice, whether or not it is dominated by the lust for power. It can 
only be speculated why Tang did not discuss Nietzsche’s  philosophy of power 
in-depth, and it is also unclear whether he ever even studied the German 
 philosopher.58 Perhaps his silence on Nietzsche is due to an implicit trait in his 
civil theology which tends to ignore incommensurable ideas, trusting instead 
that they, in the worst case, turn out to be temporary stumbling blocks along 
the spiritual path to the realm of self-fulfillment.
With its skepticism towards claims about an allegedly superior, tradi-
tional ethics, Tang’s reflection on power has repercussions for his notion of 
self-cultivation. For one, self-cultivation, which requires the practitioner to 
“understand his own nature (zhi qi xing),” inevitably entails the danger that 
the diabolic side of human nature manifests itself, in either explicit or hidden 
form. After all, self-cultivation inevitably takes place under the condition of 
the subject’s inextricable absorption with the lust for power and hence cannot 
58   Tang’s diaries from 1948 onwards, in which he listed his readings with minutely detail, do 
not give any hint at an intensive study of Nietzsche. In the context of his reflection about 
power, Tang mentions Nietzsche only in passing, once negatively, at another point more 
affirmatively. For an affirmative statement, see Tang’s article “The sources of humanity’s 
evil” (in: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 110); for a critical refer-
ence, see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 565.
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be considered immune from moral failure. Indeed, it is the awareness of a ten-
sion between essence (moral nature; xing) and existence (in a reality marked 
by manifold power-relations, most of all in political life) which sustains the 
continuing effort of self-cultivation: Individuals should neither presume that 
they embody unlimited goodness and perfection, nor that their actions are 
thoroughly characterized by purely moral motivations, morally correct rea-
soning, and morally fully accountable effects. Tang therefore criticized his 
Confucian predecessors for falsely believing that political activity (i.e. exis-
tence) can be turned into an “immediate extension of the moral conscious-
ness” (i.e. essence).59 A moral consciousness may enable the human being to 
strive for the ethical good in politics, but it does not necessarily allow him or 
her to eliminate evil.60 Human beings must brace themselves for the bleak 
prospect that their political will cannot offer any guarantee for the realization 
of moral goals by the use of moral means. Tang resisted here the wide-spread 
Confucian belief that human beings can realize political and social ideals, pro-
vided that their choice of means and aims truly conforms to the standards of 
a higher (Heavenly) order—or, as seen from another perspective, the claim 
that human beings who fail to realize political and social ideals apparently 
erred in their conception of the highest good in the first place. Tang, for his 
part, did not share the basic assumption of this belief, namely, that the inten-
sity of the “ought” (aspired to by the moral will) determines the very reality in 
which the human will exists. Such an ideologically loaded moral ontology, by 
the way, has not lost its attractiveness in Confucianism today. A tell-tale sign 
is the peculiar type of appellative Confucian rhetoric with which some propo-
nents of Confucianism express their conviction that the successful implemen-
tation of their ideas immediately depends on the intensity of the moral will (as 
expressed by their urgency of their appeal to the reader).
Tang rejected the conceptualization of the political as an extension of 
morality not only because it weakens the defenses of modern Confucianism 
against political ideologies. There is also the fact that in the ideologically dis-
torted vision of a thoroughly moralized, depoliticized reality, “moral efforts” 
by individuals are bound to disappear altogether, for there would no longer be 
a reason to strive for moral self-improvement in a perfect world. This would 
clearly contradict Tang’s liberal credo that each individual must take up his or 
her own personal struggle for moral integrity. If the individual abandons this 
59   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 419.
60   Ibid., p. 396. In another passage, Tang stated that the “evil” in politics might be 
“reduced”—though, tellingly, he did not claim that evil may be eliminated for good; see 
Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 114–115.
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struggle, nothing less than the “death of the humanistic world” is at stake. Any 
opportunity to establish a humanistic world of the “highest harmony” would 
be forsaken, because harmony and relations of “mutual excitation” (xiang 
gan 相感) between individuals require the possibility of “deviation.” The ideal 
humanistic world is therefore different from a world of “great uniformity” 
(da tong), in which the political nature of the human being would be elimi-
nated for good in favor of a new man who is perfectly rational and virtuous.61 
Tang obviously criticized here Kang Youwei’s vision of a future world of great 
uniformity. But he also more than likely turns against the totalitarian ideology 
in the PRC, and perhaps also against the ideology of the GMD, for it was, after 
all, Sun Yat-sen who vehemently upheld the ideal of a great uniformity in his 
Three Principles of the People.62 
61   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 71.
62   Sun, San minzhuyi, p. 50.
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CHAPTER 8
On Statehood
 Failed Statehood in China
Tang did not develop his ideas about a modern state out of a purely theoreti-
cal interest, but in the context of his diagnosis that China’s current political 
impasse, which he saw culminating in the communist victory on the Mainland 
in 1949, mostly consists of failures in state-building.1 He was convinced that 
these failures were mainly due to the dubious heritage bequeathed to the 
republic by imperial China, a heritage that entailed the notion of a spiritual 
ecumene (tianxia 天下)2 with an empire at the center of political power. In 
referring to the beginnings of imperial China, Tang asserted that with the uni-
fication of the ecumene during the Qin and the Han Dynasties, the concept 
of “statelet” (guo 國) became blurred and eventually disappeared altogether. 
Henceforth, the “clan system” (zongfa zhidu 宗法制度) was firmly established, 
while it was up to the literati-officials to consider themselves responsible for the 
fate of the ecumene. The concepts of clan/family ( jiating 家庭) and ecumene 
thus won out.3 This constellation is said to have remained for the most part 
unchanged in the course of Chinese history. As a consequence, the imagery of 
an ecumenical empire produced a type of “universalism” (shijiezhuyi 世界主義) 
that transgressed the particularistic notion of strengthening the dynastic state 
according to the legalist “principle of wealth and power” ( fuqiangzhuyi 富強
主義). Tang deemed this to be an unfortunate development, because it was the 
particularistic concept of the dynastic state that might have been conducive 
to the intellectual evolution of a modern Chinese nation-state (minzu guojia 
民族國家). Instead, Chinese concepts of state became engulfed by the uni-
versalistic notion of an ecumenical empire which blocked the coinage of a 
1   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 165.
2    The notion of “ecumene” (tianxia 天下) as applied to pre-imperial periods refers to the royal 
domain of the Zhou kings; with the unification of the empire and the ensuing dissolution 
of a royal domain, “tianxia” took on other meanings, including that of a global community 
consisting of civilized and not-yet civilized peoples; see also Weber-Schafer, Oikumene und 
Imperium, p. 9. Tang at times denoted by the term “tianxia” simply the “world” in a broad 
historical sense; see for example Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, p. 409.
3   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 154.
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modern concept of state. According to Tang, this amounted to the “deepest 
inner contradiction” of Chinese state-building up to the present time.4
Tang deplored the fact that the legalist notion of a powerful dynastic state 
had been downplayed in the historical evolution of Chinese political thought. 
He actually maintained that only legalism might have nurtured Western-type 
concepts of state. He further contended that as a result of the domination 
of ecumenical universalism, the Chinese developed a spirit of “self-oblivion” 
(wang wo 忘我), which left them incapable of taking hostile attitudes toward 
the outside world.5 Tang’s analysis of China’s failure to deploy a nation-state 
concept is without a doubt open to historical criticism. Still, his analysis is 
remarkable due to his refusal to portray Legalism as the historical culprit, as 
Confucian mainstream narratives would have it. What is more, given Tang’s 
assumption that a strong nation-state was indispensable for guiding the pro-
cess of modernization, this diagnosis refers back to a depiction of China’s 
thorny path to modernity. The bleak conclusion is that even though there 
were notions of empire and nation in traditional China, it took the historical 
events of the Qing Empire’s encounter with Western and Japanese imperial-
ism to pave the way for a concept of nation-state. Tang suggests that, as late 
as the 19th century and under “the impression of an invasion from the West,” 
China finally became aware of “modern industrial organization” and modern 
nation-states. During the confrontation with the “dynamic power of ‘hard, 
crystalline states’,” the traditional “consciousness of an ecumenical empire” 
(tianxia yishi 天下意識) began to crumble.6 Since then, there was the transfor-
mation from the “heavenly state” (tian guo 天國) of the Taiping movement to 
the “earthly state” (di guo 地國) of communist China, while the breakthrough 
to a “human state” (ren guo 人國) had not yet been achieved.7
What Tang meant by the incomplete breakthrough of the “human state” 
can be seen from his highly critical judgment of the ideas of state that were 
popular with Chinese elites at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning 
of the Republican period. Tang believed that, whereas the traditional clan 
system finally withered away during the period of China’s encounter with the 
West, the notion of an ecumenical empire lingered on, preventing the idea 
of a nation-state from gaining wide acceptance. He cited Tan Sitong, Kang 
Youwei, and Zhang Taiyan as thinkers who failed to devise a modern concept 
4   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 265.
5   Ibid., p. 266.
6   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 225; see also pp. 193–194.
7   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 263.
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of the nation-state, even though they rejected the traditional notions of fam-
ily and clan. To be sure, they strove for the preservation of the “land” and the 
“race,” but they still clung to the notion of the ecumenical empire and hence 
neglected the nation-state.8 This outlook, according to Tang, was in line with 
traditional Chinese political thought, which envisions a world unified without 
states.9
In his critique of Chinese thinkers who failed to establish a concept of state, 
Tang also included Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen. He elaborated that although 
Liang had been aware of the importance of the state and Sun of the impor-
tance of the nation, they, too, like Kang Youwei and Zhang Taiyan, upheld a 
vision of universal commonality, while neglecting the idea of elevating the 
state to the highest position.10 Tang’s criticism of Liang and Sun in particular 
seems unjustified and can only be understood in the context of his attempt to 
develop a new concept of state which should reconcile—in a Hegelian way—
ethics, the moral consciousness of the individual, and a constitutional state 
based on the rule of law (see below). Significantly, he contradicted Sun Yat-sen, 
who assumed in The Three Principles of the People that while a nation like the 
Chinese developed out of “natural,” non-violent resources, a state is predomi-
nantly the product of coercive means.11
The New Culture Movement which emerged during the second half of the 
1910s allegedly also failed to develop an adequate concept of state, although it 
succeeded in destroying the traditional “consciousness of the family” ( jiating 
yishi 家庭意識) in Chinese society.12 Tang assumed that the reasons why pro-
ponents of the New Culture Movement were not aware of the need to establish 
a strong and unified nation-state must be sought in their preoccupation with 
criticizing Chinese culture and history.13 This rebuke, however, was not meant 
8    Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 155. Tang lists in this context 
Kang Youwei’s The Book of Great Uniformity, Tan Sitong’s tract On Humanity (Renxue 
仁學, written in 1896/7) and Zhang Taiyan’s essay “On the Five Negations” (Wu wu lun 
五無論, published in the Minbao 民報 in 1907).
9    Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 160.
10   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 265.
11   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 155–156; see also p. 161. Tang 
was also convinced that it was detrimental to the establishment of a modern state with a 
democratic, constitutional government to focus, in the way Sun did, solely on nationalism 
and national consciousness, the so-called “people’s rights” (min quan 民權) and “people’s 
livelihood” (min sheng 民生); see ibid., pp. 159–161.
12   Ibid., pp. 155–156.
13   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 266.
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as a complete rejection of the movement. Tang rather took issue with the move-
ment’s refusal to merge its call for political reform and national reconstruction 
with a sound reinterpretation of China’s intellectual and historical traditions. 
He felt that by detaching itself from these traditions in a sweeping manner, the 
movement not only failed to gain broader acceptance of its political ideas, but 
it also missed an opportunity to critically reflect on its own attempt to absorb 
Western thought, traditions, and institutions.14
With respect to Chinese socialism, Tang astutely observed that the notion 
of an ecumenical empire was still present, albeit in a different form.15 For one, 
the aforementioned attitude of self-oblivion, together with the inability to per-
ceive the hostility of the outside world, led the CCP to forget, all too willingly, 
the crimes committed by the Soviet Union when invading China’s northeast. 
In the same spirit, he continued, countless Chinese youth were convinced 
that it would be possible to create a new world order. The traditional notion 
of the “ecumene as one family” (tianxia yi jia 天下一家) would be realized by 
the “brotherly friendship” of the Soviet Union and China.16 Tang hinted in this 
context at the conclusion that the Marxists’ negative view of the state as an 
instrument for repression readily accommodated the traditional, universalistic 
notion of a global ecumene.17
In spite of his elevation of the “consciousness of the state” to a position of 
eminent historical importance, Tang did not subscribe to the exaltation of the 
state in the circles of the Chinese Youth Party and the GMD’s right wing. He 
strongly criticized the “stateism” (guojiazhuyi 國家主義) of the Youth Party 
with its organic concept of the state and the “fascism” of the GMD, deeming 
both to be widespread after the dissolution of the first united front in the 1920s 
and during the war against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. In conclusion, Tang 
called the traditional heritage a mixed blessing, because the persistent longing 
for an ecumenical empire triggered radical reactions, ranging from fascist ten-
dencies to anti-fascist (Marxist) currents in which an ecumenical universalism 
survived, albeit in an unconscious manner.18
14   The manifesto of 1958 cites Chen Duxiu’s attack on Confucianism in the mid-1910s to 
explain that given such a negation of indigenous traditions, the only remaining (and 
unsuccessful) option was to try to establish political democracy as a foreign import: 
Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 42.
15   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 155–156.
16   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 266.
17   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 160–161.
18   Ibid., pp. 157–158, 161 (on the Youth Party).
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In the face of these failures, Tang made clear that a new “consciousness 
of the state” (guojia yishi 國家意識) was essential for establishing a modern 
nation-state in China. Yet such a consciousness could only take form in a 
“conscious, rational” process within the circles of the educated elite, and espe-
cially in the spheres of culture and scholarship. Without such awareness of 
the importance of the state, the vacuum that had emerged due to the dissolu-
tion of the traditional clan system and its “consciousness of the family” would 
be filled by an unrestrained, selfish individualism. The contemporary Chinese 
literati had, according to Tang, deceived themselves by adhering to the “ideal 
of the world as one family” (shijie yi jia zhi lixiang 世界一家之理想), but they 
could not deny the fact that they had indulged in a selfish, “absolute” individ-
ualism. As a result of such a pretense, the struggle between political parties 
became aggravated and led to chaos.19
Tang’s diagnosis of China’s failure in state-building since the mid-19th cen-
tury rests on a conceptual distinction between (age-old) nation and (mod-
ern) nation-state: The old Chinese nation in its dynastic form constituted an 
empire, but not a modern, territorial nation-state with fixed borders and a 
constitutional government. The bottom line here is that the Chinese nation 
had failed to produce a modern political form, and that such an effort—from 
a global perspective—was now belated. As Tang suggests, it was not until the 
second half of the 19th century that the quest for a nation-state gradually 
became the formative “historical experience of the Chinese nation.” During 
this period, the “political consciousness of the nation” evolved—if we are to 
follow Tang—through nine stages. Each of these was defined by specific politi-
cal developments carried out by political and intellectual elites: the Taiping 
Rebellion, the prolonged period of institutional reforms in the effort of “Self-
Strengthening,” the “Hundred Days’ Reform” in 1898, the republican revolution 
of 1911, the ensuing failure of the constitutional government, the New Culture 
Movement, the Northern expedition, which led to the formal national reuni-
fication of China under the GMD in 1928, the war of resistance against Japan, 
and finally the communist takeover in 1949.20 These nine stages are not to be 
interpreted as a progressive succession. On the contrary, they represent the 
continuing failure of Chinese elites to attain an authentic understanding of 
China’s national culture, which, in turn, impeded the effort to establish a dem-
ocratic nation-state as the adequate political form of the nation.
Tang conceded that there were also so-called “outer” historical factors 
responsible for the failed nation-state-building in China, but the main thrust of 
19   Ibid., pp. 159–161.
20   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 155–176.
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his analysis is focused on “inner,” intellectual factors, such as the persistence 
of misguided concepts of state, nation, bureaucracy, government, party as well 
as political counseling and planning. The reasons for these misconceptions 
supposedly pertain to “traditional Chinese thought,” Western ideas, age-old 
political and social habits, but also to the inherent weakness of human nature 
and “accidental” historical developments.21 As a result,  present-day China’s 
“problem” was still to be found in the fact that the “nation” was unable to estab-
lish a nation-state by democratic measures.22
The current situation was particularly bad, because it was characterized by 
a double failure in state building: The communist rule on the Mainland was, 
according to Tang, the biggest “outer” obstacle for the establishment of a mod-
ern nation-state. Yet, Tang also deemed the progress of the GMD’s regime on 
Taiwan in “democratic constitutional politics” to be “questionable.” It marked 
only the “beginning” of a development towards democratic, constitutional 
government. Tang detected deficits in democratic legitimacy on the part of the 
GMD government and concluded that it met the requirements for democratic 
constitutional government only in a formal respect (based on the constitution 
of 1947), but not in terms of democratic practice. It was therefore still unclear 
whether the “political consciousness” of the GMD government and its support-
ers was actually in full accordance with the “inherent goal” of the political con-
sciousness of the Chinese nation.23 This reference to the nation is telling, and 
even more so with respect to Tang’s depiction of China as a cultural nation. 
The fundamental conclusion is that both the CCP’s regime on the Mainland 
and the GMD’s regime on Taiwan were at odds with the eminent political val-
ues, ideas, and norms stemming from the humanistic “main current” of China’s 
national culture. It seems, indeed, that Tang was utterly disappointed, both 
21   Ibid., p. 178; see also pp. 179–180 (on concepts of political planning and bureaucracy), 
pp. 180–181, 184–187 (on concepts of the state), pp. 181–182 (on concepts of party and gov-
ernment), pp. 182–184 (on concepts of the nation).
22   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 36.
23   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 175–177. Tang shared this critical stance 
toward the GMD government on Taiwan with Taiwan-based liberal thinkers, among 
them Yin Haiguang and Zhang Foquan. To my knowledge, Tang hardly made any men-
tion of their work. This may be somewhat surprising, perhaps less so with respect to Yin 
Haiguang. One may surmise that Tang remained silent on Yin’s position due to the intense 
polemics between Yin and Tang’s fellow Confucian thinker Xu Fuguan. Another icon of 
Chinese liberal thought who is also largely absent from Tang’s work is Hu Shi. In the eyes 
of Tang, Hu was one of the chief proponents of a misguided scientism. This view, it seems, 
deterred Tang from discussing Hu’s criticism of the GMD, which had been prominent in 
China from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s.
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by the way that the GMD made political use of Confucian traditions24 and by 
the growing attacks on Confucianism on the Chinese Mainland. For him, nei-
ther the total elimination of Confucian traditions, nor their integration into a 
political ideology were adequate incentives for building a modern, democratic 
state embedded in national culture.
Tang’s thoughts on the formation of a modern nation-state in China are 
centered on two basic insights into the historical and normative dimension 
of state-building. First, modern nation-states cannot arise from a normative 
void, but only in the context of a reinterpretation of indigenous cultural and 
political traditions.25 In the Chinese case, this means that the concept of a 
modern nation-state must absorb normative inputs from a reinterpretation of 
Confucian humanism. It is against this background that Tang developed the 
idea that the Confucian “main current” of Chinese culture can only find its 
authentic historical expression in a modern, democratic state (see Chap. 11 
“Modernity and Agency”). Such a modern state was not only to entail a consti-
tutional government and the rule of law, but also to embody the community’s 
ethical substance. Tang even deemed its ethical values worthy of an “aes-
thetic appreciation.” Moreover, the state’s “transcendent existence”—i.e. the 
interconnection of ethical life and moral subjectivity—is worthy of religious 
reverence.26 This line of thought has a Hegelian twist, and Tang to be sure 
attested to the affinities of his own thought with Hegel’s theory of the state as 
the actuality of ethical life.27 But unlike Hegel, Tang attempted to fathom the 
normative resources of the democratic nation-state by interweaving the his-
torical, Confucian “main current” with the future-bound project of a modern 
Confucianism in the making. The ethical quality of the state is hence seen as 
constantly evolving out of the convergence between reinterpretations of the 
“main current,” on the one hand, and the requirements of constitutional gov-
ernment and the rule of law, on the other.
Tang’s second insight into the formation of a modern nation-state in China 
pertains to the concept of the Confucian “main current.” As we have seen, 
24   For an analysis of the ideological usage of Confucianism by the regime of the GMD, see 
Chun, “From Nationalism to Nationalizing,” pp. 136–141.
25   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 361.
26   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 263.
27   He professed that among Western theories of state, Hegel’s theory comes closest to his 
own ideas: Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 254. On Tang’s critique of Marxist and 
utilitarian concepts of state, and of contract theories and organic concepts of state, see 
Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 217, 238–253, and Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen 
zhi fazhan, pp. 198–199; see also Chap. 11 “History and Normativity.”
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he deemed an authentic understanding of the “main current” crucial for the 
foundation of a democratic nation-state. Conversely, the reinterpretation of 
Confucian traditions must be guided by concepts of a modern state and soci-
ety. A traditionalist reconstruction of Confucianism as a holistic force that 
conflates ethics, politics, law, and aesthetics is unwarranted because it would 
be detrimental to the formation of modern society. Consequently, Tang, as we 
have seen, introduced the differentiation of moral, aesthetic, political, and 
social dimensions to Confucianism and on this basis related Confucianism to 
the concept of constitutional democracy. The Confucian tradition is therefore 
not to be preserved in its entirety. Tang indeed considered the fragmentation 
of Confucianism to be inevitable, and this also pertained to the humanistic 
“main current.” In fact, it is under this premise that China’s national culture 
is to serve as the point of reference for the renewal of ethical life in modern 
China.
For the time being, however, a “democratic Chinese nation-state” which 
lives up to the official name of the new state—“Republic of China” (Zhonghua 
Minguo 中華民國)—was still in the making.28 Eventually, as Tang maintained, 
“Zhonghua” would exemplify “the continuity of China’s historical and cultural 
traditions” upheld by the “nation,” “people,” or “modern citizenship” within a 
modern state.29 In spite of all the setbacks since the mid-19th century, Tang 
was still unshaken in his belief that the progress toward a modern Chinese 
nation-state will finally prove to be irresistible. The source of this optimism 
was ultimately his conviction that, so far, the efforts of state-building had 
been undertaken without an adequate reinterpretation of the main current of 
Confucianism.30
 The State and Individual Self-Fulfillment
Tang considered the role of the state mainly from the perspective of the indi-
vidual’s quest for self-fulfillment. The state is to safeguard the freedom, safety, 
and livelihood of its members, and to secure the conditions for their ethical 
life.31 But the state must not be permitted to subject individuals to a dogmatic, 
28   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 175–176.
29   Ibid., p. 156.
30   Ibid., pp. 175–176.
31   Tang used several terms to refer to the notion of “ethical life” as he anticipated it for a 
modern China: “moral way of life” (daodexing shenghuo 道德性生活), “moral refinement 
and cultivation” (daode xiu yang 道德修養), but also, depending on the context, “culture” 
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petrified form of ethical life, for this would prevent them from actualizing their 
innate potential to attain self-fulfillment in moral intuition. Tang’s concept of 
the (future) political state as an embodiment of ethical life obviously requires 
that a distinction be made between the actual ethical life at a certain stage in 
history, on the one hand, and the moral subjectivity of individuals who are 
embedded in ethical life, but not predetermined by it, on the other.32 A politi-
cal state which subjects its citizens to dogmatism fails to live up to the true idea 
of a state, because it suppresses moral subjectivity. Consequently, Tang con-
ceived of an ideal state which embodies an ethical relation, without however 
suppressing moral subjectivity (i.e. “moral reason”). Against this backdrop, he 
developed his thoughts on human freedom. By freedom, he understood moral 
and spiritual self- fulfillment, and thus the authentic selfhood of the individual. 
This notion seems to harken back to Western concepts of positive freedom—
i.e. the freedom to participate, to cultivate one’s personality etc.—and nega-
tive freedom—i.e. freedom from undue intervention by the collectivity and 
most of all the state. But Tang explicitly claimed to follow a Confucian tra-
dition of identifying freedom as the freedom to build one’s personality and 
character and thereby attain the “true self” of an ethical person. Although the 
modern Chinese term for freedom, ziyou 自由, was unknown to pre-modern 
Confucianism, Tang listed expressions like “pursuing the perfection of one’s 
personality” (qiu renge de wanman 求人格的完滿), “self-fulfillment” (zi cheng 
自成), or “self-pursuit” (zi qiu 自求) as identical in meaning.33
The notions of freedom as selfhood and the self-realization of the individual 
are at the basis of Tang’s discussion of different kinds of individual and col-
lective freedom. The individual’s arbitrary freedom, political liberties, and the 
collective freedom of families, communities, societies, nations and states are 
all conceptualized in relation to the notion of freedom as the moral, spiritual, 
and intellectual self-realization of individuals.34 Significantly, Tang assumed 
that the individual rights and liberties that have developed in Western soci-
eties did not perforce contradict a renewed Confucian notion of freedom 
as the self-realization of individuals in an ethical context. He even took this 
(wenhua 文化), “(objective) spirit” ( jingshen 精神) or “spiritual substance” ( jingshen 
shiti 精神實體). With respect to morals in the traditional sense of an ethos, he speaks of 
fengsu xiguan 風俗習慣; see e.g. Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 601.
32   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 610.
33   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 378; see also p. 346.
34   On Tang’s theory of freedom, see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 330–346; see 
also Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 606.
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assertion one step further, trying to show that Confucian concepts of toler-
ance and solidarity have a vital function as social and ethical safeguards for 
individual  liberties.35 Here, “tolerance” (duliang 度量) entails the willingness 
to brook another person’s choice of values and ideals. Solidarity, on the other 
hand, requires the willingness to support other individuals in their attempt to 
realize their choices of values and ideals and thus to actively help them build 
their ethical personality, thereby displaying one’s “humane mind” (ren xin 
仁心).36 It is on this basis that Tang explored how an individual and a collective 
consciousness of solidarity take shape within the contexts of the family, the 
state, and the international order of nation-states.
With respect to individuals, Tang did not conceptualize tolerance and soli-
darity as either civic duties or civic virtues, but, significantly, as expressions 
of individual freedom. Tolerance and solidarity are seen as requirements for the 
individual’s freedom to strive for self-realization, and therefore as indispens-
able assets of a community whose individual members are free to choose their 
own path towards self-realization. Tolerance and solidarity are thus connected 
to the actualization of freedom, and specifically to the individual’s expression 
of selfhood. In practicing tolerance and solidarity, individuals actualize their 
essentially ethical nature and, at the same time, display their freedom by act-
ing on their ethical mindset. The crux of this conceptualization of freedom 
consists of the interrelation between individual rights and liberty, on the one 
hand, and renewed morals or Sittlichkeit (i.e. substantial freedom), on the 
other. Tang understood individual rights and liberty as a precondition for 
the (Confucian) renewal of morals, whereas renewed morals, in turn, serve to 
safeguard individual rights and liberty within the political community.
Tang was probably aware of the fact that there are counterparts in Western 
political thought that match, at least in part, his own reasoning, such as theo-
ries of civic virtues in the traditions of republican thought.37 One may also find 
35   Here and in what follows: Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 343–346.
36   Tang did not introduce a modern Chinese word for “solidarity,” possibly because there was 
no such neologism established yet. Depending on the context, he relied instead on a num-
ber of related terms such as “responsibility” (Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 293), 
“moral responsibility” (Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 295, 297), “sense of respon-
sibility” (Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 293), “love for the family” (Tang, Wenhua 
yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 295, 297), “love for the state” (Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lix-
ing, pp. 295–298) “consciousness of love for the state” (Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, 
p. 295), “loyalty toward the state” (Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 298).
37   This line of reasoning about republican thought had been explicitly pursued, for exam-
ple, by the political scientist Xiao Gongquan who in 1937 had discussed the requirements 
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commonalities with contemporary communitarian ideas about the relation-
ship between individual liberty, rights, and civic virtues. But more significant 
is perhaps the fact that Tang’s concept of rights is similar to Hegel’s, which 
suggests that there is no real freedom in a community that does not recognize 
the subjective rights of individuals. In Tang’s view, China’s political systems 
in the past were characterized by a traditional ethos and the strong tendency 
to subdue the subjectivity of the individual.38 Curiously enough, Tang’s critical 
review of Confucian traditions is not abetted by his own system of a philoso-
phy of law. He also did not bother to criticize Western philosophies of law, 
let alone try to improve on them by synthesizing Western and Eastern ideas. 
The notion that the system of law is the modern institutional precondition 
for the existence of morals in the realm of the state, which is of great impor-
tance to Hegel,39 is simply implied by Tang. Rather than discussing it in detail, 
he merely anticipates it by referring to a hypothetical Chinese present that 
is characterized by the rule of law and constitutional government. His texts 
thus lead to the impression he is writing about an extant liberal democracy in 
China.
As we have seen, Tang proposes a “Confucian” interpretation of tolerance 
and solidarity as manifestations of freedom that are indispensable for guar-
anteeing constitutional liberties. The assumption here is that these liberties 
would be far too fragile in a political reality where citizens would respect them 
solely out of individual interest or due to the power of law. What is necessary 
is a degree of voluntary obedience in the form of a willingness to respect the 
constitutional rights of others. This entails a habitual, as well as culturally and 
morally stabilized, willingness of individuals to comply with the constitution-
ally guaranteed individual rights of others. This does not, however, mean that 
such compliance should solely emerge from traditions or habits, thus effec-
tively downplaying the importance of actively sought-after moral consent 
among individuals. As Tang saw it, such a constellation of habitual compliance 
would merely amount to the “lowest stage” of the “legal consciousness.”40
for constitutional rule in China in an article entitled “The Preparations for Implementing 
Constitutional Government” (“Shixing xianzheng zhi zhunbei 實行憲政之準備”; pub-
lished in the Da Gong Bao 大公報 on May 2, 1937). Xiao had observed that Western schol-
ars consistently claimed that constitutional rule required “good habits” (liang hao xiguan 
良好習慣) from the people and could not rely on legal regulations by the government 
alone; see Xiao, Xianzheng yu minzhu, p. 15.
38   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 609.
39   On Hegel, see Ritter, Metaphysik und Politik, p. 309.
40   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 609.
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Consequently, Tang envisioned a higher stage of legal consciousness where 
the process of forming law-abiding habits among the citizenry is put in place 
by the workings of the rule of law itself. This would make it “increasingly 
unlikely” that people indulge, without restraint, in striving for power.41 Legality 
is thus said to be an important cause in the formation of the individual’s ethi-
cal mindset within political society. Yet this ethical mindset cannot be fostered 
by legal institutions alone.42 As this foundation is not strong enough, the rule 
of law and a constitutional guarantee of individual rights require the citizen’s 
“moral refinement and cultivation” (daode xiu yang).43 However, this is not to 
be mistaken as a claim to conceptualize morality as the cause of legality. It is 
rather a matter of relating the individual’s moral formation to the state and 
the legal system, thereby embedding the rule of law in social reality. That said, 
Tang cited “law” ( fa 法) and “rites” (li 禮), two traditional terms, and infused 
them with new meaning to flesh out the idea that a community’s ethical and 
cultural contexts can never find full expression in a universal and abstract 
“legal consciousness” ( fa yishi 法意識). To fill out this legal consciousness, a 
“consciousness of rites” (li zhi yishi 禮之意識), meaning an ethical disposi-
tion, must take shape among the citizens. It follows that the system of law 
cannot be detached from the community’s morals, but should instead be seen 
as shaped by discourses and practices related to ethical, social and cultural 
contexts. Tang understood the idea of morals and ethical disposition in a mod-
ern, Hegelian sense as something which does not submit the moral subjec-
tivity of individuals to the rule of an overbearing tradition or ethos. Quite to 
the contrary: The ethical contexts of the community must stand the test of 
moral subjectivity and need not be accepted blindly. The “consciousness of 
rites” is therefore as much the result of the subjective morality of individuals as 
it is of extant morals and traditions.44
 State and Society
On the basis of conceptualizing individual rights as requirements for the 
Confucian renewal of morals, Tang interpreted the individual’s ethical rela-
tions at the stages of family, communal associations, and social sectors. These 
ethical relations were to be understood as an expression of the individual’s 
41   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 396.
42   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 614.
43   Ibid., p. 612.
44   Ibid., p. 614.
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freedom to develop his or her personality and aspire for self-fulfillment.45 
The initial stage is characterized by the individual’s embedding in the family. 
According to Tang, in order to experience the family as a sphere of freedom, 
individuals must not conceive of family relations solely in terms of blood ties or 
of securing their economic subsistence by cooperating within the family.46 The 
family belongs to the sphere of freedom only insofar as it can be interpreted by 
individuals as an ethical relation that enhances their chances of achieving self-
fulfillment through moral “refinement.”47 The moral relation par excellence is 
that of a child and his or her parents. Tang insisted on an interpretation of 
“filial piety” (xiao 孝) as a moral idea in the context of modern societies where 
familial ties tend to disintegrate. He thus argued that the physical presence of 
the parents was not an indispensable precondition for practicing filial piety.48 
His insistence on filial piety in the absence of the parents is somewhat typi-
cal for his individualistic interpretation of traditional norms and practices: In 
the absence of parents, the modern individual has to consciously choose to 
practice filial piety, create a different form for the practice, and reinterpret its 
ethical meaning. The individual’s moral subjectivity will therefore not be over-
whelmed by the actual practices of traditionalist forms of ethical life.
The wider spheres of communal ties and social relations also belong to the 
sphere of ethical life, although not in the same degree or kind. Tang distin-
guished between these two spheres systematically, as well as from a historical 
perspective. In communal associations, the members meet each other “imme-
diately” on the basis of shared ethical values, or territorial, familial, or emo-
tional ties—i.e. without the intermediation of “outer” purposes like common 
economic interests. Tang suggests that Chinese communities typically include 
the family and the clan, but also organizations of alumni, members from the 
same birth-place, academics, participants in “poetry and wine gatherings,” and 
even secret societies. Tang presumed that these quasi-natural associations 
were more common in China than in the West, and that some of them may 
continue to form important contexts of individual self-realization in Chinese 
45   The sequence of these stages is loosely in line with the topical arrangement of chapters 
in Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, which is most likely inspired by Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right and hence corresponds to the idea of retracing the stages of the development 
of individual freedom (in: family life, economics, politics, philosophy and science, art and 
literature, religion, morality, physical exercise, military training, law, education).
46   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 67, 113.
47   Ibid., p. 66; see also pp. 111–113.
48   Ibid., p. 109.
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modernity.49 This continuity is said to be conducive to reducing negative side-
effects of social modernization. However, Tang did not provide any socio-
logical explanation for this proposition, and hence simply implied that some 
traditional formations may resist the forces of modernity.
Yet Tang’s position is not aptly described as traditionalist. He strongly 
insisted on the importance of the sphere of civil society which is fundamen-
tally different from communal ties. Even though Tang did not elaborate on the 
Hegelian notion of civil society (“bürgerliche Gesellschaft”) as the sphere of law 
in which “abstract” legal subjects entertain contractually organized relations, 
he still implied the significance of a civil society. Yet he hardly used the gen-
eral term “society,” preferring instead the pluralizing concept of “social asso-
ciations” (shehui tuanti 社會團體). Social associations are to be understood as 
associations emerging from the shared interests of their members. Such outer, 
intermediate interests or purposes are thus instrumental for the existence 
of these associations. What Tang actually had in mind here were the “usual 
social groups and organizations of a Western, modern type,” such as indus-
trial organizations.50 As his use of the term “Western” indicates, he claimed 
that there had been no such organizations in pre-modern China or, for that 
matter, a notion of society comparable to Western concepts of civil society.51 
In order to catch up with the West, China’s modernization would therefore 
require the development of a civil society as a sphere regulated by law and 
organized according to contractual relations between abstract legal subjects 
and the logic of division of industrial labor.
Tang’s modern Confucian notion of individual self-realization obviously 
does not condemn the pursuit of individual self-interest, as was predomi-
nantly done in traditional Confucian ethics. In a modern state, individuals 
have no choice but to participate in the sphere of the civil society in some form 
or another. Moreover, it is in this sphere where the individuals encounter each 
other first and foremost as legal persons. As Tang sees it, individuals conse-
quently acknowledge each other solely in regard to the “single aspects” of their 
49   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 193, 206.
50   Ibid., pp. 193, 206: Moreover, Tang mentioned “the organizations of class interests” and 
those “religious organizations” that rely on a “transcendent belief in an abstract manner” 
(ibid. p. 193); at another point, he sketched the spectrum of social associations by refer-
ring to scientific societies, welfare organizations, as well as political, economic and mili-
tary associations. He even listed bands of robbers, following here the rationale that they 
also function upon principles of cooperation and a division of labor to achieve common 
goals; see Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 205–207.
51   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 193.
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specific economic functions, social roles, and legal status. There is hence no 
need for them to recognize each other as ethical persons or individuals with a 
background of particular family ties, unique character traits, etc. By definition, 
the ethical values may be realized in civil society within only a very restricted 
scope,52 and the human being’s “moral reason” also can be realized to only an 
“utterly minor degree.”53
Tang contrasted this perspective to China’s traditional society and its social 
and political thought, concluding that the absence of a concept of civil society 
corresponds to pre-modern China’s lack of a concept of constitutional state. 
The modern, constitutional state not only has to deal with individuals and cer-
tain communities, but also with a broad, competitive sector of industrial and 
commercial organizations which are established on the basis of a system of 
civil law—an undertaking unknown in imperial times.54
For Tang’s modern Confucianism, individuals are embedded in spheres of 
ethics and rights (legal life) by belonging to families, communities, and civil 
society. These associations constitute contexts for the individual’s moral self-
realization. However, Tang presumes that the integration of these spheres in a 
way that successfully avoids suppressing the manifold expressions of particu-
larity can only be achieved in a (future) constitutional state which embodies 
ethical life. What is at stake in this Hegelian outlook is a concept of a modern 
state that incorporates a democratic government, the rule of law, as well as a 
renewal of Confucian morals. In Tang’s view, traditional Confucianism was in 
no position to achieve this integration.
Modern Confucianism hence needs a renewed concept of ethical life that 
does not contradict the basic tenets of constitutional government and the rule 
of law. As we have seen, a key element of this renewal is the reconceptualiza-
tion of ethical life in the broad sense as a sphere of individual freedom. The 
individual’s moral subjectivity thus must not be subordinated to social and 
religious traditions and a supposedly sacred imperial order. From the perspec-
tive of moral subjectivity, Tang discerned the foundation of the individual’s 
attachment to the family and the state in a spirit of solidarity, i.e. a “benevolent 
mind” (ren xin 仁心) and a “public spirit” (gong xin 公心). Individuals do not 
attain such a spirit by blindly submitting themselves to a powerful ethos or tra-
dition and having their moral subjectivity overwhelmed. Rather, the spirit of 
52   Tang, Zhexue gailun, Vol. 22, pp. 555–556.
53   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 223.
54   The “Western, modern organization of the state” strives, according to Tang, to have “social 
groups” join in building a unity: Ibid., p. 206.
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solidarity has to be seen as a manifestation of the freedom of the “moral self” 
(daode ziwo 道德自我). In fact, as Tang suggests, the individual’s consciousness 
of the family and the state arises exclusively from “moral reason” (daode lixing 
道德理性), which, in turn, is ultimately anchored in human nature and “the 
way of Heaven.”55
With its focus on the individual’s moral subjectivity, Tang’s idea of the 
modern state reflects the enormous conceptual shift which occurred when 
the Republic of China was established in 1912. In contrast to the old dynastic 
state and its ritual order, the new state was not seen as representing the sacred 
sphere of Heaven. Instead, it was fully accessible by the political will of its citi-
zens, at least in principle, and thus individuals no longer faced a politically 
intangible “Heavenly” order. Modern Confucianism fully consummates this 
shift by interpreting the state as a manifestation of human self-realization. The 
modern state is hence an actualization of human reason, or in Tang’s words: 
“an objectification of the reasonable self (lixing ziwo zhi keguanhua 理性自我
之客觀化).”56 Tang therefore regards the existence of the state as a demand 
from the “unified, reasonable self of our inwardness” which strives for “objecti-
fied manifestations [of itself].”57 As he bluntly states:
According to our theory, [the reason] for which the state exists is origi-
nally not its instrumental value of actually enabling the individuals to 
achieve [their] interests, but [the fact that] it is the objectified manifes-
tation of men’s unified reasonable actions. The direct goal of the state’s 
55   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 162–163. Tang also at times 
referred with a Buddhist vocabulary to the higher unity formed by the freedom of the 
individual will and the general will of the state embodying ethical life: see Tang, Wenhua 
yishi yu daode lixing, p. 256.
56   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 238. Tang strongly rejected the theories of Hobbes 
and Marx “on the origin of the state” and added that it was these two thinkers who 
departed most clearly from his own theory on the origin of the state. With respect to 
Marx, he disagreed with the assumption that the state was evolving out of armed strug-
gles between nations or people only to become, thereafter, a “relation of class rule.” As 
for the theory of Hobbes, Tang took issue with the view that men overcome their natural 
state of existence out of fear from each other and agree on the terms of a contract by con-
ceding their own rights to the sovereign rule: Ibid.; see also Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode 
lixing, p. 238; Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 214; Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi 
chongjian, p. 392.
57   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 218.
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existence consists in fulfilling the demands of the objectification of these 
reasonable actions.58
In accordance with this, Tang’s Confucian civil theology identifies the state, in 
its highest form, as the political form fully embodying human reason and 
facilitating the individual’s quest for self-fulfillment in moral intuition. Since 
it is “Heaven” which reveals itself in and through human intuition, the state 
retains, as it were, the potency to represent the sacred, albeit in an intermedi-
ate way. Tang’s hypostasis of the modern state is most likely a reaction to the 
weakness of the ill-fated republican state in China and serves a compensatory 
purpose. After all, the republican state, which failed to establish political unity 
after 1912, was depleted of any religious meaning. It was perhaps no coinci-
dence that a practical-minded ruler like Yuan Shikai was among those who 
clearly recognized the grave effects that the swift dissolution of the imperial 
state cult and its rituals and ceremonies would have on the young republic. 
But Yuan’s attempt to reinvent official rituals of Heaven within the republi-
can state in 1914 was short-lived and unsuccessful.59 Henceforth, the Chinese 
state seemed to represent nothing but mundane political interests driven by 
 competing  military, economic, and social forces. It is this secularizing vacuum 
of representation that Tang’s civil theology attempted to fill by conceptualiz-
ing a constitutional state embodying ethical life. The modern state was thus 
related to the individual’s moral subjectivity and the quest for self-fulfillment 
in “inner sagehood.”
 The World Order of “Ecumenical States”
For Tang, the formation of modern nation-states was an ongoing historical 
process of global dimensions. Any swansong for a world order of nation-states 
would therefore be premature. Tellingly, he categorized a peaceful world order 
in which nation-states form the basic elements as an ideal.60 According to 
Tang, the two major criteria for evaluating such a world order are international 
58   Ibid., p. 242. In the same context, Tang explained that the theories of Hume, Bentham, 
and Mill, who strongly emphasized individual interests, were insufficient in terms of an 
explanation of the origin of the state. They may rather explain the persistence of the state, 
i.e. its courant normal which includes the “subjective mental state” of people in everyday 
life with regard to the state: Ibid.
59   Zarrow, After Empire, pp. 230–239.
60   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 301.
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peace and “international cultural cooperation,”61 whereas the idea of global 
political, social, and economic justice plays a minor role.
Tang was convinced that international peace, understood as the eschewal of 
wars between nation-states, cannot be guaranteed by international law alone. 
It requires, in addition, a willingness of individual and collective actors to vol-
untarily refrain from the use of force, to engage in cooperation, and to act in 
solidarity across national borders. This willingness should further entail the 
implementation of international law. One of the crucial questions, therefore, 
is how solidarity across national borders may be evoked and sustained. The 
idea of a universal moral law as such cannot function as a source of solidar-
ity within the world order of nation-states, because, as Tang observed, such a 
universal moral law had no stable foundation in historical reality. As long as 
the moral duty to act in transnational solidarity solely pertains to an abstract, 
universal humanity, it would remain fragile, even if bolstered by a “sense of 
responsibility,” and never equal the strong display of solidarity within nation-
states. According to Tang, this fragility is due to the fact that, other than the 
concrete, particular idea of fellow citizens within a nation-state, the abstract 
idea of humanity does not pertain to concrete institutions and structures. The 
actual content of the idea of humanity is hence meager in comparison with 
the idea of membership in a nation-state. Besides, the responsibility for 
humanity remains abstract because the actors lack a “method” to actually live 
up to it, even though they might be willing to do so.62 Tang consequently sum-
marized this constellation with the brief phrase: “Whoever does not love the 
state, will in any case be unable to love the ecumene.”63
As a source of international solidarity, Tang identified cultural patriotism 
with a cosmopolitan outlook.64 This outlook entails an explicit distinction 
61   Ibid., p. 298. Tang was not the first Chinese political thinker to posit that the realization of 
international peace was intrinsically related to the nation-state. In his The Three Principles 
of the People, Sun Yat-sen had already assumed that international peace required the inner 
stability of the nation-states and hence could not be imposed on the world to the neglect 
of the importance of nation-states. On Sun, see Fröhlich, “Der Machtstaat in Sun Yat-sens 
Drei Volksprinzipien: Nationalismus und Expertokratie in der chinesischen Republik,” 
pp. 98–99.
62   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 293.
63   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 161. It should be noted here that 
the term “love” indicates a reference to “patriotism” (in Chinese: aiguozhuyi 愛國主義).
64   In this context, it becomes clear that the original title of the manifesto of 1958 has a pro-
grammatic ring: “A Manifesto with a Message for International Personalities Concerning 
Chinese Culture. Our Joint Understanding of Research about China as well as the Future 
of Chinese Culture and World Culture.”
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from notions of a global society as a source of international solidarity. Tang 
is indeed in agreement with Hegel’s diagnosis about the inevitable tendency 
of industrializing societies to expand and colonize other countries. Hegel 
assumed that increasing productivity regularly compels civil societies to open 
up new markets in colonized countries and thus push for a global society.65 In 
a similar manner, Tang perceived a danger stemming from the tendencies of 
social and economic forces to gradually seize hold of the world and weaken 
the nation-states. For Tang, it was a tell-tale sign that such a creeping quasi-
socialization of the world order is obscured by the notion of a universalistic 
“consciousness of the ecumene” (tianxia yishi), which is abstract insofar as it 
does not contain the concept of a (nation-)state.
As long as this false universalism persists, there will be no awareness of the 
fact that colonialist expansions are triggered by socioeconomic productivity 
and may only be curbed in a world order of nation-states. According to Tang, the 
consequences of such a misconception are severe, because uncurbed expan-
sion remains at the disposal of specific types of socioeconomic organization, 
namely, those based on instrumental rationality and which tend to conquer 
“others.” Tang warned that the notion of a universal ecumene inevitably serves 
to conceal an “absolute egotism” which threatens to annihilate  humanity.66 
As the main beneficiaries of this cover-up, Tang discerned globally active 
socioeconomic players who push nation-states into “imperialist politics.”67 
Tang did not clearly identify the historical context of his diagnosis, but it does 
not seem far-fetched to suppose that China’s experience in the international 
opium trade and its wars in the 19th century likely played an important role in 
shaping his view that ruthless economic actors were capable of exerting con-
siderable influence over their country’s foreign policy.
Tang did not believe that the weakening of the state in a dynamic process 
of socioeconomic development was a matter of historical necessity. A mod-
ernizing community might still avoid such a course and instead strive for a 
superior “ecumenical state” (tianxia guojia 天下國家) which embodies a trans-
national type of solidarity. By introducing the notion of the ecumenical state, 
Tang perhaps referred to the speculation about the world order represented in 
The Great Learning (Da xue 大學). However, he moved beyond such specula-
tion by focusing on the problem of fostering patriotism within a modern state 
65   Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp. 189–191 (§246, §248); see also Ritter, Metaphysik und Politik, 
p. 222.
66   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 162.
67   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 223–224; see also Tang, Wenhua yishi yu 
daode lixing, p. 300.
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without unleashing nationalist fervor. From this perspective, patriotism is nei-
ther restricted to the narrow interests of strengthening one’s own nation-state, 
nor to a merely emotional attachment to the state. It rather calls on individu-
als to exercise the cosmopolitan virtue of acknowledging that the patriotism 
expressed by the people of other nations is as virtuous as their own patriotism. 
Individuals, hence, are to respect the moral responsibility of others for their 
state and consider their patriotism as a reasonable cause of the existence of 
other states.68
At least the basic outlines of these ideas resemble European and American 
ideas about the foundation of a mutual recognition between nations or peo-
ples. Michael Walzer reflects on such ideas when referring to Isaiah Berlin’s 
interpretation of Herder, which centered on a “core principle of reiterative 
 universalism.” Such universalism does not posit that there exists a universal 
history following a “covering law” (as is the case in Christian and Hebrew tra-
ditions, but also in Hegelian and Marxist philosophy of history). In contrast, 
reiterative universalism relies on the particularistic view that the historical 
experience of nations should be understood in terms of narratives or histo-
ries, but not as a universal history which accords to unitary principles or laws. 
If notions of a covering law (such as “repression is always wrong”) are to be 
considered at all, then only in the sense that such laws are exemplary for a 
multitude of particular historical experiences and hence can be considered 
repetitive.69
Tang envisioned the formation of international solidarity to take place 
within the nation-states and their national cultures, provided that they were 
orientated toward cosmopolitan patriotism. It is only in such a particular-
istic context of solidarity that a collective will to curb the socioeconomic 
sector and, therein, to guarantee preconditions for implementing interna-
tional peacekeeping and international law might eventually emerge from 
within the nation-states. Whereas the political form of the nation-state is to 
remain unchanged within the (future) world order of international peace, the 
national cultures must entail a dynamic moment and foster the formation of 
68   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 296–298. Tang assumed that the individual’s cos-
mopolitan patriotism emerges from a gradual formation of his or her “consciousness” of 
the family, the state, and the ecumene—as originally indicated in The Great Learning. 
Such a formation will eventually lead to the manifestation of the “nature of the Heavenly 
mandate” (tianming zhi xing 天命之性); see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie 
bubian, Vol. 10, p. 162.
69   Walzer, Nation and Universe, pp. 509–515, 532–533, 551; on Berlin/Herder see p. 551; on the 
notion of a covering law, see pp. 524–525.
CHAPTER 8202
cosmopolitan patriotism (instead of nationalism). Tang referred to this 
transformation by the term “ecumenical states,” which are to maintain a 
cosmopolitan- patriotic “culture, education and morality.”70
An accentuation of culture, education, and morality in the context of inter-
national peacekeeping can also be found in the Confucian thought of imperial 
China. Yet, Tang removed the “ideal” of a peaceful world order from its attach-
ment to the (Chinese) empire and related it to the idea of a global ecumene 
made up of a pluriversum of modern nation-states.71 He thus distinguished 
his own conception of ecumene from earlier Confucian speculations. On this 
basis, his outlook was rather sober and only loosely related to the traditional 
discourses about the civilizational centrality of the Chinese ecumene. He 
actually never identified China as the sole center: After all the states in the 
world have begun to strive for “progress in culture, education and  morality” 
and renounced the use of force, except for the immediate purpose of self-
defense, a global situation might emerge in which nation-states that possess 
a “comparatively progressive culture, education and morality” will be “gradu-
ally” respected as “central states.”72 The exemplarity of these culturally and 
ethically advanced nation-states would be due to their willingness to pursue, 
on an international level, a course of action that is orientated toward peace, 
cooperation, and solidarity.
Although Tang had no intention of proclaiming certain nation-states or 
national cultures to be the bearers of cultural supremacy, his conception is 
not entirely free of such insinuations. Moreover, his notion of a “main current” 
in national culture unwittingly encourages, as we have seen, tendencies to 
reify the Chinese nation and its culture. It is regrettable that he did not dis-
cuss these implications, even more so because he refrained from portraying 
Chinese culture as a device for healing the modern world. Such an outlook 
70   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 301.
71   Here, it is obvious that Tang’s conception of peace is only very loosely in line with the 
Kantian idea of eternal peace. For a comparative examination of Tang’s and Kant’s con-
ceptions of peace: see Huang, “Tang Junyi de yongjiu heping lun—shiye yu juxian,” 
pp. 87, 95.
72   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 301–302. This notion of “central states” or “middle 
states” (zhongxin guojia 中心國家) clearly evokes the period before the unification of 
the empire in China, when the royal house of the Zhou was to reign over statelets in the 
central plane that were labeled as “middle states,” thus forming a cultural and military 
realm. Tang refers in this context explicitly to the Mencius and the Xunzi and introduces 
the ancient term “kingly way” (wang dao 王道) to denote an ideal way of ruling (a term, 
by the way, that also figured prominently in Sun Yat-sen’s and Qian Mu’s thought on the 
Chinese nation and its culture): Ibid. p. 302.
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could not be reconciled with his concept of modernization as a global process 
which is characterized by an inevitable and inextricable split between spiritual 
inwardness and individual subjectivity, on the one hand, and an increasingly 
instrumentally ordered, alienating objective world, on the other. According to 
Tang, the elimination of all forms of such alienation within a unified nation, a 
unified global ecumene, or some future state of “great uniformity” (da tong) is 
beyond the reach of humanity.
For further clarification of Tang’s idea of ecumenical states, it is instructive 
to briefly consider, by way of comparison, Fichte’s etatism. In Fichte’s philoso-
phy of history, the culturally advanced state is, similar to Tang’s view, a mani-
festation of the highest form of human culture. Unlike Tang, however, Fichte 
assumed that this state unintentionally strives for “the foremost purpose of 
humanity” (“den allerersten Zweck der menschlichen Gattung”), while pursuing 
its own interests. Fichte thus claimed, in fact, that the outcome of the forceful 
expansion of the state’s cultural potency onto its European neighbors, and even 
more so onto territories overseas, did not necessarily run counter to the purposes 
prescribed by the divine “plan for the world” (“Weltplan”). The global “peoples’ 
republic of culture” (“Völkerrepublik der Kultur”), which Fichte posited in his 
philosophy of history as a goal of humanity, seems at first glance to be in line 
with Tang’s notion of a global community of ecumenical states. But Tang and 
Fichte held different views on the formation of such a community; after all, Tang 
did not support the Fichtean idea that the state, while striving for power inter-
nationally in promoting its own interests, unwittingly works towards the ulti-
mate good in history. Fichte was convinced that the actual, higher purpose of 
humanity (which is to become manifest in religion, science, art, and ethics) can-
not be directly turned into the purpose of state action. The state may contribute 
to realizing the purpose of humanity only by implementing the conditions for 
its realization.73 Tang’s future ecumenical states would, much like the superior 
state in Fichte’s scheme, assume a position of power among the nation-states, 
but they would use their superior power only for the purpose of self-defense, 
and not for power politics or imperialist expansion. Thus, Tang did not follow 
Fichte’s speculation about the formation of a peaceful future world order on the 
basis of unintentional state action. He assumed, on the contrary, that only if the 
state works for the realization of international peace, cooperation, and solidarity, 
intentionally and guided by an advanced national culture, does it qualify as an 
ecumenical state.
73   For the quoted expressions and the analysis of Fichte’s theory of state, see Fetscher, 
“Johann Gottlieb Fichte,” pp. 182–184.
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Tang’s “ecumenical state” is evidently a futural political concept. Nevertheless, 
it may be applied to the present as a normative criterion, even though there are 
currently no “ecumenical states” in existence. Accordingly, Tang reached a very 
sober conclusion in 1974 with respect to the current world order. He stated that 
even though many people worldwide long for a unified “world government” 
(shijie zhengfu 世界政府) and a “world state” (shijie guo 世界國), the dominant 
tendency in military, political, and economic matters since the First World War 
was one of division, in spite of such ideas as the League of Nations, a world gov-
ernment, and a world state.74 As regards the United Nations, Tang labeled it a 
forum which had already lost its original meaning and “authentic value” in the 
midst of contending nation-states. He deemed the notions of world govern-
ment and world state therefore to be merely remote ideals.75
The tendency towards separation in international politics following two 
world wars was further evidenced by the fact that a number of new states had 
already been founded or were about to emerge in Asia and Africa. Tang believed 
that there was no historical precedent for this development and emphatically 
rejected any analogy that might be drawn with the constellation of the Warring 
States period in pre-imperial China.76 With regard to the global economy, Tang 
detected a similar tendency toward separation in the fact that the economies of 
advanced Western nations were increasingly challenged by rising nations, such 
as a rapidly industrializing Japan, oil producing Arab countries, and develop-
ing Third World countries. Besides, Tang referred to a global tendency towards 
the dissolution of centers of military power. The “core” of military power—i.e. 
nuclear weapons—was no longer an exclusive matter of the Soviet Union and 
the United States, for France, the PRC, and India had become nuclear powers 
and more states would certainly follow suit in the future.77
Based on his interpretation of the history of the 20th century, Tang was con-
vinced that a concentration of coercive means and military power, even if it 
were to be achieved by a global community of nations, would not provide a 
way to world peace. On the contrary, he foresaw that the realization of world 
peace must entail, on the one hand, a renouncement by existing nation-states 
of the suppression of ongoing global tendencies towards further “separation” 
74   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, pp. 409–410.
75   Ibid., p. 411. Already in 1953 Tang introduced the concept of a “world state” (shijie guo) 
explicitly as an “ideal” which should help to avoid a Hegelian hypostasis of statehood. In 
the same vein, he introduced the “ideal of an ecumenical great peace which transcends 
the state;” see Huang, “Tang Junyi de yongjiu heping lun—shiye yu juxian,” pp. 82, 96–97.
76   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, p. 410.
77   Ibid., p. 411.
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( fensan 分散) into new nation-states, and, on the other, gradual progress 
within nation-states in terms of “culture, education and morality.”78 This view 
of advancement towards a peaceful world order is certainly highly optimistic, 
but it is not to be mistaken for a blind belief in historical progress. Tang neither 
set out to detect signs of historical progress in every corner of the world or at 
every stage of historical development, nor did he expect human history to cul-
minate in the realization of the good. His assumption that cultural and moral 
progress first become manifest in ecumenical states rather serves the purpose 
of highlighting a possible outcome of human history, while, at the same time, 
raising awareness that the course of history is not inescapable.
There is thus leeway for critical thinking about political reality. Consequently, 
Tang’s reflection about world order remains skeptical about positions of “real-
ism” which tend to downplay the need for normative judgments about the 
political reality of world order, which is to be taken for what it is. By referring to 
the future world order of ecumenical nation-states as an ideal, Tang simultane-
ously rejected a naïve idealist outlook. Instead, he claimed that it is necessary 
to brace oneself for the fact that such an ideal world order is unlikely to be ever 
fully realized over the course of history. He consequently did not aim to issue 
political prescriptions for state action that will lead to an immediate transfor-
mation of political reality. It is indeed this delicate balance between skeptical 
realism and critical idealism which distinguishes Tang’s political writings from 
mainstream Confucian speculation about modern world order. 
78   Ibid., p. 410.
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CHAPTER 9
Anticipating Democracy
 “Confucian Democracy”: Dead Ends and Alternatives
The notion of a Confucian democracy receives considerable attention in the 
academic world today, but unfortunately Confucianism is often identified 
summarily and uncritically as the historical essence of China, or even of East 
Asia more generally. Imagining that Confucianism could be a cultural remedy 
for the defective political reality of democracy still influences the political 
thought of many proponents of Confucianism. So far, no “Confucian democ-
racy” has existed in any country, and none of the political ideas associated with 
it has had a profound impact on international discussions of democracy the-
ory, let alone an impact on the institutions of existing democracies. The only 
noteworthy exception, if one wants to consider it Confucian, is Sun Yat-sen’s 
model of five constitutional powers, as it survives on the island of Taiwan.
Many recent studies of Confucian democracy are located in the field of 
Chinese Studies, where political philosophy and various social sciences inter-
sect. These studies focus on (traditional) Confucian themes regarded as rel-
evant to theories of democracy in the broadest sense, including concepts of 
political participation, human rights, and citizenship. When they elaborate 
on how to inscribe elements of Confucian thought into Western democratic 
thought (such as pragmatism or communitarianism), it is usually in reference 
to the “classical” pre-Qin periods of Confucian thought. At most, concepts of 
democracy as developed by modern Confucians such as Tang Junyi and Mou 
Zongsan are considered in passing.1
Chinese thinkers have debated “democracy and Confucianism” since the 
early 20th century, though often in quite inconsistent and contradictory ways. 
Given Confucianism’s dubious record when it comes to promoting democracy 
in China, this is hardly surprising. Early in the Republican period, positions 
ranged from identifying Confucianism as the ideological enemy of political 
1   Recent titles include Tan, Confucian Democracy; He, “Rujia zhengzhi zhexue de qianjing;” 
Jang, “A Confucian Deliberation on Rawls’s Liberal Conception of International Justice;” Jin, 
Zhongguo min ben sixiang shi; and Hall, Democracy of the Dead. Bell’s Confucianism for the 
Modern World takes a different path in attempting to identify Confucian political or religious 
institutions and relate them to democratic ideas and institutions.
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democracy (and of republicanism)2 to portraying it as a repository of tradi-
tional Chinese ideas and institutions conducive to solidifying, if not improving 
on, Western models of constitutional democracy in a Chinese context. Zhang 
Junmai, for example, accentuated how conducive the Confucian tradition is 
to developing civic virtues, which he understood as a necessary pre-condition 
of nation-building and, consequently, democracy.3 In a quite different vein, 
claims to improve Western democracy through the Confucian tradition are 
abundant in right-wing GMD ideology (such as in the New Life Movement 
of the 1930s) and also can be found in Sun Yat-sen’s thought.4 The major 
parameters for discussing the compatibility of Confucianism with democracy 
thus were set decades before the contemporary debate about so-called Asian 
values began.
Although Mainland Chinese intellectuals who favor “Confucian democracy” 
often critique China’s present government and its policies (mostly within the 
limits sanctioned by the CCP), some are equally critical of Western democ-
racies. Jiang Qing, for example, strongly emphasizes the (seemingly fore-
seeable) superiority of a Confucian(ized) democracy over “Western liberal 
democracies.”5 Similar tendencies can be found when the CCP highly praises 
China’s democratic tradition, which is seen as embodied in pre-modern 
Chinese notions of a common welfare and rests on the idea of a government 
adhering to the principles of the “people as foundation” (min ben 民本).6 Much 
in the same vein, Chinese “neo-conservatives” of the 1990s stressed the neces-
sity of establishing Confucian nationalism as a foundation for a future Chinese 
democracy.7
The conceptualization of Confucianism varies widely in these contexts, but 
two features clearly stand out. First, Confucianism is understood in relation to 
2   For example, Chen, “Xin Qingnian zui’an zhi dabianshu,” pp. 361–362.
3   Zhang, “Xueshujie zhi fangxiang yu xuezhe zhi zeren” pp. 203, 224.
4   On the political implications of the GMD regime’s official “Confucianism” between 1949 and 
1987, see Zhongguo wenhua xiehui (ed.). Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong, pp. 5–7; Chun, 
“From Nationalism to Nationalizing,” pp. 138–141.
5   See Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue.
6   Wen, “Wen Jiabao zongli lun Huang Zongxi sixiang de qin bi xin,” p. 5. It is ironic that it was 
a staunch anti-communist thinker like Xu Fuguan who highlighted the idea of “people as 
foundation” in a similar manner. In an article from 1951, which he published in exile, Xu inter-
preted this idea as an equivalent of the “principle of rule by virtue” (dezhizhuyi 德治主義), 
calling it the “highest maxim” of Confucian political thought; see Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang 
de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” p. 49.
7   Xiao, Yu zhengzhi langmanzhuyi gaobie, p. 229.
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modernization. China’s position in the modern world here is seen optimisti-
cally,  and the proponents view Confucianism as one of China’s crucial assets. 
They think it holds the promise of being able to create a successful modern 
state (including democratic government), if not of being superior to political 
modernity as experienced in the West. Second, there are strong tendencies 
to define Confucianism as a cluster of values—whether political, social, cul-
tural, or religious. Confucianism might even be portrayed as a Chinese or East 
Asian mentality that plays an important role in the value orientation of all 
individuals.8 Confucian values and virtues are often linked to notions of indi-
vidual self-cultivation, or the self-transformation of entire communities. From 
this perspective, the quality of democratic government seems to depend to a 
large extent on the “cultivation” of personal qualities and virtues by either rul-
ers or citizens, or on the kind of values they share and put into practice.9 The 
Great Learning is often cited in this context with the traditionalistic assump-
tion that standards of personal self-cultivation are the yardstick for the quality 
of modern democracies.10
It should be noted here that the notion that individual or collective self-cul-
tivation is embedded in certain clusters of values is distinctly modern. The very 
idea of values, and therefore that of a community united in common values that 
an individual was free to accept or reject, was as foreign to pre-20th century China 
as it was to pre-19th century European thought (apart from the “values” implied 
in 18th century economic thought11). The increased currency of “values,” a term 
8    In related international debates on Asian values, one end of the spectrum is repre-
sented by Francis Fukuyama’s conflation of Confucianism and democracy, the other 
end by Samuel Huntington’s declaration that they stand in inherent contradiction; see 
Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy”; Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” 
pp. 15, 18, 21. Neither Fukuyama nor Huntington are specialists in Chinese studies, yet sim-
ilar value-based conceptions of Confucianism, Confucian self-cultivation or Confucian 
communities can also be found in more specialized studies.
9    From the vantage point of such conceptions of Confucianism, Western democracies are 
accordingly understood in terms of values and normative principles, and less in terms of 
institutions and procedures.
10   Anne Cheng calls the contemporary tendency to ignore the historical horizon of The 
Great Learning in interpreting “self-cultivation” “jack-of-all-trades Confucianism:” Cheng, 
“The Way of Confucius and sprouts of democracy,” pp. 20, 24; see also Cheng, “Des germs 
de démocratie dans la tradition confucéene?,” pp. 102–104. For an analysis of the recep-
tion of The Great Learning in Chinese political thought of the 20th century, see Fröhlich, 
“Regulating, Governing, and Pacifying the Modern World: Optimism Regarding Progress 
in Chinese Interpretations of the Great Learning.”
11   Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte, p. 37.
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rendered in modern Chinese by the neologism jiazhi 價值, in Chinese discus-
sions about Confucianism could plausibly be related to the breakdown of the 
imperial cult of state at the beginning of the 20th century and the prolonged 
failure of the republican state after 1912. There has thus been a tendency since 
the 1910s to overemphasize, in an almost cultish manner, the notions of values 
and a value-centered culture. This should probably be regarded, as mentioned 
before, as compensatory—as a quasi-religious veneration of “values” and “cul-
ture” intended to replace the sacral significance of the former imperial cult.
Obviously, the discourses about Confucian values and the identifications 
of “Chinese culture” with Confucianism are intertwined with considerations 
about cultural particularity and universality in theories of modernity and 
modernization. With respect to the issue of “Confucianism and democracy,” 
two positions are particularly relevant:
(1) Support of Confucianism’s potential to embellish or even overcome lib-
eral democracy, based on particularistic assumptions of modernization. The 
cultural uniqueness of China’s political modernity is highlighted here and 
democracy is only accepted in a specifically Chinese variant, so that institu-
tional adjustments need to be made to Sinicize democracy. Sun Yat-sen’s 
constitutional blueprint, for example, adds the governmental powers of the 
control yuan and examination yuan to the executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers. Likewise, in his lectures on “people’s rights” (min quan 民權) in The 
Three Principles of the People, he suggested a “Chinese solution” for what he 
deemed to be the fundamental problem of Western democracies: the lack of 
trust between government and citizens. Sun’s “solution” is linked to what he 
identified as the Chinese tradition of meritocratic thought and institutions, 
meaning the governance of elites composed of capable, virtuous men.
Still, despite Sun’s emphasis on the Chinese tradition, it is likely he drew 
upon European liberal thought, and J.S. Mill in particular, that argued for inde-
pendent political representation by elites, whom he deemed capable of mak-
ing wiser judgments than the mass of less educated citizens (see, for example, 
Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government from 1861). Broad political 
participation and popular sovereignty would thus be restrained. This pertains 
also to the position of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew who, in 1992, recommended 
that the voting laws be changed to award a double vote to those in their 40s and 
50s to reflect their broader experience in taking responsibility for their fami-
lies and hence their superiority in making reasonable decisions.12 Jiang Qing’s 
“political Confucianism” and his idea of adding a Chamber of Confucians 
to a parliamentary representation system can be included here. Jiang views 
12   Heinz, “Vom Mythos der ‘Asiatischen Werte’,” pp. 60–61.
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“democratic ideas” such as freedom, equality, the rule of law, and human rights 
as typically Western and favors a more “substantial” Confucian type of politi-
cal democracy instead that would guarantee the moral quality of voters and 
politicians alike.13 Such approaches entail strong elitist, if not authoritarian 
tendencies. Yet, as we have seen in the case of Sun Yat-sen, the allegedly typi-
cal Confucian or Chinese enhancement of democracy may in fact have roots 
in the Chinese reception of Western political thought. It seems that the elit-
ist strands of European liberalism of the 18th and 19th century which often 
resulted from a need to defend social and political privilege were adopted by 
Chinese thinkers who attempted to establish a strong, modern nation-state.
(2) The second position is closely related to modernization theory and its 
assertion that, in the long run, there will be a world-wide convergence of mod-
ernization. From this perspective, considerations about “Confucianism and 
democracy” do not center on the question of how Confucianism can enhance 
(Western) democracy, but rather on whether Confucianism is compatible with 
political modernization, i.e. democracy. Early examples of this approach can 
be found, for example, in the work of Hu Shi or Chen Duxiu. Both of these 
major thinkers of the New Culture Movement have asked why China has failed, 
so far, to develop a democracy on its own. Their answers point to the conclu-
sion that there is an incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy. 
Contemporary Confucianism outside the Chinese Mainland, such as in Taiwan 
or the United States, generally assumes instead that the two are compatible. 
Tu Wei-ming’s theory of multiple modernities, for example, emphasizes that 
there are culturally specific versions of modernity (hence the plural “moderni-
ties”), but it still presumes a universal convergence of clusters of core values, 
ideas and practices. This convergence contains, among others, concepts of 
democracy, open society, and scientific progress that originated in the West.14 
According to Tu, concepts of individual rights, constitutionalism, natural law, 
and individual freedom were indeed absent in Confucianism, but they can 
now be integrated into a globally evolving Confucian discourse on democ-
13   Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue, pp. 22–23, 283–284, 366–368. Jiang elaborates his idea of a “cham-
ber of Confucians” only in the Taiwanese edition of his book; see Sébastien Billioud’s 
translation: Jiang, “Le confucianisme de la ‘Voie royale’, direction pour le politique en 
Chine contemporaine,” p. 117. For an English translation of texts by Jiang Qing on the 
enlarged, tricameral legislature and on the political key function of a Confucian acad-
emy, see Jiang, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its 
Political Future, Chap. 1 and 2. David Elstein has discussed Jiang’s proposal of a tricameral 
legislature from the perspective of the question of political legitimacy: Elstein, Democracy 
in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, pp. 146–147.
14   Tu, “Multiple Modernities—Implications of the Rise of ‘Confucian’ East Asia.”
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racy, without however contorting Confucianism itself. Against this backdrop, 
Tu argues that, in fact “Confucian personality ideals” would be “realized more 
fully” in a liberal democracy.15
In the 1950s and 1960s, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan also dis-
cussed the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Whereas Xu 
Fuguan is often portrayed as the most practical-minded political thinker of 
the three, Tang and Mou are commonly recognized as eminent proponents 
of Confucian ethics and metaphysics. Unfortunately, their ideas of democracy 
in particular, and political philosophy in general, receive little attention, even 
among contemporary Confucians. This is regrettable because their notion of a 
Chinese democracy in the making transcends many of the culturalist bound-
aries that limit the discourse on Confucian democracy. To begin with, Tang 
Junyi and Mou Zongsan were both convinced that the political tradition of 
Confucianism cannot function as a normative resource of liberal democracy, 
but ought to be seen instead as harmful to it. Mou Zongsan singled out a meri-
tocratic form of “administrative democracy” that was void of any trace of con-
stitutional government but was prevalent in pre-modern China. In Mou’s view, 
this kind of administrative democracy must not be confused with political 
democracy. Political democracy was unknown in pre-modern China, and if the 
two notions were conflated, he suggested, efforts to introduce liberal democ-
racy to modern China were doomed to fail.16
Tang also set out to find the limitations in the political tradition of 
Confucianism and to use this critique as a resource for his discussion of lib-
eral democracy.17 He criticized the concept of political action held by the 
pre-modern Confucians as reductionist and dangerous, exactly because they 
had understood political action in terms of a person’s moral awareness and 
ethical standards. He assumed that, if they were to live in modern times, his 
Confucian predecessors would have falsely concluded that the struggle of 
15   Ibid., pp. 70–71.
16   On Mou Zongsan’s theory of democracy and his analysis of pre-modern Confucian politi-
cal thought, see my “ ‘Confucian Democracy’ and its Confucian Critics: Mou Zongsan and 
Tang Junyi on the Limits of Confucianism,” pp. 177–183. Peng Guoxiang’s book-length 
study on Mou’s political thought also addresses these issues. Due to its date of publi-
cation, I could not include it in my study; see Peng, Zhizhe de xianshi guanhuai: Mou 
Zongsan de zhengzhi yu shehui sixiang.
17   Tang applied a broad concept of democracy comprising constitutional government, the 
rule of law, general elections, parliamentary representation, and a multi-party system. 
Yet he neither discussed specific aspects of constitutional law, the scope of participation 
in a representative democracy, nor the difference of presidential and cabinet systems of 
government.
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individuals to protect their rights only amounted to morally questionable, self-
ish behavior. The Confucians would have failed to understand that the struggle 
for one’s rights heightened the need for checks and balances among contest-
ing wills for power, and hence produced something politically  desirable.18 This 
affirmation of an individual struggle for rights clearly goes against the grain 
of Confucian traditions. Tang was not the only modern Confucian thinker to 
point out that no conception of the individual’s struggle for political rights had 
ever emerged in the Confucian tradition. In 1951, Xu Fuguan had already come 
to the same conclusion when pondering why Confucianism had at best man-
aged to mitigate harsh autocratic rule in pre-modern China, but failed to lay a 
foundation for democratic constitutional rule. In this context, Xu had identi-
fied as a historical root of modern Western democracy the individual’s struggle 
for political rights, which he believed had been absent from China not least 
because of the Confucian idea of “rule by virtue” (dezhi 德治).19
According to Tang, pre-modern Confucians were content with conceptual-
izing political acts in general, and power relations such as the one between 
emperor and prime minister in particular, as belonging to the ethical perspec-
tive of the so-called five cardinal relationships (wu lun 五倫).20 Tang assumed, 
in other words, that these Confucians were still convinced that educational, 
ethical, and religious means would suffice to normatively shape political 
power. They thus neglected the importance of constitutional law and institu-
tional measures offering checks and balances. As a case in point, Tang cited 
the Confucians of the Han Dynasty. He held them responsible for the belief 
that practical politics might be contained by a “religious mind,” as evidenced 
by their attempts to convince the emperor to worship Confucius as a deity. 
As regards Confucians of the Song and Ming Dynasties they are said to have 
aimed for the independence of scholarship from politics, and the formation 
of politics by means of education, lectures, and writings, and by establishing 
academies and scholarly associations. Tang provided yet another example, 
referring to measures to check political power implemented in the context 
of local self-administration, such as the ancient model of the so-called well-
field system or, in the Song Dynasty, the so-called community compacts. He 
concluded that these were both unsuccessful attempts to contain “real politi-
18   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 290–291.
19   Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” pp. 49–50, 53–54; on Xu see also 
Huang, Dongya ruxue shiyu zhong de Xu Fuguan ji qi sixiang, pp. 223–224.
20   The other relations are those of father and son, husband and wife, older and younger 
brother, and of friends.
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cal power” in the spirit of “social humanism.”21 Still, Tang was not fundamen-
tally opposed to the idea that politics as well as the ethical “transformation 
[of human beings] through [Confucian] teachings” should both assist human 
beings in actualizing their potential for self-fulfillment as endowed to them by 
Heaven.22
In abandoning the political tradition of Confucianism and its notions of 
benevolent rule by superior individuals, Tang and Mou Zongsan conceptu-
alized political power in a way that they claimed was never done in China’s 
traditional political philosophies. A salient feature of their brand of modern 
Confucianism is the view that justifications of liberal democracy need to take 
into account that politics necessarily operates according to the logic of politi-
cal power and, therefore, should not be envisioned as an appendix to ethics. 
Tang and Mou placed this justification within a distinct historical outlook in 
order to assert that liberal democracy is Confucianism’s authentic political 
form, and hence that Confucianism can only fulfill itself in modern society.23 
According to Mou Zongsan, “Confucian rationalism” (rujia de lixingzhuyi 
儒家的理性主義) had never been comprehensively manifested in pre-modern 
Chinese politics. Mou asserted that it can only achieve this now due to the 
introduction of a “renewed outer king” (xin wai wang 新外王), by which he 
meant democracy and science.24 Xu Fuguan shared with Tang Junyi and Mou 
Zongsan the view that the modern reconstruction of Confucianism ultimately 
pointed toward a constitutional democracy as its political form. However, 
whereas Tang and Mou focused on the justification of constitutional democ-
racy in terms of Confucianism, Xu seems to have been considerably more 
ambitious. He further anticipated a future Confucian democracy characterized 
by a renewed infusion of Confucian ethics into democratic politics. This would 
lead, as Xu expected, to a substitution of the individual’s struggle for rights 
21   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 422.
22   Ibid., p. 417. He indeed saw “transformation through teachings” as  emphasizing the self-
determination of the individual. See also Mou, Zheng dao yu zhi dao, pp. 124–125. Tang 
accordingly emphasized the aspect of individual self-fulfillment within the speculation 
about the Heavenly mandate, while disregarding its relevance for the dynastic cult of 
state and the elevation of the emperor as the Son of Heaven (Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi 
chongjian, p. 421). The latter aspects had been rendered obsolete by the founding of the 
republican state.
23   For the manifesto of 1958 on this point, see Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 39.
24   For Mou’s reference to “Confucian rationalism” and “new outer king” see Mou, “Cong rujia 
de dangqian shiming shuo Zhongguo wenhua de xiandai yiyi,” p. 312. For Mou’s concept 
of “new outer king;” also cf. Mou, Zhengdao yu zhidao, pp. 15, 20–21 (introduction to the 
new edition).
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(a typical feature of Western-style democracies) with a harmonization of polit-
ical contestation through renewed “rites,” i.e. ethical values and virtues.25
Like Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi left no doubt that tradi-
tional Confucianism had failed to produce a liberal democracy out of its 
own resources. As a result, a justification of liberal democracy in terms of a 
renewed, modern Confucianism was necessary if the introduction of democ-
racy to China was not to spell the end of Confucianism as a political and social 
force. In this context, it is instructive to refer to Richard Rorty’s characteriza-
tion of the relationship between democracy and philosophy. Rorty identified, 
on the one hand, a strand of theories that try to provide liberal democracy 
with a comprehensive philosophical justification. These theories, among them 
communitarianism, assume political institutions can be no better than their 
philosophical foundations. On the other hand, Rorty pointed to a strand of 
theories that is represented by pragmatism as understood by Dewey and Rorty 
himself, which denies the need for any comprehensive philosophical justifi-
cation of (American) democracy. At most, democracy might need some kind 
of philosophical articulation, though a full justification through philosophy 
might even be harmful to it.26
Tang Junyi’s, Mou Zongsan’s, and Xu Fuguan’s modern Confucianism belongs 
to the first strand of theories identified by Rorty. Neither Mou and Xu, who were 
in Taiwan during the 1950s, nor Tang, who was in Hong Kong at the same time, 
could describe and analyze a liberal democracy from within the system itself. 
Instead, they had to anticipate its workings as well as its problems, and rely 
25   Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” pp. 59–60. Xu was convinced that a 
“true” democracy which rested on a secure ethical foundation could be achieved only on 
a Confucian basis: ibid., pp. 53–54. For Xu, the substitution of the use of political power and 
the enforcement of law for the rule of virtue was not merely an ideal or limit-concept, but 
a historically realizable possibility; ibid., p. 50. For a critical assessment of Xu’s position, see 
He, “Rujia yu xiandai minzhu,” p. 147; Xiong, “Xu Fuguan lun minzhu zhengzhi,” p. 49.
26   Rorty, “Der Vorrang der Demokratie vor der Philosophie,” p. 82. Rorty identified Robert 
Bellah, Alasdair McIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and the early Roberto Unger 
as communitarians; ibid., pp. 85–86. Given Rorty’s persuasive interpretation of Dewey’s 
pragmatism as fundamentally different from communitarian approaches to liberal 
democracy, analogies between Confucian political thought and a “communitarianized” 
Dewey seem problematic. A differentiation of political theory somewhat similar to 
Rorty’s can be found in Ernst Vollrath’s Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theorie des 
Politischen, albeit in the context of comparing the development of Anglo-American and 
German political theory. Vollrath’s analysis is in reference to Hannah Arendt’s attempt to 
develop a concept of power of political judgement out of an interpretation of Kant’s third 
critique.
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on their observations of non-Chinese democracies. Where American philoso-
phers can look back on the history of American democracy to understand the 
formation of political judgment, modern Confucians of the second generation 
had to make conjectures about almost everything that was related to liberal 
democracy. And while Rorty was not thinking specifically of Confucian philos-
ophers, his approach is still helpful in describing their thoughts on democracy. 
Their political thinking starts from strong religious-metaphysical assumptions 
about the nature of man. In view of Rorty’s juxtaposition of philosophy and 
democracy, they can therefore be labeled as “philosophical” in a broad, foun-
dationalist sense. For them, it was pivotal that their modern reconstruction of 
Confucianism entailed a comprehensive philosophical, or, in the case of Tang, 
civil-theological justification of democracy.
 The Weakness of Democracy in China
Tang’s thoughts on a Chinese democracy and his above-mentioned exami-
nation of the reasons for the absence of a modern nation-state in China are 
closely related. But it was the communist victory on the Chinese Mainland in 
1949 that formed the immediate historical context for his reflections about 
political democracy. Tang apparently presumed that the communists would 
not have succeeded in conquering the Mainland if there had been a modern 
nation-state, complete with a democratic constitutional order. In an arti-
cle dated September 1950 and entitled “The Cultural Background of China’s 
Contemporary Chaos,”27 Tang analyzed the failure of democracy after the 
foundation of the republic in 1912. During the 1950s, he published a number 
of texts dealing with the same question, among them: “Basic Knowledge about 
Humanistic Culture and Democracy,”28 “The Humanistic and Democratic 
Spirit in Chinese and Western Societies,”29 the Confucian manifesto of 1958, 
and the monograph Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason, which was pub-
lished in the same year. Tang clearly assumed that this search for the roots of 
the problem should precede any attempt to anticipate the requirements for a 
future Chinese democracy.
27   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 260–281.
28   Published in Democratic Review (Minzhu Pinglun), Vol. 3, No. 24 (February 1952); see Tang, 
Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 388–401.
29   Published in Democratic Review (Minzhu Pinglun), Vol. 4, No. 4 (February 1953); see Tang, 
ibid., pp. 402–425.
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In order to present a balanced examination of the related shortcomings in 
China’s political history and Chinese political thought, Tang did not neglect 
to discuss (contingent) historical developments that worked to foreclose the 
formation of constitutional democracy in China, even though he placed more 
emphasis overall on intellectual issues. The manifesto of 1958 rejected the view 
that solely the lack of democratic ideas in traditional Chinese political thought 
was to blame for China’s failure to develop a democratic government. The 
manifesto reminded its readers that the final failure of democracy in China 
in 1949 was mainly due to actual developments in political history, such as the 
high tide of nationalism and the failure of reforms under the government of 
the GMD after the Japanese intrusions in the early 1930s, the Second World 
War, and the ensuing civil war. Most importantly, the government of the GMD 
had been unwilling to establish a democracy after the  successful military uni-
fication of the country in 1928 and instead implemented a single-party govern-
ment under the guise of a so-called political tutelage.30
These turns of events happened in the aftermath of the republican revo-
lution in 1911 which, according to the manifesto of 1958, was not so much a 
victory of democracy as a success of anti-Manchu Han nationalism. The mani-
festo consequently suggests that the founding of the republic had been widely 
perceived by the Chinese as just another dynastic change, even more so since 
there were no clear ideas of popular sovereignty, democracy, and political 
rights among the population.31 The authors of the manifesto concluded that 
given such a weak presence of democratic ideas before and after 1911, it was 
not surprising that communism gained wide currency at the expense of demo-
cratic thought—especially given China’s historical experience with an “inva-
sion at the hands of Western capitalism and the repression by imperialism.”32 
The absence of a democratic government in China was thus not entirely due 
to the peculiarities of political thought in pre-20th century China, but also a 
result of the unpredictable course of Chinese history since the mid-19th cen-
tury. Besides this, Tang also took geographical and demographical aspects into 
account, such as the size of China’s population and territory, and referred the 
reader to a broad historical context of pre-imperial and imperial China.33
The gist of Tang’s analysis, however, deals with the social structure of late 
imperial China and the social background, the mentality, and the intellectual 
preferences of the social and political elites. The focus lies here on develop-
30   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 42–43.
31   Ibid., p. 41.
32   Ibid., p. 43.
33   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 420.
Anticipating Democracy  217
ments and constellations in China which stand in stark contrast to the histori-
cal evolution of Western democracies. Particularly important is the historical 
formation of an elite mentality that ultimately prevented an engagement with 
democracy. With this in mind, Tang called attention to political and economic 
issues such as the fact that there had been no feudal aristocracy in imperial 
China. He, moreover, highlighted the weak accumulation of large amounts 
of capital in commerce since the Han Dynasty, the difference between tradi-
tional Chinese associations of commerce and the more autonomous guilds in 
Western countries, the traditionally low social prestige of merchants in impe-
rial China, the absence of an autonomous class of landowners since the Sui 
and Tang Dynasties, the absence of a capitalist class in modern China, and the 
traditional detachment of farmers, craftsmen, and merchants from politics. 
In addition, he mentioned the inability of clerical organizations in traditional 
China to dominate the state and society in a manner comparable to Christian 
churches.34 Thus, whereas Western democracies gradually took shape in soci-
eties which were stratified by an aristocracy, powerful families and land own-
ers, clerical organizations, and eventually by the process of industrialization, 
leading to the formation of labor organizations, late imperial China did not see 
such developments.35
As for the educated elites in China and their particular mentality—in Tang’s 
terminology their “spirit” ( jingshen)—he concluded that they had mainly 
evolved since the Tang and Song Dynasties in the context of the imperial civil 
service examinations. Accordingly, unlike their Western counterparts, mod-
ern Chinese intellectuals did not emerge from the church, the aristocracy, 
the landowners, or, finally, the petty bourgeoisie.36 As a consequence of this 
social-historical setting and the mentalities it shaped, the predominant ideal 
for the educated person in China was to shoulder the responsibility for the 
whole ecumene (tianxia). This ideal required the educated to refrain from 
representing politically the interests of a specific class, social organization, 
or church. Instead, non-partisan participation in politics became, at least in 
theory, one of the guiding ideas of an elite culture wrought by the civil service 
system of imperial China. In the post-revolutionary political environment of 
the republic, this mentality proved to be very harmful, as the intellectuals who 
had already lost their traditional vitality now contented themselves with rep-
resenting their personal “individualism.”37 Members of the intellectual elite, 
34   Ibid., pp. 270–271.
35   Ibid., p. 272.
36   Ibid., p. 270.
37   Ibid., pp. 270–271.
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including those who acted as members of parliament, now had the mentality 
and the social background of free-floating intellectuals and academics. Unlike 
members of parliament in Western countries, they represented neither specific 
class interests, nor particular professional groups or religious organizations. 
They were thus not swayed by social or economic forces and their political 
position was weak. At the same time, they remained aloof to social reality. 
Their speeches and actions were not regulated or restricted by any social, eco-
nomic, or clerical clientele, nor were there political parties powerful enough to 
exert a system of checks and balances in parliament.38
It is against the backdrop of this depiction of late imperial and early 
Republican China that Tang reflected on the impact of Confucian humanism 
on the evolution of democratic ideas. He was, as we have seen, highly critical of 
Confucianism’s political traditions, but he did not reject its humanist strands. 
His analysis is indeed nuanced, as evidenced by his statement that before 1911, 
“[t]he humanistic spirit of China’s past contained a democratic spirit, but 
there were no institutions of democratic politics in the Western style.”39 The 
Confucian “humanistic spirit” is thus identified as an intellectual resource of 
democracy in China. As for the democratic function of this spirit, Tang was 
convinced that it was manifest in the great importance which Confucianism 
placed on the personality of individuals.40 This facilitated—if we are to follow 
the interpretation from the manifesto of 1958—the establishment of merito-
cratic ideas and institutions in imperial China.
Although meritocratic elements, which were predominantly related to the 
notion of a government by virtuous and able persons,41 are part of an “ideal” 
democracy, they were, according to Tang, severely flawed. First of all, there 
was no persistently effective safeguard against the abuse of power by the 
rulers, even though some meritocratic measures and institutions had been 
established, such as the civil service examination system, which was open to 
competition for parts of the male population; a sort of cabinet in the govern-
ment, which not only counseled the emperor but at times would remonstrate 
against him; the so-called censorial system, which functioned to survey and 
admonish the officials as well as the emperor himself; and the institutional-
38   Ibid., pp. 270–271; see also Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 41.
39   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 420; see also ibid., p. 413. For a similar statement, 
see Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 289–291: Here, Tang concluded that there was 
no rule of law in Chinese history comparable to the development of the rule of law in the 
West.
40   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 416, also cf. p. 413.
41   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 288–289.
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ized production of a historiography which passed posthumous judgments on 
emperors and dynasties. These institutions, however, proved to be inefficient 
when it came to preventing or at least sanctioning serious abuses of power. 
Ultimately, the quality of the political order depended on the willingness of 
those in power to abide by meritocratic ideals.42
Not only were the institutions of meritocracy deficient, but the idea itself 
was fundamentally flawed. A truly virtuous ruler would certainly  encourage his 
subjects to reinforce their moral personality, but since the subjects depended 
on exemplary rulers and were, in fact, for the most part denied political partici-
pation, they would never attain sufficient autonomy to actualize their moral 
subjectivity.43 Tang therefore concluded that the Chinese spirit of democ-
racy was present only in the “moral spirit” of Confucianism, and thus in a 
“hidden” form that never amounted to the manifestation of a “political spirit.” 
Consequently, the Chinese people were not aware of their status as political 
subjects and had no conception of any claim to political rights:44
I say that Confucian thought contains the highest democratic spirit, 
because [Confucian thought] believes in the highest sense that every 
human being can become a sage and join Heaven in virtue. Now people 
may ask: Why didn’t Confucians talk about Western style democratic pol-
itics . . .? (. . .) My answer is: Originally, Confucians took politics just as a 
direct extension of morality; politics was [thought of as an] occasion for 
the direct realization of human moral consciousness.45
In the same vein, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan critically reflected on the 
absence of “political subject[ivity]” (zhengzhi shang de zhuti 政治上的主體), 
to use Xu’s term, from traditional Confucian political thought. As Xu main-
tained, this was the downside of the Confucian conflation of politics and eth-
ics, which essentially resulted in the supplanting of political subjectivity by 
moral subjectivity.46 Tang, too, left no doubt that the reason for the lack of sub-
jectivity had to do with Confucianism itself. In particular, he was concerned, 
42   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 37–38; see also Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, 
p. 289.
43   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 38–39.
44   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 420.
45   Ibid., p. 419; also cf. p. 422.
46   Xu, “Rujia zhengzhi sixiang de gouzao ji qi zhuanjin,” p. 55. On Mou, see my “ ‘Confucian 
Democracy’ and its Confucian Critics: Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi on the Limits of 
Confucianism,” pp. 177–183.
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as we have seen, with the inability of pre-modern Confucianism to reach an 
adequate understanding of the lust for power that is deeply rooted in human 
nature. Unlike Xu Fuguan, he argued that since Confucian philosophers had 
failed to develop an adequate political anthropology, they held on to a false 
belief in the potential of individual character-building and education, and 
thought this would be sufficient to contain the human lust for power. They 
did not recognize, in other words, how deeply rooted this desire is in human 
nature. Consequently, they settled for a political philosophy that treated politi-
cal power mostly in terms of  educational efforts directed at individuals, includ-
ing the rulers, who were expected to cultivate their moral natures.47
 The Civil-Theological Justification of Democracy
Tang’s justification of democracy is based upon an idea of man which is closely 
intertwined with his Confucian civil theology. A key element of the civil- 
theological idea of man is the assumption of an indissoluble human lust for 
power. Because the political traditions of Confucianism severely misjudged 
the latter, Tang denied that pre-modern Confucianism was suited for bolster-
ing the call for constitutional democracy. After all, with respect to democracy, 
one needed to account for the human being’s persistent lust for power:
What makes democratic politics a necessity is indeed that human beings 
have a political consciousness stemming not only directly from [their] 
moral consciousness, but also from a drive for power. This means a gov-
ernment of sage-kings or Plato’s philosophers can almost certainly not 
appear in reality. If such [government] would [actually] appear, it would 
not be able to objectively guarantee its continuation.48
Among the indispensable arrangements to prevent the abuse of political 
power, Tang deemed the institutions for legislation and public elections to 
be especially important. This entailed a system of checks and balances which 
would gradually reduce the likelihood that political wills destroy “the values of 
human existence and culture.”49 Tang thus justified democratic institutions—
47   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 395–396, 422.
48   Ibid., pp. 394–395. Since this political anthropology is fundamental to Tang’s political phi-
losophy, He Xinquan’s (Ho Hsin-chuan) critique that Tang only partially separated poli-
tics from ethics is unjustified; see He, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, pp. 128–129.
49   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 396–397.
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in particular the democratic formation of the political will—by stating that 
they effectively balance and mitigate the wills for power. It is also significant 
that he conceptualized the necessity to curtail dangerous power struggles 
without an accompanying call for a “new man” of higher moral qualities.
The justification for institutions of checks and balances is hence insepa-
rable from the idea that individuals express their “political consciousness” by 
 striving for power (i.e. by participating in politics).50 Tang’s political thought 
takes a turn here which is untypical, to say the least, in Confucian traditions: 
His line of argument clearly suggests that something “good,” such as a democ-
racy, can arise from something morally questionable, namely, the latently 
evil lust for power which elicits the need to establish checks and balances. As 
he pointedly concluded, the source of democracy is not “perfectly holy.” He 
therefore took issue with any political philosophy founded on an excessively 
optimistic belief in human goodness.51 Tang certainly resisted the lure of an 
ethics of conviction, favoring instead an ethics of responsibility. As a conse-
quence, any justification of liberal democracy based on the assumption that 
the political consciousness of individuals might and should become a direct 
extension of their moral consciousness must be regarded, according to Tang, 
as inadequate and self-contradictory. The belief that the moral good can be 
readily detected and thereafter implemented given that political decisions are 
taken by a truly moral consciousness amounts, in fact, to a denial of the desir-
ability of popular participation. Tang maintained that if the identification and 
implementation of moral truths were taken to be crucial criteria for decisions 
in politics, a monarchy (or an authoritarian system for that matter) in which a 
tiny minority of exemplary figures rules according to their presumably supe-
rior moral standards would have to be regarded as the best political system.52
Therefore, Tang did not justify institutions like the rule of law or public elec-
tions in terms of moral subjects, but rather in terms of the idea that individuals 
are universally entitled to claim rights for themselves:
The spiritual foundation of early modern Western rule of law and govern-
ment by the people consists in the universal recognition of the rights of 
the people. This establishing of a principle of reason in recognizing every-
one’s rights can be said to originally come from each individual affirming 
and grasping their own rights, which [in turn] stems from human’s selfish 
desires. Yet, each individual’s affirmation of their own rights [in turn leads 
50   Ibid., pp. 394–395, 398.
51   Ibid., pp. 396–397.
52   Ibid., p. 394.
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to a situation where] the rights of all individuals constrain one another. 
From this, human beings attain the notion of transcending their indi-
vidual rights and recognizing the rights of others. Thus, there is the estab-
lishment of the reasonable principle that the rights of all men should 
be recognized. (. . .) By establishing this principle of reason . . . everyone 
can observe the guidance this principle [provides] and become aware of 
their own reasonable self as it transcends their striving for rights, further 
nourishes and expands their moral will and completes their moral per-
sonality through self-awareness. (. . .) Only then may China’s past ideals 
of government by virtue, government by [upright] men, and government 
by morals be truly realized.53
In other words, the contemporary realization of the ideal of “government by 
virtue” rests upon a much less optimistic view of human nature. It thus makes 
room for the political institutions of liberal democracy, which were inconceiv-
able for Confucians of the pre-Qin and imperial centuries. As Tang suggested, 
the Confucian tradition provided an insufficient basis for the justification and 
stabilization of core institutions of liberal democracies such as the rule of law 
and the legal protection of human rights:
Here, the Confucian idea of the whole man as a cultural and moral being 
seems inadequate as the spiritual ground for the establishment of a mod-
ern community and modern vocational morality. . . . the modern ideas of 
human rights, as related with ideas of democracy, freedom, and equal-
ity, are all defined objectively in terms of the individual’s social, politi-
cal, legal, and economic relations to others. (. . .) Thus the human rights 
protected by modern laws are actually protected by the whole legislative 
system, which is related to the whole political and social systems and not 
protected merely by our subjective moral sense of justice. Here, we see 
that the Confucian idea of a moral sense of justice has never developed 
enough to build such a modern systems [sic]. The Confucian’s idea of 
freedom is man’s moral freedom to do the moral good. The Confucian’s 
ideas of right and the equality of men are essentially the equality of moral 
nature and moral right to be sages. All of these Confucian ideas are not 
sufficient to provide a spiritual basis of modernization. To respond to the 
demands of the age, a further development of Confucianism from within 
is called for.54
53   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, pp. 289–290.
54   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” pp. 368–369.
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The question, then, is what role, if any, can a renewed, modern Confucianism 
play in the context of establishing a democracy in China? Given Tang’s, as well 
as Xu Fuguan’s and Mou Zongsan’s, judgment about the ambivalent nature of 
Confucianism (on the one hand, it is an intellectual “sprout” of democracy; on 
the other, it is responsible for the failure to establish a democratic government 
before 1911), the issue becomes even more delicate. Addressing this problem 
was particularly important, because they considered a democratic nation-
state to be modern Confucianism’s authentic political form. They therefore 
needed to explain how democracy, constitutional government, and the rule 
of law can be understood and justified in terms of Confucianism. It was not 
enough to understand them as Western additions, as mere formalities added 
onto a Confucian ethical substance. After all, neither Tang nor Mou Zongsan 
and Xu Fuguan fell back on the pattern of 19th century Tiyong thought. Their 
concept of liberal democracy was not based on such simplistic notions. They 
also did not speculate about how to improve, or Confucianize, constitutional 
arrangements and institutional practices of extant Western liberal democ-
racies. It was not their ambition to alter the form of liberal democracy even 
before it had begun its political life in China.
A fundamental assumption of Tang’s, Xu’s and Mou’s transcultural political 
thought is that, in order to take root in modern China, Western institutions 
and ideas need to stand the test of a full justification in terms of indigenous 
philosophy. In this context, Tang Junyi delineated comprehensive “philosophi-
cal” approaches (to borrow Richard Rorty’s term) to justifying democracy as 
those based on a theory of natural law and those focusing on a concept of the 
dignity of the individual. As Tang explained, he attempted to justify democracy 
by introducing the Mencian idea that every human being can “become a Yao or 
a Shun.” He presumed that “becoming a Yao or a Shun” is a formula connoting 
that every individual, as a “moral subject” (daode de zhuti 道德的主體), has the 
same natural potency to become a “sage.” All individuals should therefore also 
receive equal recognition as “political and social subjects” (zhengzhi shehui zhi 
zhuti 政治社會之主體).55 Accordingly, when discussing the ultimate goals of 
those striving for democracy and freedom, Tang singled out the idea of real-
izing the individual’s (moral) nature, reason, and holiness.56
55   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, p. 45.
56   See his article from 1952 entitled “The Establishment of Chinese Democratic Thought” 
(“Zhongguo minzhu sixiang zhi jianli” 中國民主思想之建立) reprinted in: Tang, 
Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 165.
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Tang did not develop a full-scale theory of democracy that deals with ques-
tions of political justice, legitimacy, or sovereignty in-depth.57 Yet one may still 
find some remarkable peculiarities in the democratic ideas that he enunci-
ated on the basis of his Confucian civil theology. To begin with, there is the 
attempt to comprehensively integrate the idea of a renewed Confucian ethical 
life (including the “consciousness of rites”) into the institutional setting of a 
liberal democracy. This entails, as we have seen, a “Confucian” interpretation of 
civic virtues such as solidarity and tolerance as manifestations of the individ-
ual’s freedom to practice moral self-cultivation in the community. The demo-
cratic practice itself is hence said to provide impetus for the individual’s moral 
self-cultivation. Moreover, democracy is deemed desirable because it allows 
individuals to engage in moral and spiritual self-fulfillment, and do so without 
risking their own survival in the political community along the way. Equally 
important, the striving of individuals to attain political power is not entirely 
curbed in a liberal democracy, nor is their pursuit of individual self-interest. 
From the perspective of modern Confucian civil theology, it is therefore pos-
sible for individuals to give expression to both their moral nature and their evil 
inclinations, albeit within legal limits. They can thus learn to judge for them-
selves whether their actions are morally questionable or not, and, in so doing, 
further develop their moral subjectivity.58
Based on his belief that individuals need to attain the freedom of express-
ing their natural endowments when striving for self-fulfillment, Tang iden-
tified liberal democracy as the political form best suited for the quest for 
self- fulfillment. Democracy can be understood as an institutional and proce-
dural precondition, and at the same time as an ongoing political and ethical 
context for personal self-cultivation. Tang thereby abandoned the older notion 
of good government as depending on the virtuous quality and superior person-
ality of the rulers. Democracy, in Tang’s view, can work even if those in power 
are not virtuous, self-cultivated individuals. Citizens need neither qualify 
themselves by becoming moral beings, nor manifest their goodwill by engag-
ing in self-cultivation and education:
57   Tang’s notion of liberal democracy does not differ significantly from Mou Zongsan’s; 
cf. Fröhlich, “ ‘Confucian Democracy’ and its Confucian Critics: Mou Zongsan and Tang 
Junyi on the Limits of Confucianism,” pp. 177–183.
58   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 394–395, 398. On the meaning of politics in 
relation to anthropological-metaphysical assumptions of the original nature of human 
beings, see, ibid., p. 417.
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Therefore, the rule of law and democratic institutions are also [a way 
of] cultivating and nourishing ordinary people so that they are endowed 
with the self-awareness of the universal reasonable self. It is thus already 
sufficient if ordinary people do not overstep the limits set by the law in 
their affirmation and grasp of their own rights and in [their] struggle for 
rights with other people—[in this regard, they] cannot make a grave mis-
take either. (. . .) But the philosophers of China’s past did not yet thor-
oughly understand this.59
If citizens do not behave morally, it does not mean democracy is failing or 
unjustified. In other words, modern Confucianism should not justify political 
authoritarianism in the guise of pursuing lofty ideals of moral and spiritual 
education with ostensibly still immature Chinese citizens. Tang, therefore, 
departed from the authoritarian approaches to Confucianism by assuming 
that a democratic government neither needs morally superior sage-rulers, 
nor a model citizenry of exemplary, virtuous personalities. If politicians and 
citizens behave like morally advanced individuals, democracy would flour-
ish, but it could also function if they are not morally superior persons. Clearly, 
Tang did not support the conflation of politics and ethics, which he saw as 
ever-present in the Confucian tradition, and in this sense his reconstruction 
of Confucianism is distinctly modern. Although Tang did not explicitly refer 
to Kant’s distinction between a good, law-abiding citizen and a morally good 
individual, he followed a similar line of thought—in contrast, for example, to 
Xu Fuguan.60 Given Tang’s distinction between good citizens and morally good 
persons, his rejection of the belief that sage-rulers or sage citizens are precon-
ditions for a functioning democracy is not surprising. He was indeed content 
to conceive of a democratic community as a political and ethical context for an 
individual’s pursuing “the perfection of [his or her] personality.”
By conceptualizing the individual’s being a sage as a fleeting moment of 
moral intuition, Tang’s modern Confucian civil theology implied that an 
enduring, morally perfect human community cannot be attained and political 
reality cannot be turned into an earthly paradise. At the same time, Tang used 
the civil-theological limit-concept of selfhood as a sage to establish a criti-
cal distance from political life and avoid the danger of simply reaffirming the 
current political reality. The other side of the coin is that what individuals in 
the ephemeral moment of sagehood perceive as true, authentic, or  correct is 
59   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 291.
60   For a critique of Xu’s tendency to blur the conceptual distinction made by Kant, see 
Xiong, “Xu Fuguan lun minzhu zhengzhi,” p. 51.
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internal to themselves and done without reasoning with other human beings. 
“Inner sagehood” is not a democratic figure, and nor could such a sage accept 
a political compromise. He would not submit to rule by the majority or to the 
idea that decisions are democratically valid, not because they are correct, but 
because the procedures of decision-making are a matter of agreement about 
that process in advance. A community populated only by sages would lose 
its political character altogether, and there would be no negotiating, no use of 
political power, and even no communication. There would just be a complete 
unity of “innate knowing” and behavior. This vision obviously transcends the 
realm of liberal democracy in a radical sense. To be sure, neither Tang Junyi 
nor Mou Zongsan expected such a community would ever become a his-
torical reality. The community of sages is real only insofar as it is part of the 
civil-theological justification of democracy. It is neither the highest ideal of 
democracy itself, nor its ultimate historical form. In spite of this limitation, the 
justification of democracy in terms of this limit-concept poses two problems 
in particular:
(1) The persuasiveness of arguments in favor of liberal democracy rests on 
the religious-metaphysical assumptions of modern Confucianism’s civil the-
ology. That means a shared belief and social acceptance of Confucianism as 
a form of religious humanism (or civil religion) is crucial to the justification. 
This does not necessarily mean religious freedom would be endangered, since 
Confucian religious humanism is not a ruling ideology bolstered by constitu-
tional provisions. Moreover, it could be argued that a Confucian civil religion 
can also tolerate other forms of religion. But if we understand modernity today 
in post-metaphysical terms, things look different. Even if it were possible for 
Confucianism to develop into a civil religion—a highly problematic and ques-
tionable prospect—what would happen if Confucianism (as religious human-
ism) gradually lost its appeal as social change occurs? Is there some underlying 
rationale for dealing with a plurality of justifications? And would that rationale 
have to be justified in terms of Confucianism?
(2) The civil-theological justification paradoxically points towards the com-
plete dissolution of democracy. After all, there is an implicit tendency to portray 
democracy both as a precondition or a context and as a means to the (apoliti-
cal) higher end of self-fulfillment as a sage. The problem is not so much that 
democracy is seen as a means, since this is asserted in other political theories, 
including Western theories, without undermining the existence of democracy. 
The problem is that Tang assumed that the end to which democracy is sup-
posed to lead (i.e. the sphere of the sage) is settled beyond the sphere of poli-
tics, making democracy as means not just optional, but accidental. Consider 
the rationality of the procedures of democratic decision-making in terms of 
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Confucianism: In the course of discussing political issues, in the framework 
of democratic rules, participants following those rules not only identify them-
selves as citizens or politicians who accept procedural agreements of demo-
cratic decision-making. They also represent themselves as human beings who 
have not attained “inner sagehood,” and are thus in need of self-cultivation. 
There would otherwise be no reason for discussion, since the sages intuitively 
know the one truth without prior communication. From a Confucian point 
of view, participating in a democratic debate, and in so doing respecting the 
opinions of others, is conducive to one’s self-cultivation. Starting a fistfight is 
not. But how does one know that this is true? The foundation of this knowl-
edge cannot consist of a conceptually or otherwise symbolically represented 
form of cognition, because such a form of knowledge would function vis-à-vis 
one’s ultimate, intuitive insight merely as a means. It is consequently a mat-
ter of belief that abiding by democratic rules and having a democratic atti-
tude could be conducive to attaining the intuitive insights of a sage. But the 
same could be said of any form or technique of self-cultivation. If one does not 
share this belief, the civil-theological justification of liberal democracy loses its 
appeal. As a result, the precarious conceptual foundation of democracy would 
be laid bare: it would float between the two poles of a concept of the political 
sphere marked by the individual’s irrational lust for power, on the one hand, 
and the notion of an individual’s spiritual inwardness culminating in an irra-
tional intuition, on the other. It is the destruction of rationality in (democratic) 
politics that looms large at this point.
The crucial question, in the end, is what function this justification has rela-
tive to the workings of a liberal democracy. If it is considered fundamental, 
in the sense that democracy can only work if everyone, or at least a major-
ity, shares these Confucian convictions, then the old trap of dogmatism is set 
again. This is not what Tang had in mind. He clearly stated the priority that a 
constitution and the rule of law must have over continuing the political tradi-
tions of Confucianism. Modern Confucianism would thus be one among many 
other intellectual or religious resources for reproducing civic virtues and demo-
cratic convictions among the citizens. Reading Tang Junyi (and Mou Zongsan), 
though, one cannot help but feel that what he actually wanted was a far more 
prominent role for Confucianism. Just the same, at least until the mid-1960s, 
Tang and Mou resisted the lure of Confucian authoritarianism. Besides, it is no 
contradiction that they were simultaneously both ardent cultural conserva-
tives who emphasized the importance of Confucianism, and political liberals 
who insisted on legal guarantees for political pluralism and religious freedom. 
Their cultural conservatism was a kind of outlet for their high expectations of 
Confucianism. They had to politically moderate those expectations in order 
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to fulfill what they perceived a democratic modern China would require. This 
was, of course, part of a discourse on democracy that is proleptic in character: 
Tang argued for the effectiveness and the desirability of a type of democracy 
which had not yet emerged in Chinese history.
 Humanistic Culture and Democracy
According to Tang Junyi, democracy does not solely rest on constitutional 
institutions and procedures, but also on individual attitudes, virtues, and val-
ues deemed favorable for sustaining a democratic order. Tang indeed avoided 
a highly formalized conceptualization of constitutional democracy which 
would preclude any elements of a value-rational justification. Instead, he 
understood the practice of democracy to include virtues, values, and hab-
its of individuals who conform to the rule of law voluntarily, and not solely 
due to heteronomous legal force.61 The ethical and cultural preconditions of 
democratic government do not exclusively pertain to the realm of the indi-
vidual, but also to the collective sphere of social and cultural life. In order to 
effectively meet the requirements for democracy, “the position and dignity” 
of the individual must be given “objective political meaning.”62 This will take 
place, as Tang explains, in a “social atmosphere” (shehui fengqi 社會風氣) that 
allows the individuals to develop an awareness of the “humanistic world.”63 
For one, such a social environment entails the formation of a public opinion 
that holds “personalities from [the sphere of] society,” such as entrepreneurs, 
scholars, educators, and those engaged in charitable work, in equally high 
esteem as politicians.64 Hence, not only the recognition of political roles in 
the narrow sense matters to political life, but also the recognition of social and 
cultural roles.
Tang posited here, in fact, that the individual quest for recognition is a 
core element in political, social, cultural and economic life, even though the 
forms of recognition and the means to achieve it may differ. This claim cor-
responds, as we have seen, to the analysis of the lust for power as driven by 
the individual’s desire to gain recognition from others. From the perspective 
61   On this topic, see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, p. 105.
62   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 401, 423–424. Tang refers in this context to 
“humanistic forces” (ibid., p. 423) and to “social and cultural forces and organizations” 
(ibid., p. 401).
63   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 237.
64   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 424.
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of power politics, the willingness to recognize others as rulers is due to the 
suppression by an opposing will. As regards the victorious will, it would take 
its self-exhaustion and subsequent “reversal” in the “great emptiness” to turn 
it into a moral will that voluntarily recognizes the will, personality, or value 
orientations of others (see Chap. 7). Even the individual’s deepest absorption 
with the lust for power hence still provides a possibility for non-coercive rec-
ognition. In turning to political life in a democratic society, we may conclude 
from this analysis that although power struggles may prevail, there is still a 
measure of voluntary recognition to be expected from political actors. At this 
point, Tang’s political thought takes an almost existentialist turn. His reference 
to the individual’s reversal in the great emptiness indeed suggests that beyond 
the forms of legally enforced and voluntary recognition, there is an existential 
ground for recognition.
In spite of his focus on the issue of recognition in social interaction, Tang 
appears to have not devised a theory of recognition that differentiates between 
recognition among abstract legal subjects, individuals in ethical relations, or 
collectivities within social sectors. It is, therefore, more apt to say that Tang 
established a foundation for further theoretical reflection about issues of rec-
ognition, without pursuing such a path himself. But even so, he clearly arrived 
at the conclusion that struggles for recognition were as pervasive in political, 
power-driven interactions as in social and cultural interactions. We may fur-
ther conclude that if the members of a democratic community have sufficient 
opportunities to become immersed in the “humanistic” realm of recognition, 
they might eventually become more inclined to voluntarily recognize other 
individuals and their value orientations. This, in turn, would have the effect of 
mitigating power struggles and reducing the need to resort to legal force as a 
means to sustain democratic practice and order.
In the same vein, Tang warned against the tendency to perceive politics and 
political life in general solely in terms of power struggles.65 Such a misguided 
perception would preclude the awareness that the “original” motivation for 
political acts indeed stems from a “mind of humaneness and justice,” which 
facilitates forms of voluntary recognition. Rather enigmatically, Tang claims 
that this reflection about the motivation to pay recognition is concerned with 
a psychological fact.66 But what about the will for power as a driving force 
of political activity? As we have seen, Tang considered the will for power to 
be “original,” too. The coexistence of the “mind of humaneness and justice” 
and the will for power at the motivational origin of political activity seems to 
65   Ibid., p. 424.
66   Ibid., pp. 391–392.
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be an uneasy one. However, they are not necessarily unrelated to each other. 
Tang had tried to show in his analysis of the will for power that it operates dia-
lectically, undergoing a reversal into a moral will. What is more, the “mind of 
humaneness and justice” does not have to be understood for it to completely 
lack a will for power. Be that as it may, Tang was certainly not saying here that 
political life may be cleansed from all power-seeking action and motivation. 
He rather wanted to highlight that the concept of politics must not be reduced 
to a definition in terms of struggles for power, domination, and rule. The prac-
tice of civic virtues, tolerance, and solidarity that entails the willingness to pay 
voluntary recognition in political life is also to be considered political in an 
original sense.
On this basis, Tang argued that humanistic issues matter to political life in 
a democracy. He further assumed that the “spirit of humaneness and justice” 
essentially evolves within a humanistic realm composed of the spheres of eth-
ics, religions, science, literature, art, education, and the economic sphere.67 As 
he saw it, these spheres belong to the so-called humanistic territory of col-
lective life.68 By acting in these humanistic fields, the individuals are said to 
practice virtues and values and develop habits of voluntarily recognizing the 
personality and the value orientation of others. The humanistic realm in soci-
ety was obviously not to be confounded with an apolitical realm for the retreat 
of individuals into a spiritual or religious inwardness, but should contribute 
to the normative preconditions of democratic political order. Tang emphati-
cally stated that “all thinking and concepts in politics” should be related to 
humanistic thought and concepts, and this was also to pertain to the concept 
of democracy which had to be interpreted from the perspective of humanistic 
concepts.69
According to Tang, in terms of their relevance for the social formation of 
a non-coercive practice of recognition, the sciences and the economic sector 
should be set at the periphery of the humanistic core area of ethics, religions, 
literature, art, and education. Politics, on the other hand, is only to have “sub-
ordinated” relevance.70 This outlook entails the assumption that the willing-
ness of individuals to voluntarily recognize “values of human existence and 
culture,” i.e. the value orientation, personality, and dignity of others, results 
from the individual’s immersion in the humanistic core area. At the same time, 
this willingness is to form the normative basis for the political consciousness of 
67   Ibid., pp. 403, 409–410.
68   Ibid., p. 403.
69   Ibid., p. 388.
70   Ibid., pp. 63–66.
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citizens in a democratic society.71 It is with this rationale that Tang identified 
China’s “humanistic spirit” in general and the “Confucian spirit” in particular, 
which holds the individual’s personality in the highest esteem, as the spiritual 
foundation of democracy.72 It should be kept in mind here that Tang was, as 
we have seen, convinced that any Confucian renewal of the individual’s ethi-
cal life and his or her ethical disposition (i.e. a “consciousness of rites”) in turn 
required the practice of constitutional government and the rule of law.
Tang’s reflections about issues of recognition in a democracy may seem to 
remain somewhat nebulous, because he neither bolstered them with a com-
prehensive political ethics, nor with a political axiology that might clarify the 
hierarchy and inter-relatedness of political values. Even so, he obviously con-
sidered the individual’s ability to evaluate “political personalities” on the basis 
of a hierarchy of political values as a key competence of citizens in a democ-
racy. He referred to the period of the founding fathers of the United States as 
being exemplary for this civic competence. In the early period of the republic, 
the Americans are said to have still “cultivated” a “spirit of striving for higher 
[values and virtues]” together with the willingness to make personal sacrifices 
for the sake of the republic.73 In order to preserve such a civic mindset under 
conditions of a progressive modernization (within a future Chinese democ-
racy), it would be necessary to accord key relevance to a humanistic core area 
which must, consequently, be shielded from a thorough politicization or econ-
omization. Tang was not overly optimistic in this regard, as he bluntly stated 
that historical developments in the United States showed how, at the stage of 
advanced industrialization and increasing division of labor, the danger of a 
domination by “instrumental values” (gongju jiazhi 工具價值)74 was growing 
and with it a general leveling in value orientations. The existence of a human-
istic core area within modernizing societies was thus not only threatened by 
ideational factors such as a misguided reduction of politics to power struggles, 
but also by factors pertaining to the socioeconomic, structural conditions of 
modernization that tend to undermine the civic consciousness in a demo-
cratic community.75
71   Ibid., pp. 391–392. Tang related this to the Confucian worthies who allegedly made 
humaneness and justice their “basis” for recognizing values of human existence and cul-
ture. According to the “teachings of the goodness of [human] nature,” all human beings 
are capable of such recognition; ibid., pp. 416, 418.
72   Ibid., p. 416. This is the political meaning of the proposition from the manifesto of 1958 
according to which the Confucian “study of mind and [human] nature” was at the “heart” 
of Chinese culture and scholarship; see Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 21.
73   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, pp. 134–135.
74   Ibid., p. 134.
75   Ibid., pp. 132–134.
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If Tang had been an American political thinker, he might have belonged 
to the tradition of the liberal left. Both his concept of a humanistic core area 
within a democratic society and his notion of a renewal of traditional “com-
munities and associations of alumni, of members from the same birthplace, 
of academics, of participants of poetry and wine gatherings” under condi-
tions of social modernity roughly correspond to John Dewey’s conception of 
a “Great Community.”76 Dewey assumed that given the evolution of modern 
mass communication and the ensuing emergence of a badly informed, politi-
cally disinterested mass public, the participation of individuals in “lesser com-
munities” (e.g. neighborhood communities) and local associations should 
play an important role in politics, because, as members of such communities 
and associations, individuals could gain experience in political participation. 
Dewey thus stated that, after all, “[d]emocracy must begin at home, and its 
home is the neighborly community.”77 At the heart of this idea, there is a con-
cept of the individual which more or less accords with Tang’s concept. Dewey, 
too, assumes that
an individual is nothing fixed, given ready-made. It is something achieved, 
and achieved not in isolation, but [sic] the aid and support of conditions, 
cultural and physical, including in ‘cultural’ economic, legal, and political 
institutions as well as science and art.78
76   Dewey refers in his book The Public and its Problems from 1927 to the pre-modern type of 
family and neighborhood associations of “the Orient,” claiming that these were neither 
political communities nor part of the societal sphere. According to Dewey, such familial 
communities were ruled by “personal loyalties” and politics were “submerged in morals,” 
while the “theocratic state” was considered to be remote. As a result, “[t]he intimate and 
familiar propinquity group [was] not a social unity within an inclusive whole;” see Dewey, 
The Public and Its Problems, pp. 41–42. Tang might have agreed. After all, when proposing 
to link up with the tradition of Chinese communities and associations, he did it on the 
basis of his diagnosis that there had been neither a civil society nor a modern nation-
state in imperial China. Tang’s position is therefore not in obvious contrast to Dewey’s 
judgment. Tan Sor-hoon recently took a different approach and refuted Dewey’s analysis 
with respect to pre-imperial and imperial Chinese (especially Confucian) thought: Tan, 
Confucian Democracy, pp. 122–123.
77   Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 210–213. On this issue in Dewey’s thought, see 
Kallscheuer, “Pluralismus, Universalismus, Hermeneutik,” p. 225; see also Kallscheuer, 
“Ein amerikanischer Gesellschaftskritiker. Michael Walzers kommunitarer Liberalismus,” 
pp. 140–144.
78   Dewey, “The Future of Liberalism,” p. 227; see also Kallscheuer, “Ein amerikanischer 
Gesellschaftskritiker. Michael Walzers kommunitarer Liberalismus,” p. 141. For a discus-
sion of the similarities between Dewey’s concept of the individual and pre-imperial 
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However, the similarities between Tang’s modern Confucianism, on the one 
hand, and Dewey’s political philosophy and other strands of American and 
European traditions of republican thought, on the other, should not be over-
stated. Modern Confucianism and Western republican traditions are based 
on vastly different theoretical frameworks. There are, for example, clear dif-
ferences between Dewey’s concept of liberty which states that liberty is the 
“. . . fulfillment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and 
manifold association with others,”79 and Tang’s theory of freedom which is 
based on the civil-theological notion of the self-fulfillment of personal poten-
tialities as endowed by Heaven. These different points of departure entail vastly 
different ideas about the practice of individual self-fulfillment and the mean-
ing and relevance of inter-subjective contexts.
Another difference pertains to the concepts of political reason which lie at 
the basis of the reflections about constitutional democracy. Anglo-American 
traditions of political thought in general take the long-standing experience 
with constitutional government as a crucial historical precondition for the for-
mation of political reason, no matter whether constitutional government was 
republican or monarchic in nature, or whether there was a written system of 
constitutional law or a tradition of common law that did not produce writ-
ten constitutions. In any case, political reason appears to be shaped by the 
reflection about the political history of one’s “own” constitutional government. 
The formation of political reason and sound political judgment is thus seen as 
depending on the interpretations of the constitutional and political history, 
and not so much on philosophical speculation. In contrast, the latter flourishes 
when a long-standing, dominant tradition of constitutionalism is unavailable 
in one’s own historical context. Political thinkers consequently try to tap more 
speculative sources of political reason.80
Tang Junyi’s attempt to devise a civil-theological basis for political phi-
losophy can be considered a typical case of the speculative mode of political 
thinking. Tang was, after all, in no historical position to refer to a time-tested, 
Confucian concepts of human nature (xing); see Tan, Confucian Democracy, pp. 25–32, 
50–53, 101–102.
79   Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 150.
80   Vollrath considers the mainstream of 19th-century and early 20th-century German politi-
cal thought as a case in point. On his comparison between German and Anglo-American 
traditions, see Vollrath, Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theorie des Politischen, 
pp. 140–148, 159–160. In this context, Vollrath deems it significant that studies in politi-
cal history and political biographies are particularly prominent within Anglo-American 
political thought: Ibid., p. 148.
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indigenous tradition of constitutional government, as there was no such 
 tradition in China’s political record. It indeed seems to make a great difference 
whether political thinkers are forced to anticipate constitutional democracy 
or whether they can critically reflect on it while actually living in a political 
community that is generally described as a constitutional democracy. A prag-
matic, non-speculative type of political thought which is skeptical about philo-
sophical attempts to construct a theoretical foundation for political reason and 
truth claims has therefore literally been out of reach for Chinese theoreticians 
of the 20th century. Given this intellectual-historical context, it is perhaps lit-
tle surprising that Chinese political thinkers like Tang Junyi focused on a con-
ceptual juxtaposition between (humanistic) culture and the lesser realm of 
politics.81 This again stands in stark contrast to Anglo-American traditions 
of political thought which conceptualized culture (or “civilization”) to encom-
pass the whole realm of political experience.
In order to deflect, on a conceptual level, tendencies to politicize the 
humanistic core of society, Tang developed a concept of politics that circum-
scribes the function of politics with respect to the social recognition of values 
and value orientations. Politics is hence said to have an indirect bearing on 
the deliberations and value orientations in public life. Tang explicitly referred 
to the American, British, and German post-war democracies in this context 
and explained that politics in general and political power in particular should 
be restrained, on the basis of constitutional law, by public opinion, social 
education, and economic forces. Such “restricted politics” (xianzhi zhengzhi 
限制政治) would be confined to a “mediate form” ( jianjie xingtai 間接形態), 
which would preclude an immediate, totalizing politicization of society.82
Tang further elucidated his concept of politics by comparing the function 
of politics, in a manner similar to differentiation theory, to the role of a police-
man who is standing guard at the entrance of a theatre. The policemen thus 
facilitates the realization of (humanistic) social and cultural values (inside the 
theatre), but he does so “indirectly,” without participating in the theatre per-
formance itself, neither as spectator nor as a critic.83 Consequently, the “active 
tasks” to be fulfilled in politics, for example in the field of educational, cul-
tural, or social welfare policy, are mainly to entail the task of organizing extant 
81   Such a constellation is reminiscent of similar juxtapositions of culture and politics in 
German conservative thought of the late 19th and early 20th century. On the German con-
cepts of culture, civilization and the political, see also Vollrath, “Zur Problematik eines 
Begriffs des Politischen,” pp. 321, 329.
82   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 237.
83   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 390. On this aspect of Tang’s concept of politics, 
see also Liu, “Tang Junyi de zhengzhi zhexue,” pp. 50–51.
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social, cultural, and intellectual currents. Here, too, politics is to be understood 
primarily as a means.84 It should hence be limited to a “domain” (lingyu 領域) 
within culture and society and must not be conceptualized as permeating the 
social and cultural domains.85 According to this conceptual strategy, politics 
itself is neither a sphere in which humanistic culture is produced, nor should 
politics take responsibility for making judgments about specific normative 
contents of humanistic culture. The foremost task of politics is to safeguard 
humanistic culture on the whole and in so doing prevent democracy from 
deteriorating into a combat zone of ideologies.
The confinement of politics to the function of safeguarding normative 
resources for democratic deliberations also has consequences for the role 
of political parties and politicians. Tang suggested that in a democratic set-
ting, political parties do not need an “ideology,” nor in fact even a “philosophy,” 
but merely political strategies for practical application.86 This prescription 
for political parties should obviously preclude the existence of ideologically 
charged parties such as the CCP or the GMD in a future Chinese democracy. 
Tang completed his exhortation by adding that practical politics had to be con-
cerned with concrete and particular issues, which was why politicians should 
refrain from relying on abstract principles and theories.87 Otherwise, there 
was a risk of falling victim to an ideologization of politics that might engender 
totalitarianism. Such a type of politics is characterized, according to Tang, by 
the ambition to realize truth claims “immediately” and within all social and 
cultural sectors.
By rejecting calls to a comprehensive realization of political doctrines, the 
modern Confucian project is most of all about retracing ideational foundations 
of democracy and freedom—and not about efforts to implement doctrines 
and prescriptions.88 Tang was therefore merely being consistent when stating 
that “our scholarship” should not be directly turned into a political force.89 The 
idea here is that democratic discussions among citizens about which traditions 
to follow and how to interpret the normative foundations of their collective 
life require a humanistic realm that is free from direct interference by political 
84   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 391; see also ibid., pp. 66–67.
85   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 226–227. On Tang’s notion of 
politics as a sector within the “domains of human culture,” see also Tang, Renwen jingshen 
zhi chongjian, p. 389. “Culture” and “society” are used here as umbrella terms, that is, in a 
very broad sense.
86   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 226.
87   Ibid., p. 227.
88   Ibid., p. 236.
89   Ibid., p. 227.
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ideologies and power politics. As a consequence, no particular humanistic 
tradition should obtain political protection above all others and this includes 
Confucianism. Tang’s reluctance to provide a detailed, prescriptive depiction 
of Confucian humanism is therefore not due to a lack of practical concerns. 
On the contrary, the relative vagueness of Confucian humanism functions to 
prevent its abuse by political ideologies, and thus facilitates open deliberations 
about its contents and meanings among citizens in the first place. By raising 
the awareness for the need of such open deliberations, modern Confucianism 
is conducive to establishing a political culture that befits liberal democracy.
Unlike what one may generally expect from a Confucian philosopher, Tang 
did not support the idea that, in modernity, politics should be refueled with 
ethical values so as to fully reestablish the “representational value of the 
political.”90 Instead of longing for a substantial reintegration of politics and 
ethics, Tang chose virtually the opposite direction by relieving politics from 
claims to a higher moral truth. From now on, the field of politics was to be 
seen as characterized by the quest for power of contesting wills and the institu-
tional and procedural arrangements for mitigating these contests. Even though 
cultural, social, or ethical values are not completely dysfunctional within poli-
tics, let alone absent from politics altogether, the operational logic of politics 
itself is not determined by such value orientations.
With this approach of differentiation, Tang sought to address challenges to 
constitutional democracy as he perceived them in the 1950s and 1960s, while 
at the same time rejecting the ideological lures of a concept of pure politics 
incorporating a higher morality, a scientific truth, or a historical necessity. He 
therefore deplored the fact that, on the Chinese Mainland after 1949, politi-
cal rule had completely dominated the humanistic realm. In the “modern Qin 
Dynasty,” as he called it, the CCP had elevated politics to the highest position 
in the whole sphere of culture in order to subdue the “humanistic world.” The 
respective socialist theories of art and science should be discarded, accord-
ing to Tang, because they submit the arts and sciences in total to political and 
economic standards.91
90   The term “representational value of the political” (“Repräsentationswert des Politischen”) 
is borrowed from Bolz, who introduces it in his analysis of Walter Benjamin’s critical 
remarks about the erosion of representational substance in democratic politics driven by 
the mounting dominance of mass media in politics: Bolz, “Charisma und Souveränität,” 
p. 251.
91   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 65, 68, 388. This diagnosis of Tang has been 
refuted from a Marxist perspective by Zhang Xianghao, who criticized Tang’s political 
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With respect to contemporary (and future Chinese) liberal democracies, 
Tang supported, as we have seen, the idea of indirectly enhancing the repre-
sentational value of democratic politics by reaffirming the importance of the 
humanistic realm. He was walking a fine line here. While rejecting the tra-
ditionalistic idea of resubmitting politics altogether to pre-modern ethical 
standards and values, he repudiated the idea of reducing politics to a purely 
functional sphere deplete of any normative contents. The middle position that 
Tang envisioned for politics is an elusive terrain which is difficult to demarcate 
conceptually, even though he set a perimeter around the two-fold dimension 
of dissociative and associative aspects of political action. On the one hand, he 
depicted the sphere of political action as characterized by a dissociative strug-
gle for power which involves specific means, institutions, and procedures; on 
the other, he conceptualized a social sphere of humanistic culture and values 
which is said to function as a crucial normative input for fostering associative 
behavior in politics.
Such an expectation with respect to the political relevance of human-
istic culture appears to be overly optimistic, while at the same time under-
estimating the increasing political impact of modern mass communication. 
Tang assumed, for example, the success of politicians in democratic elec-
tions to be the result of a broad acceptance of their value orientations by the 
 constituency.92 In the same vein, he was convinced that the values represented 
by the constituency have a crucial impact on decisions about who is to be 
entrusted with political responsibility.93 To be fair, it should be mentioned 
again that Tang developed these views not as descriptions of extant democra-
cies, but rather as to explore the normative potential of democracy. Indeed, 
when reflecting on the American democracy in his time, he not only observed 
an excess of instrumental values in politics, but also a dangerous tendency 
to turn democratic elections into a barter trade. Apparently both candidates 
and the constituency perceived each other as instrumental for the pursuit of 
their respective goals. Modern election campaigns are hence designed, Tang 
believed, to evoke a certain psychological condition in which the voters are 
easily incited. In a somber mood, he concluded that only those candidates get 
elected who are capable of inciting an emotional response in their constitu-
ency, whereas political personalities in the true sense of the word fail to be 
thought for neglecting the “substance of classes” and disregarding the question of which 
class holds power to rule; see Zhang, Tang Junyi sixiang yanjiu, p. 161.
92   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 399.
93   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, p. 132.
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elected. In the end, “human beings” are not elected, but the financial power 
behind the campaigns of the candidates.94
Even though these reflections on the downsides of modern democracy were 
in general agreement with pessimistic diagnoses of mass democracy in Europe 
and the United States, there are also some significant differences to be found. 
About two decades prior to Tang’s critical view of American democracy, Walter 
Benjamin presented a profound critique of the modern parliament and its pub-
lic. According to Benjamin, the technical innovations of radio and film were 
for the most part responsible for an essential change in the nature of political 
selection. Now, the new procedure of “presenting the politicians before the 
recording equipment” was gaining so much momentum that parliaments and 
theaters were likewise in a state of atrophy. Benjamin concluded that given 
this novel “selection before an apparatus,” only “the champion, the star, and 
the dictator” would be able to succeed.95 Tang did not consider the distor-
tion of democratic politics and the depletion of normative deliberation under 
the impact of mass communication with the same heightened attention as 
Benjamin. But even so, he also did not believe in the feasibility of replenishing 
modern democracy with rejuvenated forms of rule by virtue, nor did he advo-
cate the idea of a Confucian democracy characterized by meritocratic stan-
dards of political selection.
As regards the modern politician, Tang’s “humanistic” concept of the politi-
cal suggests an ideal which is quite different from the one found in the thought 
of Max Weber, even though Tang, like Weber, expected politicians to resist the 
lure of an ethics of conviction. But the ideal politician described by Tang does 
not belong to the Weberian type of modern, professional politician who lives 
for and from his or her political activities. Tang rather envisioned politicians 
who reluctantly engage into politics and conscientiously acknowledge that 
they do not directly contribute to the realization of common values.96 Such 
political personalities should be persons of broad humanistic education who 
do not use their power to suppress others, but to “treasure culture.”97 They are 
thus “worthy persons” of humanistic background who volunteer to shoulder 
the burden of political engagement. Due to such a lack of political passion, 
ideal politicians would find it easier to stay impartial and free from partisanship 
94   Ibid., pp. 137–138.
95   Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings 
on Media, p. 50, Endnote 24 (for the German original, see Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im 
Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, pp. 27–28; Footnote 20).
96   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 390.
97   Ibid., pp. 67, 394.
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when assuming higher office.98 They would hence remain aloof from social 
and political pressure groups and resist the paralyzing pressure of bureaucratic 
mechanisms. Even though Tang referred here explicitly to an ideal, one may 
still wonder whether his political thought is not prone to an elitist elevation 
of personalities of humanistic breadth. In this regard, his portrayal of ideal 
politicians and his requirements for practitioners of self-cultivation are in con-
formity insofar as both depict outstanding individuals capable of bearing up 
under the failures of their efforts when facing the downsides of the modern 
world. 
98   Ibid., p. 394.
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CHAPTER 10
Civil Religion on a Confucian Basis
 Civil Religion for a Future China
The fact that Tang’s ideas about a Chinese democracy are anticipatory in 
character becomes particularly evident in his writings concerning the role of 
Confucian religiosity within a future democracy. In this context, Tang devel-
oped the notion of a Confucian-based civil religion.1 This civil religion is to 
serve as a basis for civic virtues, including the virtue of religious tolerance. In 
order to outline the historical form, the dogmatic contents, as well as the social 
and political functions and effects of a future civil religion, Tang made refer-
ence to his concept of a Confucian civil theology and, above all, to the civil-
theological limit-concepts of the sage and (moral) intuition.
Tang’s concept of a Confucian-based civil religion is embedded in histori-
cal claims which entail temporal and normative implications. These implica-
tions can be readily clarified by briefly considering comparable constellations 
in Western concepts of civil religion. First of all, in relating Tang’s approach 
to civil religion to research on civil religion in the United States, we may note 
that in the American case, there is a predominantly descriptive-analytical 
framework based on the assumption that civil religion is actually extant in 
American society. Civil religion in the United States is consequently treated 
as a phenomenon which can be observed in historical time and space. In 
1   With respect to terminology, it should be noted that Tang did not use a direct verbal equiva-
lent to “civil religion” in Chinese. Translations of terms like “civil religion,” “civic religion,” 
and the French “religion civile” were not yet current in the Chinese-language discourse on 
religion of the 1950s and 60s. Tang referred to the idea of a civil religion with various Chinese 
terms, and most of these terms not only cover the concept of civil religion, but also other 
meanings. Among these terms, the following are the most common: “religiosity” (zongjiaox-
ing), “religious spirit” (zongjiao jingshen), and “complete religion” (wanman de zongjiao 完滿
的宗教); see Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 594. The term “renewed Confucianism” 
(xin ruxue 新儒學) also deserves special attention in this context. In one of the few instances 
where Tang applied it, he referred to the role of religions in China and reminded his readers 
that Buddhism had an impact on neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties. In anal-
ogy to this Buddhist-inspired formation of neo-Confucianism, he concluded that religions 
might “initiate” the formation of a “renewed Confucianism” and a future “renaissance” of “the 
religious spirit which was originally present in Chinese culture.” See Tang, Zhongguo renwen 
jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 34.
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contrast, such an assumption is rejected, for example, in the case of post-war 
Germany. Researchers from the disciplines of sociology, political science, phi-
losophy, and intellectual history have not reached a consensus whether a civil 
religion—or at least some related phenomena—actually evolved in Germany 
after the war. Yet another approach can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
classical depiction of a civil religion or “religion civile.” Rousseau developed his 
concept of civil religion in section eight of the final chapter of his Du contrat 
social with the intention of anticipating a civil religion for a future commu-
nity. In so doing, Rousseau interpreted extant Christian denominations with 
the goal of reducing their dogmatic contents to the point where they should 
become generally acceptable as a civil religion across different denominations.
Civil religion as conceptualized by Tang may, mutatis mutandis, be labeled 
Rousseauian insofar as it functions as an anticipation of the future: Neither the 
Chinese democracy nor the civil religion which Tang foresaw as instrumental 
for the implementation of civic virtues such as religious tolerance, were yet in 
existence. But whereas Rousseau devised the idea of a civil religion to bolster 
his theory of social contract, Tang conceived of a civil religion with the goal of 
redefining the role of Confucian religiosity in modern society. This entailed an 
attempt to counter ideas of a Confucian theocracy (Kongjiao 孔教), a dogmatic 
Confucianism (as in the authoritarianism of the GMD), and a political religion 
(Marxism-Leninism, Maoism).
In order to achieve the status of a civil religion in a future Chinese democ-
racy, the religious convictions inherent in Confucianism would have to be con-
ducive to the unity and stability of a democratic community in China. This 
involves, first of all, the idea of the emancipation from the shackles of political-
religious dogmatism and authoritarian claims made in the name of ostensibly 
traditional (Confucian) values and virtues. At the same time, the civil-religious 
convictions were to compensate for the loss of traditional worldviews in mod-
ern society. Here, Tang’s concept of civil religion is in accord with what Robert 
N. Bellah analyzed as a fundamental idea of American republicanism, namely, 
that a republic needs an encompassing system of values symbolized in a civil 
religion. The democratic republic aims at fostering an ethical commitment 
from its citizens, and the civil religion serves as a symbolic representation of a 
higher order that gives meaning to republican virtues and values.2
But Tang and Rousseau, and possibly also Bellah, differed in their ideas 
about engendering the citizen’s willingness to act upon civic virtues. Rousseau, 
like the mainstream of Enlightenment philosophy, believed that the citizens 
needed the assurance of a reward for virtuous deeds that was to be obtained, if 
2   Bellah, “Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic,” p. 197.
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not in this world, then in the afterlife.3 In contrast, the Confucian citizens are 
left on their own, without any reassurance of a reward in an afterlife or in the 
present. They are expected to accept the burden of virtuous behavior based on 
the demand to engage in self-cultivation, even if the prospects of success, i.e. 
becoming a sage, are dim. Confucian religiosity is, after all, in essence a religi-
osity of individual inwardness without a notion of divine grace.
Based on his distinction between world religions and the religiosity (or the 
“religious spirit”) of a renewed Confucianism, Tang assumed that Confucian 
religiosity is better suited than the world religions to foster civic virtues in gen-
eral, and religious tolerance in particular. More specifically, he expected that 
Confucian religiosity can provide a foundation for other religions to attain a 
position of mutual “recognition” in China’s (future) “humanistic world” (ren-
wen shijie 人文世界).4 Tang’s notion of religiosity is here in line with European 
concepts of religiosity, which evolved from the late 18th century. These con-
cepts essentially served to anchor religion in reason while, at the same time, 
highlighting moral duties as an integral element of religion.5 In this regard, 
Enlightenment notions of religiosity accord with ideas of a civil religion, 
including the concept of a Confucian-based civil religion in China.
However, some qualifications need to be made here. For one, a typical fea-
ture of Western notions of civil religion is absent from Tang’s reflection on the 
social and political role of Confucian religiosity within a democracy: Tang did 
not attempt to reduce the dogmatic contents of Confucianism, Daoism, and 
Buddhism, whereas it was common practice among European thinkers to con-
ceive of a minimizing of Christian dogmas. This reductive move was meant to 
defuse tensions between different Christian denominations, which were sin-
gled out as potential triggers of religious and civil war in European history. In 
contrast, Tang found no traces of a malignant dogmatism in Confucianism. The 
dogmatic content of “[religious] Confucianism” (rujiao 儒教), as he pointed 
out, merely enticed with the idea that
3   Forschner, “Rousseau über religion civile,” pp. 24–25, 34.
4   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 389.
5   Ritter et al., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, pp. 653–654. Both deism and notions of 
a religion of reason (“Vernunftreligion”) evolved in the intellectual context of the European 
Enlightenment, namely philosophies of natural law and natural religion dating back to the 
17th century. They are consistent with Tang’s idea of religiosity insofar as they, too, do not 
contain ideas of cults, revelation, miracles, or anthropomorphic notions of God: ibid., p. 657; 
see also Kleger, “Einleitung: Bürgerliche Religion, Religion des Bürgers, politische Religion, 
Zivilreligion, Staatsreligion, Kulturreligion,” pp. 11–12.
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. . . human beings only need to examine themselves and be sincere . . . [so 
that even] amid the whole turbid and sinful spirit, all of them will be 
able to perceive this original nature of the highest good, this existence of 
innate knowing.6
Neither did Tang find traces of dogmatism in Daoism and Buddhism. He 
apparently adopted the traditional cliché of a peaceful integration of the so-
called Three Teachings (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism) as a master 
narrative of China’s religious history, and concluded that there was no histori-
cal evidence for genuinely religious warfare in China comparable in scale and 
intensity to the religious wars in Europe.7 Moreover, Tang assumed that the 
three Confucian forms of ritual sacrifice (see below) did not evoke “feelings of 
religious insistence and urgency” that were as strong as those in world religions 
which were ecclesiastically organized, relied on revealed sacred scriptures and 
rigid doctrines, and upheld a fixed monotheistic or polytheistic belief.8 Tang’s 
portrayal of Confucian religiosity is, by the way, in some accordance with the 
image of Chinese “religion” or “theology” held by Sinophile philosophers of 
the European Enlightenment, such as Voltaire, Leibniz, Wolff and Hume. Still, 
when interpreting Tang’s approach to Confucian religiosity in terms of a civil 
religion, it is necessary to take into account a shift in perspective: Tang’s agenda 
was to demonstrate that Confucianism actually had a religious dimension of 
its own, in spite of the fact that there were rampant Western misconceptions of 
it which denied it profound religious significance. This intention clearly differs 
from Western agendas of civil religion. For Tang, reinterpreting Confucian reli-
giosity as a civil religion was not a matter of reducing religious dogmatism, but 
of substantiating that the “Confucian spirit” did have religious significance, 
even though its dogmatic content was rather thin.
As regards the topic of religious tolerance, Tang is more or less in line with 
Western ideas of civil religion in that he placed great emphasis on tolerance. 
He deemed Confucian religiosity exceptionally suitable for infusing religious 
tolerance into society due to its lack of religious dogmatism and hence tried to 
convince his readers that Confucian religiosity should serve as a spiritual pivot. 
Consequently, he discussed at length the potential of Confucian religiosity to 
open up a “spiritual ground” or “meeting place” for all religions in China and 
the world. Religious conflicts would hence be peacefully solved and religious 
6   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 590–591.
7   See Tang’s depiction of the historical development of humanistic thought in China: Tang, 
Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 12–32.
8   Ibid., p. 376.
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tolerance and harmony would be implemented in society by upholding “our 
Confucian position.”9 Crucial in this regard is the assumption that religious 
tolerance can be promoted in communities by emphasizing and fostering 
commonalities of religious convictions.10 As the minimal content of such com-
monalities, Tang singled out the civil-theological notion of human nature and 
its potency to attain moral intuition. Religious tolerance would be established 
on the basis of Confucian religiosity due to the fact that the Confucian belief 
in human nature may even tolerate, for example, Judeo-Christian notions of 
original sin or Brahmanic and Buddhist beliefs in karma. Therefore, no “funda-
mental” antagonism between Confucianism and Christianity, Buddhism and 
Brahmanism would persist.11 Confucian religiosity is hence said to acknowl-
edge that “different religions are different ways of attaining sagehood . . . that 
the ultimate destination of all the ways may be the same, but that no one way 
is itself ultimate.”12 On this premise, Tang claimed that:
[A] man with moral sincerity can rise above the frontier of particular 
knowledge to attain an exalted and intimate realization of the origin of 
the universe and human life, whether he lives and behaves according to 
Confucianism, Taoism, or Buddhism, or solely engages himself in reflect-
ing on his personal status amid human communities and history.13
But even if one were willing to endorse the conviction that Confucian religi-
osity is such a source of religious tolerance, a number of questions remain. 
For one, Tang never elucidated the role of Confucianism vis-à-vis dogmatic 
or social tensions and conflicts between non-Confucian religions. Nor did he 
clarify the implications of his accentuation of Confucianism as the religious 
“meeting place” in terms of constitutional law. There is no doubt that Tang 
situated his discussion of religious tolerance within the context of a liberal 
constitution that guarantees religious freedom. But since he did not treat this 
subject in depth, we can only assume that he was convinced that the burden 
of legal enforcement of religious freedom and tolerance in society had to be 
9    Ibid., pp. 389–390; see also Tang, “The reconstruction of Confucianism and the 
Modernization of Asia,” pp. 366–367; and Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, 
pp. 591–593.
10   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 591.
11   Tang, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy” [1968], p. 8.
12   Tang, “Chinese Attitudes Towards World Religions,” p. 330.
13   Tang, “My Option between Philosophy and Religion,” p. 425. See also Tang, Zhongguo ren-
wen zhi jingshen fazhan, p. 369.
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strictly separated from the task of Confucian religiosity to create a spiritual 
“meeting place” for religious believers. The latter must not compete with 
 constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and should reject any aspi-
ration of dominating the state and the constitutional process. After all, the 
agenda of the modern revival of Confucianism was not to be defined by domi-
nating the constitutional order and turning the modern state into a Confucian 
state. It is against this backdrop that Tang criticized neo-Confucianism from 
the Song and Ming Dynasties for having established an antagonistic relation-
ship between Confucian teachings and other religions.14
The modern form of Confucian religiosity is said to contain neither a sort 
of catechism, nor a clerical structure that could lead to the establishment of 
a Confucian state religion. Nonetheless, it has certain ritualistic forms. Tang 
identified the aforementioned three forms of ritual sacrifice and stressed not 
only their local particularities, but also the highly individualized character 
of these rituals: Individuals worship their own ancestors, saints, and worthies 
in these core rituals of Confucianism and, what is more, these rituals are highly 
diverse in form and content depending on the professions of the worshippers 
and the localities where they are performed. According to Tang, Confucian 
rituals therefore cannot be amalgamated into a universal church, even though 
there are indeed some rituals of a unitary character, such as those performed 
to honor Confucius, the Yellow Emperor, or Heaven and Earth.15 Although 
Tang conceded here that Confucian religiosity in fact contained some uni-
tary elements of ritual practice, he still claimed that these rituals were never 
integrated into a Confucian clerical and doctrinal structure comparable to the 
organizational patterns of (world) “religions.”16 Tang consequently predicted 
that the project of strengthening Confucian religiosity in modern society can-
not be accomplished by political, clerical, academic, or economic organiza-
tions. Such an effort should be undertaken by precursors who do not build 
an “[organizational] form,” but maintain the mutual relations of “teachers 
and friends” engaged in social, cultural, political and academic practice, and 
strive for a moral conduct of life. The renewed Confucian religiosity would 
then slowly diffuse throughout society in a non-hierarchical manner. This out-
look must have been particularly attractive for Confucian intellectuals who 
were driven by a strong sense of mission to stop the decline of the (religious) 
14   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 369.
15   Ibid., pp. 376, 378, 381.
16   Ibid., p. 376.
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“Confucian spirit,”17 while struggling with the difficulties of establishing a solid 
organizational framework in exile after 1949.
With respect to world religions, Tang noted with “deepest regret” that the 
followers of Christianity, which he depicted as the strongest religious force in 
the contemporary world, but also Buddhists and Muslims, could not yet accept 
“the value of divergent religions.”18 It is the prevention of future religious con-
flicts which was on Tang’s agenda here.19 From this perspective, he interpreted 
the religious history and dogmatic developments of Christianity in close rela-
tion to his Confucian matrix of religious tolerance. By focusing on Christianity, 
he portrayed the West as a zone of latent religious warfare dominated by hostile 
Christian denominations and suggested that future religious tolerance would 
evolve on a global scale on the intellectual foundation of Confucianism. But 
still, he remarked, it would be crucial to further develop “harmonizing notions” 
that already exist within Christianity.20
There are three problematic consequences of this approach. First, Tang dis-
regarded the traditions of religious tolerance, and civil religion for that matter, 
which have evolved in the West. The irony here is that Tang himself reflected 
on historical traces of religious tolerance within Christianity in a manner that 
is indeed common in Western notions of civil religion, namely, by applying the 
strategy of reducing the dogmatic contents of Christianity to a minimum in 
order to dissolve the danger of conflicts sparked by confessional differences. 
Second, Tang’s interpretation of Christianity as well as other world religions 
is highly idiosyncratic and also simplistic, if not reductionist, in terms of reli-
gious history and theology. This pertains to the very selective way of viewing 
certain dogmatic and institutional aspects of Christianity, among them the 
idea of exclusive salvation as offered by divine grace, the idea of original sin, 
and the absence of a belief in the mundane perfectibility of man, as well as 
the clerical institutions and organizations.21 As for other “world religions” 
like Islam, Judaism, or Buddhism, but also Daoism, they are only incidentally 
mentioned in this context. Third, Tang tended to interpret the religious com-
mitment of devotees of world religions from a highly rationalistic perspective. 
Their religious commitment and fervor is thus seen as if it had resulted from a 
17   Ibid., pp. 390–391.
18   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 564. Judaism is marginalized in Tang’s discussion 
of world religions.
19   Ibid., p. 593; Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 377.
20   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, p. 564.
21   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, p. 377; Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, 
pp. 592–594.
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conscious choice or even a rational decision taken by the individual believers. 
Tellingly, Tang forwent a clear conceptual distinction between religious devo-
tion and the conscious choice of certain (religious) values by individuals.
These problematic issues in Tang’s reflection on religion are, to a certain 
extent, due to the fact that he did not conceive of civil religion as a historical 
reality in China. As a projection of a future social reality, his conceptualization 
of a Chinese civil religion tended to produce reductionist depictions of reli-
gious history and schematic representations of dogmatic aspects of Confucian 
religiosity and world religions. There is, one may conclude, a high likelihood of 
failure in attempts to implement a civil religion as an intervention into social 
reality. It seems that Tang was aware of the precarious nature of his vision to 
inscribe Confucian religiosity into the democratic life of (future) Chinese soci-
ety. He preferred instead to imagine its formation as a gradual development 
initiated, but not engineered, by a minority of individuals. He expected, in 
other words, that the development of civil religion in China should be per-
ceived, in hindsight, as the outgrowth of a historical evolution, not as the result 
of a target-orientated project.
 Political Ideals and Reality
There is yet another reason why Tang did not devise a plan for the implementa-
tion of a Confucian-based civil religion in modern China. Such an effort would, 
after all, easily deteriorate into the ideological ambition to impose a higher 
religious truth on political reality. This would run counter to the fundamen-
tal assumption of Tang’s Confucian civil theology that (moral) truth—i.e. the 
moral intuition of the “principles of Heaven”—is only indirectly related to 
political reality, namely, as a positive limit-concept. Notions of an immediate 
presence of absolute truth in political reality, as exemplified for example by 
the imperial figure of the Son of Heaven, have been abandoned by modern 
Confucianism.
One crucial implication of the Tang’s civil theology is that any implementa-
tion of absolute truth claims in political reality inevitably subdue individu-
als’ subjectivity and thus deprive them of the opportunity to actualize their 
(moral) nature in the course of their social and political life. As a consequence, 
Tang did not conceptualize political order and institutions as representations 
of an ultimate truth. He understood the modern world to be fatally fractured 
and inevitably devoid of a substantial harmony between the realm of Heaven, 
the human being, and political reality. Modern subjects should therefore brace 
themselves for the somber fact that political reality never totally accords with 
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the exigencies of individual self-fulfillment. Tang’s political thought indeed 
insists that modern society cannot be accommodated by a pre-modern, 
ecumenical speculation about the representation of a “Heavenly mandate,” 
because the substantial unity of political form and Heavenly order is irrevers-
ibly broken. What is left, is a sharp conceptual distinction between the individ-
ual’s “inner sagehood” and the “renewed outer king” (i.e. the renewed political 
form), and their communion is irrevocably called into question. The lacuna 
that now separates the two requires an effort of reflection in order to retrieve 
their inter-relation. This effort is undertaken by modern Confucianism via 
such categories as “ideals” (lixiang), “values” ( jiazhi), and “spirit” ( jingshen), 
and hence in reference to newly coined terms which were unheard of in pre-
imperial and imperial China.
The orientation towards political ideals has consequences for the anticipa-
tion of political reality in modern Confucianism. For one, the category of ideals 
indicates that political reality will never be fully consistent with it. By intro-
ducing “ideals,” Tang’s speculation precludes expectations of an instantaneous 
implementation of a perfect political community. Tellingly, Tang did not issue 
political prescriptions for the realization of allegedly superior Confucian ethics. 
His approach here might cause uneasiness among apologists of Confucianism 
who muse over the superiority of a Confucian democracy, or meritocracy, even 
before democracy is established in China. As a matter of fact, Tang cautioned 
against the idea of a meritocracy in which worthy and able persons are recom-
mended for and promoted to office, deeming it a “distant view” (yuanjing 遠景) 
that transgresses the present world and cannot be realized in a “leap” (yue 越).22 
It would necessitate a corresponding attitude among citizens, which would, at 
best, gradually emerge from the core humanistic realm, and only “perhaps” do 
so under the influence of the Confucian intellectual tradition.23 In the same 
vein, Tang called attention to the fact that abstract, universal ideals— including 
the ideal democracy—may at most initiate the unification of individuals, but 
they cannot produce a complete reality out of themselves.24 In accordance, 
approaches to realizing political ideals should take shape on the basis of a 
gradual transformation of cultural and ethical values. For Tang, safeguarding 
such an evolution of values and attitudes was the ultimate purpose of politics.25
Given Tang’s cautious reflection about the relation between political ide-
als and political reality, it seems that contemporary critics who denounce his 
22   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 2, p. 140.
23   Ibid., p. 138.
24   Ibid., p. 105.
25   Ibid., p. 141.
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 modern Confucianism as too lofty or too “philosophical” miss a crucial point. 
Tang did not intend to submit political reality to a dictate of ideals under the 
pretense of effectuating an immediate political impact. This is not to say that 
he rejected the idea of making political ideals a yardstick for reality, but he 
remained careful to clarify and restrict their function. Here, a quasi-Platonic, 
cognitivist paradigm becomes obvious: Tang clearly conceptualized the foun-
dation of political order as resting on the insight of its members into the guid-
ing principle of the order itself.26 The Confucian political order thus requires 
the awareness of its members that it is based on a specific notion of human 
nature, which includes the ideal of individual moral self-fulfillment and the 
ideal of an authentic conduct of life. What is more, the political actors should 
at all times be aware that politics as such only has an intermediate function in 
relation to the higher goal of realizing humanistic values.
Political ideals like the ecumenical state embodying ethical life may, accord-
ing to Tang, only pertain to a distant future. Nonetheless, they are fully situ-
ated within the horizon of human history. These ideals thus have a different 
ontological status than the limit-concepts of the sage or a community of sages. 
Such a community cannot be realized within history and, indeed, it has no his-
torical dimensions, because the sagely members are identified by the very fact 
that they dwell in the ahistorical realm of absolute, unchangeable truth. If a 
community of sages were possible, its members would behave in total unanim-
ity and thus constitute an apolitical community. It is significant that Tang does 
not consider this vision to be an ideal and refrains from devaluating politi-
cal reality altogether by contrasting it to a community of sages. Clearly, Tang’s 
Confucian civil theology makes a crucial distinction between limit-concepts 
and ideals. It is under the label of “ideals” that Tang takes up the task of histo-
ricizing and temporalizing limit-concepts.27 The figure of the “sage” is hence 
historicized as the “ideal politician,” and the sagely community of intuition 
is temporalized as the ecumenical state within an ideal humanistic world. 
But in so doing, Tang did not advocate a complete rejection of political real-
ity. He remained immune to the ideological appeal of claims aimed at a total 
transformation or a re-founding of political society altogether. His modern 
Confucianism therefore establishes its critical distance from a political reality 
which will never be perfect, but is permanently in need of reflection and sup-
portive action that advances it toward an ideal community. 
26   On the cognitivist tendency in Plato and in German political thought of the 19th century, 
see Vollrath, Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theorie des Politischen, p. 57.
27   Tang’s notion of ideal clearly differs from Kant’s understanding of an ideal; see above 
Chap. 5.
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CHAPTER 11
Coming to Terms with History
 Modernity and Agency
Tang Junyi pursued the highly ambitious goal of establishing a normative 
theory of modernity covering all spheres of society as well as the dimension 
of human subjectivity. This agenda is arguably a defining feature not only of 
Tang’s philosophy, but also of mainstream Confucian thought since the 20th 
century. An adequate appraisal of the Confucian philosophical projects must 
take into consideration their strong assumptions about Chinese and global his-
tory that permeate their attempts to reconstruct Confucianism. For Tang, there 
is no doubt “that the revival of Confucianism in a new form, i.e. a reconstruc-
tion of Confucianism is a necessary condition for keeping such a [historical] 
continuity in some East Asian countries.”1 Apart from generating continu-
ity, this reconstruction served another purpose, namely that of uncovering a 
broad range of social, cultural and political ideas, principles, values and norms 
that were to guide Chinese modernization.
Even though Tang never claimed that modernization as a whole could be 
guided by holistic social planning, he was convinced that modernizing com-
munities could exert a considerable measure of control over the process of 
modernity. He believed that modernization on a global scale would, in the long 
run, lead to the establishment of modern nation-states with democratic and 
constitutional governments, and to pluralistic, industrialized and scientifically 
progressive societies (see Chap. 4). Modernity was thus not characterized by 
a forceful nature, as it was depicted, for example, in Max Weber’s image of an 
“iron cage of dependence,” which consists of the anonymous coercive power 
of bureaucratic and economic structures and processes that tend to subdue 
the individual and collectivities alike. Tang rejected such bleak prospects 
and claimed that modern man may retain the power of consciously choos-
ing and opting for a specific type of modernity in terms of a project—a claim 
that pertains also to the reconstruction of Confucianism in the context of 
modernity:
1   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 361.
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. . . we have to acknowledge that there are some new ideas and new spir-
its which are missing in traditional Confucianism. If we do not want to 
keep Confucianism backward of age, we have to look forward and plan a 
reconstruction of the Confucian spirit to meet the modern need.2
Confucian concepts of modernization thus hold the promise that the proj-
ect of modernity will produce an overall betterment of Chinese society and, 
eventually, also of non-Chinese societies. In this historical vision of modern 
Confucianism, the fact that China arrived belatedly to a modernizing world of 
nation-states does not take away the hope of “catching up” in terms of mod-
ernization. The notion of progress refers here to a willful collective effort that 
involves “learning” from historical experience, good or bad, Chinese or foreign. 
One striking example (among many) of this line of thought can be found in 
a passage where Tang elaborates on the economic backwardness of contem-
porary China. In a highly optimistic manner, he perceives this backwardness 
as a fortunate break that will provide China with an opportunity to avoid the 
consumerism and cultural-spiritual shallowness that has afflicted moderniz-
ing Western countries such as the United States, where, in the eyes of Tang, the 
reification of modern man was particularly severe.3
The expectation that China’s project to catch up in terms of modernization 
is, essentially, manageable by a Chinese community whose members agree on 
the goals and means of modernization, is reminiscent of German theories of 
a “Sonderweg” (special path) in the modern world. Theories of a “Sonderweg,” 
which emerged in Germany at the end of the 19th century, placed equal 
emphasis on belated efforts in nation building, industrialization and techno-
logical progress. Before the Second World War, these theories were applied in 
an affirmative manner, and centered on the assumption that there were actu-
ally many benefits to Germany’s alleged ability to refute “Western” rational-
ism and adhere to its own superior cultural spirit.4 Tang’s depiction of China’s 
path to modernity and his project of a Confucian renewal is in line with the 
main thrust of theories of a Sonderweg that affirm cultural particularity. The 
core element here is the anticipation of a superior social modernity guided 
by humanistic values and ideas that are gleaned from a reinterpretation of 
2   Ibid., p. 369.
3   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 135.
4   For a concise introduction to theories of a German “Sonderweg,” see Ottmann, Geschichte 
des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Der Totalitarismus und seine Überwindung, 
pp. 335–338.
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China’s allegedly unique culture and history. On the basis of such reinterpreta-
tion, an effort to “learn” from achievements and failures in Western moderniza-
tion shall take place.
The optimistic expectation of implementing modernization through a 
learning mode was widespread in 20th-century China.5 Tang related the topic 
of “learning” not only to the sphere of collective action by the state and cer-
tain social agents, but even to how individuals conduct their lives. In a par-
ticularly striking statement from 1974, he mused about the “beautiful virtues” 
of the Chinese, which he said were still observable in the Taiwanese country-
side. In contrast, he asserted that most city slickers in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
who indulged in materialistic lifestyles were under the negative influence of 
Western culture. The obvious conclusion was that “we just need the resolve 
to change customs, which will not be difficult [to do],” given that these nega-
tive customs came from “outside” and were thus not deep-rooted. If one really 
wanted to change them, it could be done right away. Tang provided a disturb-
ing example of this by claiming that the CCP managed to rid Shanghai of lav-
ishness and corruption after 1949.6 It seems that the point here was neither a 
vindication of communist measures to implement social change, nor a reaf-
firmation of the CCP’s actions in Shanghai as a model for modernization. Still, 
Tang was obviously fascinated by the prospect of reining in the woes of mod-
ernization in such a willful collective effort.
The negative effects of the progressive division of labor in modern societies 
were treated in a similar manner. Tang pointed out that this is a crucial matter 
in Western countries, and particularly in the United States, because the increas-
ing division of labor created a social situation in which individuals could no 
longer estimate the intrinsic value of their labor.7 The problem concerned not 
only the economic sphere but also such phenomena as the increasing “profes-
sionalization” in other social spheres, including academic life. These were signs 
of an ongoing submission of “cultural forces” to political and economic forces 
resulting in general tendencies of “reification” and cultural “degeneration.”8 
According to Tang, only purposeful change in the form of social and cultural 
activities might prevent these tendencies from spreading further into society. 
Such change was to include, as we have seen, a renewal of traditional Chinese 
associations on the level of communities. In these  communal contexts, human 
5   See Fröhlich, “Regulating, Governing, and Pacifying the Modern World: Optimism Regarding 
Progress in Chinese Interpretations of the Great Learning.”
6   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 324.
7   Ibid., p. 115.
8   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 392.
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beings might truly interact with each other as individuals, and hence break up 
the uniform standards of instrumental values on the basis of their individual-
ized value-consciousness. It is significant that Tang focused here on the form 
of these tradition-inspired associations and interactions, and not on specific 
contents and values.
In the same vein, he ascertained in very general terms that non- instrumental 
forms of interaction hinged on a revival of a “classical kind of spirit” in society, 
politics and ethics, which engendered a certain “value-consciousness.” The 
individuals would learn to interact with each other by evaluating their respec-
tive accomplishments and knowledge within a broad range of intellectual or 
artistic activities as well as other forms of individual “effort” (gongfu). However, 
Tang did not naively believe that the workings of instrumental rationality 
might be completely dissolved in modern societies, but instead expected that 
they could be confined to their appropriate areas, such as the economic sphere. 
This might result in a foil for modern society in which the “lines of latitude,” 
as Tang called them, could be calculated according to the “spirit of societies 
based on the division of labor of the modern type,” and the “lines of longitude” 
according to a classical spirit.9 Tang seemed confident that East Asian societ-
ies, due to their particular cultural traditions, were in an excellent position to 
create these foils of social modernity. Yet, at that time, he identified Japan as 
the only country in the region to pursue such a course of modernization.10
To conclude, there can be no doubt that Tang deemed ideational factors to 
be crucial for solving global problems of modernity. He therefore highlighted 
an awareness of cultural traditions that should strengthen the consciousness 
of a “we”-group whose members are ready to act upon their normative choices. 
9    Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 115–118, 123, 125, 129. In this context, 
see also the following passage in which Tang rhetorically asks: “How can an individual 
spiritual being really be an individual, if his religious, moral, and cultural life is not inte-
grated into a unity as a genuine Confucian aspires to?”: Tang, “The Reconstruction of 
Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 365.
10   At times, Tang’s confidence in the success of Japan’s modernization was shattered, leaving 
him to express his hope that the Japanese would not define Japan’s progress in indus-
trialization solely in terms of an increase in industrial production alone, but also with 
respect to the benefits of cultural life; see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, 
p. 211. Whether Tang’s topical way of thinking in longitudes and latitudes is inspired by 
topical thinking as prevalent in the philosophy of the Kyoto school is difficult to deter-
mine. Be that as it may, Tang obviously shared with the Kyoto school, and with influential 
European and American intellectual trends of the mid-20th century, the apprehension 
that the process of modernity might entail strong tendencies of massification and dete-
rioration of cultural standards.
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Such an endeavor, he believed, would involve a broad range of humanistic 
cultural activities, including intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic “efforts” of 
individuals to “overcome themselves,” for example by engaging in Confucian 
scholarship, Chinese arts, Indian Yoga, Buddhism or Christian devotion.11
The main trajectory for propelling normative inputs in the course of mod-
ernization was, as Tang saw it, state action. Accordingly, he refrained from 
characterizing modernity as an increasing deterioration of the state’s capacity 
to dominate societal development. On the contrary, the idea of an evolving 
modern Chinese state, still in the making, assumed an orienting function in 
the modern Confucian project. In spite of the misappropriation of state coer-
cive power in the dictatorial party states in China before and after 1949, the idea 
of statehood still looms large in Tang’s concept of modernization. Whereas he 
considered the extant party-states of the CCP and GMD to be bad options, he 
expected that the modern Chinese nation-state, in its democratic form, would 
evolve as an emanation from the normative resources of a renewed Confucian 
“main current.”
In giving thought to the formation of the modern state, Tang drew selec-
tively, as we have seen, from Hegel’s concept of a state of ethical nature. But he 
was clearly not a Hegelian theoretician of state, and he accordingly refrained 
from applying the speculative framework of Hegelian philosophy of history to 
his own concept of state. As a consequence, he never referred to the historical 
manifestation of a “world spirit” in this context. Tang also differs from Hegel in 
that he envisioned the ideal form of the modern state as an immediate emana-
tion of the human (ethical) will to the state. He thus designated the state to 
be the highest, direct manifestation of human reason in history (see Chap. 8 
“State and Society”)—and not, as Hegel would have it, as the historical mani-
festation of a “cunning of reason” which remains aloof from concerted human 
action.12 Tang bolsters his departure from the Hegelian theory of the state by 
criticizing Hegel for failing to clarify that the state, although it is a “manifesta-
tion of the objective spirit,” cannot detach itself from the striving of “the sub-
jective spirit which exists for itself,” that is, a striving resulting “spontaneously” 
from the “rational self” and the moral will of individuals.13
The rejection of Hegelian speculation facilitated an optimistic vision 
of modernity: Given a successful “reconstruction” of the Confucian “main 
11   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 56–57.
12   In the famous words of Hegel: “This may be called the cunning of reason—that it sets the 
passions to work for itself, while that which develops its existence through such impul-
sion pays the penalty, and suffers loss.” Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 47.
13   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 262.
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 current,” China would be able to partake in global progress by implementing its 
own type of guided modernization. The general direction of this moderniza-
tion would be foreseeable, because it was part of a global process of modernity 
that tended toward democracy and constitutional government, scientific and 
technological development, industrialization, and an open, pluralistic society. 
For Tang, modernity was thus not a lost cause for humanity, but carried, on the 
contrary, a promise to empower human agency to the point where it becomes 
the master of its own fate. The belief in such empowerment is indeed a salient 
feature of modern Confucianism. Pessimistic notions of modernity as an ines-
capable historical fate or as a process which is, essentially, beyond control fun-
damentally contradict the Confucian notion of human agency asserting itself 
in the process of modernization. Tellingly, Tang bluntly rejected, in his late 
work, Western notions of human history as an inevitably chaotic process char-
acterized by contingent events, along with Western theories that undermine a 
firm belief in the effectiveness of “holy values,” such as existentialism and the 
Freudian psychology of the unconscious.14 Even though he was apprehensive 
of human agency suffering from reification and alienation—a modern threat 
causing individuals to become oblivious to the dangers of modernity—he dis-
agreed with an overall pessimistic vision of modernity.15
Tang’s belief in the dominant role of human agency in the process of moder-
nity is based on assumptions about human nature and the human being, which 
he obtained from his interpretations of Confucian thought. Two perspectives 
are particularly relevant in this regard:
1) Tang’s civil theology asserts that the perfectibility of the human being as 
a sage is a historical reality, but such sagehood is neither a permanent state of 
mind nor an individual’s way of life, nor can it be realized by whole collectivi-
ties of human agents, such as congregations, nations and classes. A revolution 
in the name of establishing a community of sages is consequently absent from 
Tang’s modern Confucianism, as is the idea of a collective will totally dominat-
ing history. But the opposite notion is also absent, namely, the idea of human 
14   Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, pp. 461–462. Tang elucidated in this 
context the historical development of the “victory of Marxism” in China mostly in terms 
of a general loss of faith in “traditional” values of Chinese and Western cultures: ibid., 
p. 464. His skepticism towards existentialism dates back to at least the late 1950s; see his 
criticism of existentialism’s inability to “actively” seek a solution for humanity’s spiritual 
crises in the modern world: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 57.
15   See for example Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 127.
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beings subdued by the process of modernity.16 In fact, Tang depicted “inner 
sagehood” as the moment in which the human mind breaks free from its own 
embedment in history. Accordingly, he conceived of the sage as being detached 
from a particular historical context. It is therefore no coincidence that nowhere 
in the modern Confucian discourses do we find the assumption that the very 
mode of an ahistorical, immediate presentification of sagehood itself changes 
under different historical circumstances. And whereas the so-called outer 
king (wai wang) is said to be in need of a “renewal” (xin), the “inner sage” 
(nei sheng) remains untouched by changing times. Obviously, by relating the 
notion of human nature to “inner sagehood,” modern Confucianism presumes 
that human nature, and consequently the human being, is intangible vis-à-vis 
history, including the process of modernity. This, in turn, is the religious-
anthropological basis for the Confucian insistence on the stronghold of human 
agency in history, including the process of modernity.
2) Modern Confucianism clearly refrains from claiming that human beings 
are perfectible as a species. Even if one was to believe that, at one point in 
history, a community of sages might be realized, their offspring would not be 
born as sages, nor would the institutions and structures of such a community 
perforce lead every human being to perfection. The perfectibility of the human 
being evidently pertains to the individual, not to the species, and as individu-
als human beings retain the freedom to strive for sagehood, or not to strive for 
it, or to strive and fail along the way. As a consequence, there will be no “end” 
of history brought about as the victory of sagely inwardness over all “outer,” 
alienated formations of modernity. Tang’s philosophy does not offer the conso-
lation of an idyllic modern world that is free from alienation. But even though 
“objective” constellations of alienation will persist, the Confucian individuals 
may be spared the distress of experiencing them solely as “outer” obstacles. 
Instead, they can mitigate the downside of modernity as historical conditions 
16   As mentioned above, Thomas Metzger subsumes Tang Junyi’s modern Confucianism to 
the category of an “epistemological optimism” that is characterized by the assumption 
that the “ultimate reality” of all phenomena is detectable and describable by human 
beings; see Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between Chinese and 
Western Political Theories Today, pp. 21–31, 171–182 [endnote 138], 220, 672–676. Yet with 
respect to Tang’s philosophy, it should be noted that the idea of the human being’s insight 
into the absolute truth of the “Heavenly principles” cannot be detached from the assump-
tion that such an insight is attainable only in an ephemeral moment of intuition and 
only by individuals, never by whole (political) collectivities. As a consequence, the intui-
tive insight never amounts to a permanent, political state of existence. Claims to absolute 
truth, together with their totalitarian repercussions, are therefore not supported by Tang’s 
political thought.
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of their quest for sagely inwardness, which might be attained in the course of 
participating in and struggling with the modern world.
The religious-anthropological notion of the intangibility of human nature 
marks one of the main rifts between modern Confucianism and Marxism. 
While both tend to emphasize the importance of the role of human agency 
with respect to the course of history, Marxism does so by positing that the 
human being should be considered the product of a historical and social for-
mation. A purposeful transformation of human collectivities through generat-
ing the conditions for the emergence of a “new man” within a perfected society 
is feasible according to the Marxist scheme. In contrast, modern Confucianism 
assumes that the “nature” (xing) of the human being is not subject to histori-
cal change and remains essentially out of reach of any attempt to objectify 
or manipulate it. What is subject to change is indeed not the human being 
itself, but only its symbolic representations, which might find their “true” cul-
tural expression in the humanistic “main current.” This Confucian outlook had 
to be defended not only against Marxism, but also against positivist theories 
of historical research. Tang criticized these theories because he believed they 
reduced history to a mere “object” of research, and implied, at the same time, 
the depletion of subjectivity by stripping the human subject of its historical 
dimensions, thereby reducing it to a putatively pure subject of cognition.17
 History and Normativity
Tang Junyi’s speculation about history defies a clear-cut classification as phi-
losophy of history, theology of history or philosophic-historical anthropology. 
The difficulties of classification partially stem from the fact that Tang was not 
a historian, neither by professional training nor by the thrust of his work. He 
himself referred to his speculation as a “philosophy of history” (lishi zhexue), 
yet this may lead, if taken at face value, to considerable misunderstandings.18 
17   On Tang’s criticism of positivism in the context of historical research, see for example: 
Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 7, pp. 165, 167; for a discussion of this issue 
see Chap. 4 “Defending Authenticity.”
18   The fact that Tang conceived of lishi zhexue not simply as a philosophy of history in the 
European tradition becomes evident when he agreed with Mou Zongsan that the Spring 
and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋) are the pioneering works of Chinese “lishi zhexue;” 
see Tang’s article “A Philosophical Inquiry of Chinese History,” published in the journal 
Rensheng (No. 120; November 1955): Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 7, p. 178. 
Besides, Tang labeled the works of Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007–1072) and Sima Guang 
司馬光 (1019–1086) as the beginning of “historical studies” (shixue 史學) in China and 
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Instead of regarding Tang’s “philosophy of history” as an offshoot of European 
philosophies of history, it is more apt to delineate it in a much broader con-
ceptual framework—so broad that it even includes references to German his-
toricism from the 19th century. The latter was indeed highly critical of classical 
European philosophies of history. It evolved in the political context of German 
nation-state building and was, in fact, a hotbed of the above-mentioned theo-
ries about a German “Sonderweg,” while at the same time fostering the institu-
tionalization of a professionalized science of history in modernizing German 
universities. Even though historicism was not, as its label seems to indicate, a 
historiographical school in the narrow sense of the word, the majority of clas-
sical historicist thinkers like Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), Johann Gustav 
Droysen (1808–1884) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) shared a profound skep-
ticism towards philosophies of history as well as positivist approaches to his-
torical research.19
Whether Tang’s historical thinking was actually informed by German his-
toricism is difficult to determine. His diaries reveal that he was reading a “book 
by Dilthey” in July 1953, but there is no title indicated.20 There are other chan-
nels through which he might have become familiar with historicism, for exam-
ple through the work of Chinese historians like Chen Yinke, whose concept of 
historiography suggests remarkable affinities to the basic tenets of historicism. 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Chen and Tang actually had studied 
European historicist thought.21 Be that as it may, key historicist ideas appear 
repeatedly in Tang’s own speculations about history. Among these is the 
assumption that the different periods in Chinese history need to be considered 
with respect to their particularity and uniqueness, for they each have, accord-
ing to Tang, their own specific meaning and “value.”22 Also in accordance with 
historicist thinkers, among them Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) and Dilthey, is 
the strong rejection of positivist claims to the objectivity of historical “facts,” 
and the assertion that the quest for the meaning of history is inevitably bound 
compared this achievement to the contributions of Galileo and Newton to Western sci-
ence. Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai, p. 25. 
But for all this praise, Tang still remained elusive about the actual innovations made by 
those scholars from the Song Dynasty.
19   See Iggers, Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, pp. 18–23.
20   Tang, Riji, Vol. 27, pp. 151–152.
21   On Chen Yinke’s affinity to historicism, see Schneider, Wahrheit und Geschichte. Zwei chi­
nesische Historiker auf der Suche nach einer modernen Identität für China, pp. 140–141.
22   Tang, “Zhongguo wenhua zhi yuanshi jingshen ji suo jingli zhi tiaozhan yu you huiying er 
xingcheng zhi fazhan,” p. 10. In contrast to most European historicist thinkers, Tang did 
not relate this uniqueness to the idea of equality before god.
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to the ascription of meaning to singular facts, events and intentional acts by 
individual interpreters:
This, then, [means that] with respect to identical historical facts, their 
meaning can originally contain interpretations added by men according 
to different orientations. As stated above, all of these interpretations are 
something that men have perceived and created. In these [interpreta-
tions], the historical facts themselves, which exist at the basic level, can-
not necessarily determine [the following, namely]: the direction men’s 
interpretations take at the higher level [of interpretation].23
Instead of proclaiming the search for a universal truth in history as the fore-
most task of the interpreter, Tang underscored the pragmatic aspects of histor-
ical thought, and especially its function to provide normative orientation with 
regard to the present situation,24 i.e. the epochal interest in nation-building 
and the formation of a nation-state. In contrast, “positivist” historical thought 
appears to be restrictive because it disregards the present historical context 
and pretends to be completely detached from human praxis in society, politics, 
culture and ethics.25
In his rejection of positivism, Tang shared with Dilthey, Chen Yinke and 
others the hermeneutic awareness that interpreters of history should reflect 
not only on the context of their interpretations, but also on the formation of 
their own subjectivity. The latter comprises the moral personality of the inter-
preter, as well as everything that “makes up [his or her] personhood.” As a con-
sequence, the interpreter’s moral standards are relevant to the interpretation. 
However, Tang assumed that the historical situation in which the interpreter 
exists does not predetermine the details of the interpretations, but only their 
general orientation, which includes the guiding ideas of the interpretations 
and the selection of historical sources. Therefore the values that the inter-
preter applies to history have only relative validity. Tang did not advocate a 
devaluation of the past by subsuming it to values and standards of the present. 
He rather expected, in line with historicism, that the engagement with the past 
as a foreign intellectual territory would produce new insights for the present—
provided that the approach to the past was one of “empathic understanding” 
23   See Tang’s article “Historical Facts and Historical Meaning,” published in two consecutive 
issues of Minzhu Pinglun (Vol. 14, Nos. 22, 23; November 1963): Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu 
dangjin shijie, Vol. 7, pp. 165–166.
24   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 7, pp. 167–169.
25   Ibid., pp. 164, 166, 170.
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and “openhearted and upright intentions,” which lead the interpreters to see 
themselves from a foreign perspective.26
One of the focal points of this hermeneutical engagement with history was 
to acquire a better understanding of the human being itself. What was at stake 
is the self-enlightenment of the interpreters about the true nature and con-
stitution of human beings and their manifold cultural and social expressions. 
This orientation inspired Tang to inscribe the effort of interpreting history into 
the broad agenda of individual self-cultivation.27 Historical interpretations 
were to contribute to the individual’s understanding of the nature of man. To 
this end, the intentions of human agents in history had to be reconstructed. 
Whether it is the history of the humanistic “main current,” the demise of the 
Chinese nation since the mid-19th century, or China’s democratic failures 
of the 20th century, Tang’s interpretations underscore the crucial impact of 
intentions, foresights or misapprehensions on the part of political, social and 
intellectual agents. Here, the traditional topic of history providing ethical edu-
cation reappeared. The adherence to this well-known aspect of historiography 
in pre-modern China entailed the assertion that the interpreters of history 
may attain ethical insights by studying historical paragons whose acts can be 
judged as either good or bad. At the same time, the interpreters are said to pro-
duce “new meaning” in writing history, which in turn has an impact on the 
course of history itself. Yet Tang did not take these ideas to indicate that the 
“moral consciousness” itself was the product of a historical formation.28
26   Ibid., pp. 164–166.
27   Cheng Chung-yi concludes that Tang’s hidden agenda of reconstructing a taxonomy of 
scholarship was one of guiding the human being’s practical efforts to attain an authentic 
existence. In this context, Tang proposed a sequence of modern disciplines which he tried 
to bring into accord with the standard fourfold classification used in imperial libraries, 
which distinguished between “classics” ( jing 經), “histories” (shi 史), “masters [philoso-
phers]” (zi 子), and “collections [of literature]” ( ji 集). Yet Tang’s reconstruction seems to 
be forced and somewhat self-contradictory. He categorized, for example, “philosophy” as 
“zi,” and as “jing” (which includes works of moral philosophy). He left, however, no doubt 
that “shi,” which would include modern historical research, is closely linked to the indi-
vidual’s self-cultivating quest for authenticity; see Zheng (Cheng Chung-yi), “Tang Junyi 
lun renwen xueshu,” pp. 362–363.
28   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 7, pp. 167–169. Tang related the notion of 
creating “new meaning” and therein acting as a “creator” of history to the Confucian 
notion of “transmitting the way” (dao tong 道統). He then referred to Confucius as the 
founding figure of historical speculation and took up the traditional belief that Confucius 
authored the Spring and Autumn Annals; see ibid., pp. 164, 168, 170.
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It is because of such proximity to historicism that Tang’s lishi zhexue is 
clearly set apart from Hegelian philosophy of history. Overall, lishi zhexue 
is not an enterprise of detecting the self-realization of reason in history, as 
Hegel’s philosophy of history claimed to do by retracing the historical manifes-
tations of the “world spirit.” The cosmic unity, i.e. the “mind of Heaven,” does 
not permeate human history as a historical force. Consequently, Tang’s specu-
lation entails no idea of a world spirit present in history,29 and, what is more, 
he criticized Hegel’s philosophy of history for its assumption that “all cultural 
affairs and heroic personalities” were mere vehicles for the self-manifestation 
of “absolute spirit.” Hegel, it would thus seem, failed to acknowledge that 
the human being could indeed firmly establish its cultural activities and its 
individual personality as its own “inherent goals.”30 In contrast to Hegelian 
philosophy of history, Tang measured historical reality against the religious-
anthropological assumption that human beings are destined to realize their 
natural ability to attain sagehood. Tang’s speculation about history is indeed 
intimately related to his Confucian civil theology. “Reason” in history is hence 
to be found in the formation of conditions which are conducive to individual 
self-perfection in sagehood—a formation that entails, to be sure, a dialectical 
structure, as Tang’s analysis of the will for power had shown.
Tang’s modern Confucianism conveys an overall optimistic outlook by 
depicting the course of history as pointing to an increasing formation of 
political, social and cultural conditions that are favorable to individuals’ self-
perfection. This optimism also pertains, as we have seen, to the process of 
modernity. Tang in fact left no doubt that modernization would amount to 
a betterment of individual and collective life—provided the members of the 
Chinese nation obtain an “authentic” understanding of the humanistic “main 
current.” Chinese humanism hence appeared to have the capacity to rein in the 
woes of modernity:
What we are awaiting is merely the self-consciousness of all humanity, in 
which it will seek a common goal and then take up common endeavors. 
As for this common goal, one can talk about it from two perspectives: 
1) It is indispensable to liberate “culture” from the heavy pressure of “poli-
tics” and “economics” and to do the utmost to have the “cultural powers” 
surpass the “political powers” as well as the “economic powers” (this is 
29   See also Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai, 
pp. 27, 54–55, 61–62.
30   Tang, Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi, p. 231.
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“humanism”). 2) Whatever the new social ideal is, those who make a great 
effort to realize this ideal must, at the same time, engage in self-reflection 
and clearly recognize in advance the potential abuses so as to prevent 
them in time (here, we must wait for those of great insight and wisdom).31
Yet this optimistic outlook gave rise to the problem of identifying foundational 
elements of necessity in history. Otherwise, what reason was there to be opti-
mistic in the first place? Huang Zhaoqiang assumes that an “optimistic mind” 
was entrenched in Tang’s conviction that the moral consciousness might over-
come all hindrances in history and that this very conviction was, on top of it, 
a crucial impetus of historical betterment. According to Huang, Tang indeed 
believed that a moment of necessity was at work here.32 Stringent as this inter-
pretation by Huang is, it probably underestimates the ambivalence in Tang’s 
speculation with respect to the belief in a victory of morality in history. While 
Tang was convinced that the moral will might be able, in principle, to conquer 
historical reality, he stated time and again that it regularly failed for reasons 
that pertain to the finiteness, i.e. the inextricable moral imperfection, of the 
human being and its historical world.
Tang’s difficulties with the problem of necessity are symptomatic of his trou-
ble in coining a full-fledged Confucian philosophy of history. The fundamental 
reason for this trouble has to do with the unresolved and probably unresolvable 
tension between the attempt to historicize our understanding of the world, on 
the one hand, and the insistence on the Confucian religious-anthropological 
outlook that posits an unchanging, ahistorical and pre-determined “nature” of 
the human being, on the other. It is this outlook that accommodates the his-
toricizing perspective, and not the other way around. This does not preclude 
historical-philosophical reflections, but the dominant perspective throughout 
is characterized by the attempt to relate history to the “natural” disposition of 
the human being, albeit in dialectical twists and turns.
Tang’s strategy for dealing with the philosophical problem of historical 
necessity was one of avoidance. As an upshot, his optimism seems to be sus-
pended in ambiguity, and resembles more a personal attitude or faith than a 
conviction based on stringent arguments. He asserted, for example, that the 
ideal of national unity of China would “necessarily” come about because 
the “historical impetus” (lishi dongli 歷史動力) of national and cultural life in 
31   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 393.
32   See Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai, p. 132.
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China originated from a single root.33 “Ideals” entailed an “impetus” that “per-
force” worked for their realization, and the truth of this could be revealed, as 
Tang maintained, by “philosophical reflection.”34 The problem of coming to 
terms with the notion of historical necessity still looms large here, even more 
so since Tang himself remained skeptical with respect to the belief that ideals 
could actually forge history. He did not, after all, naively believe that history 
was guided by ideals or that ideals could be realized with ease. Besides, accord-
ing to Tang, it was often impossible to identify those who were responsible for 
the failure to realize certain ideals. He even warned that attempts to imple-
ment ideals might lead to unintended negative effects. Any “consciousness” of 
ideals should therefore entail the awareness that ideals can produce negative 
results in historical reality.35
Overall, Tang’s dealings with this issue remain obscure. He elucidated nei-
ther the workings of necessity in depth, nor how the interpreter of history 
might detect or retrace the historical effects of necessity. Tellingly, whenever 
he referred to certain periods in Chinese or world history, he refrained from 
depicting the transformations of one period into the following as a neces­
sary development involving specific antinomies as the driving forces of the 
transformation.36 There is, indeed, no clear-cut, comprehensive concept of 
distinct antinomies in Tang’s “philosophy of history,” which thus lacks a pivotal 
element of philosophies of history in the tradition of German idealist thought.37 
The closest Tang came to positing a historical constellation of epochal antin-
omy was his reflection about the formation of modern Confucianism itself. The 
whole body of his work on the reconstruction and renewal of China’s human-
istic culture seems to suggest that modern Confucianism has arisen from inner 
contradictions of late imperial Chinese society, most of all related to problems 
of stabilizing the political and social order, and from the challenge of facing 
33   Tang, “Zhongguo wenhua zhi yuanshi jingshen ji suo jingli zhi tiaozhan yu you huiying 
er xingcheng zhi fazhan,” p. 10. For similar assumptions about quasi-necessary historical 
tendencies, see, for example, the assumption in the manifesto of 1958 about the “inner” 
trend in Chinese history towards the establishment of a constitutional democracy: Zhang, 
Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 37–39.
34   Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, p. 493.
35   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 386, 388.
36   According to Tang, the different historical periods in Chinese history each have their 
own characteristics, meaning and value, and variously express the historical impetus of 
China’s national and cultural life: Tang, “Zhongguo wenhua zhi yuanshi jingshen ji suo 
jingli zhi tiaozhan yu you huiying er xingcheng zhi fazhan,” p. 10.
37   Odo Marquard assumes that the notion of distinct antinomies is a key element of philoso-
phies of history; see Marquard, Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie, pp. 114–115.
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Western nation-states and Western thought. But it is not entirely clear whether 
Tang believed that the formation of modern Confucianism really entailed a 
moment of historical necessity. So even if he shared with classical European 
philosophies of history the basic assumption that history is evolving as “prog-
ress,” he refrained from explicitly retracing the course of history by referring to 
the idea of a necessarily progressive advancement. He consequently did not 
seek factual proof for an unfolding of progress across the different historical 
periods.
 Signs of Progress
In the face of the pending ambiguity of historical necessity, it seems that Tang 
contented himself with the idea that there are at least scattered signs or indica-
tors of progress in history, which the interpreter can detect. These signs may 
be taken as pointing to a general tendency of historical progress towards a bet-
terment of humanity and its societies. The fact that humanistic personalities 
time and again found a following and were able to shape the history of nations, 
peoples or states thus appeared as a sign of progress. The list of such figures 
mentioned by Tang in a variety of writings includes Confucius, Buddha, Jesus, 
Gandhi, but also Sun Yat-sen and Karl Marx.38 There is a distinct tendency in 
Tang’s thought to elevate historical figures to a position of admiration, thereby 
underscoring the historical relevance of human agency in general. For exam-
ple, when praising the “classical kind of spirit” that he deemed to be beneficial 
to modernizing societies, Tang highlighted the “classical” admiration of “great 
personalities” in politics, religion, culture and society in China and the West.39 
In the same vein, he considered the persistent recurrence of the “classical” 
humanistic spirit itself to be an indication for progress in history, even though 
it did not necessarily emerge in a straight, unbroken line. Tang saw “humanity” 
rather following a “line winding upwards,” one that is “in accordance with rea-
son,” but can be recognized only after history has taken its course.40 He hence 
38   Such references to Confucius, Buddha and Jesus are abundant in Tang’s writings; see for 
example Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 442. For the reference 
to Gandhi, Sun Yat-sen and Marx see an article from 1952, quoted in Huang, Xueshu yu 
jingshi—Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai, p. 142.
39   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 125–126.
40   Tang, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing, p. 302. Tang argued here in accordance with Hegel’s 
famous reflection on history at the end of his preface to the Philosophy of Right: “History 
thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does 
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contradicted those theoreticians of history whom he presumed to be believ-
ers in a straight line of historical progress, like Marx, Condorcet, Comte and 
Spencer.41
In contrast to these concepts of linear, continuous progress in history, Kant’s 
consideration on “signs of history” in his The Contest of Faculties (1798)42 is 
partially in line with Tang’s historical thinking. Kant dedicated the second sec-
tion of his book to the question of whether humanity is on a course of constant 
progress and betterment—in the words of Kant, “Is the human race continu-
ally improving?” In order to answer this question, Kant introduced the idea 
of signs of history, which he believed serve to indicate a general tendency in 
human history, albeit not in the sense of a prognostic tool that provides the 
basis for specific forecasts about the future course of history.43 Like Tang, Kant 
did not claim to make propositions about the “betterment” of humanity as a 
species, but instead focused on human collectivities such as nations, peoples or 
states.44 Humanity’s progress in history can be detected, according to Kant, in 
signs of history that emerge as publicly displayed attitudes of individuals, but 
not perforce as specific “deeds or misdeeds.”45 On the basis of Tang’s histori-
cal speculation, one might agree here. It seems, however, that Tang would not 
have hesitated to claim that certain historical events were indeed “progressive” 
in themselves, such as the alleged unification of China as a cultural nation, or 
steps taken in the global course of modernization, such as the implementation 
of democratic government.
Tang left open to debate the question of whether this sort of progress is 
reversible in the course of history. Kant, on the other hand, emphasized the 
irreversible impact of the public attitude with regard to the events of the French 
the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, 
and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one 
form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only 
known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.” 
See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 20.
41   Tang, “Zhongguo wenhua zhi yuanshi jingshen ji suo jingli zhi tiaozhan yu you huiying er 
xingcheng zhi fazhan,” p. 10.
42   The following quotations and references are from the edition of The Contest of Faculties 
in: Reiss, Kant: Political Writings. Tang had most likely no knowledge of Kant’s text.
43   Ibid., p. 181.
44   Kant explicitly stated that he is concerned not “with any specific conception of mankind 
(singulorum),” but with “the whole of humanity (universorum), united in earthly society 
and distributed in national groups;” ibid., p. 177.
45   Ibid., p. 182.
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Revolution as a historical sign of progress.46 By welcoming the revolutionary 
founding of republican government based on a civil constitution that entailed 
a prohibition against wars of aggression, the public had displayed, according 
to Kant, a desire to participate in the implementation of these revolutionary 
ideas, despite the danger of suffering repression as individuals.47 Such a sign 
of progress would never be forgotten again, even if the revolution were to fail. 
Kant assumed that the lofty ideas of republican government and the abolition 
of wars of aggression were so closely interlaced with the general interests of 
humanity that such progress is historically irreversible in the long run.48
Tang did not focus, as Kant did, on the public and the attitude it displays, 
and he would certainly have disagreed with Kant’s prediction that the pro-
gressive improvement would not be brought about by “the education of the 
young people in intellectual and moral culture, reinforced by the doctrines of 
religion.”49 Kant, after all, much more than Tang, contented himself with the 
assumption that signs of history indicate, if nothing else, the fact that human-
ity’s progress is at least “negatively” assured—i.e. it will unfold in the long run,50 
even if there are no cultural forces present to willfully propel it.
Although the workings of reason in history and the winding course of prog-
ress may only be understood in hindsight, Tang’s speculation still asserts that 
the realization of progress and the prevention of an ultimate catastrophe 
require purposeful efforts on the part of human agency. The following pas-
sage from Life, Existence and the Horizons of Mind is particularly striking in this 
regard:
Today it is solely true religion, morality and philosophical wisdom which 
are able to dominate all [kinds of] specialized knowledge and technology 
in order to invoke—to varying degrees and in all individuals . . .—distinct 
moral refinement and cultivation as well as knowledge cultivated by phil-
osophical wisdom, so as [to enable them] to embrace and tolerate each 
other within a vast and bright spiritual horizon. This should allow the 
human world to [succeed in] avert[ing] [its] collapse and disintegration, 
46   In this context, Kant referred to the “attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public;” 
ibid., p. 182.
47   Kant assumed with respect to the French Revolution that “. . . this revolution has aroused 
in the hearts and desires of all spectators . . . a sympathy which borders almost on enthu-
siasm, although the very utterance of this sympathy was fraught with danger;” ibid., p. 182.
48   Ibid., pp. 182, 185.
49   Ibid., p. 188.
50   Ibid., p. 183.
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and hence disrupt and dissolve [its] anxiety. In this case, the contempo-
rary way to save the world consists of religion, morality and philosophy.51
In Life, Existence and the Horizons of Mind, Tang’s speculation about history 
takes a sudden turn towards salvific thought, thereby highlighting the potency 
of human agency to create its own history. While the salvific assumptions 
clearly stand out in comparison to Tang’s earlier, far more sober writings, the 
claim that collective normative action might create a better world had been 
raised by Tang time and again. The question of whether this entails a perma-
nent salvation in terms of historical time was left unanswered. However, Tang 
left no doubt that any historical form of progress depends on the prerequi-
site that human beings attain an awareness of their role as creators of his-
tory. Tellingly, he took issue, as we have seen, with Hegel’s theory of the state 
because he believed it insufficiently valorizes the historical force of the human 
will. Tang’s defense of the elevated historical role of human agency also com-
prised a rejection of those theoreticians of historical materialism who “talked 
solely about historical necessity and the laws of reality as it is.”52 In contrast, 
modern Confucian speculation itself was to be understood as propelling the 
formation of historical subjectivity (complete with a self-awareness as creators 
of history) and, hence, progress.
 Delimiting a “Philosophy of History”
Tang had not developed a philosophy of history in the sense that he claimed 
to reveal either a “plan” or a “law” of history that would explain, by measure 
of necessity, the sequence of certain periods or epochs in history. Perhaps 
the case of Mou Zongsan is different. Yet for whatever reason, Mou was solely 
concerned with Chinese history from the Xia Dynasty (ca. 21st–16th BCE) to 
the Later Han Dynasty (25–220 CE) in his book on Philosophy of History (Lishi 
zhexue 歷史哲學) from 1955. It remains doubtful, to say the least, whether 
Mou’s philosophy of history at all operates within the speculative mode of 
retracing epochal antinomies as triggers for necessary change from one period 
of Chinese history to the next. Equally doubtful is whether Mou Zongsan’s 
and Tang Junyi’s philosophies of history entail the teleological idea of human 
51   Tang, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, Vol. 24, p. 465.
52   Tang in “The Genesis of Humanity” (published in Minzhu Pinglun, Vol. 3, No. 1; 1952); 
quoted from Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai, 
p. 144.
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history taking a general course towards a final goal or purpose, such as the ulti-
mate realization of freedom and emancipation. The “ideal humanistic world” 
to which Tang referred would not, it seems, mark a final stage of history, nor 
would the forms of individual and collective freedom realized in such a society 
be the pinnacle of freedom. After all, the perfectibility of the human being in 
“inner sagehood” is not a matter of historical subjectivity.53 It rather entails a 
transgression of the totality of historical conditions: in realizing self- perfection 
in the highest form, human beings lift themselves beyond their historical exis-
tence. Accordingly, modern Confucianism does not speculate about the final 
realization of human emancipation in history, nor does it speculate about an 
apocalyptical crisis of humanity.54
European philosophies of history contain self-reflection about their own role 
and impact within history. This was certainly attractive for Tang as it opened 
a gateway to self-reflection on the pivotal role of “modernized” Confucian 
thought in creating historical progress: by triggering the dynamics of China’s 
humanistic “main current,” modern Confucianism would raise the historical 
self-awareness of the Chinese. The impulse of modern Confucianism would 
therefore enable China (as a cultural nation) to tap into the driving forces 
of history. Here, Tang was in accordance with the mainstream of European 
philosophies of history, which are characterized by the fact that they “see and 
want” progress.55
Also similar to European philosophies of history, the modern Confucian 
speculation about history entails both a national perspective and a vision 
of world history, i.e. an anticipation of modernization on a global scale. As 
we have seen, a crucial element of this speculation is the assumption that 
the process of modernization within nation-states is not self-propelled, but 
depends on the human factor. This accentuation of human agency and the 
need to attain historical subjectivity was to take the edge off a rapid social 
transformation that might otherwise be experienced as largely uncontrollable 
and  contingent. What is more, modern Confucianism provided the individual 
53   With respect to European philosophies of history, Marquard deems the notion of the 
human being’s perfectibility within history to be a tenet of the historical-philosophical 
conception of history as the progressive development of human emancipation; see 
Marquard, Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie, pp. 67–68.
54   Significantly, Tang took little, if any, interest in the eschatological implications of 
European philosophies of history; nor did he reflect on the thesis that philosophies 
of history evolved out of a secularization of earlier theological speculations about history.
55   On European philosophies of history, see Marquard, Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichts­
philosophie, pp. 14, 67–68.
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members of society with an unchanging “anthropological” point of reference 
that served their need to stabilize self-images and life patterns amidst the det-
rimental effects of accelerated modernization. Yet there were, as we have seen, 
lingering contradictions between such insistence on historical subjectivity and 
the anthropological perspective.
In Tang’s speculation, the epoch of modernity acquired a civil-theological 
foundation that in effect supported comprehensive and continuous modern-
ization. One might thus speak here of a “modernizing conservativism.” Such 
conservativism implicitly curtails criticism of modernization. This may seem 
odd given the abundance of critical remarks about “Western modernity” in 
Tang’s writings. However, there is all the same a strong tendency in Tang’s 
work to disregard any critique of modernization that is directed at fundamen-
tal structures which elude the immediate reach of interventions by human 
actors. This raises, in turn, the question of whether his modernizing conser-
vativism provides individuals with a soothing, yet dubious consolation of self- 
fulfillment, while they actually remain caught up in the “iron cage” made 
of modern capitalism and the bureaucratic state. This consolation, in other 
words, would seem illusory because the basic social, political and economic 
realities that cause the predicament remain unchallenged due to the decep-
tive immobilization of spiritually consoled individuals. If this were the case, 
modern Confucianism might as well function as “opium of the people.” Yet 
one should recall that modern Confucianism neither entails the promise of 
an afterlife nor accepts an escapist way of life that might thoroughly placate 
the individual’s distress under conditions of modernization. On the contrary, 
Tang’s civil theology depicts individuals as being in constant need of address-
ing the modern world. Tang once even described liang zhi as the human being’s 
“last source” of the “historical age.”56 With its focus on the historical implica-
tions of liang zhi, it would seem that Tang’s Confucianism may accommodate 
a critique of modernity that takes the increasing disempowerment of human 
agency into account. 
56   See Tang’s text from 1972: “Wang Yangming zhi liang zhi xue zhi shidai yiyi 王陽明之良
知學之時代意義” quoted from Huang, Xueshu yu jingshi—Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi 
zhongji guanhuai, p. 56. In the same vein, Tang referred to the “moral self” as the driving 
force of human history; see Huang, ibid., p. 53.
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CHAPTER 12
In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Totalitarian Challenge
Among the proponents of a modern Confucianism who addressed the topic of 
totalitarianism, Tang Junyi’s political thought stands out. Indeed, from the early 
1950s onwards, Tang’s reflections on totalitarianism were more comprehensive 
than those of the vast majority of his fellow Confucian thinkers.1 A discussion 
of Tang’s writings on totalitarianism needs to take his own claim regarding the 
global significance of modern Confucianism at face value.2 Tang of course did 
not address totalitarianism by focusing exclusively on Chinese communism, 
but made reference to what he identified as Western European and Russian 
phenomena of totalitarian rule. What is conspicuously absent, however, is 
a reflection on a defining experience of the modern West that was brought 
about by a totalitarian regime: the Holocaust. I do not point this out as a way 
of counterbalancing the fact that Western philosophers have often paid only 
scant attention to the non-Western world in their reflections on modernity. 
Rather, I want to suggest that if we are to take the Confucian claims to global 
significance seriously, we need to consider the problem that the Confucian cri-
tiques of “Western modernity” have largely ignored the Holocaust and hence 
revolve around a black hole. A rigid exegete of Tang’s work might content him- 
or herself with stating that Tang, for whatever reason, chose to forgo a discus-
sion of the Holocaust. There are other options, however. For one, we can relate 
Tang’s thought to a reflection on the Holocaust and examine to what effect it 
might contribute to our understanding of this cataclysmic experience. In this 
1   For example, Zhang Junmai commented on international communism and Chinese com-
munism after the Second World War (see Zhang’s articles in Zhang Junmai yanlun ji. Yijiusijiu 
nian yihou, Vols. 2, 3, 4). In the 1930s he had written a book about the Soviet Union under 
Stalin, covering the period from 1928 to 1933 (The Soviet Union Under Stalin; 1933), and pub-
lished a brief comparison of the dictatorships in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy (in his The Way to Establish the State; 1938), using terms such as “fascist” or “autocracy;” 
see Zhang, Shitailin xia zhi Su’e; Zhang, Li guo zhi dao, pp. 117–137.
2   Such claims have been repeated time and again since the end of the Second World War, 
for example in the Confucian manifesto of 1958 (Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie). More 
recently, Tu Wei-ming prominently raises similar claims about the global significance of a 
renewed Confucian humanism; see e.g. Tu, “Multiple Modernities—Implications of the Rise 
of ‘Confucian’ East Asia,” pp. 60, 66–67.
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sense, the present chapter, much like the previous ones, is an attempt to think 
with Tang, instead of merely thinking about him.
At first glance, Tang Junyi seemed to be in an awkward position to examine 
the formation and various manifestations of totalitarianism, because he hardly 
took account of speculative elements that are often considered fundamental to 
totalitarian ideologies. Among these are secularized eschatologies stemming 
from philosophies of history, complete with ideas about a historical struggle of 
humanity against its enemies, and the accompanying belief in the final, this-
worldly elimination of all antinomies. It is thus not surprising that in his analy-
sis of totalitarianism he did not attempt to explore the ideological foundations 
of Western forms of totalitarianism in a comprehensive manner. Yet he appar-
ently felt that to remain silent on totalitarianism was not an option. Given the 
experience of European fascism, National Socialism, Stalinism, the communist 
takeover of the Chinese Mainland and the tensions of the Cold War period, the 
need to examine totalitarianism was compelling, even more so because Tang 
was convinced by the early 1950s that the government of the PRC was in fact a 
totalitarian regime (see below).
Apart from the harsh experience of civil wars and world wars leading up 
to the mid-20th century, other issues engendered Tang’s interest in totalitari-
anism. Most of all, his optimistic outlook on human history in general and 
on the global course of modernity in particular was at stake. If an analysis 
of totalitarianism would show that totalitarian societies were as likely to be 
the outcome of modernization as democratic societies, then this optimism 
would have been shattered. What is more, the renewal of “humanism” that 
was at the core of modern Confucianism had to measure up to the cata-
strophic experience of totalitarianism if it was to avoid the criticism of being 
a mere reverie of an idyllic world or, worse still, a naïve escapism that curtails 
critical thought. The following shows that, Tang addressed these challenges 
in his reflections on totalitarianism, but he did so in a highly selective man-
ner when it came to include the history of non-Chinese totalitarianism. Far 
from leaping into such reverie, Tang assumed that totalitarianism was nei-
ther non-modern nor anti-modern, nor a mere aberration that occurred as a 
singular event in the course of Western-induced modernity.
 On the Origins and Causes of Totalitarianism
Tang probably first dealt with the problem of totalitarianism in 1951, when 
he wrote an article for the Democratic Review about repressive and violent 
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measures taken by the communist regime on the Mainland.3 His choice to 
publish this text in the Democratic Review set a precedent for the following 
decades, when he continued to publish articles on totalitarianism in journals 
that appealed to a broad readership. Whereas the historical contexts of Tang’s 
interest in analyzing totalitarian rule can be readily discerned, we can only 
speculate about the theoretical inputs he had absorbed. It is not unlikely that 
he was aware, in the early 1950s, of American discussions about totalitarianism 
that had begun in the mid-1930s. On the whole, Tang’s analyses are to some 
degree in line with conservative critics from the American Review of Politics: 
these critics had assumed that a totalitarian reaction was triggered by a fatal 
crisis of Western civilization, complete with an equally disastrous crisis of cap-
italism, which entailed unrestrained materialism, rampant individualism and 
a widespread spiritual void in modern Western societies. Consequently, some 
of these conservative thinkers identified an ethical renewal of society as the 
essential antidote to totalitarianism.4
Tang neither devised a theory of totalitarianism nor presented a compre-
hensive analysis of totalitarian ideologies or totalitarian regimes. This is, how-
ever, not surprising given the state of international studies on totalitarianism 
on which one commentator recently concluded: “ ‘Totalitarianism’ remains as 
ambiguous today as ever: as a historical concept it is insecure and contested, 
as memory it is geographically promiscuous and unstable, and nebulous; only as 
a semantic marker of new political constellations, identities, and ideological alli-
3   The article is entitled “Is a Human Being a Human Being after All?” and was published 
in Minzhu Pinglun, Vol. 2, No. 24 (June 1951); see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie 
bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 131–137.
4   On the early American debate about totalitarianism, see Knöbl, Spielräume der 
Modernisierung, pp. 116–120. The Review of Politics was founded in a Catholic milieu. John 
Nef, an economic historian from Chicago University, warned about the detrimental effects 
of unrestrained materialism and the crisis of capitalism in Western societies including the 
United States in 1940: Knöbl, ibid., p. 119. American public and academic debates about 
totalitarianism date back to the 1930s and over time comprised a broad intellectual and 
political spectrum, at one time bringing together socialists, liberals and conservatives in the 
“Committee for Cultural Freedom” founded by philosophers Sidney Hook and John Dewey 
in 1939. The scope of “totalitarianism” was contested throughout and discussions responded 
to shifts in international politics, from the Hitler-Stalin Pact to the U.S. cooperation with 
the Soviet Union in the war against Nazi Germany and to the subsequent rift in the Cold 
War period, which led to a revival of studies on totalitarianism in the 1950s; see Rabinbach, 
“Moments of Totalitarianism,” pp. 89–93; Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism: 
Chapters in the Intellectual History of Radicalism, pp. 12–14.
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ances is it, as ever, indisputable.”5 As for Tang’s writings on totalitarianism, we 
find no comparative analysis of the inner workings of totalitarian regimes of 
the 20th century, even though he conceptualized totalitarianism to include 
Italian Fascism, National Socialism, Stalinism, and Chinese communism. Nor 
did he analyze ideological components of totalitarianism such as fascism, rac-
ist ideologies or anti-Semitism. Overall, he applied the label of totalitarianism 
in a very loose, sometimes polemical manner.
With regards to the system of Chinese communism, Tang did not examine 
it in a comprehensive manner, but rather presented detailed observations 
about its workings and inscribed these into a larger theoretical framework of 
totalitarianism[s]. From the 1950s to the 1970s he used the terms “totalitari-
anism” ( jiquanzhuyi 極權主義), “totalitarian world” ( jiquan shijie 極權世界), 
“totalitarian system” ( jiquan zhidu 極權制度), “totalitarian society” ( jiquan de 
shehui 極權的社會) and “totalitarian politics” ( jiquan de zhengzhi 極權的政治) 
to refer to Chinese “totalitarianism from Qin Shihuang up to the contemporary 
Qin Shihuang-ism of Mao Zedong,”6 to the European “Fascists” Mussolini and 
Hitler and to the Russian “communists” Lenin and Stalin.7 Whether Tang’s use 
of “totalitarianism” includes GMD rule, which he believed was “fascist” during 
the period from the dissolution of the first united front in the mid-1920s until 
the end of the Second World War, is not entirely clear.8 Be that as it may, Tang 
gives the concept of totalitarianism a very broad extension here, which com-
prises even the dynastic rule of the Qin as well as czarist Russia.9
It is deplorable that Tang did not substantiate this extensive use of “totali-
tarianism.” Whether he actually believed that there were intellectual or insti-
tutional roots of totalitarianism reaching back to the Qin Dynasty and whether 
he, therefore, agreed with Xu Fuguan’s diagnosis of Chinese  despotism, remains 
5   Rabinbach, “Moments of Totalitarianism,” p. 100. In the same vein, A. James Gregor states 
in a recent study that “[w]hat ‘totalitarianism’ is not is a ‘theory’. (. . .) It is not clear that all 
members of the class share all its defining traits—nor is it clear how many of those defining 
traits, or in what measure, are required for entry into the class.” Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, 
and Totalitarianism: Chapters in the Intellectual History of Radicalism. p. 17.
6   See a 1974 article by Tang in Mingbao: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 428. 
The reference to Mao Zedong pertains to Chinese communism of the early 1950s; see Tang, 
Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 136.
7   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 331.
8   For Tang’s diagnosis of fascist tendencies in the GMD; see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin 
shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 157–158.
9   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 318–319.
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doubtful.10 What is more, Xu Fuguan polemicized in the early 1950s against 
Tang and Mou Zongsan by claiming that their project of modern Confucianism 
was not immune to an absorption by totalitarian ideas.11 In countering Xu’s 
criticism, Tang presented a conceptual argument as well as a historical inter-
pretation. On the conceptual level, as we have seen, he proposed a definition of 
politics that placed the emphasis on the need to confine politics to an institu-
tional realm without imposing it on other spheres within society. Politics had 
to be functionally limited to the task of indirectly supporting the realization of 
social and cultural values by safeguarding the organizational and institutional 
framework. Aside from these systematic considerations, Tang reacted to Xu 
Fuguan’s criticism with an attempt to discern intellectual currents in Chinese 
history that are characterized, to some degree, by an affinity to totalitarianism. 
This approach is typical of Tang’s profound skepticism towards the political 
traditions of Confucianism, which in fact exceeds Xu Fuguan’s critique of the 
Confucian tradition. As Tang saw it, the Confucians of the past had tried to 
endow their doctrines with immediate ruling power by propagating the idea 
that the “ruler” ( jun 君) and the (highest) “teacher” (shi 師) should be one and 
the same person.12
Tang detected similar tendencies of infusing politics with totalizing, doctri-
nal claims to truth in strands of Buddhism, Daoism and “original” Christianity,13 
but he primarily targeted the New Culture Movement of the 20th century, 
insinuating strong affinities to totalitarian thought. These affinities are said to 
become manifest in the conviction of New Culture advocators that the total-
ity of extant drawbacks in Chinese society can be removed by implementing 
a new, anti-traditional and anti-metaphysical culture in a surgical manner. 
Accordingly, the totalizing notion of a “new culture” promised to eliminate 
all the remnants of Confucianism, including the familial virtue of filial piety, 
and to replace the social significance of religions altogether with “science and 
democracy.” In his criticism of such a belief in the salutary conflation of  politics 
10   As Liu Honghe points out, Xu Fuguan assumed in his study of centralized, bureau-
cratic rule in imperial China that a “totalitarian” type of despotism evolved in the Qin 
and Han Dynasties and persisted, in various forms, throughout imperial China; see. Liu, 
Confucianism in the Eyes of a Confucian Liberal. Hsu Fu-kuan’s Critical Examination of the 
Confucian Political Tradition, pp. 111–112.
11   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 226–227.
12   Ibid., p. 235.
13   Ibid. According to Tang, in these currents the evil in politics was considered to be identi-
cal with the evil in man. The ensuing attempts to eradicate all evil intentions in man were 
in effect attempts to transcend politics and its evils once and for all. As a consequence for 
practical life, politics would thus be depleted of its contents.
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and true doctrines, Tang arrived at the drastic conclusion that the New Culture 
Movement on the whole played a crucial role in facilitating the spread of com-
munism in China.14
Given Tang’s very broad conceptual extension of “totalitarianism,” it is not 
surprising that he did not present a clear-cut definition of totalitarianism, but 
instead contented himself with elucidating certain characteristics and mecha-
nisms of totalitarian rule and ideologies. Tellingly, the focus is here on com-
munist rule in China, and not on Soviet Stalinism or National Socialism. In 
1951, on the occasion of writing about trials and killings in communist China 
that involved incidents of children exposing crimes allegedly committed by 
their parents, Tang deemed these incidents to be “unbearable.” He added that 
Chinese communists’ “massacres” and repressive propaganda could not be 
fully comprehended by solely analyzing some specific political or other rea-
sons for such actions.15 The communist concept of politics according to which 
“politics” was to rule and control every aspect of human life, and which allowed 
only for a single  distinction—the one between a “we”-group and an enemy 
who must be eliminated—had to be taken into account. The involvement of 
children’s accusations in the execution of their parents was, it seemed, to serve 
the purpose of eliminating the very root of “humaneness” in human beings, 
namely by eradicating the sphere of intimate feeling for one’s parents as the 
initial expression of  humaneness.16 The totalitarian politics of Chinese com-
munism aimed, therefore, not only at dehumanizing the enemy; it also served 
to create a “we”-group whose members are similarly incriminated and entan-
gled in dehumanizing acts of breaking taboos that amount to a fundamental 
denial of humaneness. Tang hence called Chinese communism an ideology 
of “negating everything” ( fouding yiqie 否定一切), which thereby attained the 
intensity of a “new religion.” By reifying the human being to the point of dehu-
manization, the ideology of Chinese communism was truly “satanic.”17
There are two conclusions that we might draw here: First, the communist 
campaign to systematically dissolve familial ties was an attempt to destroy 
those social and ethical relations that play an important role in the forma-
tion of an individual’s personal identity. Second, there are mechanisms of 
totalitarian rule that function to categorize the victims under anonymous, 
de-individualized labels, thereby facilitating a decrease of solidarity and a 
14   Ibid., p. 237.
15   Ibid., pp. 131–132, 134.
16   Ibid., pp. 132–133.
17   Ibid., p. 136. Arguably, Tang came close to a concept of “political religion” in his analysis of 
totalitarian ideologies.
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growing indifference on the part of bystanders. With respect to incriminating 
the “we”-group into the acts of the perpetrators, the term “satanic” is relevant 
because it links Tang’s analysis to his reflection on the human lust for power 
and inclination toward cruelty (see Chap. 7 “The Political and its Demonic 
Aspects”). It is implied here that the totalitarian mechanisms of Chinese com-
munism radically dissolve ethical relations and social contexts of humanistic 
culture, and hence serve to expose the individuals to their own self-consuming 
lust for power.18 Incriminated, exposed and de-individualized human beings 
would now be ready to participate in the violent tearing down of the old order. 
Tang alluded to this aspect of totalitarian ideology in his sharp rejection of 
revolutionary morality:
The communists’ acclamation of revolutionary morality as the highest 
morality of man is one type of pan-moralism which is morality perverted 
for a political purpose. The ideology of such a pan-moralism can strip 
a man of all his cultural garments and sacrifice him naked on the altar 
of political revolution. Such an attitude, be it admitted, is not without 
moral sentiment originating from within. But, nonetheless, when the 
naked moral being of a revolutionary hero is worshipped above all men, 
the preservation of traditional human culture would be considered as of 
no essential importance, and barbarism among other things will come 
out from this very pan-moralism.19
However, totalitarian rule in communist China was ridden with inner contra-
dictions, even regarding the treatment of familial ties. Tang recognized that 
the communist regime did not intend to dissolve these ties altogether, but 
rather tried to make use of them in order to secure and exert power within the 
ruling circles. Two particularly striking cases were the ascendance to power 
of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the Red Guards’ intimate attachment to Mao 
that  culminated in their fervent admiration of the “Great Helmsman.” This 
18   Tang explicitly stated that in the world of Marxism-Leninism, human beings are deprived 
of opportunities to rely on a moral or cultural way of life in order to rein in their lust for 
power. He added that for the Communist Party, the existence of political power is identi-
cal with the existence of human life; see an unpublished manuscript from 1972 entitled 
“On the Contradiction between Chinese Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, and on 
the Road of China,” reprinted in Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, 
p. 422. See also Tang’s diagnosis of the totalitarian politicization, and hence destruction, 
of the humanistic realm in the PRC: Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongian, pp. 65, 388.
19   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 368.
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was, according to Tang, clearly reminiscent of familial ties and was probably 
even inspired by Mao’s earlier readings of late imperial novels such as The 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin.20 The obvious conclusion 
is that communist rule in China had to rely on such traditional measures to 
secure power because it was permanently faced with severe ideological contra-
dictions. Among these, the ideological tensions between universal aspirations 
to world revolution and particular claims of Chinese nationalism that took 
shape in the rift between a pro-Soviet and an anti-Soviet camp within the CCP 
stand out. It is regrettable that Tang did not attempt to inscribe such detailed 
observations of the inner workings and mechanisms of totalitarian rule on the 
Chinese Mainland into a systematic examination of Chinese totalitarianism. 
Instead, he tried to detect particular signs of contradictions within commu-
nism in China, never attempting to systematize his observations in the manner 
of Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (1942/1944), which contains an analysis of the 
inner antagonisms, rampant contradictions and chaotic aspects of National 
Socialism. Neither did Tang try to relate his observations about the Chinese 
communist state to an extensive examination of totalitarianism on the scale 
of Friedrich and Brzezinski’s classical Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 
(1956), which he most likely had not studied.
Even though Tang did not present a comprehensive analysis of totalitari-
anism, he did try to uncover the sources of totalitarianism. His approach— 
loosely similar to Hannah Arendt’s in The Origins of Totalitarianism from 
1951—highlights factors that were conducive to the emergence of totalitarian 
rule without claiming to identify all the compelling causes that lead to totali-
tarianism. Such an approach involves vastly different elements and layers. With 
respect to the question of why individuals show inclinations towards totalitari-
anism, Tang turned to habitual attitudes. He identified a specific “attitude of 
thinking” that is best described as a “passive state” in which individuals “habit-
ually conform to opinions that they themselves have naturally formed.” Due 
to a lack of intellectual alertness and reflection, individuals are particularly 
prone to fall victim to political, religious and social propaganda that aims to 
make them readily conform to a “totalitarian system.” In a pessimistic diagno-
sis, Tang ascertained that these attitudes are very difficult to alter.21 One effect 
of such habitual passiveness can even be seen, he believed, in the United States 
where many people strove solely for their own personal gain while trying to 
minimize their losses vis-à-vis their government. Similarly, many overseas 
20   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 427–429 (unpublished 
manuscript).
21   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 572–573.
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emigrants from China became increasingly unwilling to actively resist totali-
tarianism the longer they lived in the “free world” (ziyou shijie 自由世界).22
On a different level of analysis, Tang diagnosed the decline of the indi-
vidual in modernity and related this development to the rise of totalitarian-
ism. He depicted modern societies as characterized by the excessive spread 
of instrumental rationality throughout the political, social, cultural and eco-
nomic sphere. As a consequence, the individuals understand, evaluate and 
organize their own lifeworld, including their mutual relations and their self-
conceptions, solely in consideration of efficiency and utility, thereby reifying 
the human being itself. The objectified human being is thus put at the dis-
position of the alleged overall progress of society. The quintessence of Tang’s 
diagnosis of modernity is evident from his conclusion that there is a potential 
convergence between totalitarian and liberal societies in the common degen-
eration of the individual: Both totalitarian societies and societies of “laissez-
faire individualism” are made up of individuals who are closely enmeshed in 
an unrestrained quest for wealth, power, and prestige which eventually leads 
to the individual’s loss of a “feeling of authentic existence” (zhenshi cunzai gan 
真實存在感).23 The decline of the “authentic self” pertains to the individual’s 
loss of self-awareness as a being that is capable of lifting itself up to the realm of 
sagehood—and to achieve this not at the cost of others but on the basis of rec-
ognizing each other’s political and social freedom as a precondition for one’s 
quest for self-cultivation. This decline in turn gives rise to the formation of an 
isolated and alienated self in the spheres of politics, society, and “academic 
culture.” This self is utilizing human beings as means to maximize its gains in 
terms of wealth, power and prestige, thereby exterminating those forms of rec-
ognition that do not accord with instrumental rationality. Such objectification 
affects not only the others but also encapsulates the self. It eventually turns 
into an atomistic self that is particularly prone, according to Tang, to the lures 
of totalitarianism.24
22   See Tang’s 1958 article in Zuguo Zhoukan, Vol. 28, No. 3–5; reprinted in Tang, Zhonghua 
renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, here: p. 110.
23   Ibid., pp. 424–425. Tang stated, in the manner of Western mainstream criticisms of reify-
ing effects of modernity: “. . . modern man, who sees and does nothing other than what 
his profession demands of him, leads a way of life more or less like a bee or an ant, thus 
degrading the human spirit”; see Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the 
Modernization of Asia,” p. 370.
24   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 424–427, 428. Tang was here referring, 
among others, to Jaspers, Buber, and Sartre as philosophers who warned that the basic 
problem of human existence in the 20th century, in capitalist as well as socialist  societies, 
was not so much one of material life as one of a deepening isolation and solitude on 
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In this context, Tang turned to the global ascension of a Janus-faced scien-
tific civilization that is crucial to “free and democratic societies” but may also 
function as a trajectory for the reification of modern man:
If man is regarded merely as an object in the external world, then like 
other external objects he has no reason not to be used, controlled and 
manufactured. The totalitarian states do in fact use scientific knowledge 
and techniques to remold men for political purposes, degrading their 
dignity and condemning their soul. Here we can again see the need for 
Confucian teachings, which respect scientific study on the one hand, and 
hold sacred the transcendental subjectivity of man on the other.25
Without critical reflection on the mixed blessing of the modern advancement 
of science and technology, a failure of the project of modernity is looming. The 
reconstruction of Confucianism was thus to serve as a bulwark against such 
danger. This entailed repeated warnings against the totalizing reification of the 
human being in modern societies, including totalitarian societies which also 
make comprehensive use of modern science and technology. Here Tang drew 
a parallel between the repressive regimes of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet 
Union:
For example, Hitler and Stalin and other dictators all made use of scien-
tific and technological methods to build a human society. But what kind 
of society did they actually build? They applied scientific and techno-
logical methods to control and enchain the freedom of humanity, form 
autocratic and dictatorial politics, and destroy democratic institutions. 
[This] was evidently even more effective than not using scientific and 
technological methods.26
Another layer of origins of Chinese totalitarianism pertains to the peculiar 
historical conditions under which communism took hold in China. In Tang’s 
view, “Marxism-Leninism” became accepted in China in the context of wide-
spread anxieties among the Chinese about the survival of their nation amid 
imperialistic threats foreign nation-states posed since the mid-19th century. 
the part of the individual, which runs counter to an “authentic” mode of life; see Tang, 
Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 435 (unpublished manuscript).
25   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 367.
26   See Tang’s 1959 article “World Humanism and Chinese Humanism,” reprinted in: Tang, 
Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, p. 49.
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Communism was thus seen as a powerful weapon to resist imperialistic intru-
sions and also as a tool to strengthen the Chinese nation.27 This perception 
certainly fit the popular view that the whole Chinese nation had become a 
“proletarian class” at the hands of “capitalist states of the West.” Besides, the 
fact that Marxism-Leninism was “anti-Western Western thought” decisively 
enhanced, it seems, its attractiveness in the Chinese world.28 Whether Tang 
himself agreed with this view is open to discussion. He did not, after all, clar-
ify the meaning of capitalism nor its relation to imperialism and colonialism. 
His analysis of Western imperialism suggested, however, that socioeconomic 
groups and organizations within Western nation-states were the driving agents 
propelling imperialistic politics (see Chap. 7 “The World Order of ‘Ecumenical 
States’ ”). Hence the submission of the nation-state to forces from the socio-
economic sphere was a crucial prerequisite for imperialistic action, which 
in turn effectuated a totalitarian backlash in the victimized countries. Tang 
consequently insisted on the need to establish strong nation-states in order 
to contain totalitarianism. Only within the institutional setting of democratic 
nation-states would the societal sphere with its capitalist dynamic be reined in, 
and a totalitarian backlash therefore prevented. The nation-state in its political 
form of liberal democracy was thus identified as a bulwark against totalitarian-
ism, and its absence in China had particularly disastrous consequences.
Perhaps it is due to this diagnosis that Tang never considered the quest 
for a strong nation-state as a potential origin of Chinese totalitarianism. He 
instead bolstered his analysis by drawing his readers’ attention to the fact that 
Mussolini, Hitler, Lenin and Stalin all proclaimed their determination to resist 
“inequality and crimes in the capitalist societies of the modern West” when 
they successfully mobilized the masses.29 This analysis is highly problem-
atic, not only because the generalizing equation of Italian Fascism, National 
Socialism, Leninism and Stalinism is misleading from a historical point of 
view. Equally disturbing is the implicit vindication of totalitarianism as a form 
of self-defensive reaction against severe capitalist or imperialistic threats to 
one’s nation.
27   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 445 (unpublished manuscript).
28   See an interview with Tang from 1974 in Mingbao, reprinted in: Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu 
dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 318–319.
29   See an interview with Tang from 1974 in Mingbao (Hong Kong), reprinted in Tang, ibid., 
p. 331.
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 Overcoming Totalitarianism?
The strengthening of (democratic) nation-states vis-à-vis transnational socio-
economic aspirations of imperialistic expansion is not the only means of 
curbing the danger of totalitarianism that Tang discussed. He also deemed it 
imperative, as we have seen, to initiate a renewal of humanistic thought and 
values (e.g. as a renewal of a “classical spirit”) within a liberal democracy. He 
related this agenda explicitly to the struggle of the “free world” against the 
“totalitarian world,” which he saw unfolding in the 1950s as a struggle that 
should involve the reconstruction of a “democratic spirit.”30 The notion “dem-
ocratic spirit” refers to the conviction that the stability of democratic govern-
ment requires the social diffusion of a humanistic culture. Tang thus warned, 
in an interview from 1974, that because democracy was abused by totalitarian-
ism in the 20th century, establishing a kind of “education and culture” that 
generates common knowledge about “true democratic political institutions” 
was now necessary.31 When seen from this perspective, the modern Confucian 
project to interweave the renewal of China’s humanistic “main current” with 
the adoption of a democratic political form is also an attempt to fend off 
totalitarianism.
Tang’s modern Confucianism entails, if not a detailed prediction about the 
future of Chinese totalitarianism, then at least the general prediction that 
totalitarianism is bound to eventually collapse in China primarily because 
of its antagonistic stance toward the “main current” of China’s “national cul-
ture.” In the manifesto of 1958, Tang and his co-authors expected that Chinese 
Marxism-Leninism would falter due to the self-destructive power struggles 
within its ruling elite, but most of all because of its erroneous concepts of 
human nature and culture that are fixed to the “standpoint of class.” These 
concepts were said to run counter to globally shared principles of “higher cul-
ture” and also to China’s “cultural thought” of several millennia, which refers 
to the “[human] mind” and “human nature” in order to establish the “moral 
subject.”32 Tang, who frequently repeated this expectation from the 1950s to 
the 1970s, here once again deployed—implicitly—the tautological depiction 
of the relation between the Chinese nation and its “main current” (see Chap. 4 
30   Ibid., p. 104.
31   Ibid., p. 331. He had already claimed in 1951 that the problem of “Chinese communism” 
was in fact neither a problem that was primarily related to certain political parties nor 
to certain political systems, but rather a problem of “culture” and “mind and [human] 
nature”; see Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, p. 136.
32   Zhang, Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, p. 44.
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“Nation and Culture”). The tautology of the prognosis asserts, in essence, that 
totalitarianism is not entrenched in the cultural “main current” of the Chinese 
nation, whereas the democratic nation-state is indeed its authentic political 
form. Accordingly, there is no historical “necessity” for the victory of totalitari-
anism (i.e. “Marxism-Leninism”) in China. Establishing a democratic nation-
state, on the other hand, will eventually occur as “evidenced” by the fact that 
it is in accordance with the “main current” that shapes the course of Chinese 
history.33
However, as we have seen, Tang did not conceptualize this historical devel-
opment as a result of linear, planned human action. The individuals are 
unburdened, in Tang’s theory of state, from the need to unreservedly identify 
themselves with factual efforts of nation-state building. Similar to the so-
called Hegelian Left, Tang’s political hermeneutics distinguish clearly between 
the truth claims of the state in historical reality and the truth of the concept 
or the idea of the state: the “idea of the state” (guojia zhi linian 國家之理念) 
is a “purely spiritual idea” (chuncui jingshen de linian 純粹精神的理念).34 The 
historical reality of the state, in other words, is not to be considered an imme-
diate manifestation of reason.35 In a somber mood, Tang drew the distinction, 
in 1955, between the “Republic of China” as the label for a pending effort of 
state building on the one hand, and as the denominator for the contemporary, 
unsatisfying reality represented by the current state of the Chinese Republic 
on the other:
Although today’s national government has retreated to Taiwan, the ques-
tion about its achievements in carrying out democratic, constitutional 
politics is another matter altogether. But nothing will ultimately be able 
33   Tang, Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 318–319; see also Tang, Zhonghua 
renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian, Vol. 10, pp. 445–446 (unpublished manuscript); Zhang, 
Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie, pp. 44–45. In the same vein, Tang made retrospective prog-
nostications in the form of historical diagnoses. Among these, we find his highly ques-
tionable dictum that contemporary Russia, due to its “totalitarian” tradition of czarism, 
was far more likely to witness a prolonged totalitarian era than China, whose “totalitarian” 
past had merely lasted for the very short period of the Qin Dynasty; see Tang, Zhonghua 
renwen yu dangjin shijie, Vol. 8, pp. 318–319.
34   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 392–393.
35   The so-called Hegelian Right in Germany is often said to have considered the factual 
state as the rational state, whereas the Hegelian Left attempted to conceptualize a future 
human community in which alienation and the institutions of the state would have 
ceased to exist; see Vollrath, Grundlegung einer philosophischen Theorie des Politischen, 
p. 128.
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to obstruct the Chinese nation from proceeding along this path, in order 
for the Republic of China to make a name for itself and conform, in actu-
ality, to [the concept of the] Republic of China. [. . .] The outer impedi-
ments consist, of course, in the Communist Party, which completely 
disagrees with the spirit of the Chinese Republic striving for the con-
struction of a ‘Chinese, national, democratic state’, and [instead] solely 
believes in Marxism-Leninism, one-sidedly [establishing] an autocracy 
of one party and one class.36
Furthermore, Tang did not assume that the concept of the state wields such 
power over reality as to enforce its own implementation by prefiguring and 
anticipating actual political and social movements.37 In accordance with 
this conceptual delimitation of the theory of the state, Tang repudiated Kang 
Youwei’s vision of a limitless world of “great uniformity” in which all extant 
legal, political, social and cultural “boundaries” ( jie 界) and institutions would 
eventually dissolve:
If we again imagine that in an ideal world everybody would generally have 
only one [way of] thinking, one [single] will, one [way of] feeling, and 
would lead the same cultural life, again without any difference, then the 
interchange of human thought would no longer exist, and neither would 
affectionate mutual concern . . . This would amount solely to the death of 
the humanistic world . . . Our ideal world is thus not a world of identity in 
which there is no difference between human beings . . . We therefore do 
not call our ideal world a world of great uniformity, but rather a world of 
grand harmony (tai he 太和). The difference between harmony (he 和) 
and uniformity (tong 同) is something that we must urgently recognize.38
We may conclude from this critique that such visions of a great uniformity 
are totalitarian in essence, not only because they applaud a totalitarian 
36   Tang, Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan, pp. 175–176 (this article was first published in 
Zuguo Zhoukan, Vol. 12, No. 7; November 1955).
37   Koselleck called this latter type of concepts, which gained wide currency after the French 
Revolution, “collective and motivating concepts capable of reordering and mobilizing 
anew the masses.” These concepts, many of which were “isms,” aided political mobiliza-
tion and were (and still are) used not only in academic contexts, but also as political 
watchwords; see Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, p. 80.
38   Tang, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian, pp. 71–72 (this article was published in Minzhu 
Pinglun, Vol. 1, No. 2; July 1949).
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future, but also because the visionaries ascribe to their own ideas a totalizing, 
reality-consuming power. The danger, then, lies in the assumption that the 
respective “ideals” wield total power over reality. Tang tried to hold this 
totalitarian implication at bay when he pinned down “ideals” by introducing 
notions of sagehood and moral intuition as limit-concepts.
Given this astute awareness of ideological aberration of totalitarianism, it 
may seem perplexing that Tang, for all his criticism of the downsides of Western 
types of modernity and modernization, refrained from linking the critique 
of modernity/modernization more closely with a diagnosis of Western types of 
totalitarianism. As for the mainstream of contemporary Confucian thought, an 
even more perplexing image emerges. It is indeed ironic that Confucian crit-
ics of “Western modernity” generally stop short of tapping into those intense 
Western debates about modernity that take up the issue of the project of 
Western Enlightenment reverting into a totalitarian collapse of civilization. By 
abstaining from these debates, the Confucian reflection on modernity evades 
disturbing questions and unsettling perspectives, above all the acknowledg-
ment of “the gnawing suspicion” that Zygmunt Bauman expressed, namely 
“that the Holocaust could be more than an aberration . . . from the otherwise 
straight path of progress . . . We suspect (even if we refuse to admit it) that the 
Holocaust could merely have uncovered another face of the same modern 
society whose other, more familiar, face we so admire.”39 Such a somber assess-
ment adds additional weight to the question of why the Holocaust—as well as 
the Soviet Gulag—plays such a marginal role in modern Confucianism’s criti-
cal reflections on modernity.
It should be noticed that although Tang Junyi mentioned National Socialism 
and Stalinism in the context of totalitarianism, he did so only in passing, and 
without attempting to explore the implications of the Holocaust and the 
Gulag. Trying to provide a comprehensive explanation for such reservations 
would be tedious, perhaps even futile. Without a doubt, one would have to 
take into account the fact that by the 1950s and early 1960s, Chinese exiles’ 
most immediate concern about totalitarianism was its Chinese manifesta-
tion, which they were quite literally facing from Hong Kong. It was therefore 
a particularly pressing topic, even more so in the general context of the Cold 
War period. To avoid an anachronistic default in intellectual history, one would 
moreover have to consider the international discussions and debates as well as 
the media coverage about the Holocaust up to the 1970s (in Tang’s case) and 
take into account the reception of these in the Chinese-speaking world. Even 
though there is a severe lack of research on this topic, it seems safe to say that 
39   Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 7.
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Adorno and Arendt, for example—two of the most prominent thinkers of the 
immediate post-war period to reflect on the Holocaust as the other side of the 
modern society’s coin—were largely unknown in Chinese circles in the 1950s 
and 1960s.
Given these qualifications and constraints, simply brushing aside the topic 
with respect to Confucian critics seems prudent. However, the whole issue has 
a sting to it because, for one, modern Confucianism emphatically insists on its 
responsibility to address an international public, and not solely the Chinese 
audience. This, if nothing else, validates the concern of examining Confucian 
reflections on the Holocaust—or rather, the lack thereof. This concern would 
arguably not need such validation in the first place. Be that as it may, instead 
of asking why modern Confucianism continues to marginalize the Holocaust, 
one might rather be inclined to think about the upshot of overcoming such 
neglect. This is, in other words, a matter of pondering the consequences for 
modern Confucianism if it were “to treat the Holocaust as a rare, yet significant 
and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society”40 and hence share 
“. . . the [disturbing] awareness that ‘if it could happen on such a massive scale 
elsewhere, then it can happen anywhere; it is all within the range of human 
possibility. . . .’ ”41
From such a perspective, serious doubts might be raised about modern 
Confucianism’s optimistic assumption that modernity-as-modernization is, on 
the whole, a process leading to the betterment of human society. This assump-
tion rests, after all, on the conviction that the dangerous excesses of modern-
ization coupled with instrumental rationality may be swiftly contained by a 
collective effort based on commonly shared humanistic concerns and values. 
In this context, modern Confucianism depicts the threat of the human being’s 
reification in societies undergoing rapid economic and technological trans-
formation as pertaining to the authenticity of the individuals’ way of life. But 
the lethal threat industrialized reification posed in death camps is met with 
silence. By neglecting this terminal point of “the hidden possibilities of modern 
society,” modern Confucianism misjudges the real danger of reification. It also 
disregards the fact that the genocide on the scale of the Holocaust involved 
highly advanced, modern bureaucratic procedures, technological achieve-
ments, industrial organization and pseudo-scientific theories.
It is, moreover, doubtful whether modern Confucianism is prepared to 
reflect on the fact that as the Holocaust moved forward, its bureaucratic 
routinization and industrial mechanisms established assiduous functional 
40   Ibid., p. 12.
41   Ibid., p. 11.
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patterns and structures on the basis of which perpetrators and sympathizers 
cast aside moral concerns. When applying a Confucian approach that essen-
tially relies on a normative juxtaposition of instrumental and moral rationality, 
the Holocaust cannot be adequately described, let alone analyzed. The same 
holds true for attempts to grasp the mind-set of the bystanders: simply describ-
ing them as morally degenerate individuals or as a mass of people who were 
cut off from ethical relations and deprived of a humanistic education would 
be incorrect. The Holocaust resulted, in other words, not just from a tempo-
rary absence or weakness of moral rationality, humanistic culture and ethics 
vis-à-vis instrumental rationality, but “. . . was born and executed in our modern 
rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and at the peak of human 
cultural achievement . . .”42 When seen from this perspective, it is questionable 
whether the Confucian vision of modernity, with its highly optimistic expecta-
tion of a modernization guided by a renewed humanistic culture, may appre-
hend “. . . the most terrifying, and still most topical, aspect of the ‘Holocaust 
experience’: that in our modern society people who are neither morally cor-
rupt nor prejudiced may also still partake with vigour and dedication in the 
destruction of targeted categories of human beings . . . This is by far the most 
important lesson of the Holocaust.”43
This “lesson” seems to thwart depictions of totalitarianism as an epi-
phenomenon of modernity that may be eliminated by a Confucian proj-
ect integrating the renewal of humanistic culture and efforts of democratic 
nation-state building. The reflection on the Holocaust sobers optimistic out-
looks on modernity. Two conclusions may be drawn here: first, the analytical 
and conceptual resources of modern Confucianism provide an inadequate 
basis for reflecting on the process of modernity as entailing the possibility of a 
Holocaust. Second, keeping the reflection about the Holocaust at bay is indeed 
a precondition for preserving the kind of historical optimism that character-
izes the vision of a superior, Confucianized project of modernization. This 
belief in the superiority of a modernization informed by Confucianism thus 
42   Ibid., p. x. With respect to instrumental rationality, Bauman cogently analyses: “This is not 
to suggest that the incidence of the Holocaust was determined by modern bureaucracy or 
the culture of instrumental rationality it epitomizes; much less still, that modern bureau-
cracy must result in Holocaust-style phenomena. I do suggest, however, that the rules 
of instrumental rationality are singularly incapable of preventing such phenomena; that 
there is nothing in those rules which disqualifies the Holocaust-style methods of ‘social 
engineering’ as improper . . .”: Bauman, ibid., pp. 17–18.
43   Ibid., p. 250.
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comes at a considerable price, and its claim to establish a renewed humanism 
of global dimensions remains dubious.
However, Hannah Arendt raises another concern about the Holocaust in 
her controversial book Eichmann in Jerusalem, Tang Junyi’s moral philosophy 
may address:
What we have demanded in these trials . . . is that human beings be capa-
ble of telling right from wrong even when all they have to guide them is 
their own judgment, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds 
with what they must regard as the unanimous opinion of all those around 
them. (. . .) These few who were still able to tell right from wrong went 
really only by their own judgments, and they did so freely; there were no 
rules to be abided by, under which the particular cases with which they 
were confronted could be subsumed. They had to decide each instance as 
it arose, because no rules existed for the unprecedented.44
Arendt reflects here on a social situation in which all conventionally autho-
rized moral wisdom, established ethical rules and religious authorities fail, 
without exception, to provide individuals with sound moral judgments. The 
problematic that arises in such a situation not only concerns the correctness 
of moral judgments as such, but also alternative sources for moral judgments 
that individuals might tap into in order to acquire (or preserve) the ability to 
tell right from wrong. This latter issue echoes in Tang’s thought. His moral phi-
losophy, as an integral element of the whole modern Confucian project, is a 
response to the deplorable state of China in the mid-20th century: according 
to Tang, China was deprived of reliable moral standards by the 1950s—on the 
Mainland under communist control, as well as in Taiwan under the authoritar-
ian regime of the GMD. Modern Confucianism was thus confronted with the 
issue of identifying reliable sources of correct moral judgment. However, Tang 
and other Confucian intellectuals did not address this issue by relating it to 
totalitarianism in as straightforward manner as Hannah Arendt did.
Still, Tang was evidently convinced that propagating Confucian moral val-
ues and virtues in societies threatened by totalitarianism—no matter how dili-
gently this was done—would not suffice to secure correct moral judgments, let 
alone prevent totalitarian takeovers. Nor would it effectively reduce the spread 
of indifference and passiveness on the part of the bystanders once the shift to 
a regime of terror had begun. As a matter of fact, Tang remained skeptical with 
44   Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking 
Press, 1964), pp. 294–295, quoted from Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 177.
CHAPTER 12288
respect to the moral impact of Confucianism in modernizing societies, even if 
those societies were not immediately endangered by totalitarianism. In 1965, 
he expressed his skepticism as follows:
. . . the modern industrialized community is highly departmentalized 
in its structure by the division of labor. Here man must particularize in 
something, has his special profession, and consequently has his special 
social position in a corner of the complicated structure. Man’s moral 
practice as demanded by the modern community is just to be loyal to his 
special profession and not feel ashamed of his special position. Here the 
Confucian idea of the whole man as a cultural and moral being seems 
inadequate to be the spiritual ground for the establishment of modern 
community and modern vocational morality.45
He consequently refrained from turning his moral thought into a search for 
allegedly superior moral values and virtues or ethical practices. His reflection 
on a Confucian concept of morality and ethics did not lend itself to practical 
concerns in such an immediate, yet insufficiently complex manner. Instead, 
his moral thought is best described as centering on the issue of the self-image 
of individuals. What is at stake here is the capacity of individuals to conceive of 
themselves as solitary moral authorities, namely as sages capable of moral 
intuition. Such a self-depiction can be considered as an intrinsic requirement 
for the individuals’ ability to make autonomous moral judgments. With its core 
concept of liang zhi, Tang’s Confucian civil theology unfolds a moral vision 
that describes the individual as having immediate access to an innate source 
of judgments about right and wrong. This entails a tendency to de-emphasize 
the role of society as the producer of morality.
But liang zhi does not belong to this moral vision exclusively: notions of 
liang zhi, after all, also proved attractive to Chiang Kai-shek and his follow-
ers, as well as to 20th-century Japanese militarists. It seems that there is an 
inevitable ambiguity to the notion of liang zhi. Given the idea of an intuitive 
enlightenment that is quintessentially aloof, in its immediacy, from any sym-
bolic prefiguration and representation, any attempt to attach such enlighten-
ment firmly to certain normative choices amounts to a precarious undertaking. 
Faced with such a dilemma, Tang inscribed his moral intuitionism into an eth-
ics that stressed the individual’s social responsibility. The Confucian individual 
was not to withdraw into the irrationality of purely spiritual inwardness, but 
rather called upon to bear the tension between the requirements of social life 
45   Tang, “The Reconstruction of Confucianism and the Modernization of Asia,” p. 368.
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and the continuous effort to realize the self-image of becoming the sole media-
tor of the “inner sage.” Still, the individual is seen as not bound by convention-
ally sanctioned moral rules in realizing his or her capacity for moral intuition. 
Tang’s modern Confucianism addresses, in other words, “the question of moral 
responsibility for resisting socialization”46—and hence a problem that belongs 
to the reflection on the Holocaust. 
46   Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 177.
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Appendix: Biographical Survey
Preliminary remark: For a brief biographical outline of Tang’s life and career, see 
e.g. Qin, Zhongguo xiandai shi cidian, p. 250. Much more detailed information on 
Tang’s biography can be obtained from Tang’s diaries from 1948 to 1978 (see Tang, Riji). 
Biographical accounts in narrative form are provided by Tang Duanzheng’s Tang Junyi 
zhuanlüe; see also Tang Duanzheng’s Chronicle of the life and work of Tang Junyi (Tang, 
Nianpu, pp. 3–243). The latter work is particularly important with regard to Tang’s 
biography. The nianpu, however, should be read with care, because it does not make 
reference to source material. What is more, parts of the nianpu obviously stem from 
an autobiographical account which Tang published in the second volume of his Life, 
Existence and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie). In this 
text, Tang recalled events that pertained to his own intellectual and spiritual devel-
opment. The inclusion of some of these passages in the nianpu has been done with-
out any indication. For penetrating comments on Tang’s intellectual biography see 
Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific, pp. 194–226 (Metzger’s account is based on: Feng, 
Tang Junyi xiansheng jinian ji, pp. 119–139). None of these biographical accounts makes 
extensive use of Tang’s manuscripts and personal correspondence.
The following biographical sketch is based, where not otherwise indicated, on the 
nianpu. Tang Junyi was born into a middle class family of school teachers in Yibin 
county 宜賓縣, Southwestern Sichuan province, on January 17, 1909. After receiving 
private tutoring at home, he entered junior middle school in Chengdu in 1919 at age 11. 
In 1925, he graduated from a middle school in Chongqing and went to Beijing and 
briefly enrolled at the recently founded Chinese-Russian University (Zhong E Daxue 
中俄大學). He passed the entrance examination for the Department of Philosophy of 
Peking University (Beijing Daxue 北京大學) shortly thereafter, remaining in Beijing for 
one year and a half. At age 18, he studied philosophy as a major and literature as a minor 
at Southeastern University (Dongnan Daxue 東南大學; renamed Central University 
[Zhongyang Daxue 中央大學] in 1927) in Nanjing, one of the top three universities 
of the time. Tang graduated from the Department of Philosophy at Southeastern 
University in 1932 at age 23. This was, it seems, the highest academic degree that he 
received. He had never left China prior to 1949, and unlike many Chinese academics 
and intellectuals of his generation, he had never studied in a Western country.
In 1933, Tang taught philosophy at Central University in Nanjing. He returned to 
Chengdu in 1937 to teach at Chinese Western University (Huaxi Daxue 華西大學) 
as well as several middle schools. By 1939 the general situation in Chengdu had become 
very tense due to the course of the war. Tang moved to China’s war capital Chongqing 
and was employed by the ministry of education as an editor by special arrangement. In 
October 1940, he returned to teaching philosophy at Central University in Chongqing. 
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Before long, he was listed by the ministry of education as being qualified for the posi-
tion of full professor in the following year and became editor of the wartime journal 
Ideal and Culture (Lixiang yu Wenhua). In 1944, he became full professor at age 36 and 
headed the department of philosophy at Central University. He received permission to 
take leave for one year to teach at Jiangnan University in 1946.
Tang’s exile began on June 8, 1949, when at the age of 41, travelling from Guangzhou, 
he arrived in Hong Kong accompanied by the famous historian Qian Mu.1 He remained 
in Hong Kong, together with his wife Xie Tingguang and his adopted daughter Tang 
Anren 唐安仁, the daughter of his younger sister, for the rest of his life. Despite ini-
tial financial difficulties, he managed rather seamlessly to continue the academic and 
intellectual work he had started on the Mainland. As early as October 10, 1949, on the 
National Public Holiday of the Republic of China, he founded the evening school Asian 
Humanities and Business Night College (Yazhou Wenshang Ye Xueyuan 亞洲文商夜 
學院) in Hong Kong, together with Qian Mu and others. The school became well-
known after it was renamed the New Asia College (Xin Ya Shuyuan) following a reor-
ganization on February 28, 1950. Fourteen years after his arrival in Hong Kong, in 1963, 
Tang was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
which had been founded the same year. He remained at this university, also serving 
as head of institute and dean, until his retirement in October 1974. During this period, 
he was able to travel abroad on several prolonged lecture tours to the U.S., Western 
Europe and Korea and Japan, the longest of these tours taking place from February to 
August 1957.2 After his retirement from Chinese University of Hong Kong, Tang headed 
the New Asia Research Center (Xin Ya Yanjiusuo 新亞研究所), which had become an 
independent research institution in 1974, until his death. Tang was diagnosed with 
lung cancer in August 1976, followed by an operation in Taiwan. In March 1977, he was 
told that he had only a few more months to live. He decided that he wanted to die in 
Taiwan and be buried there, allegedly stating that he wanted to rest in native soil. Tang 
died on February 2, 1978. A mourning ceremony was held in Hong Kong, the funeral 
took place in Taipei.
1   Tang, Riji, Vol. 27, p. 34.
2   After 1949, Tang travelled abroad fourteen times, including trips to Taiwan, Japan, Europe 
and the United States; see Li, “Tang Junyi shujian xi nian xianyi bu ding,” p. 134. Since March 
1966 Tang suffered from an eye disorder for which he received treatment in Kyoto in 1967; see: 
ibid., pp. 159–160.
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